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My dissertation, “Encyclopedic Aesthetics: Science, Salvation, and Storytelling in the 
Thirteenth Century,” deals with the idea of the encyclopedia in thirteenth-century 
vernacular narrative, and is a contribution to the history of secularization. I combine 
theoretical approaches to genre, literary reception, and political ideology with my 
philological grounding in Middle High German, Old Norse, and Italian in order to 
trace the tension between competing encyclopedic discourses (sacred and secular, 
foreign and native, Christian and pagan, Latin and vernacular) in literary narrative. I 
demonstrate how secular, vernacular authors invoke the framework of the medieval 
encyclopedia in order to legitimate the appropriation of heathen scientia for the new, 
this-worldly ethic of non-clerical audiences. I show how encyclopedism operates as a 
rhetorical strategy within three distinct political and cultural contexts: the 
parliamentary Icelandic Commonwealth, the feudal court of Thuringia, and the Italian 
city-state. The first of four main chapters investigates the merger of imported Christian 
and native pagan pedagogical traditions in the Edda, the mythographic-poetic treatise 
of the Icelandic chieftain Snorri Sturluson, as an allegorical negotiation of Icelandic 
identity under Norwegian hegemony. A second chapter on the Edda relocates the 
Norse sapiential tradition within the ideology of Snorri's mythographic ethnography. 
The third chapter reads Dante’s dialogue with sacred authority in the Paradiso as a 
rehabilitation of the “failed encyclopedism” that leads to Adam’s spiritual exile—a 
 mirror of Dante’s political exodus. A final chapter on Wolfram von Eschenbach’s 
Parzival and the technology of the book argues that Wolfram inverts the structure of 
the medieval encyclopedia—a Christian moral framework for Greco-Arabic science—
in order to recover the world of heathen learning for the lay morality of his Christian 
audience. I conclude that encyclopedism can no longer be understood as the mere 
“reception” or insertion of encyclopedic discourses in narrative texts, but should be 
seen as a new cultural meta-narrative of secular authority framing the explosive 
development of vernacular literature in a long thirteenth century. 
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Encyclopedic Aesthetics: Science, Salvation, and Storytelling in the Thirteenth 
Century 
 
This is not a study of the medieval encyclopedia but of medieval 
encyclopedism—a phenomenon not bound up solely in the leaves of its namesake. It 
examines the idea of the encyclopedia in the vernacular narrative literature of Europe 
in the Middle Ages. 
 It is a commonplace that many of the most widely received literary texts of the 
Middle Ages—Dante’s Commedia, the Roman de la Rose, Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales—are in some sense “encyclopedic.” The merely casual application of this term 
has, however, ultimately hindered our understanding of the cultural production of a 
period the French historian Jacques Le Goff recently called “l’age encyclopédiques.”1 
The thirteenth century is in fact marked by a radical new desire for ordered totalities, 
both in literature and elsewhere, be it in the form of voluminous summae, the “visual 
catechism” of the great cathedrals, or the massive compilations of the medieval 
encyclopedists themselves. Surprisingly, a broad, interdisciplinary discussion of 
medieval encyclopedism—something such evidence would seem to cry out for—has 
yet to ignite; it has been prevented by an disciplinary fire-wall that divides the study of 
“the medieval encyclopedia” from encyclopedism as a wider mode of aesthetic 
intervention in the culture and politics of medieval society. The aim of this study is to 
breach that wall. 
 My concern is with “encyclopedism” in the broader literary culture of the long 
thirteenth century, with works themselves not classifiable as encyclopedias, but which 
nevertheless articulate an encyclopedic program.2 I deal with the idea of the 
                                                
1 Jacques Le Goff, “Pourquoi Le XIIIe Siècle a-t il été plus particulièrement un siècle 
d’encyclopédisme?” In L’enciclopedismo medievale, ed. Michelangelo Picone (Ravenna: Longo 
Editore, 1994), 23-40. 
2 Paraphrasing Picone on “la rilevanza della cultura enciclopedica su opere che non sono catalogabili 
come enciclopediche, ma che sono costruite secondo una prospettiva enciclopedica” in "Il significato di 
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encyclopedia in thirteenth-century vernacular narrative; thus my project is also a 
contribution to the history of secularization. I combine theoretical approaches to genre, 
literary reception, and political ideology with my philological grounding in Middle 
High German, Old Norse, and Italian in order to trace the tension between competing 
encyclopedic discourses (sacred and secular, foreign and native, Christian and pagan, 
Latin and vernacular) in literary narrative. I demonstrate how secular, vernacular 
authors invoke the framework of the medieval encyclopedia in order to legitimate the 
appropriation of heathen scientia for the new, this-worldly ethic of non-clerical 
audiences. 
Toward this end, I examine the representation of totality in certain literary texts 
of a rough-hewn century (ca. 1209-1321), with a focus on three European vernacular 
traditions rarely gathered through a single lens. My ultimate aim is to examine the 
scope and depth of an often-invoked “encyclopedic mentality” in the literary culture at 
large, not through a philological hunt for “learned insertions”3 from the great 
encyclopedias in literary texts (a project worth carrying out for other reasons), but on 
the level of structure, theme, and ideology (shorthand: “encyclopedic aesthetics”). I 
suggest how this aesthetics both reflects and intervenes in the social and political 
horizons of the works examined, situating what I call Encyclopedic Literature as part 
of a larger movement—well known, but not known well—in which the lay ruling 
classes of Western Europe strive to appropriate the intellectual tools of the clergy for 
their own ends. On the macro-level, my argument is that narrative, as a counter-means 
for the representation of totality (as opposed to the descriptive mode of what I call the 
Canonical Encyclopedia) becomes a means with which a secular, vernacular 
authorship attempts to appropriate the auctoritas of Latinate clerical tradition (a story 
                                                                                                                                       
un convegno sull'enciclopedismo medievale” (Picone, 15-21; 20-21).  
3 Cf. Bernard Ribémont, Littérature et encyclopédies du Moyen Âge (Orléans: Paradigme, 2002). 
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that will always have to be retold on the local level). In other words, in the thirteenth 
century, authors of vernacular narrative fiction begin to strive, alongside the compilers 
of the Canonical Encyclopedias, for a new status as auctor.4 
In this light, “encyclopedism” is not primarily a matter of the influence of the 
Canonical Encyclopedia on literary culture at large, but, rather, a new cultural meta-
narrative5 framing the explosive development of a lay, vernacular, literary culture 
among emerging classes of secular intellectuals in thirteenth-century Europe.6 
(“Secular” in a medieval context always meaning “worldly” as opposed to clerical, 
never, of course, “non-religious.”) Determining the pervasiveness of this “narrative” 
will require us, borrowing the programmatic statement of Michelangelo Picone, to 
“avail ourselves of encyclopedism as a privileged key allowing us to decipher the 
literary production of the medieval period” (verremo cioé servirci dell’enciclopedismo 
come chiave privilegiata che ci consenta di decifrare la produzione letteraria 
mediavale).7 In what follows, I avail myself of this key to “decipher” the first book of 
the Edda, the mythographic-poetic treatise of the Icelandic Chieftain Snorri Sturluson, 
                                                
4 In the Apologia Auctoris of his vast Speculum maius, Vincent of Beauvais writes that it is the ordering 
of the book, not the content itself, that is properly his (“nostrum autem sola partium ordinatione”). In 
other words, his own status as author and authority derive from the ability to put things in order. Here it 
is not hard to see how the idea of narrative would exert a broad appeal to a class of would-be authorities 
working outside the bounds of canonical tradition but still attracted to its ethos. I quote the edition of 
Serge Lusignan, Préface au “Speculum Maius” de Vincent de Beauvais: réfraction et diffraction, 
Cahiers d’études médiévals 5 (Montréal-Paris: Bellarmin, 1979), 118.  
5 “Meta-narrative” often means different things in fields as diverse as film studies, political theory, 
psychoanalysis, and literary theory, and not infrequently within these disciplines themselves. Moreover, 
it is often used interchangeably with “grand” or “master-narrative,” and sometimes “master-plot”: terms 
whose exact significance can also vary widely. A useable definition of meta-narrative for my purposes 
is provided by John Stephens and Robyn McCallum, Retelling Stories, Framing Culture: Traditional 
Story and Metanarratives in Children's Literature (New York: Garland, 1998), 3, 6: “a global or 
totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience . . . the 
implicit and usually invisible ideologies, systems, and assumptions which operate globally in a society 
to order knowledge and experience.” Other medieval cultural meta-narratives along with “encyclopedic 
pedagogy” would include the process of self-perfection under the feudal contract (courtliness, chivalry), 
as well as the overarching meta-narrative of salvation history (Paradise, Fall, Redemption), which is 
recapitulated in the life of the individual believer (i.e. anagogically). 
6 As described at length by Jacques Le Goff, Les Intellectuels au Moyen Âge (Paris: Editions du seuil, 
1957). 
7 Picone, 15-21. 
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parts of Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival, and select canti of Dante’s Commedia: 
all works by lay, vernacular authors active within a hundred-year span of one another, 
all responding to the encyclopedic dominant of the period. There is nothing strictly 
necessary about this particular constellation; I could have chosen different texts. (Piers 
Plowman, Wittenwiler’s Ring, and the Roman de la Rose come to mind.) But I would 
be hard pressed to come up with a comparably “encyclopedic” set of figures. Dictated 
in part by my own philological abilities and inabilities, this selection is, moreover, 
intended to illuminate the intersection of encyclopedism with widely divergent 
cultural contexts: the lay ruling elite milieu of the last decades of the parliamentary 
Icelandic Free-State, the feudal German court of Landgraf Hermann of Thuringia, and 
early-urban Italy. My list of “Encyclopedic Literature” could be extended, but not 
indefinitely: Arthurian romance (Parzival excluded), the Sagas of Icelanders, and 
most courtly poetry follow meta-narratives of their own.  
 Of course, an exhaustive study of “Encyclopedic Literature” in the thirteenth 
century would require a book that is itself an encyclopedia. Such a book would be well 
worth writing. My present project cannot aspire to the scope of its subject, but aims to 
point the way. 
 
Medieval Encyclopedias? 
 One problem for the study of the “encyclopedia” in the Middle Ages is that 
there appears to be no such thing; the term itself is an anachronism. Latin 
encyclopedia arrives on the scene as late as 1508, followed in English in 1531 in the 
sense of “currciculum,” and in the French vernacular with “encyclopédie” in 1532,8 
almost nine-hundred years after the death of Isidore of Seville, whose Etymologiae 
arguably constitute the first medieval encyclopedia. Hence, “the medieval 
                                                
8 Le Goff (1994), 24-25. 
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encyclopedia” is born posthumously. Our modern word comes from the Greek 
enkuklios paideia or, literally, “circle of learning,” which has a sense closer to modern 
English “curriculum,” or “course of study,” than to its legitimate lexical offspring. The 
Greek implies neither a written work nor a systemization of the totality of knowledge, 
but, rather, a program of education propaedeutic to specialization within a specific 
discipline (e.g. architecture, music, etc.). The Greek concept is not, however, 
irrelevant to a discussion of what a scholarly opinio communis calls “the medieval 
encyclopedia”; it already indicates the “will-to-a-system” and ideas of practical 
instruction, general education, and vulgarization at play in medieval encyclopedic 
discourse. 
 What we do find in the Middle Ages is host of works with titles signaling 
programmatic claims to totality: De ordine, De doctrina, De philosophia mundi, 
Etymologiae, Origines, De rerum naturis, Imago mundi, Compendium philosophiae, 
De proprietatibus rerum, Speculum,9 etc. An embarrassment of riches—but all in 
seemingly different currencies. On account of this proliferation of titles, scholars have 
generally been of two minds regarding “the medieval encyclopedia,” approaching it 
either as a genre with its own conventions, or as a collective misnomer applied to a 
heterogeneous body of texts.10 Most recent research has adopted the former position 
and is largely predicated on the idea of an encyclopedic genre, although what exactly 
constitutes this genre remains hotly debated.11 “Medieval encyclopedia” remains a 
                                                
9 Cf. Ritamary Bradley, “Backgrounds of the Title Speculum in Mediaeval Literature,” Speculum, 29 
(1954), 100-15. Also Herbert Grabes, Speculum, Mirror und Looking-Glass: Kontinuität und 
Originalität in der Spiegelmetapher in den Buchtiteln des Mittelalters und der englischen Literature des 
13. bis 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen:  Buchreihe der Anglia, Zeitschfrift für englische Philologie, no. 16, 
1973). 
10 Christel Meier, “Grundzüge der mittelalterlichen Enzyklopädik: Zu Inhalten, Formen und Funktionen 
einer problematischen Gattung,” Literatur und Laienbildung im Spätmittelalter und in der 
Reformationszeit: Symposion Wolfenbüttel 1981, ed. Ludger Grenzmann and Karl Stackmann, 
Germanistische Symposien Berichtsbände 5 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984), 467-500. 
11 The proceedings of four international conferences on the encyclopedia and encyclopedism have been 
published since 1991. The three most recent are devoted predominately to the Middle Ages: 
L’Encyclopédisme: Actes du Colloque de Caen 12-16 janvier 1987, ed. Annie Becq (Paris: Aux 
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shorthand, albeit a highly useful one. 
 Le Goff attempts to account for the banalité fondamentale of the inexistence of 
the word “encyclopedia” in the Middle Ages—the fragmentation into a set of 
approximate words for works constituting a single genre—in part as a result of the 
multiplicité féconde of intellectual life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. More 
suggestively, he blames the lack of a single term on the mauvaise conscience of a 
medieval mind engaged in a search for what may in fact be forbidden knowledge—
and still wary of the wrath of a secretive Creator-God who punished the first human 
couple for tasting of the arbor scientiae. The failure to declare the encyclopedic 
project is viewed by Le Goff in the context of a theologically grounded apprehension 
concerning a Creator who withholds fundamental knowledge from his creatures, and 
who, perhaps, still desires to confine human knowing to the same state of disorganized 
multiplicity to which language was reduced at Babel.12 Thus the lack of a common 
encyclopedic denominator in the Middle Ages does not indicate the lack of the 
concept, but rather a form of caution on the part of this “bad conscience.” This 
multiplicity of titles can also, less speculatively, be traced to the sheer diversity of uses 
to which encyclopedic texts were put.  
 
 
Canonical Encyclopedias - Literary Encyclopedias - Encyclopedic Literature 
As one scholar has put it, “the history of the Encyclopedia—and not only of 
the medieval encyclopedia—is the history of its reorganization.”13 Therefore any 
attempt to delineate an encyclopedic genre on the basis of certain “invariables” (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                       
Amateurs de livres, 1991); L’enciclopedismo medievale (see footnote 1); Pre-modern Encyclopaedic 
Texts: Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996, ed. Peter Binkley 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997); Die Enzyklopädie im Wandel vom Hochmittelalter bis zur frühen Neuzeit, ed. 
Christel Meier (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2002). 
12 Le Goff (1994), 25-27. Curiously, Le Goff does not mention the Book of Job in this context.  
13 Christel Meier, “Vom ‘homo celestis’ zum ‘homo faber’: die Reorganisation der mittelalterlichen 
Enzyklopädie für neue Gebrauchsfunktionen bei Vinzenz von Beauvais und Brunetto Latini.” In 
Pragmatische Schriftlichkeit im Mittelalter: Erscheinungsformen und Entwicklungsstufen, ed. Hagen 
Keller, Klaus Grubmüller, and Nikolaus Staubach (Munich: Fink, 1992), 157-75. 
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indispensable genetic material by which membership in an encyclopedic family is 
adjudicated by means of a literary-historical “paternity test”) will invariably be 
devoured by the million-headed hydra of empiricism. In what follows, I use the term 
“encyclopedic” broadly to refer to texts that present some mixture of “eine kohärente 
Gesamtschau der Natur, der Geschichte, der Moral, des Lebens und des ewigen Heils” 
(a coherent overview of nature, history, morals, human life, and eternal salvation).14 
No single one of these elements must be present for a work to be considered as part of 
an encyclopedic genre. The one thing needful is a concern with the ordered totality 
(variously defined) of knowledge. Ultimately, I rely on a Wittgensteinian notion of  
“family resemblances”15 rather than a prescriptive catalogue of essential encyclopedic 
features derived from a normative precursor-text (e.g., Isidore’s Etymologiae), and try 
to shift the discussion of medieval encyclopedism away from its grounding over the 
last twenty years in the encyclopedia per se.  
 For heuristic purposes, it may be useful to distinguish between the following  
groups of texts (which I capitalize):  
 
1) Canonical Encyclopedias: Latin works represented by, but not limited to: the 
Etymologiae of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560 - 636), De rerum naturis (De universo) of 
Hrabanus Maurus (780-856), the Speculum maius of Vincent of Beauvais (ca. 1200-
1264), De Proprietatibus rerum (ca. 1235) of Bartholomaeus Anglicus, the Liber de 
natura rerum of Thomas de Cantimpré (ca 1201-1270), the Clavis Physicae and 
                                                
14 Ch. Hannick, “Enzyklopädie, Enzyklopädik,” Lexikon des Mittelalters, ed. Robert Auty, 1st ed. 
(Munich; Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, [1977]-1999), 2034. 
15 Cf. Wittgenstein’s discussion of “Familienähnlichkeiten” in §§66/67 of his Philosophische 
Untersuchungen. Using games as an example, Wittgenstein shows that resemblances between 
exemplars of a genre do not consist in characteristics common to all. This is depicted as follows:   
Game a:   A  B  C  D 
Game b:    B  C  D  E 
Game c:      C  D  E  F 
Game d:       D  E  F  G 
Game e:       E  F  G  H 
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Imago Mundi (ca. 1122-1152) of Honorius Augustodunensis. This grouping is 
motivated as much by the canonical status of these works in modern scholarship as on 
their organizational principle per se, although, with the exception of Isidore, they are 
arranged according to an objective “order of things.”  
 
2) Literary Encyclopedias: encyclopedic-didactic poems in dialogue-form in the 
tradition of Boethius’s Consolatio Philosophiae, such as the Cosmologia of Bernardus 
Silvestris, De Planctu Naturae of Alan of Lille, and the Tesoretto of Brunetto Latini. I 
consider these primarily as works of “literarisierte Wissensvermittlung,” which is 
distinct from 
 
3) Encyclopedic Literature: works of narrative fiction in the vernacular themselves not 
classifiable as encyclopedias, but which articulate an encyclopedic program, not 
limited to but including those discussed in this dissertation. Left out of this tripartite 
grouping (but not out of my study) are more speculative works like the Philosophia 
Mundi of William of Conches and works arranged according to a logical ordering of 
the arts and sciences (ordo artium), such as the Didascalion of Hugh of St. Victor. 
There is also the vast tradition of the Vernacular Encyclopedia, such as L’Image du 
Monde of Gossouin de Metz, the reworkings of Honorius’ Elucidarium in most 
European vernaculars (including the Middle High German Lucidarius and Old Norse 
Elucidarius), the Buch Sidrach, the Buch von den natürlichen Dingen16 of Konrad von 
Megenberg (his vernacular adaptation of the Liber de natura rerum of Thomas de 
Cantimpré), and the Trésor of Brunetto Latini. Finally, there is a vast tradition of Latin 
                                                
16 This being the proper title of Konrad’s book, not, as Georg Steer points out, “Buch der Natur”: the 
title given to the work by its fifteenth century editors “in bewusstem Rückgriff auf die Lateinische 
Vorlage” (p.181) and retained in the edition of Franz Pfeiffer (Stuttgart: Karl Aue, 1861). See Georg 
Steer: “Das ‘Buch von den natürlichen Dingen’ Konrads von Megenberg--Ein ‘Buch der Natur’?” in 
Die Enzyklopädie im Wandel vom Hochmittelalter bis zur frühen Neuzeit, ed. Christel Meier (Munich: 
Fink, 2002), 181-188.  
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and Vernacular encyclopedias in dialogue-form: once more, the Elucidarium (with its 
many adaptations and translations) and the Clavis Physicae of Honorius, the 
Norwegian Konungsskuggsjá, the Buch Sidrach, the Secretum Secretorum, and the 
Dragmaticon of William of Conches (a reworking of his Philosophia as a dialogue 
between a Philosopher and his royal patron).  
 This grouping is meant to highlight a shift from an encyclopedic model rooted 
in the Isidoran tradition, based on synchrony and hierarchy (chain-of-being), to a new 
emphasis in certain quarters on narrative as the, perhaps, only truly sufficient means 
for the representation of totality. Totality refers to the knowable order of things; yet, 
there is an emerging sense in this period (if its literature is any guide) that it is 
comprised not only by this knowable order of things but also by human relationships. I 
locate this “narrative turn” of medieval encyclopedism in the context of an ongoing 
process of vernacularization and secularization of the arts (trivium) and sciences 
(quadrivium), as well as in a new awareness of history.17  
 “Totality” is, of course, a slippery concept. We can, however, distinguish 
between two common modes of its representation in medieval encyclopedic tradition. 
First, there is the attempt reproduce everything there is to know (compilatio), based on 
the notion that (human) knowledge is finite and exhaustible; this is where we find the 
great volumes of Isidore’s Etymologiae,18 De rerum naturis19 of Hrabanus Maurus, the 
                                                
17 See M.-D. Chenu. Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997, esp. Ch. 5. 
18 To give a sense of the structure some of these works, I have included a table of contents: Etymologiae 
1) Grammar, 2) Rhetoric and Dialectic, 3) Mathematics, 4) Medicine, 5) Human and Divine Law, 6) 
Books and Offices of the Church, 7) God, Angels, Saints, 8) Church and Sects 9)  Languages of 
foreigners; names or affinities of kings, warriors, and citizens, 10) Words, 11) Man and Portents, 12) 
Animals, 13) The World an its Parts, 14) The Earth and its Parts, 15)  Of cities, of Edifices Urban and 
Rural, of Farms, of Boundaries and Measures of Farms, of Travel , 16) Stones and Metals, 17) Rustic 
Things, 18) War and Games, 19) Ships, Building, Weaving, 20) The Home and Domestic Implements. 
19 De rerum naturis: 1) God, 2) Biblical Patriarchs, 3) Other Old Testament figures (men and women), 
4) Figures of the New Testament. 5) Holy Scripture, 6) Man and his Parts, 7) Ages of Man, 8) Animals, 
9) The Universe, 10) Time, 11) Water, 12) Earth (Geography), 13) Topography, 14) Public Buildings, 
15) Philosophers, Poets, Sybils, Magicians, Pagans, Foreign Gods,  16) Foreign Languages, Cites, 17) 
Stones and Metals, 18) Weights, Measures, Numbers, Music, Medicine, 19) Agriculture and Botany, 
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Speculum quadraplex of Vincent of Beauvais, De Proprietatibus rerum20 of 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus, and the Liber de natura rerum of Thomas de Cantimpré 
(i.e., group 1: Canonical Encyclopedias). There is, however, another encyclopedic 
tradition whose idea of totality is oriented around the individual subject—no longer 
concerned with “everything there is to know” but with “everything you need to know” 
(compendium). The latter model is closer to the etymological meaning of enkuklios 
paideia, and in the Middle Ages it is represented, e.g., by the Lucidarius tradition 
(which originally served the needs of clerical schooling), by a monastic encyclopedia 
like the Hortus deliciarum of Herrad von Hohenburg, by the German Hausbuch 
tradition, and by the Old Norse Konungsskyggsjá (Speculum regale) which, despite its 
title, is actually addressed to members of an upwardly-mobile merchant class.  
 What is novel about what I call “Encyclopedic Literature” is the conflation of 
these objective and subjective totalities: enkuklios paedeia in its original sense of 
individual orientation and “round learning” played out within a comprehensive, 
knowable order of things. The knowable ordo becomes a locus for the unfolding of 
politico-social knowledge and history. The gap that separates the Encyclopedic 
Literature of Dante, Snorri, and Wolfram (to name again only the subjects of my 
dissertation) and the Literary Encyclopedia of the Boethian tradition (e.g., Bernardus 
Silvestris, Allain of Lille, Brunetto Latini), is the attention of Encyclopedic Literature 
to the social dimension of the encyclopedic agent as one who affects and is affected by 
human relationships. Unlike in Literary Encyclopedia, the hero is not led by 
Philosophia or Natura through the orders of being in the gran turismo of the soul; his 
relationship to the world is not (at least not primarily) that of microcosmos to 
                                                                                                                                       
20) War, 21) Buildings and Clothes, 22) “Home Economics” 
20 De Proprietatibus rerum: 1) God, 2) Angels, 3) The Reasoning Soul, 4) The Elements and Humors, 
5) Anatomy, 6) Ages of Man, 7) Sickness and Poisons, 8) The World and The Celestial Bodies, 9) 
Time, 10) Matter, Form, Elements, 11) Air, 12) Birds, 13) Waters, 14) The Earth (Geology) 15) 
Geography, 16) Stones and Metals, 17) Herbs and Plants, 18) Animals, 19) Accidentals: Colors, 
Flavors, Fluids, Smells, Eggs, Numbers, Musical Instruments.  
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macrocosmos. Encyclopedic Literature, in other words, opens the doors to the 
personal, secular, and the political, or, more generally, to questions of human 
relationships in time.21 It is at least suggestive in this context that Snorri’s Gylfi is, and 
Parzival becomes, king, and that Dante holds various political offices in Florence 
before the long exile in which he declares himself a “party of one.”  
 Scholarly discussion of medieval encyclopedism, however, has suffered from a 
bifurcation dividing the study of encyclopedias proper from encyclopedism as a wider 
mode of aesthetic intervention in the culture and politics of society. A case in point: 
Bernard Ribémont has recently provided a model for the derivation of an encyclopedic 
genre in the Middle Ages that focuses almost exclusively on the great canonical 
encyclopedias.22 Using the model “prototype-reception,” Ribémont uses the Isidoran 
tradition to measure the “encyclopedicity” of later texts. Hence his book on Literature 
and Encyclopedias in the Middle Ages23 focuses strictly on “insertions 
encyclopédiques” from a canonical “core” into narrative texts (i.e., where a work can 
be shown to quote or paraphrase material found in a given encyclopedia, bestiary, 
lapidary, etc). The Canonical Encyclopedia of Isidoran tradition is thereby made the 
epicenter of medieval encyclopedism, its other manifestations their textual 
aftershocks. While Ribémont’s “Encyclopedic Model”24 is adequate to delineate a 
canon of encyclopedias per se, it is too restrictive to account for the diverse 
                                                
21 A similar process is well documented within the tradition of Canonical Encyclopedias themselves. 
See Christel Meier, “Der Wandel der mittelalterlichen Enzyklopädie vom ‘Weltbuch’ zum Thesaurus 
sozial gebundenen Kulturwissens: am Beispiel der Artes mechanicae,” Enzyklopädien der frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. Wolfgang Harms, Hans-Henrik Krummacher, and Werner Welzig, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1995.  See also Meier, “Vom ‘homo celestis’ zum ‘homo faber’: die Reorganisation der 
mittelalterlichen Enzyklopädie für neue Gebrauchsfunktionen bei Vinzenz von Beauvais und Brunetto 
Latini,” Pragmatische Schriftlichkeit im Mittelalter: Erscheinungsformen und Entwicklungsstufen, eds 
Hagen Keller, Klaus Grubmüller, and Nikolaus Staubach, Münstersche Mittelalter-Schriften, 65 
(München: Fink, 1992), 157-75. 
22 Bernard Ribémont, “On the Definition of an Encyclopedic Genre in the Middle Ages,” Pre-Modern 
Encyclopedic Texts, ed. Peter Binkley (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 47-61. 
23 Ribémont, Littérature et encyclopédies du Moyen Âge (Orléans: Paradigme, 2002). 
24 Ribémont (1997), 53.  
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articulations of medieval encyclopedism.25 Ribémont’s model distinguishes “true” 
encyclopedias from epiphenomenal (often merely shorter) works.  
 While Ribémont’s conception of the encyclopedic “core” is clearly a product 
of his desire to establish a strict Isidoran genealogy for an “encyclopedic genre,” I 
wonder whether this notion is not prejudiced by the contemporary notion of the 
encyclopedia as a big book. In effect, he posits the Canonical Encyclopedia as a cause 
of medieval encyclopedism. If encyclopedism is approached as a broader cultural 
phenomenon not bound up exclusively with textual transmission, the strict Isidoran 
derivation becomes increasingly problematic. For example, if we consider the 
medieval cathedral as a visible summa totiae scientiae for the laity, a massive biblia 
pauperum, and, with its symbolic architecture, stained-glass windows, paintings, 
tapestries, and statuary art, as a kind of specular catechism—an enkuklios paideia in 
the etymological sense of a “course of education” directed towards a specific telos—it 
is hardly possible to insist that a restricted “core” of encyclopedic texts serve as 
measuring stick for the encyclopedicity of all other cultural artifacts.  
 An alternative model is afforded by the idea that the Canonical Encyclopedias, 
Literary Encyclopedias, and Encyclopedic Literature constitute different 
manifestations of the broader “encyclopedic turn” of the thirteenth century. Hence, 
encyclopedism in literature should not only, or primarily, be gauged by the presence of 
insertions from Canonical Encyclopedias. We should assume, rather, that the massive 
                                                
25 His dismissive treatment of encyclopédies dialoguées is a case in point. See Ribémont, La 
“Renaissance” du XIIe Siècle et l’Encyclopédisme (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2002), 130-1. 
Encyclopédies dialoguées, according to Ribémont, are part of a literature that uses dialogue to convince 
of the usefulness of possessing knowledge of the nature of things and is devoted primarily to the curious 
(p. 132). He holds that the Dialogical Encyclopedia does not display the kind of ordering (p. 132) 
constitutive of an encyclopedic genre; he further believes that the “broadening” (évasér) of the genre 
through the “question and answer” format leads to a “loss,” or disorder, of both subject proper and 
encyclopedic ordo for the sake of the satisfaction of a wanton and unstructured curiositas. And yet the 
process of vulgarization (of high-level knowledge to its mid or low-level recipient) in the Dialogical 
Encyclopedia is a perfect example of the transposition encyclopédique that, according to Ribémont, is a 
pillar of the encyclopedic genre. Thus Ribémont ignores the entire Elucidarius tradition, presumably 
because it displays a clear encyclopedic ordo despite the “broad” (évasé) dialogue form. 
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codifying projects of the thirteenth century (Vincent’s Speculum, Bartholomaeus 
Anglicus’s De probretatibus rerum, as well as the great theological summae) are 
themselves a product, rather than cause, of the expanded interest in the representation 
of ordered totalities that is also taken up by producers of literary narrative. 
 Accepting the criteria of “order” and “totality” as fundamental to the 
constitution of an “encyclopedic genre” in the Middle Ages, one might ask whether 
Encyclopedic Literature—with its incorporation of (1) a plurality of Canonical-
Encyclopedic discourses (2) disposed in space and time in a (3) narrative structure (4) 
that situates this sheer amassment of learning anthropologically for the orientation of 
the individual—is not in a sense more “encyclopedic” than the massive tomes of 
Vincent, Anglicus, et al. Encyclopedic Literature appropriates not only certain 
encyclopedic themes, but also the principle of  “ordered totality” for a secular 
audience. Unlike the Canonical Encyclopedia, it is not intended for reference by a 
community (e.g., in a monastery) that consults parts of the whole over time, but to be 
experienced continuously by a reader/listener from start to finish. The point, however, 
not that Dante’s Commedia or any other literary work is “really” an encyclopedia, or 
more encyclopedic than the encyclopedias themselves. We know from Dante’s 
reluctance in the Convivio (Trattato Primo II 12-17) that the act of speaking of oneself 
(lo parlare di se) is something traditionally permitted only for the purpose of its 
exemplary value (as in Augustine’s Confessions). With Dante (and perhaps not 
onlywith Dante), encyclopedic pedagogy legitimates the narration of subjective 
history.26 
 
 
                                                
26 This is equally true if the “person” in question is a fictional or an allegorical character. There are, of 
course, other models for such personal narration, such as the Saint’s Life. But other narratives of 
personhood lack the Saint’s Life’s theological justification. 
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Encyclopedisms: Legitimate and Illegitimate  
 It has been argued that any attempt to systematize the totality of knowledge in 
a single book needs to be legitimated against a looming theological proscription of 
curiositas.27 To avoid any suggestion of innovation, and to ground his own authority, 
the encyclopedist links the arrangement of his work to a given, objective order. 
Scholars have found it convenient to distinguish between two main organizational 
principles for the medieval encyclopedia: the ordo rerum (order of things) and the 
ordo artium (order of the arts).28 The former is ordered according to an ontological 
hierarchy, from the top to bottom or bottom to top of the order of being (the direction 
is a question of perspective—the hierarchy stays the same). The ordo rerum can also 
take the form of a chronology, sometimes using a hexameral scheme—treating the 
orders of being according to their order in the six days of Biblical creation 
(cosmogony). It can also proceed according to an eschatological scheme, including the 
course of salvation history and the end of the world as a framework for the orders of 
natural and human existence. Either way, the idea is that the book recapitulates the 
order of the objective world. The other (and later) artes model is based on the system 
of the septem artes liberales. It is anthropocentric, not cosmological, in its orientation, 
leading some to consider it a “maturation” of the encyclopedic project and precursor to 
an all-encompassing “Humanist universality.”29 The artes model organizes the totality 
of human knowledge based on the rational organization of the sciences, and can 
therefore be called Aristotelian, whereas any model that reflects the perceived order of 
the world is ultimately of Neo-Platonic derivation.  
 The legitimation of the encyclopedic project is ultimately rooted in the idea—
                                                
27 See Hans Blumenberg, “Aufnahme der Neugierde in den Lasterkatalog” and “Schwieigkeiten mit der 
Natürlichkeit der Wißbegierde im scholastischen System,” Die Legitimität der Neuzeit: Dritter Teil: 
Der Prozeß der theoretischen Neugierde (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), 358-400.  
28 Christel Meier, “Enzyklopädischer Ordo und sozialer Gebrauchsform,” Meier (2002), 511-532. 
29 Meier, ibid.  
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pervasive in the Middle Ages—of God as the author of two co-extensive texts: the 
Book of God and the Book of Nature, as well as in the idea of man as the animal 
rationale who can read the truths of the one in the pages of the other. The following 
passage from Hugh of St. Victor is representative: 
 
For this whole visible world is a book written by the finger of God, that is, 
created by divine power . . . But just as some illiterate man who sees an open 
book looks at the figures but does not recognize the letters: just so the foolish 
natural man who does not perceive the things of God outwardly in these visible 
creatures sees  the appearances but does not inwardly understand the reason. 
But he who is spiritual and can judge all things, while he considers outwardly 
the beauty of the work, inwardly conceives how marvelous is the wisdom of 
the Creator.30 
 
This idea (what Lukács calls “the perfect immanence of the transcendent”31) is 
seminal for the intellectual life of the Middle Ages, and can be traced to the world-
view expressed in Romans 1:20:  
 
Ever since the creation of the world, His invisible nature, namely, His eternal 
power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. 
  
 (Invisibila enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta 
 conspiciuntur, sempiterna Eius et virtus et divinitas.) 
 
Ultimately, the biblical legitimation of man as reader of the ordo of the world-book is 
grounded in a faith in the wisdom of a God who ordered all things in the created world 
(“ea, quae facta sunt”) in mensura et numero et pondere (“in measure, number, and 
weight”).32 “The encyclopedism of the thirteenth century was only possible after 
twelfth-century Humanism had restored confidence in ‘man’ created by God in his 
image, and established a Christian concept of  ‘nature,’ a legitimately knowable ‘order 
                                                
30 Quoted in Gabriel Josipovici, The World and the Book (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 
29. For the “language of things” in the Middle Ages, see Hennig Brinkmann, Mittelalterliche 
Hermeneutik (Tübingen: Niemeyer 1980), 25, 74ff. 
31 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, Bostock trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), 59. 
32 Wisdom 11:20: “Sed omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.” 
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of things.’”33 This nature is legible because it is “made for man” (propter hominem 
factus est).34 
  This is why the ordo of the medieval encyclopedia is not the order of its 
modern namesake. The alphabetic organization of the modern encyclopedia bears no 
structural resemblance to the world it describes. For the primary recipients of medieval 
encyclopedias, such an order of words would have meant a disorder of things. Here 
the idea of the world as book finds its counterpart in the idea of the book as world.35 
As mentioned, the order-of-things in the microcosmic book-world of the medieval 
encyclopedia often recapitulates not only the fixed order of the world after its 
becoming, but also the order in which this ordo came to be in the liber naturae written 
by the hand of God: beginning with biblical creation and proceeding through natural, 
secular, and salvation history on to an eschatological account. Thus, at a higher degree 
of integration, a medieval encyclopedia may recapitulate not only an ontological ordo 
but also its unfolding (evolutio) in time. This chronological principle constitutes a key 
point of contact between certain models of medieval encyclopedia and literary 
narrative. The imposition of a narrative frame on work that addresses the order of the 
totality of knowledge is not the imposition of a convenient but extraneous organizing 
principle, but rather a further mirroring of the “order-of-things” (ordo rerum), 
reflecting not only its ontological status but also its historical becoming.  
 
Encyclopedism as a Literary Aesthetic: Snorri, Dante, Wolfram 
  Although the magna opera of Dante, Snorri, and Wolfram encompass (or 
                                                
33   Le Goff (1994), 28 [my translation].  
34   “Hic quippe sensilis mundus propter hominem factus est” [(§261). “Totius mundus propter 
hominem et in homine”: Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, ed. Paolo Lucentini (Rome: 
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1974), 212. 
35   For the most extensive study of the of the book-microcosm metaphor, see Hans Blumenberg, Die 
Lesbarkeit der Welt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000). Also, Ernst Robert Curtius, Europäische Literatur 
und Lateinisches Mittelalter (Bern; Munich: A. Franke Verlag, 1969), 323ff.  
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create) vast expanses of their contemporary intellectual landscape, they, unlike 
encyclopedias sensu stricto, cannot be considered primarily as works of 
Wissensvermittlung. It is, in fact, not entirely unproblematic to view transmission of 
knowledge as the ultimate aim of medieval encyclopedias generally, since this 
knowledge is typically handmaid to an exegesis of the visibila of an immanent moral-
order legible in both the book of the world (liber mundi) and in holy scripture. It is 
clear that the Commedia, Snorra Edda, and Parzival integrate a variety of 
encyclopedic discourses on cosmogeny, cosmology, theology, history, geography, 
mythography, sometimes medicine, botany, zoology, ethnography, and the disciplines 
of the trivium and quadrivium (especially astronomy). Yet none of these works can be 
described as mere depositories of knowledge or the “literarization”36 of its 
transmission. The ultimate aim of Dante’s Commedia and Wolfram’s Parzival, both of 
which present a vision of the ordo mundi in the spheres of natural, human, and divine 
history, is not Wissensvermittlung but moral instruction.37 These narratives are not 
primarily concerned with the transmission of knowledge (although they perform this 
function, as well) but with questions of ethical practice (questiones morales). 
Similarly, at least after Hrabanus Maurus (9th c.), the medieval encyclopedia does not 
attempt to organize the totality of knowledge as an end in itself, but depicts the ordo 
mundi as a reflection—in aenigmate—of a divinely ordained moral order.38 This 
outlook is grounded in a faith in the “significance of the cosmos as a motive force and 
                                                
36 Cf. Wissensorganisierende und wissensvermittelnde Literatur im Mittelalter: Perspektiven ihrer 
Erforschung : Kolloquium, 5.-7. Dezember 1985, ed. Norbert Richard Wolf. (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 
1987). 
37 For the status of moral philosophy in the Commedia, see Dante, Das Schreiben an Cangrande della 
Scala, ed. and trans Thomas Ricklin and Ruedi Imbach (Hamburg: Mainer Verlag, 1993), 16-17: 
“Genus vero phylosophie sub quo hic in toto et parte proceditur, est morale negotium, sive ethica.” 
38 Earlier scholarship falsely presupposed a fundamental opposition between “zwei Arten der 
mittelalterlichen Enzyklopädie mit ganz verschiedenen Zielen, einer objektiv-wissenschaftlich die Welt 
erforschenden, die unterrichten will (meist lateinisch), und einer das Universum nur als Ensemble von 
Symbolen verstehenden, die der Erbauung dient (oft volkssprachig).” Quoted in Christel Meier, 
“Grundzüge der mittelalterlichen Enzyklopädik,” Literatur und Laienbildung im Spätmittelalter und in 
der Reformationszeit, ed. Ludger Grenzmann and Karl Stackmann (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984), 470. 
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source of meaning in human existence, centering on the ordering power of nature and 
natural philosophy as a means to stability and moral guidance.”39 This is why the 
genesis of imagines mundi is one feature of the medieval encyclopedia that also plays 
a major role in literary works whose concern is largely ethical.  
  
Dialogizing the cosmic ordo 
 In one of the most widely disseminated models of the medieval encyclopedia, 
the genesis of images of the ordo mundi takes place in a dialogical process of question 
and answer between magister and discipulus. To give some sense of the scope of this 
tradition, it should suffice to recall a few of its major representatives and off-shoots: 
the Elucidarius of Honorius Augustodunensis and its adaptations in most of the 
European vernaculars (among them, the Middle High German Lucidarius), the Buch 
Sidrach, the Secretum Secretorum, the Dragmaticon of William of Conches (a 
dialogical reworking of his earlier Philosophia Mundi), and the Tesoretto of Brunetto 
Latini. Since the works of Dante, Snorri, and Wolfram under consideration here are so 
suggestive of the question-and-answer format of medieval encyclopedia, an 
investigation of their encyclopedism will have to focus on the conception of their 
works as dialogue. Among other things, it will be necessary to take into account what 
Hans Robert Jauß calls “die Funktionsgeschichte von Frage und Antwort.”40 Any 
literary dialogue is essentially a conversation with assigned roles: student/teacher, 
Christian/pagan, man/nature, etc. Encyclopedic dialogue in the Middle Ages is almost 
always driven by pre-established conclusions, but still sometimes tries to give 
expression to the tentativeness of fides quaerens intellectum. A history of the function 
                                                
39 Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1972), 6. 
40 Hans Robert Jauß, Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1982), 377ff. 
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of dialogue would have to include dialogue as apology, as didaxis, and as dialectic 
(philosophical dialogue). The encyclopedia is fundamentally a didactic genre, and, 
with the appropriation of its question-and-answer format, literary fiction adapts the 
tools of traditional clerical education in order to develop a pedagogy of its own. 
  One criterion for making distinctions between types of dialogue is the question 
of the relative priority of question or answer. A question can be said to have priority 
when it lacks a predetermined response. Such a question is not merely a cue but 
participates in the openness of “actual” dialogue. I refer to this above as philosophical 
dialogue or “dialectic” because it suggests a process of genuine rapprochement 
between persons and ideas. This openness is, of course, still an idealized literary 
representation of the openness of dialogue between persons and lacks the spontaneous 
interplay of question and answer constitutive of the latter, since both are already 
present in the mind of the author. Still, the open-endedness of the search and the care 
taken to play out multiple possibilities and alternatives from various perspectives 
before offering conclusions can be seen as a concern of certain philosophical 
dialogues, notably Abelard’s Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum, 
which at times reproduces the tentativeness of a “search for truth.” The priority of 
answer over question is most evident in the dramatized catechism of the tradition of 
master-student dialogue (Lehrgespräch). Here the focus is on delivering a pre-
delineated body of propositional truths, the knowledge of which is deemed essential to 
salvation.  Any curiosity that fails to serve this end is frivolous, if not already a 
potential first step to perdition.41  
 From its beginnings, Christian theology has understood itself primarily as an 
answer (or rather the answer) to questions. The First Letter of Peter (3:15) calls upon 
the individual believer to be prepared to give an account of the reasons behind his faith 
                                                
41 See Blumenberg (1966), 358-400 
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(“parati semper ad defensorum omni poscenti vos rationem de ea, quae in vobis est 
spe”) and an outpouring of Christian apologetics in the second century contributed to 
the idea of Christianity as a religion capable of answering all questions.42 The 
dialogue-form employed in many theological texts contributed to this understanding: 
“Die Form des Dialoges gab . . . den christlichen Theologen Gelegenheit, die 
christliche Lehre als alle Fragen voll befriedigende Antwort vorzutragen.”43 (This is 
hardly a goal shared by all religious traditions, not all of which extol the search for 
answers or claim to offer any. To the Zen Buddhist, for example, the beginning of 
wisdom is the recognition of the folly inherent in any propositional truth or dogma. A 
famous tale illustrates the point: a monk once asked a master: “All things are reducible 
to the One; where is this One to be reduced?” The master retorted: “When I was in the 
Tsin district I had a robe made that weighed seven chin.” And “this is one of the most 
noted sayings ever uttered by a Zen master.”44 We can imagine the confusion, if not 
utter horror, of the discipulus of master-student dialogue upon hearing his question: 
“ubi est deus?” dispatched with a similar sartorial non-sequitur.)  
 The question-and-answer format, originally derived from Platonic dialogue and 
adapted for the purposes of Christian apologetics in the writings of the Greek church 
fathers,45 serves a function both in literary encyclopedias and in encyclopedic 
literature similar to its function in the early church. In both instances, we find recourse 
to the dialogue-form in order to present a world-view that is strange, unfamiliar, and 
potentially objectionable. The target audience’s potential resistance to the radical 
novum of a work is anticipated, addressed, and assuaged through dialogue’s 
                                                
42 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Frage und Antwort -- Das Normative in christlicher Überlieferung und 
Theologie,” Text und Applikation: Theologie, Jurisprudenz und Literaurwissenschaft im 
hermeneutischen Gespräch (Poetik und Hermeneutik IX), ed. Manfred Fuhrmann, Hans Robert Jauß, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg (Munich: Fink, 1981), 413.  
43 Pannenberg, ibid. 
44 D.T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Rider, 1949), 72.  
45 Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode nach den gedruckten und 
ungedruckten Quellen dargestellt (Basel: B. Schwabe, 1961), Bd. II, 218. 
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dramatization of a gradual process of understanding. The literarization of this 
trajectory, from befuddlement and confusion to tentative understanding, gradual 
illumination, and final comprehension, is a strategy for overcoming anticipated 
resistance to the strange and unfamiliar. As such dialogue opens up a unique window 
on authorial self-understanding. Literarization provides an imaginative paradigm for 
an exemplary process of understanding which attempts to guard against worst-case 
scenarios of misinterpretation (and their potential consequences). The question-and-
answer form of dialogue may also have the advantage ascribed to it by St. Anselm: 
that it is better suited and more pleasing to the “multis et maxime tardioribus 
ingeniis”—to the many, and, particularly, to the slower in spirit.46 Dialogue allows 
authors to address their own apprehension about a work’s reception by a given 
audience. By dramatizing an idealized process of understanding, the author produces a 
literary model for the reception of his work and attempts to guide the hermeneutic 
process post partum in a manner not afforded by other literary forms. More than any 
other genre, dialogue betrays an anxiety about a work’s reception.  
            In the present context, such anxiety is understandable. The narrative worlds of 
Dante’s Commedia and Snorri’s Edda hardly always reflect the ordines mundi of 
received or, in the latter case, even Christian tradition. The ordines they depict are 
derived from a reshaping and selective culling of distinct and sometimes disparate 
sources and traditions; their world-view does not already bear the imprimatur of 
authority. The ordo of Snorri’s Edda is no more that of the eddic poems than 
Wolfram’s Parzival is a dutiful translation of Chrétien, or the Commedia a rhyming 
version of St. Thomas Aquinas. The dialogic character of these works can best be 
understood as a means especially suited for the descriptio of a world that is still 
                                                
46 Anselm of Canterbury, Cur deus homo, S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera omnia, vol. 2, 
Book I, Ch. I, 48 and Ch. II, 12-13. Quoted in Eileen Sweeny, “Anselm und der Dialog,” Gespräche 
Lesen: Philosophische Dialoge im Mittelalter, ed. Klaus Jacobi (Tübingen: G. Narr, 1999), 107n.  
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unsanctioned. In the case of the Edda, there is a clear sense in which the dialogue 
between King Gylfi and his pagan interlocutors reproduces the position of its Christian 
primary recipients, confronted with the increasingly unfamiliar pagan world-view of 
their ancestors. In the following, I attempt to show that the encounter with the non-
Christian world is part of the “encyclopedic aesthetics” of the Commedia and Snorri’s 
Edda. On a thematic level, it reproduces for a vernacular audience the medieval 
encyclopedia’s appropriation of Arab and Greco-Arab learning, as well as its more 
obvious debts to classical tradition. By focusing on the conception of these 
“encounters” as dialogue, I try to suggest a more satisfying approach to the 
intersection of Encyclopedic Literature with the broader phenomenon of medieval 
encyclopedism than is offered by a narrow focus on insertions encyclopédiques. 
 
Dialogue with the Heathens? 
            A Christian book that aims to contain the world within its covers—a 
microcosmic book-world of the world book—has to come to terms with the factum 
brutum of the presence of non-Christian characters on its pages. That is, a systematic 
representation of the elements of reality must address the theological problems posed 
Christendom’s vast intellectual debt to classical and Arab culture. Intercultural 
dialogue between Christian and heathen, for Dante, Wolfram, and Snorri, appropriates 
the encyclopedist’s role as a mediator between heathen science and Christian morality. 
Dante the pilgrim encounters a number of figures of pagan antiquity, including the 
noble pagans exiled to Limbo—whose peer he famously declares himself—and others 
among the sommersi and salvati.47 Furthermore, Dante the poet elects Virgil, the noble 
                                                
47 In Inferno IV:  Homer, Avicenna, Averroes, Horace, Ovid, Lucan, Electra, Aeneas, Caeser, Saladin, 
Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Orpheus. Cleopatra, Achilles, Helen of Troy, Paris, Brutus and Cassius. Inferno  
V: Semiramis, Dido, Helen, Achilles. Paris. Paradiso XX:121-122: Trajan and Ripheus. 
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pagan and “wise magician” of medieval lore,48 to guide his pilgrim through the first 
two realms of the Christian afterlife. In Snorri’s Edda, the mythic Swedish king, Gylfi, 
undertakes a lone journey to the Æsir in order to uncover the secret of their seeming 
superiority and engages in a contest of wisdom with these figures of the North’s pagan 
past.49 Parzival’s father, Gahmuret, wins fame among the heathens and sires the hero’s 
half-black, half-white half-brother, Feirefiz, with his heathen bride, Belacâne, the 
black queen of Zazamanc. In fact, the narrative of Parzival was, according to 
Wolfram, first discovered written “in heidenischer schrifte” (453.13) in Toledo, where 
the Middle Age’s greatest “dialogue of heathen and Christian”—the translation of 
Greek and Arabic learning into Latin—took place. 
In what follows, I investigate the interplay of imported Christian and native 
pagan pedagogical traditions in the Edda. Their merger can be read both as an allegory 
of thirteenth-century Norwegian-Icelandic relations, in which Snorri played a 
prominent role as a political leader, and as Snorri’s self-commentary on his primary 
task as a mythographer: the integration of a native/pagan  (Icelandic) with an 
imported/Christian (Norwegian) worldview. 
                                                
48 See Domenico Comparetti, Vergil in the Middle Ages, trans. E.F.M. Benecke (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). Latin Virga can mean “magic wand,” as it does in book 7, line 190 of the 
Aeneid. 
49 Cf. Lars Lönnroth, “The Noble Heathen: A Theme in the Sagas,” Scandinavian Studies, 41 (1969), 1-
29.   
  24 
 
 
Illustration 1: Gylfi (Gangleri) questioning his three informants in Gylfaginning 
(Icelandic, ca. 1300). From the Uppsala manuscript of the Prose Edda, Uppsala 
University Library, DG II, f. 26v. 
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Chapter 1:  On the Shoulders of Frost Giants: Encyclopedic Poetics in Snorri 
Sturluson’s Edda 
 
Snorri Sturluson’s interest in the poetry of his pagan ancestors has been subject 
to a number of divergent interpretations, but these can typically be classified according 
to whether they focus on his Edda as a mythographic project50 or as a poetics.51 Few 
ever went as far as Hans Kuhn, who tried to explain the perceived inconsistency of a 
Christian author’s interest in a forbidden pagan past by claiming that Snorri still 
believed the old myths.52 As has been shown more recently, it is more productive—
although not wholly uncontroversial—to see Snorri’s project as informed by 
continental Christian literary traditions. Certainly few nowadays view it as the product 
of “recidive” paganism, or as an indigenous flowering of Nordic genius. Also, we 
should not forget that Snorri’s stated purpose in the Edda is to produce a handbook for 
aspiring poets on the expiring art form of skaldic verse. Snorri may deserve some 
blame for this, since he only states his intentions after the first narrative segment of the 
second book, Skáldskaparmál (“ars poetica”), which culminates in the story of Odin’s 
acquisition of the Mead of Poetry. The tales of Gylfaginning are conceived, at least in 
part, as a propaedeutic to this poetological endeavor—familiarizing the novice with 
                                                
50 See Richard Meyer, “Snorri als Mythograph,” Arkiv för nordisk filologi, 28  (1912), 116; Sigurður 
Nordal, Snorri Sturluson (Reykjavík: Þór. B. Þorláksson, 1920), 107; Walter Baetke, Die Götterlehre 
der Snorra-Edda (Berichte über die Verhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu 
Leipzig, Philol.-hist. Kl. 97, Bd., Heft 3, Berlin, 1952), 3; Anne Holtsmark, Studier i Snorres mytologi 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlage, 1964), 83; Anthony Faulkes, “Introduction” in Snorri Sturluson: Edda 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), xvii. 
51 See Finnur Jónsson, Den oldnorske og oldislanske litteraturs historie, v.1 (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 
1901), 684-685, 697; Anne Holtsmark, “Grammatisk literatur om modersmålet” in Kulturhistorisk 
leksikon for nordisk middelalder (Roskilde: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1962); Gerd Wolfgang Weber, 
“Edda, jüngere,” Reallexikon der germanischen altertumskunde (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985), 394; 
Margaret Clunies Ross, Skáldskaparmál: Snorri Sturluson’s Ars Poetica and Medieval Theories of 
Language (Odense: Odense University Press, 1987).  
52 See Hans Kuhn, “Das nordgermanische Heidentum in den ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten,” 
Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur, 79 (1942/43), 132-166. Today, this view 
remains little more than a curiosity of Edda scholarship. It was severely criticized soon after its 
publication, especially by Baetke (1952). 
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the mythological lore needed to understand (or at least try to understand) the hyper-
allusive kennings, or periphrastic metaphors, on which much Old Norse poetry is 
based. It is an irony of reception history that interest in the mythological propaedeutic 
has largely overshadowed the poetry it was intended to illuminate.      
 Earlier scholarship held that the prologue to the Edda offers an “apology” for 
the mythology of Snorri’s pagan ancestors, explaining it as the product of diabolical 
trickery.53 More recently others, beginning with Peter and Ursula Dronke, have 
contended that Snorri stresses the continuity of pagan and Christian tradition in the 
spirit of the school of Chartres: 
 
We would suggest that some of the emphases Snorri gives in his prologue are 
akin to those given by some of the greatest twelfth-century Christian Platonists 
— by William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Hugh of St. Victor, Bernard 
Silvestris, and Alan of Lille. There is nothing in Snorri’s prologue to show that 
he had works by these men at his elbow (though that he read some of there 
writings cannot be ruled out). Much, however, suggests to us that Snorri had 
become familiar with some of their most remarkable ideas — perhaps through 
conversation with scholars who had studied in France, or through teachers who 
had undergone this platonizing influence. Above all, we believe a certain 
influence, direct or indirect, was possible because Snorri would have found in  
twelfth-century Latin humanist speculation much that was congenial to him.54 
Snorri’s upbringing at the parish school at Oddi, founded roughly one hundred years 
before his birth by the cosmopolitan Sæmundur fróði (“the wise”) Sigfússon (1056-
1133), favors the Dronkes’ thesis. According to family annals, Sæmundur had studied 
theology in Frakkaland (France), although his exact whereabouts, often presumed to 
be in Paris, have never been established. While we don’t know the contents of Oddi’s 
library, or whether the school, which flourished until the end of the thirteenth century, 
maintained its ties with the continent, it is not improbable that the most powerful 
                                                
53 See Baetke (1952), 37ff. Also see Anne Holtsmark (1964), 15, 23ff. 
54 Peter and Ursula Dronke, “Prologue of the Prose Edda: Explorations of a Latin Background” in: 
Intellectuals and Poets in the Middle Ages (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1992), 95; originally 
published in Sjötíu ritgerðir helgaðar Jakobi Benediktssyni 20. júlí 1977, 2 vols, ed. Einar G. Pétursson 
and Jónas Kristjánsson (Reykjavík: Stofnun Árna Magnússonar, 1977), vol. 1. 
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institution of learning in Iceland would have done precisely this. Highly suggestive of 
such a connection with the European “mainstream,” is Guðrún Nordal’s recent 
argument for the influence of Plato’s Timaeus  (the seminal text for 12th-century Neo-
Platonism) on Snorri´s cosmology in the Edda.55  
 Ursula Dronke and Margaret Clunies Ross, among others, have argued that 
Snorri’s interest in pagan poetry should be viewed against the broader background of 
the interest in grammatica and new openness to the pagan past characteristic of the 
school of Chartres, not in a scheme that pits indigenous pagan traditions against 
newer, imported Christian ones.56 Snorri’s interest in the beliefs of his pagan forebears 
is a product of his cosmopolitanism, not its opposite. With Snorri we can observe a 
shift away from the utilitarian attitude toward heathen intellectual property espoused 
by St. Augustine in De doctrina christiana, where the spiritual achievements of 
heathendom are likened to the gold and silver vessels borne away by the Israelites 
fleeing Egypt. Snorri’s attitude does not reflect what some have called Augustine’s 
“quarrying” approach to non-Christian cultures; he is in line with developments in 
Chartrian thought that lead to “wholehearted acceptance of moments in pagan thought, 
because of a deep conviction that they were pointing, by the same images to the same 
                                                
55 Guðrún Nordal, Tools of Literacy: The Role of Skaldic Verse in Icelandic Textual Culture of the 
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 273-283. Anthony 
Faulkes argues against the possibility of unmediated contact between Snorri and continental tradition by 
pointing to the lack of evidence that Snorri knew Latin or knew it sufficiently to access such intellectual 
currents. See Anthony Faulkes, “The Sources of Skáldskaparmál: Snorri’s Intellectual Background” in   
Snorri Sturluson: Kolloquium anläßlich der 750. Wiederkehr seines Todestages, Script-Oralia 51, ed. 
Alois Wolf (Tübingen: G. Narr, 1993), 59–76. The issue is not ultimately resolvable. The encyclopedic 
tradition in Icelandic is well documented in the period before and during Snorri’s life. See Margaret 
Clunies Ross and Rudolf Simek, “Encyclopedic Literature,” Medieval Scandinavia: An Encyclopedia, 
ed. Phillip Pulsiano (New York: Garland, 1993), 164-166. Thus the question of Snorri’s Latin literacy, 
while of interest, remains secondary. Still, one should acknowledge contemporary political debates 
raising the stakes in what might seem like a strictly “academic” dispute. Recent and on-going attempts 
to articulate Scandinavian national identities, both as part of and distinct from “Europe,” are likely to 
influence the way in which the tabula rasa of Snorri’s intellectual biography is filled in. There are 
parallels to this very contemporary debate in the society of Snorri’s thirteenth-centruy Iceland at the end 
of the Free-State and beginning of Norwegian rule. 
56 Clunies Ross, 1987.  
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realities as Jewish and Christian traditions. Here the enormous reverence for antiquity, 
and the exhilarating sense that it is not distant but contemporary, are inseparable.”57 
Building on the Dronkes’ argument for the influence of the School of Chartres on 
Snorri, Margaret Clunies Ross proposes that “The purpose of the Prologue of the Edda 
was to suggest that the religious beliefs of the pre-Christian Scandinavians, and the 
language in which they expressed these ideas, anticipated Christian thought on 
fundamental concepts of the nature of the deity and the cosmos.”58 As I will show in 
what follows, Snorri applies this idea of “anticipation” not only to Christian teachings 
themselves, but also to the pedagogical tradition responsible for their transmission.  
 Before proceeding, however, I should stress the two-fold agenda behind 
Snorri’s decision to make the Æsir’s interrogator a figure of pre-Christian 
Scandinavia, rather than composing a dialogue of heathen and Christian.59 Since Gylfi 
is a heathen, he is not compelled to allegorize the figures of pagan mythology and 
integrate them into a comprehensive Christian world-view. By treating the Æsir as 
euhemerized historical personages of ultimately foreign origin, Snorri is able to avoid 
apologetics and legitimate the pagan past as a worthy object of historical interest. In 
contrast to the wider medieval reception of pagan antiquity, he does not interpret the 
Æsir as timeless exempla of modes of moral conduct, or representatives of 
philosophical or psychological truths.60 Snorri does not present us with an Edda 
Moralisé, but with a comparatively “objective” and generally sympathetic account of 
pagan belief unique to the age in which it was produced.61 Clunies Ross comments: 
                                                
57 Peter Dronke, “New Approaches to the Schools of Chartres,” Anuario de estudios medievales, 6 
(1969), 136. Reprinted in Dronke (1992), 36.  
58 Clunies Ross (1987), 13. 
59 A precedent for such cross-cultural dialogue had been established by Peter Abelard a century earlier. 
60  Snorri does present us with a compendium of different kinds of (im)moral behavior, but these are 
played out by flesh-and-blood characters, not in allegorical figures. The other works I consider here, 
most obviously Dante, but no less Wolfram, share Snorri’s interest in presenting such a compendium. 
61 Cf. Clunies Ross (1987, 171) who paraphrases Holtsmark’s observation (“Ovid,” Kulturhistorisk 
leksikon for nordisk middelalder, 13 [1968], cols. 63-6, 65) that “Snorri’s Christian interpretation of 
Norse myths reminds one of various medieval Christian interpretations of Ovid.”  
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“In medieval Icelandic literature, unlike many other literatures of the European Middle 
Ages, the indigenous past and indigenous literary genres are not marginalized; on the 
contrary, they are made part of a Christian world history.”62 I would further nuance 
this distinction by adding that Snorri and other Icelandic traditions, such as the sagas, 
marginalize pagan elements in time (whereas Wolfram, Dante, and other continental 
traditions tend to marginalize them in space, be it on the outskirts of the known world 
or in hell). To put it another way, the pagan past of the Icelanders is integrated with 
the topography of their cultural present and recent history. Such historical continuity 
with pre-Christian tradition is frequently reinforced by reference to common locality, 
especially in the Sagas of Icelanders, where places and objects of importance in pagan 
times, such as burial mounds, can frequently “still be seen today.”63  
 
Encyclopedism and Genre in Gylfaginning (“The Beguiling of Gylfi”) 
In her groundbreaking study of the second book of the Edda, Skáldskaparmál or “the 
art of poetry,” Margaret Clunies Ross devotes a chapter to “The formative influence of 
the medieval encyclopedia on Snorri’s Edda,” cataloguing potential correspondences 
between Snorri’s account of certain res naturae in Gylfaginning and Skáldskaparmál 
and those in Bede’s De natura rerum, Isidore’s Etymologiae, and the Imago mundi of 
Honorius Augustodunensis.64 While an invaluable contribution in its own right, it is 
somewhat narrowly circumscribed by her notion of the encyclopedia as a “literary 
form that treated the subjects that we would now call the natural sciences and 
astronomy.”65 It is doubtless correct that “the repertoire of the encyclopedia gives us 
                                                
62 Clunies Ross, “Medieval Iceland and the European Middle Ages,” International Scandinavian 
Studies in Honor of Gerd Wolfgang Weber, ed. Michael Dallapiazza (Triest: Edizione Parnaso, 2000), 
111-120.  
63 The pagan holy “mountain,” Helgafell, in Eyrbyggjasaga, which later becomes the site of a Christian 
monastery, furnishes another example. 
64 Clunies Ross (1987), 151-173. 
65 Clunies Ross (1987), 151. 
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some insight into the reasons for Snorri’s choice of certain subjects in the Edda, the 
manner of his treatment of them and, in some cases, the ordering of the material,”66 
but this is ultimately too narrow a lens with which to bring the rays of the 
encyclopedism of Snorra Edda into focus. To assume that the encyclopedic tradition 
concerned itself only topics of natural philosophy such as meteorology and astronomy 
(“the encyclopedic material in the Edda”67) overlooks, for example, the tendency to 
synthesize cosmography and historiography that begins with Bede (ca. 672-735) in De 
temporibus and De ratione temporum. Snorri’s encyclopedism cannot be understood 
solely in terms of his appropriation of natural-scientific topics from Canonical 
Encyclopedias (i.e., insertions encyclopédiques); it is also manifest in his interest in 
universal-history, as well as geographical and ethnological lore.68 In fact, by placing 
these natura rerum discourses within the framework of an historical narrative poetics, 
Snorri’s Edda creates a conceptual niche for itself between the organizational 
principles of ordo rerum and ordo artium.  
The idea of the encyclopedia as a practical handbook (compendium) is 
common to the Middle Ages. A number of medieval encyclopedias are explicitly 
intended as references for preachers: as aids in the preparation of sermons, as source-
books for analogies to the visibilia of a morally significant natural order, and as guides 
for dealing with questions with which over-inquisitive parishioners might tax the 
oftentimes limited learning of the rural clergy. Snorri’s Edda is arguably part of this 
“handbook” tradition, but it is a handbook for thirteenth-century Christian Skaldic 
poets rather than for preachers. Its ambition to map out a poetics in the Icelandic 
vernacular makes it a kind of Nordic De vulgari eloquentia.69 The allusion to Dante is 
                                                
66 Ibid., 153. 
67 Ibid., 158. 
68 Clunies Ross considers “chronological and geographical lore” to constitute a separate category (ibid., 
157 
69 Pace Walter Haug’s claim: “So far as we know, no vernacular writer of the Middle Ages wrote a 
treatise on poetics. The medieval poetics are all written in Latin and accordingly belong to that cultural 
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not casual, for the two are the Middle Age’s preeminent theoreticians of the 
vernacular; both also attempt to establish the prestige of poetry in their mother-tongue 
vis-à-vis the literary traditions of classical antiquity. As Peter Foote writes, “Snorri 
assumed without question that what was preserved in Norse was classic in its own 
right. In his prologue he traces the venerable Trojan origins of the Æsir and hence 
establishes the dignity—on a par with that of Rome and Britain—of the dynasties they 
founded in the North and the poetry they discovered.”70 
 The author of medieval encyclopedias is first and foremost a compilator whose 
authority is grounded in his competence in selecting the most accurate sources for a 
project that involves the transmission of “high-level knowledge”71 (e.g., Aristotle, the 
Arabs, and other auctoritates) to the “middle-level” reader or listener. The author may 
occasionally take issue with the auctores he cites, preferring his judgment to theirs,72 
but, as a rule, bases his authority on his ability to draw on the best sources, recount 
them accurately, and arrange them according to a scheme that mirrors an objective 
order. What was long read as a lack of originality is really adherence to a prohibition 
against innovation, since the world-order was created once-and-for-all by God (“solus 
creator est deus”). Snorri’s Edda is conspicuously the result of such compilation, since 
it draws on diverse sources, including the Poetic Edda, possibly other texts no longer 
extant, and oral tradition to produce a largely coherent synthesis of a disparate 
mythological tradition.73 In the course of his “Arbeit am Mythos,” Snorri draws on a 
                                                                                                                                       
tradition, derived as they are from classical theories of poetry.” Vernacular Literary Theory in the 
Middle Ages: The German Tradition, 800-1300 in Its European Context (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 7. 
70 Peter Foote, “Latin Rhetoric and Icelandic Poetry,” Saga och Sed (1982), 115. 
71 Ribémont,  “On the Definition of an Encyclopedic Genre in the Middle Ages,” Pre-Modern 
Encyclopedic Texts, ed. Peter Binkley (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 47-61; 50. 
72 William of Conches, for example, frequently makes a point of furnishing his audience with the views 
he rejects as false. In the Dragmaticon, the Duke does not simply cue the “philosophus sine nomine,” 
but rather states his own opinions, cites authorities, and raises objections against which better 
authorities are brought to bear. Cf. Snorri’s judgment on the conflicting accounts of Thor’s encounter 
with the Midgard Serpent. 
73 As an antiquarian, Snorri wants to preserve as much of his source material as possible and sometimes 
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multiplicity of literary genres in order to frame his mythological matière. Some of 
these are presumably native to pre-conversion Iceland, like the wisdom-quest (cf. 
Baldrs draumar), prophetic monologue (cf. Völuspá), and the wisdom-contest (cf. 
Vafþrúðnismál). But Snorri also incorporates elements of the master-student dialogue 
that plays such a large role in the Christian encyclopedic tradition. Thus in the Edda, 
Snorri acts as a compilator not only of mythological lore, poetic kennings, and verse 
forms, but also of literary genres. In what follows, I argue that the intersection 
“foreign” and “native” encyclopedic didactic traditions addressed in Gylfaginning 
provides a key not only to its perplexing frame story, but, moreover, to Snorri’s 
construction of authorship in the Edda. 
 To begin with the frame story: Snorri tells how King Gylfi ruled over those 
lands that are now called Sweden. As payment (laun) for her “conversation,”74 he 
offers a wandering woman, as much land as four oxen can plow in one day and one 
night. Gefjun, however, is of the race of the Æsir and beguiles (ginna) the king, 
depriving him of a disagreeably large portion of his kingdom. She spans four oxen 
(sons spawned with a giant in Jotunheim) to a plow and they promptly heave up a 
colossal landmass and drag it out to sea, providing an aetiological account for Seeland 
in Denmark. (The hole left behind fills with water to form Lake Mälar in Sweden.) 
Gylfi’s loss of sovereign territory spurs him on a quest to determine the cause of the 
Æsir power—having learned its effect only all too well. He sets out to visit the Æsir in 
Asgard in order to determine whether this power stems from their own nature or from 
                                                                                                                                       
relegates conflicting accounts to Heimskringla. 
74 The Icelandic word skemmtun in the phrase “at launum skemmtunar sinnar,” here translated as 
“conversation,” leaves room for conjecture. The German edition of Arnulf Krause (Die Edda des Snorri 
Sturluson, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997) renders it as “Unterhaltung” which better captures the connotation 
of “entertainment” and “amusement.” The Icelandic also has the sense of German “Kurzweil.” It 
remains ambiguous whether Gylfi is rewarding Gefjun for her conversation or simply for her company-
-with possible sexual connotations (noted by Holtsmark). Either way, the episode shows that Gylfi is 
either lacking in wisdom, or in the self-restraint and discipline expected of a king. It would be 
interesting to view this in the context of the discourse on kingship in the Norwegian Konnugskuggsjá 
(Speculum regale).    
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the divinities (the “divine Æsir” or Norse gods) they worship. Through their unfolding 
dialogue, Snorri provides a unique mythographic synthesis of Norse paganism. 
 Before taking up Gylfi’s wisdom-quest, however, let us pause to consider the 
figure of Gefjun.75 We might well ask to what manner of woman a king offers 
payment for her conversation? The wanderer who roams the world questioning and 
testing others in pursuit of wisdom, as Oðinn does in Vafþrúðnismál, is a topos of Old-
Norse wisdom-poetry.76 The poems of the Poetic Edda distinguish between episodes 
where Oðinn tests the knowledge of his adversary, and those where he acquires new 
knowledge, as he does in Völuspá. (The Seeress or Völva of Völuspá is the more 
ancient of the two and has first-hand knowledge of events before his birth).77 On the 
other hand, Gefjun’s receipt of payment (laun) for her wisdom-service is suggestive of 
a Germanic tradition that survives in the figure of the wandering poet of Middle High 
German Spruchdichtung, who demands material payment in exchange for the wisdom 
he imparts to his noble audience (as opposed to the immaterial lôn sought by his 
almost-never-kissing cousin, the Minnesänger). Such wisdom is the prerogative of an 
aristocratic ruling class, even if its conduit, the poet, is a little “less than kind.” As is 
clear from Oðinn’s wisdom-monologue in Hávamál, this gnomic wisdom constitutes 
the kind of knowledge necessary for rulership. The Gefjun episode shows that Gylfi’s 
quest for knowledge does not begin with his journey to the Æsir, but is part of an 
                                                
75 The story of Gylfi and Gefjun may have been suggested to Snorri by the first verse quoted in the 
Edda (7, 12-19), which is thought to be from a poem known as Ragnarsdrápa by the first known Skald, 
Bragi hinn gamli (“Bragi the old”) in which several such tales of legendary character are recounted. See 
Snorri Sturluson, Edda. Prologue and Gylfaginning, ed. and trans. Anthony Faulkes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), xxv-xxvi, note to p.7, l.12-19.   
76 See Vafþrúðnismál, stanza 43:  “Frà jötna rúnum / ok allra goða / ek kann segja satt, / pví at hvern hef 
ek / heim of komit: / níu kom ek heima / fyr Níflhel neðan; / hinig deyja ór helju halir.” (Of the secrets 
of the giants and of all the gods, I can speak the truth, for I have been to every world; nine worlds have I 
traveled down to Nífhel below, into which men die out of hell.) See also stanzas 3, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 
54: “Fjölð ek fór / fjölð ek freistaðak.” (Much have I travelled / much have I tested). Also see Odin’s 
riddle-contest in Heiðreks saga. 
77 Judy Quinn, “Dialogue with a Völva,” in The Poetic Edda: Essays on Old Norse Mythology, ed. Paul 
Acker and Carolyne Larrington (New York & London: Routledge, 2002), 245-274. 
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ongoing, if not always successful, pursuit of wisdom intimately connected with the 
question of sovereignty.     
 Grímnismál in the Poetic Edda provides another model of Old Norse wisdom 
poetry. Here Oðinn visits the hall of Geirrøðr in disguise to test Frigg’s assertion that 
his charge, the king, is stringy with guests. Frigg tricks Geirrøðr into torturing Oðinn 
between two fires, and Oðinn gradually reveals his identity in a long wisdom-
monologue; after this, Geirrøðr dies suddenly and is succeeded by his son, Agnarr, 
who demonstrates the wisdom his father lacked by giving Oðinn a drink. Jere Fleck 
has argued that Oðinn’s ordeal and Agnarr’s ascent to kingship is set in the context of 
a ritual in which the would-be ruler is initiated with the kind of mythological 
knowledge required for legitimate kingship.78 The question of kingship, while never 
addressed explicitly in Gylfaginning, is arguably of central importance since all four 
interlocutors are themselves kings. Also Gylfi, like Geirrøðr, suffers from a lack of 
wisdom that, if not exactly fatal, does pose an acute threat to his sovereignty. While 
for Snorri Gylfi’s quest provides a framework in which to order his mythological 
material, Gylfi’s own purpose is to determine the source of the Æsir’s power and 
better guard his kingdom against such deceit in the future. Thus just as the wisdom-
poetry of the Poetic Edda thematizes the “knowledge criterion” essential for political 
sovereignty, Gylfaginning, as a poetological-political allegory, makes this same 
mythological inheritance the “knowledge criterion” for the thirteenth-century 
Christian poet who wishes to maintain sovereignty over his linguistic inheritance. 
 As is well known, Gylfi’s entrance into the hall of the three Æsir named Hár, 
Jafnhár, and Thriði (or “High,” “Just-as-High,” and “Third”) employs a another well-
known topos from this inheritance: the loser is faced with the unappealing prospect of 
                                                
78 Jere Fleck, “Konr-Óttarr-Geirroðr:  A Knowledge Criterion for Succession to the Germanic Sacred 
Kingship,” Scandinavian Studies, 42 (1970), 39-49. Also see “The ‘Knowledge Criterion’ in the 
Grímnismál: The Case against ‘Shamanism,” Arkiv for nordisk filolgi, 86 (1971), 49-65.   
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emerging from the wisdom contest a full head shorter. When Gylfi/Gangleri enters the 
hall, 
 
Hann segir at fyrst vil hann spyrja ef nokkvorr er fróðr maðr inni. Hár segir at 
hann komi eigi heill út nema hann sé fróðari. (8. 21-23)79 
 
 (He said that he first wanted to ask if there was any wise man present. High 
 replied that he would not come out of there alive, unless he were himself the 
 wiser.)80 
 
This is a recapitulation of the beginning of the wisdom-contest between the giant 
Vafþrúðnir and the wayfaring Oðinn (disguised as “Gagnráðr”) in Vafþrúðnismál: 
 
6. [Oðinn:]81     Odin said:82 
 
‘Heil þú nú, Vafðrúðnir! nú em ec í höll kominn, “Hail, Vafðrúðnir!   I’ve come to 
your hall  
á þic siálfan siá;     to see you myself 
hitt vil ec fyrst vita,  ef þú fróðr sér   I’ve come to find out   if they call
       you wise 
eða alsviðr, iotunn.’     rightly or wrongly, giant.”  
 
7. [Vafðrúðnir:]     Vafthrudnir said: 
 
‘Hvat er þat manna, er í minom sal   What sort of man is this?   He 
       comes to my hall 
 verpomc orði á?    and flings bold words at my face? 
  Út þú né komir órom höllum frá,  You’ll never leave here   still alive 
 nema þú inn snotrari sér.’   unless you’re wiser than I.” 
 
8. [Oðinn:]     Odin said: 
 
  ‘Gagnrádr ec heiti; nú emc af göngo kominn I am called Gagnrad.   I’ve
       come to your hall 
                                                
79 All original citations from Prologue and Gylfaginning are from the normalized edition of Anthony 
Faulkes (1982), see note 75, above. Numbers refer to page and line. 
80 My translation. Unless noted, English translations are from Anthony Faulkes, Edda (London: 
Everyman, 1987). 
81 All citations from the Poetic Edda are from the edition of Gustav Neckel and Hans Kuhn, Edda: Die 
Lieder des Codex Regius nebst verwandten Denkmälern, 5th ed. (Heidelberg: Winter, 1983). Numbers 
refer to stanza. 
82 I have adapted the English translation of Patricia Terry, Poems of the Elder Edda, revised ed. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990). 
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 þyrstr til þinna sala;    thirsty from my travels; 
  laðar þurfi hefi ec lengi farit   a weary wanderer asks for
       your welcome  
 oc þinna andfanga, iotunn.’   will you not greet a guest,
       giant?”   
 
Snorri casts Gylfi in the Oðinn-role. He is not only wise (vitr) and skilled in magic 
(fjölkunnigr) but, also like Oðinn, takes on the guise of a wandering old man to 
conceal his true identity from his opponents as he does in wisdom-contest in 
Vafþrúðnismál and in his wisdom monologue in Grímnismál. Not only Gylfi’s 
disguise but also the manner of his questioning frequently places the discourse of 
Gylfaginning within the framework of the wisdom-contest: “who is the most noble of 
the gods,” “where is this god,” “what was in the beginning—all assume a form 
familiar from the wisdom-contest between Oðinn and Vafþrúðnir in Vafþrúðnismál 
(i.e., “what is X called” and “where does X come from”). In fact, of the forty-seven 
direct questions Gylfi poses (not including asides that prompt further explanations 
from the Æsir), nineteen are either close paraphrases or thematically identical to 
Oðinn’s questions to Vafþrúðnir.  
 Snorri, however, promptly complicates the expectations he establishes, for the 
Æsir are wiser (vísari) than Gylfi and possess prophetic foresight (spádóm), and as 
such more akin to the more-knowing seeress in Völuspá than they are to Oðinn’s 
benighted foes in Vafþrúðnismál and Grímnismál. As Anne Holtmark first pointed out 
in her delineation of the genre-conventions of the wisdom-contest, the questioner must 
also be able to verify the truth of the answers he receives.83 Gylfi is obviously in no 
such position, since his quest is motivated by his very lack of knowledge.  
 Within the matrix of this native tradition scholars have noted in Gylfi’s 
questions an echo of the master-student dialogue of the medieval encyclopedia, quite 
                                                
83 Anne Holtsmark, “Den uløselige gåten,” Maal og Minne (1965), 101-5. 
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possibly known to Snorri through the Old-Norse Elucidarius.84 In fact, Gylfi’s 
interrogation of the Æsir initially follows the widespread encyclopedic “Chain of 
Being” format, beginning with the highest deity. “Where does God live?” is the first 
question posed by the discipulus in the widely-transmitted Elucidarium of Honorius 
Augustodunensis. Written at the beginning of the twelfth century as a dialogus de 
summa totius christianae theologiae, it was used as a schoolbook, and soon translated 
into the major European vernaculars (the first translation into Old Norse being ca. 
1200 or earlier).85 The magister proceeds to detail God’s creation of the world, 
prompted by frequent exhortations to “explain this more clearly.” Gylfi’s two first 
questions: “who is the most noble and oldest of the gods?” and “where is this god and 
what is within his power and what great works has he performed?” (8. 27, 33-34), 
mirror even more closely the words of the discipulus in the Old Norse Elucidarius 
(AM 674a 4to): “could you at the beginning of this discussion tell me who God is?” 
and “where does God live?”86  
 The patent absurdity of the hierarchical arrangement of Gylfi’s interlocutors, 
named “High,” “Just-as-High,” and “Third,” has been lost on few observers: High 
occupies the lowest seat on one of three vertically arranged thrones, with Just-as-High 
above him, and Third on top. As is well known, these three names, as well as “Gylfi,” 
are all Oðinnsheiti or “names of Oðinn” found in Oðinn’s wisdom-monologue in 
Grímnismál, which further invokes the generic register of native pedagogical tradition. 
One curiosity that has not been noted is that this vertical arrangement of the human 
Æsir constitutes a hyper-literal realization of Isidore of Seville’s definition of the 
                                                
84 Jan de Vries refers to the Elucidarius as a possible source for the dialogue form of the Edda. See his 
Altnordische Literaturgeschichte, vol. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), 221. Edith Marold also points out 
the two strands of wisdom contest and master-student dialogue but does not introduce the third element: 
the wisdom quest. 
85 Elucidarius in Old Norse Translation, ed. Evelyn Firchow and Kaaren Grimstad (Reykjavík: Stofun 
Árna Magnússonar, 1989), xxvi-xxvii. 
86 The Old Norse Elucidarius, ed. and trans. Evelyn Firchow (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 1992), 
1.2, 1.10. 
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magister in the Etymologiae as “maior in statione,” or “greater in station.”87 While 
Snorri’s familiarity with Isidore cannot be established, his works are thought to be the 
ultimate source of certain encyclopedic writings in Icelandic that Snorri could have 
known. 
 The juxtaposition of the wisdom-contest and master-student dialogue in 
Gylfaginning has often been noted, but never explained.88 Instead, scholars have 
argued that it is “really” one genre or the other, or just thrown up their hands 
altogether. Contrary to Wolf, who argues for the predominance of the wisdom-contest, 
and Marold, who calls the latter a “blindes Motiv,” I would argue these disparate 
elements are Snorri’s way of addressing the most ambitious aspect of the Edda: the 
integration of a pagan past with the Christian present. In what follows I maintain that 
the same proleptic understanding of the truths of Christian revelation ascribed to 
Snorri’s pagan ancestors in the Prologue is also evident in Gylfi’s  proleptic use of 
Christian pedagogical practice in Gylfaginning. 
   Scholars have generally assumed that the title Gylfaginning or the “Beguiling 
of Gylfi” “refers to the sudden lifting of illusion at the end of the frame narrative.”89 
This title exists only in one of the four complete manuscripts (U), not in the rubric but 
at the end of the prologue, and is not generally considered authorial. As Faulkes notes 
in his edition, this “beguiling” may refer to the fact that the “historical” Æsir (parsed 
by Snorri as “men of Asia”) trick the pre-pagan Scandinavians into taking them for 
gods.90 Gylfi, who returns to his lands and tells “of those matters which he had seen 
and heard” (segir þau tiðendi er hann hefir sét ok heyrt91), is the conduit through 
                                                
87 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, ed. W.M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1911, 170: 
“Magister, maior in statione: nam †steron† Graece statio dicitur.”  
88 Cf. Edith Marold, “Der Dialog in Snorris Gylfaginning,” Snorri Sturluson: Beiträge zu Werk und 
Rezeption, ed. Hans Fix (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1998). Also see Alois Wolf, 1977. 
89 Faulkes (1987), xiii. 
90 Ibid., xviii.  
91 Ibid., 54. 34-35. 
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which these tidings spread: “and after him each man told the others these tales” (Ok 
eptir honum sagði hverr maðr öðrum þessar sögur92). The text does not state whether 
Gylfi actually believes what he has seen, or merely relates what he has “seen and 
heard.” Thus it is uncertain whether “beguiling” can refer to Gylfi being fooled into 
believing the Æsir’s account or “conversion” to their beliefs. The use of the old 
Germanic formula “seen and heard” (sét ok heyrt) suggests that he considers what he 
has learned to be true since for an almost universally illiterate society “seen and 
heard” often functioned as a truth-topos.93 The abrupt closure of the frame narrative 
offers little hint as to whether Gylfi considers himself victorious or defeated—beguiler 
or beguiled. 
 There is a parallel between Snorri’s presentation of Gylfi as the pre-historic 
source or witness for Scandinavian mythology and Snorri’s account of his own 
historiographic methodology in Heimskringla. In his forward, Snorri states that he has 
based his account of the Kings of Norway “on the information given to me by well-
informed men.” He goes on to say that “although we do not know whether these 
accounts are true, yet we do know that old and learned men (fróðir menn) consider 
them to be so.”94 Applying Snorri’s source-critical approach in Heimskringla to Gyfli 
as such a “learned man” (maðr vitr, 7, 20) and our chief-informant on Norse 
mythology, we might not unreasonably conclude that while Gylfi did not “know” 
these accounts to be true, he “consider[ed] them to be so.”95 
 Before proceeding, it is necessary to revisit the question, does “Gylfi’s 
Beguiling” refer to the deception of Gylfi by the Æsir, or does it indicate the 
                                                
92 Ibid., 54. 35. 
93 A fact that is parodied in the present-day use of this formula as a name for Scandinavian tabloids such 
as Séð og Heyrt and Se og Hår.  
94 Snorri Sturluson, Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway, ed. and trans. Lee Hollander 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), 3. 
95 See Edith Marold, who considers Gyfli to undergo “conversion” the Æsir’s beliefs, “Der Dialog in 
Snorris Gylfaginning,” Snorri Sturluson: Beiträge zu Werk und Rezeption, ed. Hans Fix (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1998), 131-180, esp. 164 
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opposite?96 As Rory McTurk points out, Gylfa (masculine, genitive, singular) is 
grammatically ambiguous and could refer, as has traditionally been assumed, to 
“Gylfi’s fooling” by the Æsir, or to “Gylfi’s fooling” of them. McTurk is fairly 
reserved about his own proposal (“such a double interpretation of the expression 
Gylfaginning is theoretically possible”97), which has met with considerable 
resistance.98 Still, he is correct that both possibilities are equally available from a 
purely grammatical point of view. McTurk speculates that Gylfi’s “beguiling” 
(ginning) of the Æsir consists in the “fact” that Gylfi has actually seen through the 
Æsir’s illusions and believes neither their account nor that they are in fact identical 
with the divinities the describe. Hence, Gylfi does not—as has been assumed—spread 
pagan beliefs among the people of Scandinavia (beliefs which from a Christian 
perspective, I would note, would comprise the biggest “beguiling” of them all).  
 This argument, which has the merit of raising the question, fails to convince. 
The Æsir’s stories are ultimately propagated and believed, suggesting that Gylfi did 
not see through them after all. Even if Gylfi did not believe what he has “seen and 
heard,” others clearly believe his account and adopt the Æsir’s beliefs—a rather empty 
victory for Gylfi. Clearly, as has traditionally been assumed, Gylfi is “fooled” in some 
sense, although McTurk senses correctly that he has not been sufficiently recognized 
as is a practitioner of deception in his own right. The implicit tertium comparationis 
for both Gylfi’s pre-pagan proto-Christianity and the Æsir’s faith is, of course, 
Christianity itself. It is fitting that both Gylfi, as the representative of pre-pagan 
Scandinavia, and the Æsir, the source of pagan belief in that part of the world, should 
appear fallible, easily blind-sided, error-prone, and—despite the respect with which 
Snorri treats them—slightly ridiculous.  
                                                
96 Posed by Rory McTurk, “Fooling Gylfi: Who Tricks Who?”, Alvíssmál, 3 (1994), 3-18.  
97 McTurk, 10. 
98 McTurk, 3, n.1. 
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McTurk’s reading, moreover, overburdens Snorri’s succinct closure to the 
frame story of Gylfi’s journey to the Æsir: 
 
Then he [Gylfi] went off on his way and came back to his kingdom and told of 
the events he had seen and heard about. And from his account these stories 
passed from one person to another. (57)  
Doubtless, if Gylfi had really seen through the Æsir’s attempt to make him the 
benighted apostle of paganism to the Scandinavians, this would constitute a beguiling 
of the first order. In fact, “Gylfaginning” would then have to be taken to refer 
primarily to the supposed foiling of the Æsir’s scheme, rather than the reciprocal 
network of illusion and concealment that provides the basic structure for Snorri’s 
mythography. Beyond the fact that this reading of “beguiling” lacks any basis in the 
text, it cannot readily be reconciled with Snorri’s broader project in the Edda: to offer 
an apology for the paganism of his ancestors and to show how they, although 
ensconced in error, still anticipated fundamental aspects of Christian thought.   
 I would suggest that “beguiling” in Gylfaginning is indeed double-edged.99 The 
ginning of Gylfaginning, or “beguiling” of Gylfi, refers potentially to at least four 
separate “beguilings.” First, there are the events at the beginning of the frame-
narrative when Gylfi is tricked into relinquishing part of his kingdom and his power 
through a ruse spawned by the superior wisdom of Gefjun, who is af Ása ætt (of the 
race of the Æsir) (Gylfaginning 7, 4). The second and third “beguilings” are Gylfi’s 
disguise as Gangleri, and the illusions the Æsir prepare when they spy Gangleri 
making his way to meet them. The fourth is the final dispelling of illusion with which 
the Æsir interrupt Gylfi’s interrogations and hence “beguile” him out of victory in the 
wisdom-contest. I would claim that the Æsir are at least equally beguiled, but for a 
wholly different reason than the one McTurk offers: Gylfi misdirects the Æsir’s 
“reading” of the entire situation such that they initially mistake a dialogue of 
                                                
99 Although not in the manner suggested by McTurk. 
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unequals—a master-student dialogue—for a wisdom-contest. The beguiling is product 
of this deliberate generic ambiguity. “Gylfi’s beguiling” should thus also be taken to 
refer to the fact that Gylfi fools the Æsir into betraying their coveted, arcane 
knowledge—the source of their power and authority—to a rival who, unlike the his 
counterpart in a true wisdom-contest, is not in a position to verify the truth of the 
answers he receives. 
 Despite the commonplace that “Gylfi’s beguiling” refers to the “deceptive 
appearances” the Æsir prepare for him and then dispel without warning, nothing in the 
text suggests the Æsir have actually seen through his disguise. We are merely told that 
Gylfi 
set out to Asgard and traveled in secret and assumed the form of an old man 
and so disguised himself. But the Æsir were wiser in that they had the gift of 
prophecy, and they saw his movements before he arrived, and prepared 
deceptive appearances for him. (7) 
All we can gather conclusively from this passage is that the Æsir see an old man 
approaching and (since they know a wisdom contest when they see it) take the 
necessary precautions. The text notes only that they see Gangleri approaching (ferð 
hans), not that they have seen through his disguise. Moreover, the hall that they 
conjure up to greet him, the locus classicus of the wisdom-contest a la Vafþrúðnismál, 
would indicate that the Æsir have swallowed the bait. The generic parameters of the 
wisdom contest are further invoked when Gylfi proclaims upon arrival that “he wished 
first to find out if there was any learned person in there” (8). With the Æsir’s response, 
that “[Gylfi] would not get out unscathed unless he was more learned” (8), the rules of 
this particular language game seem firmly established. 
 And yet, as often noted, this pretense of a wisdom-contest is not always 
sustained with great finesse by Gylfi, who frequently expresses his amazement at what 
he learns. The Æsir, however, are forced to maintain the pretense of the wisdom-
contest despite Gylfi’s own increasingly evident lack of qualifications for such a 
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match. Even after several dead give-aways of his own ignorance, Gylfi is still able to 
threaten them with the rules of a game he is unqualified to play. Thus when the Æsir 
are unwilling to say whether Thor has ever met an adversary he could not handle, 
Gylfi can reply,  
 
It looks to me as though I must have asked you something that none of you is 
capable of telling me...Here I shall stand and listen whether anyone offers a 
solution to this matter, and if not I declare you are overcome if you are not able 
to tell what I ask. (38 [43-44]) 
Despite their eventual awareness of his ignorance, the Æsir could only really “see 
through” Gylfi from a vantage point outside of the tradition they represent, which 
would rupture the generic convention that is the ground of their own illusory authority. 
Underscoring the comedy of this double-bind, the mechanics of this situation are 
apparent to neither party: not to Gylfi, who as proto-Christian has a practical, but no 
theoretical, understanding of his own actions; not to the pagan Æsir who lack even a 
proleptic understanding of master-student dialogue. The true situation is apparent only 
to the medieval reader from the vantage point of the Christian present—suggestive of 
the idea that true knowledge is only accessible to those whose grasp of Christian 
teaching is not merely anticipatory.  
 Ultimately aware that they have nothing to learn from Gylfi, the Æsir send him 
off with the hortatory words “may the knowledge you have gained do you good” (57) 
and dispel their hall. As Edith Marold has pointed out,100 the phase “ok note nú seem 
þú name” contains an echo of the words that with which Oðinn concludes the Old 
Norse didactic poem Hávamál. Although the Æsir might have long since broken with 
any pretense of a wisdom-contest, their frame of reference still derives from pagan 
didactic traditions they are unable to transcend—they cannot ultimately perceive that 
they have been playing magister to Gylfi’s discipulus. 
                                                
100 Marold (1998), 137. 
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 These events invoke, but do not quite reproduce, the contest in Vafþrúðnismál, 
where the interrogated sees through the interrogator’s disguise at the last minute. Still, 
the events of Gylfaginning are something of an ironic reversal of Vafþrúðnismál, 
where the rival is discovered to be “the wisest.” Gylfi exhausts the Æsir’s store of 
knowledge, not on the basis of his own superior lore, but because he establishes a set 
of expectations proper to one genre and then subverts them at his opponents’ expense. 
The situation is akin to Thor’s victory in the periodic wisdom-contest in Alvíssmál, 
where it is Thor’s cleverness, rather than any wisdom, that succeeds in delaying the 
dwarf Elvis long enough for the encroaching daylight to transform him to stone.  
 Gyfli is still defeated in the sense that he falls pray to the Æsir’s illusion. Yet 
his “defeat” in a contest he cannot win also contains a victory since the Æsir are at 
least equally deceived. Support for this idea is suggested by reading of one of the 
central episodes of the Edda as an allegory of the frame-story of Gylfi among the 
Æsir.101 The encounter of Thor and his companions and their defeat at the hands of 
Útgarða-Loki has long attracted the lion’s share of attention both from scholars, 
readers, and anthologizers.102 The activity of the latter may account to some degree for 
the tale’s popularity among the former, a tale that, along with the account of the 
creation of the world, the building of Asgard, and the account Ragnarok, is one of the 
most memorable, or most remembered, in the Edda. The extra attention lavished on 
this tale is, however, by no means limited to its historical reception. The tale of Thor 
in the hall of Útgarða-Loki is the longest sustained narrative passage in the Edda, free 
of interruption from those intrusive narrators, High, Just-as-High, and Third. Since 
this tale and the frame-story of Gylfi/Gangleri and the Æsir both take place in illusory 
                                                
101 McTurk (p. 3) mentions the comparison of these two stories as a possibility suggested by Bjarne 
Fidjestøl but does not take it up in his argument. 
102 It is, for example, the second longest selection in E.V. Gordon’s long-standard An Introduction to 
Old Norse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927). 
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halls, is inviting to view the Útgarða-Loki episode as a self-commentary on (or key to) 
the larger whole of Gylfaginning, which it recapitulates in part. 
 Just as Gylfi is allowed to maintain the pretense of the wisdom-contest, 
Útgarða-Loki allows Thor and his companions to spend the night in his illusory hall 
even though he has stated that “no one is allowed to stay here with us who does not 
have some art or skill in which he is superior to most people”(41). At stake is the right 
to stay—in the frame narrative it is the ability to leave alive that is contested. Thor and 
his companions suffer defeat in contests they cannot possibly win: Thor wrestles with 
Old Age; Loki has an eating-contest against Fire; Thor’s servant, Thialfi, races against 
Thought. But contrary to Útgarða-Loki ’s proviso, they are allowed to stay the night 
and receive hospitality. Gylfi, on the other hand, is allowed to leave unscathed even 
though his knowledge is in fact inferior. Útgarða-Loki knows the gods are superior but 
deceives them with illusions; the Æsir grant Gylfi the victory even though he cannot 
win by the rules of their contest. Thor and his companions suffer defeat at the hands of 
Utgard-Loki, but all should nevertheless believe, according to High, that Thor is the 
most powerful. “Hier wird offen aufgefordert, gegen die Wirklichkeit zu glauben.”103 
This exhortation to believe what is contrary either to reason or appearance is another 
quintessential feature of master-student dialogue (as are, for that matter, the student’s 
ongoing expressions of amazement and admiration). Given the illusory nature of the 
opponents of Thor and his companions, and that they all represent insurmountable 
forces like Fire and Old Age, it is not hard to see the grain of triumph in their defeat. 
Similarly, just as Gylfi is beguiled by the illusory hall of High, Just-as-High, and 
Third, they are likewise beguiled by Gylfi’s disguise as an old wanderer which leads 
them initially to “misread” what is in essence a master-student dialogue as a wisdom-
contest, and reveal their knowledge (and source of their power) to one who does not 
                                                
103 Marold (1998), 167. 
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already know the answers to his own questions. Thus the Æsir are true to their word 
when they said that Gylfi “ would not come out of there alive, unless he were himself 
the wiser.” Gylfi’s proleptic “mastery” of the master-student dialogue makes him 
precisely that.  
 As the composer of a vernacular ars poetica, Snorri also employs Gylfi’s naive 
manipulation of pagan and Christian didactic traditions to thematize a polyphony of 
genre-forms (wisdom contest, wisdom quest, master-student dialogue), combining 
them to create a rhetorical compendium that is not descriptive but in “real time.” That 
is to say, rather than merely offering a catalogue of genres—something essential to 
any ars poetica since Aristotle—Snorri shows them interacting within the ideal space 
provided allegorically by the Æsir’s hall. This allegory gives Snorri a framework in 
which to construct an ordered totality out of his own incompatible Christian-pagan 
cultural heritage, a project reminiscent of the great synthesis of heathen science and 
Christian morality found in the Canonical Encyclopedias. That, I would suggest, is a 
major, but overlooked, facet of  “the formative influence of the medieval encyclopedia 
on Snorri’s Edda”104—one which goes well beyond the ordering of natural-scientific 
material.  
 A discussion of Snorri’s encyclopedism is bound to stir the debate as to 
whether his work is significantly indebted to continental models or essentially 
autochthonic in character (a debate that even today shows few signs of abating).105 In 
this context it is especially worth emphasizing again that Gylfi trumps the pagan Æsir 
by establishing an initial horizon of expectations suggested by an indigenous “pagan” 
genre (wisdom-contest) while simultaneously employing a mode of inquiry derived 
                                                
104 To quote the chapter heading in Margaret Clunies Ross’s Skáldskaparmál, 151; see n. 43.  
105 See esp. Klaus von See, Mythos und Theologie im skandinavischen Hochmittelalter, Heidelberg, 
1988, and “Snorris Konzeption einer nordischen Sonderkultur,” Snorri Sturluson: Kolloquium anläßlich 
der 750. Wiederkehr seines Todestages. Script-Oralia 5, ed. Alois Wolf (Tübingen: G. Narr, 1993), 
141–77. Also see Anthony Faulkes, “The Sources of Skáldskaparmál: Snorri’s Intellectual 
Background” (59–76) in the same volume. 
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from the Christian pedagogical tradition of continental Europe. By playing the 
wisdom-contest and master-student dialogue off one another, indeed, by turning the 
competition of various genres—the first indigenous, the second a foreign import—into 
the key element of the plot the frame-narrative, Snorri voices his overarching concern 
with the integration of the native/pagan with an imported/Christian world view. Snorri 
dramatizes the conflict of indigenous and foreign traditions by making them the object 
of manipulation by one of the characters. Clearly, the Æsir cannot help but be 
“beguiled” since they are wholly ignorant of the Christian model that Gylfi naively 
employs. Gylfi’s appropriation of this model is consistent with the discussion of the 
wisdom (spekina)106 that God granted human beings that they might understand 
certain Christian teachings proleptically. Just as the pagans described in the prologue 
used this “earthly understanding” to anticipate truths later revealed by Christian 
teaching (such as the trinity),107 Gylfi uses this same naive understanding to anticipate 
and employ the practices of the Christian pedagogical tradition later responsible for 
transmitting these truths.   
 A character, of course, Gylfi, cannot be “aware” of his own appropriation of 
Christian pedagogical practice. How much of a problem to consider this, if at all, 
depends in part on how inclined we are to underestimate Snorri as a humorist. 
Moreover, to make an objection on these grounds would gloss over Snorri’s desire to 
offer an apology for his pagan ancestors by showing show how their beliefs and 
practices, although couched in error, anticipated fundamental aspects of Christian 
thought. Most of all, it would ignore Snorri’s avowed task: to compose a poetics in the 
Icelandic vernacular. Through Gylfi’s proleptic use of Christian pedagogical practice, 
                                                
106 Faulkes (1982), 3, 15. 
107 One should not lose sight of the comic potential of the very names Hár, Jafnhár, and Thriði (“High,” 
“Just-as-High,” and “Third”). While these names derive from various Oðinnsheiti, they form a rather 
parodic trinity, or, rather, perhaps they highlight the pagan Æsir’s inability to anticipate the true trinity 
of Christianity. Cf. Faulkes (1982), xxvii-xxviii.  
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Snorri shows how generic forms manipulate the expectations of a given audience by 
means of a fictive performance situation built into the narrative. Based on this, I would 
further suggest that the traditional distinction between Gylfaginning as mythographic 
narrative and Skáldskaparmál as an ars poetica is untenable. Just as Skáldskaparmál 
sometimes presents mythological material in the narrative mode of Gylfaginning, the 
narrative of Gylfaginning thematizes the rhetorical subject matter proper to Snorri’s 
encyclopedic poetics.  
 Snorri’s Edda strives to be a world-book no less than the Canonical 
Encyclopedias. The difference is that the world represented in the Edda is a pagan 
misapprehension of the true order of things. As mentioned, it has been suggested that 
the Æsir’s parodic trinity of High, Just-as-High, and Third reveals an inability to 
apprehend the true trinity of Christianity.108 I would further suggest reading Snorri’s 
tale of one king’s journey to three false kings as an inversion of the biblical story of 
the three kings’ journey to the one true king, the infant Christ. The story of the Æsir 
(three human men who for Snorri’s ancestors “become as gods”) is an inversion of the 
narrative of Christian salvation-history: the story of a triune god who becomes human. 
Such an inversion is a fitting framework within which to elaborate the combination of 
native tradition and proleptic insight that Snorri ascribes to the “earthly 
understanding” of his pagan forebears. 
 One might consider the juxtaposition of the Norse wisdom-contest and the 
Latinate master-student dialogue as Snorri’s way of addressing the “two cultures” of 
medieval Iceland. According to Lars Lönnroth, Einar Ólafur Sveinsson had argued  
 
“that a secularized literate culture had developed out of [the] system [of 
literary production established by the catholic Church] as early as the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, largely as a result of conflicts between the 
Church and the secular chieftains. The split between clerical and secular 
                                                
108 Faulkes (1982), xxvii-xxviii. 
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culture had, in his view, resulted in a farm-based literary production system, 
independent of the Church and ideal for the preservation of ancient pagan 
traditions. According to him, sagas and other secular native genres were 
written by farmers for farmers on the farms, while saints’ lives and other types 
of medieval genres were written by clerics in monasteries.”109  
Lönnroth argues that while the evidence indicates formal education in Iceland was the 
same as in western Europe, i.e., conducted  
 
in Latin and confined to the clergy . . . There was, on the other hand, quite a lot 
of information indicating that oral tales and poems, knowledge about the laws, 
and other types of traditional learning were cultivated on the farms and passed 
on from generation to generation, but only rarely in written form and certainly 
not part of any school curriculum.”110  
 
Lönnroth concludes that these were not in fact  
“two separate literatures or literary production systems, one clerical and one 
secular, but rather . . . overlapping and peacefully coexisting cultures jointly 
promoted by the Church and the secular chieftains, one dominated by native 
oral tradition, the runic alphabet, Old Norse feud stories, Eddic and skaldic 
poetry, the other dominated by the Latin alphabet, clerical education, and 
foreign literary genres.”111 
I would suggest that Snorri’s juxtaposition of the native wisdom-contest and clerical 
master-student dialogue reflects a preoccupation with the continuities and tensions that 
characterize the relationship of these “two cultures”—a reflection mirrored in the 
“world-book” of Snorri’s encyclopedic poetics. 
                                                
109 Lars Lönnroth, “Sponsors, Writers, and Readers of Early Norse Literature,” Social Approaches to 
Viking Studies, ed. Ross Samson and Margaret Clunies Ross (Glasgow: Cruithne Press, 1991), 4.  
110 Ibid., 6.  
111 Ibid., 10.  
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Chapter II. They Might Not Be Giants: The Sapiential Tradition, Ideology, and 
Snorri's Mythographic Ethnography  
 
 
 
Illustration 2: “Thor and Skrýmir” from The Heroes of Asgard: Tales from Scandinavian Mythology. By 
A.&E. Keary. Illustrated by C.E. Brock. New York: Macmillan & Co, 1870. 
 
 
Standing on the shoulders of frost-giants (chapter 1), it is now possible for us 
to see our way to some far-reaching conclusions concerning the intersection of 
Snorri’s encyclopedism and the broader sapiential tradition in of Medieval Iceland. To 
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delineate the tensions between the “two cultures” of Norway and Iceland, I examine 
the nature of the relationship between the main opposing (yet equally mutually 
dependant) camps in Norse mythology: the gods and the giants. While not always in 
the form of a neat analogy, the tensions between these two societies are, I will argue, 
reproduced in stories handed down to us by the thirteenth-century mythographer about 
Æsir and jötnar. While the world of Norse myth is populated by dwarfs, elves (and 
even the occasional human being), Norse mythic history mainly recounts the storied 
interactions of the gods and their giant kin. 
The figure of the giant occupies a central place in the Norse vernacular 
encyclopedic tradition. Giants are the sources and purveyors of encyclopedic wisdom. 
Therefore the question of “giantness” is central to Snorri’s practice of encyclopedism. 
The reading of the “two cultures” which has grown out of my discussion of the 
encyclopedic dimension of Snorri’s Edda can now be mobilized to support three 
theses: 
 
(1) the giants of Snorri’s Edda are not “gigantic.” 
 
The evidence for this commonplace idea is at best scant in Snorri’s Edda, in which 
 
(2) the distinction between the gods and the giants is cultural, not physical or 
racial. 
 
This explains one of the paradoxes of Norse myth: Odin continually struggles to 
acquire and display superior wisdom in the gods’ ongoing struggle with the giants, 
despite the patent uselessness of such wisdom in forestalling the doom of the gods. 
 
(3) Only the need to maintain this cultural distinction (2) accounts for the Odin’s 
pursuit of useless wisdom.  
 
This accounts for the high value placed on wisdom in the Old Norse Icelandic 
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sapiential tradition, which is at the core of Snorri’s encyclopedic project in the Edda. 
Wisdom is not good for anything—much less defeating the giants at Ragnarök—
which is precisely why it is useful in the gods’ construction of a distinct Æsir identity, 
predicated on alleged differences between god (ás) and giant (jötunn). It is a mere 
status symbol used to construct that difference, and like all status symbols, the more 
useless, the greater the prestige. 
The most basic putative difference between god and giant is the conventional 
notion of the giants’ super-human (or super-divine) size. However, what is well 
known is not necessarily known well. The notion of the giants’ gigantic stature is—as 
far as the evidence of Snorra Edda is concerned—based on colossal suppositions and 
unsupported by the textual evidence of Snorri’s mythography. 
My claims will seem as counter-intuitive as their implications are far-reaching, 
and will be argued in detail in this chapter. Reframing the status of “wisdom,” in 
encyclopedic learning in particular and the sapiential tradition in general, challenges 
the conventional wisdom of both popular and scholarly notions concerning the 
ethnographic and social orders of Norse myth. 
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1. What’s so big about giants? The jötnar of Snorra Edda 
In a recent study of “Giants in Germanic Tradition,” Randi Eldvik provides an 
overview of Jacob Grimm’s investigations into the nature of giantness in German and 
Scandinavian tradition in the light of recent scholarship. Eldvik warns against 
applying ideas about giants derived from Greco-Roman antiquity (such as Titans and 
Cyclopes) and biblical sources (such as Goliath and the biblical Γίγαντες) to our 
conception of the “basic idea of a giant” in Germanic tradition.112 This is a sound 
warning, but one Eldvik herself fails to heed in her re-examination of the Old Norse 
sources. Eldvik goes on to state that “In both traditions [i.e., Greco-Roman and Norse 
mythology], beings of colossal size [emphasis mine] constitute the greatest enemies 
and rivals of the ruling pantheon.”113 
This notion is well beyond widespread; it is the bedrock on which the entire 
discussion on the subject rests. In practice, documenting it would mean excavating the 
entire critical literature, as well as myriad popular sources. A brief excerpt from 
Cassell’s Dictionary of Norse Myth & Legend by Andy Orchard allows us to 
conveniently focus on some common (but unsupported) assumptions that inform the 
discourse on giantness. Orchard writes that the giants “inhabit the margins of the 
known world, dwelling in Útgard.”114 While this may seem uncontroversial  to anyone 
who has read Snorri´s account of the journey of Thor and his companions to Útgarða-
Loki, it is far from clear that Útgarða-Loki and his men are coterminous with the 
giants of Norse myth as recounted by Snorri.115 Hence positing the location of the 
giants’ home “in Útgard” becomes equally problematic. Orchard (probably in implicit 
                                                
112 Eldvik (in Shippey), 86. 
113 Ibid., 85. 
114 Andy Orchard, Cassell’s Dictionary of Norse Myth & Legend (London: Cassell, 1997), 132. 
115 Detlef Brennecke thinks the Skrymir episode is based on an original myth, cf. “Gab es eine 
Skrýmiskviða?”, Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi, 96 (1981), 1-8; cf. John Lindow, Norse Mythology: A 
Guide to the Gods, Heroes, Rituals, and Beliefs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43 
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reference to the classic article by Einar Haugen116) goes on to state that “perhaps the 
overriding characteristic of giants of all kinds is their essential hostility to gods and 
men [emphasis mine].”117 The problem is that the interactions of giants with 
humankind are, at best, sparsely attested, if at all. The final conflict of giants and men 
at Ragnarök can be inferred from the sources, but is nowhere described or attested in 
Snorri’s final accounting of the fate of Odin’s human warriors, the einherjar: 
 
“The Æsir will put on their war gear, and so will all the Einherjar, and advance 
on to the field” (Faulkes, 54). 
 
Gangleri also asks what will happen “after all Einherjar and all men are dead.” “Men,” 
it should be noted, are not previously and otherwise mentioned in Snorri’s account of 
Ragnarök, but the phrase “all Einherjar and all men” would seem to indicate that there 
is another group of humans, perhaps men still living at the time of Ragnarök, who 
fight alongside the gods and their undead human warriors. On this, the sources are 
silent. 
It is curious, to say the least, that in Snorri’s otherwise thorough accounting of 
the pairings of mortal combatants at Ragnarök—Odin and the Fenris Wolf, Thor and 
the Midgard Serpent, Freyr and Surtr—that there is no word concerning the precise 
manner of the demise of the einherjar. One assumes that Odin’s anonymous warriors 
pair off against the equally anonymous Sons of Muspell, though this is mere inference. 
Equally curious is the fact that no accounting is given of the giants’ role in the final 
battle. Loki arrives with an otherwise unattested giant “Hrym,” who captains Naglfar, 
the ship made of dead men’s nails, and “with him all the frost-giants” (54). This 
harkens back to the story of the giant Bergelmir, who on his ark escapes the blood-
dimmed tide loosed by the slaying of Ýmir. I do not believe it has previously been 
                                                
116 Einar Haugen, “The Mythical Structure of the Ancient Scandinavians: Some Thoughts on Reading 
Dumézil,” Introduction to Structuralism, ed. Michael Lane (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 170-83. 
117 Andy Orchard, 133. 
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noted that the history of the giants thus begins and ends with the figure of a giant in a 
boat.118 None of the gods’ other giant-enemies—the Fenris Wolf, the Midgard 
Serpent, or Loki himself—is a giant in the traditional sense (as are, say, Hrýmir, 
Þrymr or Vafþrúðnir), but rather monsterous out-births of jötunn-Æsir miscegenation. 
Thus, the giants’ “hostility to...men” can be inferred from, but is curiously 
undocumented in Snorri’s otherwise painstaking account of Ragnarök. The hostility of 
Útgarða-Loki towards Thor’s human companion, Þjálfi, might serve as eveidence of 
such hostility, assuming one assumes that Útgarða-Loki and his men are in fact 
giants—an assumption that is open to serious question. 
The point of the aforegoing is not to contest Orchard’s notion (with which I in 
fact agree) that the giants of Norse myth represent forces that are hostile to Æsir 
society, although the myths provide little evidence of hostility to humankind, for 
which one must look to the sagas. My point is simply that the sources, and Snorri’s 
mythography in particular, do not provide the basis for that particular belief, or for 
many other widespread ideas about the giants and their nature. The “Reference 
Section” in the monumental five-volume translation into English of the Complete 
Sagas of Icelanders is another case in point; it provides another synopsis of widely 
held beliefs that are, at best, only tenuously supported: 
 
giant jötunn, risi: According to the Nordic mythology, the giants (jötnar) had 
existed from the dawn of time. In many ways, they can be seen as the 
personification of the more powerful natural elements, and the enemies of the 
gods and mankind. The original belief was that they lived in the distant north 
and east in a place called Jotunheim (“the world of the giants”), where they 
were eternally planning the overthrow of the gods. The final battle of the gods 
and the giants, Ragnarök , would mark the end of the world. The original 
giants should not be regarded as stupid. They were clever, and devious, and 
had an even greater knowledge of the world and the future than that which was 
available to Odin. The term risi is a later term, coined when the old beliefs 
were fading and the ancient giants were on their way to becoming the stupid 
trolls of later ages. The expression refers primarily to the physical size of these 
                                                
118 Cf. also Hymisquiða; Örvar-Odds saga, ch.18; Gylfaginning 49.23-30. 
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beings that live in the mountains on the borders of civilization.119 
 
Much of this, stated with the brisk assurance of an encyclopedia entry, is open to 
question, if not outright rebuttal. What evidence is there that the giants personify 
natural elements (an idea that harkens back to the aetiological thinking and “nature 
cults” of nineteenth-century scholars), or, as argued above, that the giants are the 
enemies of mankind? The connection between Thor and the elements is clearer (both 
etymologically and mythographically) than that between the giants and the natural 
world. It is true that the sources speak of “Frost-giants” and “Mountain-giants,” but 
these terms are never even remotely explained. One might object that the name of 
Thor’s mother, Odin’s giantesses concubine Jorð, is indeed synonymous with “earth.”  
Again, my point is not to disprove such connections, merely to point out their 
tenuousness and the degree to which inference has played a role in the development of 
an uncritical consensus. What evidence is there really, direct or indirect, that the giants 
are “eternally planning the overthrow of the gods”? The giants are nowhere shown in 
council scheming the defeat of their enemies, in stark contrast to the gods in the Giant-
Builder episode.120 In Snorri’s Edda, the giants undoubtedly attempt to acquire the 
women and the property of the gods by a number of means, ranging from exchange to 
predation and violent confrontation.121 Snorri, in fact, depicts these attempts in 
precisely that order, suggesting that the giants’ earlier attempts at peaceful negotiation 
only later devolve into violence when they are thwarted by the gods’ violent response, 
e.g., in the Giant builder episode. One can infer or allege a master plan behind these 
machinations, but nowhere are such a motives stated expressis verbis. It remains 
unclear whether the giants’ in their ambitions are merely acting locally or thinking 
                                                
119 The Complete Sagas of Icelanders, Including 49 Tales, ed. Viðar Hreinsson, Introduction by Robert 
Kellogg, 5 vols. (Reykjavík: Leifur Eiriksson, 1997), V.410. 
120 One wonders if the Æsir are not in fact accusing the enemy of their own misdoings in Rovian 
fashion? 
121 Margaret Clunis Ross (1994), 107-126. 
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globally. In addition, while the giants are doubtless portrayed as wise (though at times 
stupid, e.g., Hrungnir), there is little evidence that they are “clever,” since their 
strategies almost always result in the bashing of the seat of their wisdom (i.e., their 
heads) into to tiny skull fragments courtesy of Thor. 
The glossary’s assertion that the “term risi is a later term, coined when the old 
beliefs were fading and the ancient giants were on their way to becoming the stupid 
trolls of later ages,” is also open to question. Wisdom in this case would consist in 
conceding that there is no statement that can be made of the giants of which the 
opposite does not hold equally well. Giants are wise and foolish; noble and savage; 
forces of chaos but bound by a social order. They are as complex, contradictory, and 
multi-dimensional as the gods, if not more so. 
If scholars have been wrong so many seemingly uncontroversial points, this 
raises the prospect that they have been wrong about the giants’ size as well. My 
argument is not that the giants of Norse tradition are not “actually” big but that Snorri 
does not represent them as such. In fact, Snorri goes to great length to avoid depicting 
the physical stature of the giants as bigger than the gods. Representations of giants as 
beings marked by “colossal size” are indeed wholly lacking in Snorri’s mythography. 
Simply put, there are no big giants in Snorri’s Edda. 
A review of the jötnar of Snorra Edda will demonstrate that this is indeed the 
case. Afterwards, I will offer a theory as to why this is the case. Since Old Norse-
Icelandic sources both older than and contemporary with Snorri, such as Saxo’s Gesta 
Danorum, the corpus of fornaldarsögur, and even a few of the Íslendingasögur, attest 
the idea of giants as beings distinguished by inordinate size, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine that Snorri could have been ignorant of the Scandinavian 
mainstream. Snorri’s treatment of giants in the Edda attests that he is well aware of 
this current; in fact, it provides a foil for his own unique representation of giantkind. 
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Why, then, does Snorri represent the giants of the Edda as “no big deal”? 
First, however, we must establish something the average reader will take for 
granted: namely, that the giants of Scandinavian tradition are usually big. While it may 
seem counterintuitive to offer so much evidence for what most will already believe, it 
is necessary to distinguish the sources of gigantic size in order to contrast them with 
Snorri’s depictions of the giants. The Danish historian Saxo Grammaticus, Snorri’s 
early thirteenth-century contemporary,  provides succinct evidence of giants of 
gigantic size in an oft-cited passage from the beginning of the Gesta Danorum: 
 
The fact that the land of Denmark was once inhabited by a race of giants is 
attested by the huge boulders found next to ancient burial mounds and caves. If 
anyone doubts whether this was carried out by superhuman powers, let him 
ponder the heights of certain mounds and then say, if he can, who carried such 
huge blocks to their tops. Anyone considering this wonder must reckon it 
unthinkable that ordinary human strength could lift such bulk to that height. 
Even on a level plain it would be difficult, and perhaps beyond your strength, 
to shift it. There is not enough evidence to decide whether those who devised 
these works were giants who lived after the influx of the flood or men of 
supernatural strength.122  
 
This passage indirectly supports the idea of the superhuman size of the giants, 
although on closer inspection it merely provides evidence for the idea of superhuman 
strength. One must infer that the giants’ “superhuman powers” are a result of being 
super-sized; Saxo, however, does not say this. Saxo’s account is also suggestive of 
Snorri’s myth of the Giant Builder, who constructs the gods’ fortress, Ásgarðr, by 
hauling similarly “huge blocks” with the aid of his horse, Svaðilfœri. Hence Saxo’s 
account provides some evidence of a general continuity between continental and 
Icelandic giant-lore. 
For textual evidence of the giants’ gigantic size, we must look to the so-called 
“ancient-legendary sagas” or fornaldarsögur, fantastic tales of Scandinavian heroes, 
                                                
122 Saxo Grammaticus, Gesta Danorum, ed. Hilda Ellis Davidson, trans. Peter Fisher (Suffolk and 
Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 1979) 9. 
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whose exploits take place in the legendary past before the settlement of Iceland . 
Thorstein Mansion-Might (Þorsteins þáttr bæjarmagns) provides a clear and 
unambiguous expression of the equation, giants = big: 
 
Nú er at segja af Þorsteini, at allan þann dag gengr hann um mörkina ok verðr 
við ekki varr. En at áliðnum degi kemr hann á eina braut breiða. Hann gekk 
eptir brautinni, þangat til at aptnaði. Gekk hann þá brott af brautinni ok víkr at 
einni stórri eik ok stígr upp í hana. Var þar nóg rúm í at liggja. Sefr hann þar 
um nóttina. En er sólin kom upp, heyrir hann dunur miklar ok manna mál. Sá 
hann þá, hvar margir menn ríða. Þeir váru tveir ok tuttugu. Þá bar svá skjótt um 
fram. Undraðist Þorsteinn mjök vöxt þeira. Hafði hann eigi sét jafnstóra menn 
fyrr. Þorsteinn klæðir sik. Líðr nú morgininn til þess, at sól er komin í 
landsuðr. 123 
 
[Thorstein walked on through the forest all day without noticing anything 
particular. But towards evening he came to a wide road and followed it till 
dusk. The then turned off the road and made for a huge oak tree. He climbed it 
and found there was plenty of room to lie down, so he slept there through the 
night. At sunrise he heard a great deal of noise and some voices and saw 
twenty-two men riding hard past the tree. Thorstein was amazed to see how big 
they were—he had never seen men of this size before (all italics mine).]124 
Other examples from the fornaldarsögur expressly state the giants’ inordinate size: 
 
“Hún var í skinnkyrtli ok mikil vexti ok illilig, svá at þeir þóttust ekki 
kvikvendi slíkt sét hafa.” (Örvar-Odds saga, ch.5).  
 
[She wore a leather tunic and was so high in stature and nasty looking that they 
thought they had never seen such a creature.] 
Einn dag sér Oddr, at jötunn mikill rær á steinnökkva þangat at bælinu. Hann er 
hátalaðr ok mælti: “Illr fugl er þat, sem hér á bæli, því at hann venst á, dag 
eptir dag, at stela brott kjöti mínu nýsoðnu. Skal ek nú leita við at hefna honum 
nokkuru. Ætlaða ek þá annat, er ek tók yxnin frá konungi, en fugl þessi skyldi 
hafa þau. Oddr stendr þá upp ok drepr ungana, en kallar á jötuninn: “Hér er allt 
þat, er þú leitar at, ok hefi ek varðveitt þat. Jötunninn gengr upp í bælit ok tekr 
kjöt sitt ok berr á nökkvann. Jötunninn mælti: “Hvar er kögurbarn, er ek sá 
hér? Gangi þat fram óhrætt ok fari með mér. Oddr sýnir sik nú, ok tók 
jötunninn hann ok lét út í nökkvann” (Örvar-Odds saga, ch.18, p.74-5).  
                                                
123 All quotations from the fornaldarsögur are from Fornaldar sögur Norðurlanda, ed. Guðni Jónsson, 
4 vols., Akureyri: Íslendingsagnaútgáfa, 1954. English translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
124 Þorsteins þáttr bæjarmagns, trans. Hermann Pálsson and Paul Edwards, Seven Viking Romances, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 262-3. 
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[One day Odd saw a great giant rowing up toward the nest in a stone boat. 
That’s a wicked bird nesting here,” he said in his very loud voice. “It’s begun 
to make a habit of stealing my fresh cooked meat every day and now’s the time 
to get my own back. When I took the king’s oxen, it wasn’t any part of my 
plan that this bird should get them. Then Odd stood up, killed the young 
vultures, and called out to the giant: “Here’s everything you’re looking for. 
I’ve been taking care of it. The giant climbed up into the lair, picked up his 
meat and carried it into the stone boat. Where’s that little infant I saw here just 
now?” he asked. “There’s no need to be frightened, step forward and come 
with me.” Odd showed himself, and the giant picked him up [or simply, “took 
him” —JT] and put him in the boat.] 
The bird stealing the giant’s fresh cooked meat recalls the myth in Skáldskaparmál of 
the giant Þjazi, whereas the stolen oxen recall the oxen-seizing Thor in the poem 
Hymisquiða.  
“Eptir þat settist Hildir til ára ok reri heim til Risalands, ok þótti Oddi fádæmi, 
hversu nökkvinn gekk. En er hann kom heim, sýndi hann barn þat, er hann 
hafði fundit, ok biðr dóttur sína gæta sem síns barns ok eigi verr. En er 
Hildigunnr tók við Oddi ok er hann stóð hjá henni, tók hann henni tæpt í mitt 
lær, en þó hafði Hildir allan vöxt yfir hana, eptir því sem karlmanni heyrði” 
(Örvar-Odds saga, ch.18, p.76).  
[Then Hildir settled down to the oars and rowed home to Giantland. Odd was 
quite surprised how fast the stone boat went. When the giant got back home, he 
showed people the infant he had found and asked his daughter to look after 
him with his own baby son. Hildigunn took Odd, and as he stood there beside 
her he barely reached her mid-thigh, yet Hildir was a lot bigger than she was, 
as you would expect of a man.] 
Hálfdanar saga Eysteinssonar contains a giant called “Sel,” also referred to as a 
spellvirki or troublemaker.  
“Er þar sá spellvirki, er Selr heitir, ok með honum einn hundr stórr sem naut” 
(Hálfdanar saga Eysteinssonar, ch.16)  
[There lives the mischief-worker called Selr, and with him a dog as big as a 
bull.] 
“Þann mann er at nefna til sögunnar, er Kolr hét. Margt gott er af honum at 
segja, þat fyrst, at hann var stórr sem jötunn” (Þorsteins saga Víkingssonar, 
ch.3).  
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[The saga mentions a man named Kolr. Much good is to be said of him, 
foremost, that he was as big as a giant.] 
 
“Lítr hann einn hræðiligan jötun liggja í sinni rekkju. Aldri hafði konungsson 
sét stærra mann” (Sörla saga sterka, ch.3)  
 
[He saw a terrifying giant lying in his bed. Never had the king’s son seen a 
bigger man.] 
 
“Í þeira liði sást einn maðr, mikill ok sterkr. Drap þessi maðr menn ok hesta, 
svá at ekki stóð við, því at hann var líkari jötnum en mönnum” (Norna-Gests 
þáttr, ch.7)  
 
[In their company was a man to be seen, big and strong. This man killed both 
men and horses, such that no one withstood him, because he was more like a 
giant than a man.] 
 
“Bóndi reri þá til lands. Hann hét Surtr. Mikill var hann og illilegur” (Ketils 
saga hængs, ch.2)  
 
[The farmer rowed to land. His name was Surtr. He was big and evil.] 
 
“Þeir sáu einn stóran jötun sitja við elds glór. Reykr var mikill í hellinum. Eitt 
kvikendi sat við eldinn ok kló jötninum með kömbum, en hann ýtir höfðinu á 
móti ok skældi sik allan” (Hjálmþés saga ok Ölvis, ch.9)  
 
[They saw a big giant sitting by the glow of the fire. There was a lot of smoke 
in the hall. A creature sat by the fire and combed the giant with a comb, and he 
turned his head towards them and made a huge grimace.] 
 
This scene is reminiscent of the famous episode where the young, troll-like Grettir 
Ásmundarson scratches his similarly-disposed father´s back with shearing combs by 
the fire. Indeed, there is some evidence that Grettis saga here draws on a “troll/giant-
by-the-fire” type-scene, which it  recapitulates when Grettir encounters the troll by the 
fire.125  
 
Röndólfr: “Hann mátti vel tröll kallast fyrir vaxtar sakir ok afls Móðurætt hans 
var frá Áluborg í Jötunheimum ok þar hafði hann upp vaxit (Göngu-Hrólfs 
saga, ch.30). 
 
                                                
125 For the “giant-by-the-fire” motif, see Grettis saga, ch. 66 and the myth of the giant-eagle Þjazi in 
Snorra Edda; also see Jökuls Þáttr Búasonar. There is also indirect evidence in Hymisqviða, since 
Hymir is noted for his brewing cauldron.  
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[He might well be called a troll on account of his size and on account that his 
mother’s side was from Áluborg in Jotunheim, and he had grown up there.] 
 
“Hann sá þar á hól einum jötum mikinn” (Egils saga einhenda ok Ásmundar 
berserkjabana, ch.11, probably the most giant-intensive of the 
fornaldarsögur).  
 
[In a cave there he saw a big giant.] 
In addition, Völsunga saga mentions giants in allusion to their sexual appetites, not 
their size. Gríms saga loðinkinna contains two giants (also referred to as tröll) without 
indication of size, but apparently a happily married couple. Thus, fifteen of the thirty-
four or so fornaldarsögur feature or refer to one or more giants. The Ancient-
Legendary sagas largely also explicitly describe the giants as big, though some refer 
instead to other attributes such as their wisdom (Gautreks saga), voraciousness (in the 
cases of Sörla saga sterka and Ketils saga hængs, this includes an appetite for man-
flesh), and their outlandish sexual appetites (Völsunga saga).126 
While the dating of the sagas is fraught with perils, all the Íslendingasögur that 
refer to jötnar are considered late, from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Giants 
play a role in Bárðar saga Snæfellsáss, Fljótsdæla saga, Grettis saga, and Jökuls Þáttr 
Búasonar; Egils saga mentions a jötunn in two skaldic stanzas. There are also 
references to jötnar in Flateyjarbók (ch. 453-455) and Landnámabók (84). It is not 
possible to make a ready distinction between the depiction of giants in the 
Íslendingasögur and the fornaldarsögur, except for the fact that they are scarcely 
attested in the former and rampant in the latter. This, of course, speaks to the question 
of medieval Icelanders’ concepts of truth and fiction.127 Giants are typically regarded 
                                                
126 “Other references to giants in the fornaldarsögur (not pertaining to size) include: Starkaðr var 
hundvíss jötunn” (Gautreks saga, ch.3) [Starkaðr was a very wise giant]; “At miðjum vetri kómu þeir í 
Heiðmörk. Þar var sá konungr fyrir, er Hrólfr í Bergi hét. Hann var sonr Svaða jötuns norðan af Dofrum 
ok Áshildar” (Frá Fornjóti ok hans ættmönnum, ch.1; a lengthy jötunn-genealogy follows.) [At mid-
winter they came to Heiðmörk. There ruled that king called Hrólfr-in-the-mountain. He was the son of 
the giant Svaði north of Dovre and Áshildar]; “Þar fell margr tvíhöfðaðr jötunn” (Hálfdanar saga 
Brönufóstra, ch.7). [Many two–headed giants fell there.] 
127 A question I address in my forthcoming paper, “Historia, argumentum, fabula: Genre and the 
Icelandic Saga revisited.” Cf. Strejblin Kaminski, The Saga Mind. 
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as creatures of the fantastic, who do not intrude on the “fiction of realism”128 of the so-
called family sagas or Sagas of Icelanders. Yet, these same “realist” sagas regularly 
feature visits from the dead, which—one cannot help but surmise—did not strike a 
medieval Icelandic audience as particulalry fanciful, but rather a remote but present 
fact of life.129 Thus, in terms of fact and fiction (not the  anachronistic concepts they 
are often assumed to be), the giants are more fantastic, more alien to mundane 
experience than other creatures of the Icelandic imagination.    
Both the fornaldarsögur and the Íslendingasögur largely (though not 
unanimously) attest the notion that the giants are beings of inordinate size. The 
following passages amply represent the beliefs of what I call the mainline 
Scandinavian tradition: 
Bárðar saga Snæfellsáss: 
 
Og eftir draum þenna fóru þau Bárður og Flaumgerður í burt frá Dofra en litlu 
síðar kom þar Haraldur Hálfdánarson og fæddist þar upp með Dofra jötni. 
Efldi Dofri hann síðan til konungs yfir Noregi eftir því sem segir í sögu 
Haralds konungs Dofrafóstra. (ch.1)  
 
[After this dream Bard and FlaumGerðr moved away from Dofri, and shortly 
thereafter Harald Halfdan’s son arrived and grew up with Dofri the Giant. 
(Complete Sagas, II, 238)] 
 
Mjöll giftist aftur Rauðfeld hinum sterka syni Svaða jötuns norðan frá Dofrum. 
Þau áttu þann son er Þorkell hét. Hann var mikill og sterkur. Hann var svartur á 
hár og hörund. En þegar hann hafði aldur til varð hann hinn mesti 
ójafnaðarmaður. (ch.2)  
 
[Mjoll was married again to Red-cloak the Strong, son of Svadi the giant from 
Dovrefjell. They had son called Thorkel, who was big and strong, with dark 
hair and swarthy skin. When he got older, he became the worst troublemaker. 
                                                
128 Robert Kellog, “Introduction,” The Sagas of Icelanders (London: Penguin, 2000), xxxiv.  
129 Much as it does in Iceland today: My own landlord in Reykjavík, son of a famous Icelandic scholar, 
was convinced that he had held conversations with ghosts while working as a village school teacher in 
the remote Eastfjords, and also believed that a spiteful ex-girlfriend (a witch, as it happens) sent her 
fetch to press down on him in his sleep. This did not strike his friends or family as fanciful. Even if 
Icelanders do not believe such stories, they are reluctant to dismiss them out of hand, as attested by the 
fact that only 10% of Icelanders are willing to state on record that they unequivocally do not believe in 
the existence of elves.  
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(Complete Sagas, II, 239)] 
Fljótsdæla saga: 
 
Jarl svarar: “Hví mun eigi verða svo að vera? Eg átti mér eina dóttir, fyrr en 
þessa sveina tvo, er Droplaug hét. Það var kallað að hún væri vel mennt. Eg 
unni henni mikið. Á hinum fyrrum jólum hvarf hún héðan á burt. Hana tók 
jötunn sá er Geitir heitir. Á hann þar byggð er þú þóttist koma. Það heitir 
Geitishamar en það fjall heitir Geitissúlur. Að þeim manni verður mörgum 
mein. Meiðir hann bæði menn og fé en sjá meinvættur er mest á öllu 
Hjaltlandi. Hef eg það mælt að þeim manni mundi eg hana gefa ef nokkur væri 
svo frækinn að henni næði á burt.”(ch.5)  
 
[The earl replied: “Why should it not be so? I had a daughter before these two 
boys. She was named Droplaug. It was said that she was highly accomplished. 
I loved her very much. Last Yule she vanished from here. A giant called Geitir 
took her. He lives in the place you dreamed you reached. It is called 
Geitishamar, and the mountain is called Geitissulur. Many people came to 
harm from this creature. He injures both men and cattle, and he is the greatest 
monster in all Shetland. I have declared that I would give her to the man, if he 
exists, who was bold enough to rescue her.” [(Complete Sagas, IV,386)] 
 
Hann sér þá að bar við himni höfuð jötunsins, miklu hærra en hamarinn. Hann 
bar að henni grjót svo mikið að hún mátti ekki á burt komast. Þá tók hann 
sverðið og gengur í mót jötninum. Jötunninn kallar hátt og bað hann niður láta 
melluefni sitt “ætlar þú þér mikið í fang að færast auðvirði þitt ef þú vilt taka 
hana frá mér er eg hefi áður lengi átt.” Og í þessu stígur jötunninn upp í 
skoruna bjargsins þá sem Þorvaldur hafði séð, en öðrum fæti á flesin og varð 
hann eigi votskór. Og sá hann að til þess var þessi skor að jötunninn vildi eigi 
vaða. En í þessu kemur Þorvaldur að og hleypur inn undir hann en jötunninn 
breiðir frá sér lámana og ætlaði að taka Þorvald. En í því höggur Þorvaldur til 
hans og kom á mitt lærið jötunsins og tók af fótinn vinstra fyrir ofan kné en 
hinn hægra fyrir neðan kné og kom sverðið í sandinn niður. En jötunninn féll 
og kvað við sárlega og mælti: “Illa hefur þú mig svikið og meir en eg ætlaði að 
þú hefur tekið það eitt vopn er mér mátti grand vinna. Fór eg af því óhræddur 
eftir þér að eg hugsaði ekki að smámenni mundi mér verða að bana. En nú 
muntu þykjast hafa mikinn sigur unnið. Muntu ætla að bera vopn þetta og þínir 
ættmenn. En það mæli eg um að þá verði þeim síst gagn að er mest liggur 
við.”(ch.5)  
 
[Then he saw the giant’s head looming on the skyline, high above the cliff. He 
carried some stones to her, so many that she could not get away. Then he took 
the sword and went to face the giant. The giant called out loudly to him and 
told him to put down his mistress – “you must think you can handle a lot, you 
wretch, if you want to take her from me whom I have possessed for a long 
time.” At that moment the giant stepped up into the cleft in the cliff which 
Thorvald had seen before, and he put the other foot on the flat rock, and he did 
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not get his shoe wet. And he saw that the cleft was there because the giant did 
not want to wade the shoal water. At that moment Thorvald came up and ran in 
underneath him, and the giant spread out his paws intending to catch Thorvald. 
But at that moment Thorvald struck at him and the blow landed on the middle 
of the giant’s thigh and took off the left leg above the knee and the right one 
below the knee, and the sword came down into the sand. The giant fell and 
cried out painfully and said, “You have betrayed me wickedly, and worse than 
I thought, because you took from me the only weapon which could do me 
injury. That’s why I came after you without any fear, because I had no idea 
that a puny human [lit. “small people”] would turn out to be my killer. Now 
you must think that you have won a great victory. You will be thinking that 
you and your descendants will bear this weapon. But I lay a curse on it, so that 
it will be the least help to them when they most depend on it. (Complete Sagas, 
IV, 387-388)] 
 
Hann lætur hlaða bál og láta síðan draga jötuninn út á bálið og brenna hann að 
köldum kolum og eftir það flytja þeir öskuna á sjá út.(ch.5)  
 
[He had a pyre built, and then had the giant dragged out on to it and burnt to 
cold ashes, and after that they carried the ashes out to sea (Complete Sagas, IV, 
389)] 
 
Grettis saga: 
Grettir sá að þar lá jötunn ógurlega mikill. Hann var hræðilegur að sjá. En er 
Grettir kom að honum hljóp jötunninn upp og greip flein einn og hjó til þess er 
kominn var því að bæði mátti höggva og leggja með því. Tréskaft var í. Það 
kölluðu menn þá heftisax er þann veg var gert. Grettir hjó á móti með saxinu 
og kom á skaftið svo að í sundur tók. Jötunninn vildi þá seilast á bak sér aftur 
til sverðs er þar hékk í hellinum. Í því hjó Grettir framan á brjóstið svo að 
nálega tók af alla bringspalina og kviðinn svo að iðrin steyptust úr honum ofan 
í ána og keyrði þau ofan eftir ánni…Hann lét skammt höggva í milli þar til er 
jötunninn dó. (ch.66)  
[He entered the cave and a great log fire was burning there. Grettir saw a giant 
lying there monstrous in size and terrible to behold. When Grettir approached 
it, the giant snatched up a pike and swung a blow at the intruder. Known as a 
shafted sword, this pike was equally suited for striking or stabbing and had a 
wooden shaft. Grettir returned the blow with is short sword, striking the shaft 
and chopping through it. The giant tried to reach behind him for a sword that 
was hanging on the wall of the cave, but as he did so Grettir struck him on the 
breat, slicing his lower ribs and belly straight off and sending his innards 
gushing out into the river where they were swept away…He struck a few quick 
blows at the giant until he was dead. (Complete Sagas, II, 66.154)] 
Jökuls Þáttr Búasonar: 
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Þeir sáu að þrjú flögð sátu við eldinn og var ketill yfir eldinum. Jökull lætur sér 
óbilt verða bregður sverðinu og heggur á háls jötninum svo af tók höfuðið og  
hraut ofan í ketilinn.(ch.2)  
 
[They saw three giantesses sitting by a fire, over which a cauldron was 
hanging. Jokul did not panic, drew his sword and struck at the neck of one of 
the giantesses so that her head flew off and fell down into the cauldron.130] 
 
“Það gerði Skrámur er konungur er yfir öllum óbyggðum og allir jötnar eru 
hræddir við hann.”(ch.3)  
 
[It was Skram, who is king of all the wilderness, and all the giants are afraid of 
him. (Complete Sagas, III, 332)] 
 
“Hér er hellirinn Skráms konungs; hefur hann boðið hingað öllum jötnum og 
flagðkonum er í óbyggðum búa og munu þeir færa þig til heljar er þeir sjá þig, 
hverju ég vildi ekki valdið hafa. Hér er gull eitt er ég vil gefa þér; þar er í sá 
náttúrusteinn; ef þú dregur gullið upp á fingur þér þá sér þig enginn framar en 
þú vilt.”(ch.3)  
 
[“Here is King Skram’s cave. He has invited all the giants and giantesses who 
live in the wilderness, and they will do you to death the minute they see you. 
This is not something I want to happen. Here is a ring which I will give you. If 
you put it on your finger, the stone has the power to make you as invisible as 
you want.” (Complete Sagas, III, 332, Modified)] 
 
 “Ég heiti Hvítserkur, sonur Soldáns konungs af Serklandi en systir mín 
Marsibilla. Skrámur jötunn heillaði okkur hingað, ætlaði hann Grímni, syni 
sínum, systur mína;”(ch.3) [“I am Hvítserk, the son of King Soldan of the land 
of the Saracens, and this is my sister, Marsibilla. The giant Skram brought us 
here by witchcraft. He intended his son Grimnir to marry my sister.” 
(Complete Sagas, III, 333, Modified)] 
Landnámabók: 
 
Ketill raumur hét hersir ágætur í Raumsdal í Noregi; hann var son Orms 
skeljamola, Hross-Bjarnarsonar, Raumssonar, Jötun-Bjarnarsonar norðan úr 
Noregi.(ch.56) 
 
[Ketill raumar was the name of a prominent chieftain in Raumsdal in Norway; 
he was the son of Ormr skeljamoli, son of Hross-Björn, who was the son of 
Raum, who was son of the Giant-Björn.] 
 
Þorvaldur holbarki var hinn fjórði; hann kom um haust eitt á Þorvarðsstaði til 
                                                
130 All English translations are from The Complete Sagas of Icelanders (see note 119, above), III.2.330. 
Citations refer to volume, chapter, and page. I use the anglicized versions of proper names when 
quoting available translations; otherwise the spelling of the Icelandic original is maintained.  
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Smiðkels og dvaldist þar um hríð. Þá fór hann upp til hellisins Surts og færði 
þar drápu þá, er hann hafði ort um jötuninn í hellinum. Síðan fékk hann dóttur 
Smiðkels, og þeirra dóttir var Jórunn, móðir Þorbrands í Skarfsnesi.(ch.64) 
 
[Þorvaldur holbarki was the fourth; he came one fall to Þorvarðsstaði to 
Smiðkell and stayed with him for a while. Then he journeyed up to the cave of 
Surtr and delivered that drapa, which he composed about the giant in the 
caves. Afterwards he married Smiðkell’s daughter, and their daughter was 
Jorunn, the mother of Þorbrandr of Skarfsnes.] 
 
The giants of the Íslendingasögur are betimes-powerful rulers, distinguished 
ancestors, terrible monsters, sexual predators, or guardians of treasure—all (?) roles 
attested in the mythological poetry and in Snorri’s Edda. Yet despite their numerous 
attestations in the sagas, the giants are not primarily associated with the Sagas of 
Icelanders, nor with the more densely giant-populated tales of the fornaldarsögur. The 
scholarly and popular imaginations have seemingly relied largely on mythological 
sources such as Eddic poetry and Snorri’s Edda for their depictions of giantkind. Yet 
the scholar’s image is far closer to the portrayals of giants in the sagas than to the 
thirteenth-century mythographic tradition, represented chiefly by Snorri and the 
collection of poems known as the Poetic Edda. 
Scholars have rightly—though somewhat overzealously—questioned Snorri’s 
reliability as a witness for “actually-existing” Norse paganism.131 Historians of Norse 
religion have gone so far as to make the wholesale exclusion of Snorri’s mythography 
a methodological requirement for further investigation in the field. Yet, despite 
concerns about his reliability as a source for actually-existing Norse paganism—
sometimes justified, sometimes exaggerated—the author of the Edda remains our 
main and indispensable source for the narratives of Norse myth.  
From the evidence of the sagas, it is clear that the giants of Scandinavian 
tradition are inordinate in size. My argument is not that the giants of Norse tradition 
                                                
131 Most recently the Roberta-Frank school. 
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are not “actually” big but that Snorri does not represent them as such. Snorri in fact 
goes to great length to avoid depicting the physical stature of the giants as bigger than 
the gods. Representations of giants as beings marked by “colossal size” are wholly 
lacking in Snorri’s mythography. Simply put, there are no big giants in Snorra Edda. 
This claim will seem counter-intuitive, or simply fanciful, to those acquainted 
with the most familiar tales of Snorra Edda, such as Thor’s encounter with Skrýmir or 
journey to Útgarða-Loki, and his battle with Hrungnir and Mökkurkálfi. However, it 
can be shown that all beings represented unambiguously as “gigantic” in size in 
Snorra Edda are not giants at all. In the case of any being identified expressis verbis as 
“jötunn,” it is the reader armed with the combined prejudices of poplar and scholarly 
tradition who supplies ideas about size, not Snorri’s text. 
What has escaped the attention of critics and scholars is that the only big giants 
in Snorra Edda are not giants at all. The two “giants” depicted as gigantic are Skrýmir 
and Mokkurkalfi, neither of whom can be considered giants: the first is an illusion 
wrought by Útgarða-Loki; the second is a golem-like construct made by the giants as 
Hrungnir’s sekundant in his duel against Thor. In addition, Snorri never refers to either 
as giants. Thus, the only two unambiguously big “giants” in the Edda are not giants at 
all. 
As promised, I will now review the jötnar of Snorra Edda in support of this 
claim, beginning with the primal giant, Ýmir.  
It seems intuitive that Ýmir’s must have been of gigantic proportions, since 
Bor’s sons construct the world from his dismembered body. Is Ýmir, however, bigger 
than the gods? The text offers little support for this conclusion. Is the mass of the 
world equal to the mass of Ýmir’s corpse, or is it more like the gods’ ship Skiðblaðnir, 
which is big enough to carry the whole pantheon yet folds into the size of a pocket? 
How much spit was required for the Æsir and Vanir to construct Kvasir? Is it equal to 
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the six quarts equal to the amount of blood in the human body? Or do the gods 
generate it after passing around the divine spitoon once only? How literally should we 
consider such questions of size? Does size matter?  
We must assume that Ýmir, whose skull forms the sky, whose flesh forms the 
earth, and is big enough to supply oceans of blood, is either no bigger than the Æsir, 
who are capable of killing and him and rearranging his body parts, or, the gods must 
be possessed of the strength necessary for such a Herculean task, since the gods are 
unable to move even Hrungnir’s leg off of Thor after their duel. Nowhere is it even 
alluded to that Ýmir’s stature surpasses that of other giants. We are told that “so much 
blood flowed from his wounds that with it [Bor’s sons] drowned the race of frost-
giants” (11). Logically, if Ýmir’s blood is sufficent to drown an entire race, his body 
must either be exponentially larger than that of other giants, or the blood must flow 
from his wounds perpetually, as in the case of certain Christian miracles or folk tales. 
We are in fact told that “the blood that came from his wounds...was flowing 
unconfined” (12). This would support a reading of the outpour of blood and 
transfromation of his body as a miraculous event. Odin transforms the flesh of Ýmir’s 
male body into the female earth [Jorð], who at that moment becomes his daughter, and 
who later will be his wife and mother of his son, Thor. It does not take a Freudian to 
read the “blood...flowing unconfined” as parallel to menstruation, further reinforcing 
the feminization implicit in the murder of Ýmir and transformation of his body.  
This would seem to be the first instance in mythic history of ergi, the Old 
Icelandic concept whose basic meaning is “effeminacy” or “passive homosexuality.” 
Ergi and its adjectival form argr extends to witchcraft, male and female promiscuity, 
cowardice, and other Norse concepts of “unmanliness.”132 No greater slander is 
                                                
132 Cf. Preben Meulengracht Sørensen, The Unmanly Man: Concepts of Sexual Defamation in Early 
Northern Society, The Viking Collection: Studies in Northern Civilization (Odense: Odense University 
Press, 1983). 
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possible in the myths and the sagas. The term also has legal standing; accusing another 
man of ergi is an actionable offence whose perpetrator can be slain with impunity.133  
The Norse creation account contracts the creation of the world and the first 
murder into one felonious event, both of which—in both the biblical account of the 
Fall and in Snorri’s account of creation—result in an unstaunchable female (or 
feminized) bleeding. Of course, as others have noted, Ýmir is already sexually 
ambiguous in that he gives birth to the next generation of giants in an act of “male 
pseudo-procreation.”134 Since the earth itself can be regarded as both metaphorically 
male and female,135 the transformation of Ýmir’s male body into the female Jorð 
provides a narrative basis for a well-worn paradox. 
According to a much-neglected theory originally put forth by Finnur Jónsson 
almost a century ago, the animosity of Loki and the giants toward the Æsir is a form of 
revenge for the killing of Ýmir.136 The theory, as I will argue later, has great 
explanatory force and helps us transform the scattered episodes of mythic history into 
a coherent narrative. Be that as it may, I would point out that what has been 
overlooked is that the giants are not merely seeking revenge for the death of Ýmir but 
also for the feminization implied by both the nature of his bleeding wound and the 
transformation of his male body into the female earth. 
While I would leave open the possibility that Ýmir may indeed be bigger than 
human beings, there is little to suggest he is bigger than the gods. Whereas Odin’s 
paternal grandfather Buri is  described as “big and powerful” (Faulkes, 11), Ýmir is 
nowhere described as “big.” Snorri quotes Vafþrúðnismál which describes Ýmir as 
                                                
133 Sørensen (1983), 16.  
134 Margaret Clunies Ross (1994), 144-186; see also Jan de Vries, The Problem of Loki, Folklore 
Fellows Communications No. 110 (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1933), 221. 
135 André Jolles, “Geschlechtswechsel in Literatur und Volkskunde,” Mitteldeutsche Blätter für 
Volkskunde, 6 (1931), 160.  
136 Finnur Jónsson, Goðafræði Norðmanna og Íslendinga: Eftir heimildum (Reykjavík: Hið íslenska 
bókmentafjelag, 1913), 96. 
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“wise.” The passage (from Vafþrúðnismál and Snorri) is worth quoting in full: 
 
 And here it is told by the giant Vafþrúðnir 
 
where Aurgelmir [i.e., Ýmir] came from together with the sons of 
giants [the Æsir? Cf. Odin to Thor, “son of a giantess”], that wise giant: 
 
“When from Elivagar shot poison drops and grew until from them came 
a giant in whom our ancestries all converge: thus ever too terrible is all 
this.” (Faulkes, 10) 
 
Who are the “sons of giants” to whom Vafþrúðnir refers? The giants themselves? Or 
the gods? The fact that Odin refers to Thor’s son Magni, who is counted among the 
Æsir, as “the son of a giantess” makes the latter reading plausible. This might suggest 
an early social union between “Bor’s sons,” Odin, Vili, and Ve and Ýmir. “Thus ever 
too terrible is all this”: what exactly is too terrible? Is it the manner in which Ýmir 
comes into being (“Elivagar shot poison drops and grew until from them came a 
giant”) or the fact that the gods’ “ancestries all converge” in him? 
“The Æsir race” (Faulkes, 13) is first described as the family line that descends 
from Odin and his legitimate wife Frigg. This “race” is defined by its territorial 
dominion, as the race that “resided in old Asgard and the realms that belong to it” 
(13). They are likewise defined by their power. When Gylfi asks “which group was 
more powerful [the gods or the giants]”, Gangleri responds, “Bor’s sons killed the 
giant Ýmir” (11). The Æsir race’s “whole line of descent is of divine origin” (13), 
which is to say that they trace their origin back to Buri, Bor, and Odin. It is unclear 
whether Buri and Bor should be counted as “Æsir” or whether this is an Odinic 
innovation. This notion that all the Æsir are “of divine origin” is immediately 
undermined by the genealogical account of Thor, whom Odin begets with the giantess 
Jorð. It is striking, to say the least, that the account of the founding of an Æsir dynasty 
(where pure Æsir are defined as the offspring of Odin and Frigg) begins first with 
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Odin’s bastard son Thor, thus strongly suggesting the distinction between god and 
giant is slippery, at best, and that Odin’s experiment in eugenics will be short lived. 
Indeed, if one takes Odin as the first of the Æsir, their subsequent genealogy spans 
only two more generations, down to the sons of Thor. Notably, Odin’s legitimate sons 
produce no heirs.    
Finally, we must ask: when Bor’s sons “drowned the race of frost-giants,” was 
this an attack on a “race” that was already distinct from the Æsir, or was this itself the 
act that created this racial distinction in the first place? The Æsir define themeselves 
as the patrineal descendents of Buri, his son Bor, and his son Odin. Foremost among 
Odin’s sons are Thor and Baldr. Thor is, as mentioned, the product of the union of god 
and giant, whereas Baldr is the legitimate son of Odin and Frigg, hence reckoned 
among the “pure” Æsir. Yet despite his mixed parentage, Thor is the “most 
outstanding” and “strongest” (22) of the Æsir, in stark contrast to the decidedly static 
figure of Baldr. Baldr is “best,” “fair,” and “wise” (?), unlike Thor, but “none of his 
decisions can be fulfilled. Baldr is wise but lacks the wit that is the active application 
of wisdom. 
None of the Ásyniur are said to have giant lineages, as opposed to Thor, Móði, 
Magni, Víðarr, Vali, or Odin himself. We are left to speculate whether this is in fact 
the case or if their genealogies are perhaps omitted due to the taboo nature of god-
giant unions. Perhaps the association of giant sexuality with female genealogy is more 
threatening than when male offspring are the result. Nowhere is the threat female 
genealogy is more evident than in giants’ repeated attempts to secure Ásyniur brides. 
And nowhere is this threat greater than where Freyja, most coveted of the goddesses, 
is concerned, as in the case of the Giant Builder, who tries to secure her through 
peaceful exchange in a bargain to build a fortress for the gods. Despite being identified 
as a “mountain giant” (36), the Giant Builder lacks the strength that Saxo ascribes to 
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the giant inhabitants of prehistoric Denmark, who are able to move “huge boulders” 
by themselves. The Builder is marked not by size or strength but by excess. The giant 
wants as wages not only Freyja but the sun and the moon. The gods only realize “for 
certain” (36) that the master builder is a giant after he displays his uncontrolled giant’s 
rage (jötunmoðr). It is also clear that the Builder has only secured this shady deal with 
the assistance of his half-giant cousin, Loki. (Thus affirming that even among the gods 
construction contracts are secured through nepotism.) The gods contract with the 
Builder to make a fortress “secure against mountain-giants and frost-giants.” If one 
takes the hostility of the giants towards the gods as a given, this makes about as much 
sense as hiring prisoners to construct a prison, and lends credibility to the thesis that 
the gods do not know who they are dealing with, as affirmed by the fact that they only 
realize “for certain” that the Builder is a giant after his display of rage. This detail 
resists simple explanation since the gods, at least by the time of their emergency- 
council wonder “who had been responsible for the decision to marry Freyja into 
giantland” (35). It would seem that the gods were ignorant of the Builder’s nature 
when the deal was sealed, grew suspicious when the work was underway, and only 
realize “for certain” when the giant show’s his true nature, which consists in excess, 
not gigantic size. This is parallel to how the Builder’s horse Svaðilfœri realizes “what 
kind of horse it was” (36) only when their dealings are underway. Loki’s “neighing” 
heralds the fact that he is a mare in the same way that the Builder’s violent outburst 
announces to all that he is a giant. 
The line between the gods and the giants does at times appear to be 
dangerously thin. Both Thor and the Giant Builder fly into a giant rage when their 
respective animals (Thor’s goats and the Builder’s horse) are misused and contracts 
regarding them are violated (Thor’s implicit contract with a human family regarding 
the treatment of his goats and the Builder’s contractual right to avail himself of his 
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horse’s labor). The god’s rage at the violation of a contract regarding an animal is 
reflected in the thirteenth-century Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða, when the wrathful 
Hrafnkell kills his laborer Einarr for riding a horse forbidden him by the terms of their 
agreement. This transpires during Thor’s and his companions’ “journey east to 
Giantland (Jötunheim)” (38), and it is natural to assume, when they come to the hall of 
Útgarða-Loki, that they have arrived. But are Útgarðr and Jötunheim really the same 
place? Are they synonyms? Scholars routinely make this equation,137 but at no point 
does Snorri’s text equate Jötunheim with Útgarðr. What scholars have failed to notice 
is that the word “jötunn” does not occur on any occasion in the Útgarða-Loki episode. 
This is not conclusive evidence in itself, but it is highly suggestive that the equation 
Útgarðr = jötunheim is at least problematic. There are many apparent references to 
large size in both Thor’s journey and his and his companions stay in the hall of 
Útgarða-Loki. Curiously, these references are always oblique. The word jötunn is 
scrupulously avoided throughout Thor’s journey to Útgarða-Loki’s Hall. 
En route to Jötunheim, Thor and his companions take shelter for the night in a 
strange dwelling that turns out to be the glove of a huge being who later identifies 
himself as “Skrýmir.” Since Thor is en route to Giantland and Skrýmir is clearly as 
gigantic as it gets, one concludes that Skrýmir is a giant. Snorri, however, 
scrupulously avoids the word jötunn, and, as is typical of the entire Útgarða-Loki 
episode, describes Skrýmir’s inordinate size through a series of litotes (a figure of 
speech consisting of an understatement in which an affirmative is expressed by 
negating its opposite). The text of Concerning Skrýmir’s stature, Snorri’s narrator, 
“Third,” says that “he was no midget” (39) and “a person of no small build.” 
Skrýmir, the thumb of whose glove serves as lodgings for a night’s rest for a 
party of four is clearly and unequivocally gigantic. But is he a giant? The correct 
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answer is that he is not anything at all.  Skrýmir, properly speaking, does not exist; he 
is an illusion. Therefore, he cannot be entered into evidence for any claims regarding 
the nature of the giants. 
The journey of Thor and his and his companions is, notably, the only episode 
in Snorri’s Edda where sleep is involved. Even the preceding episode where Thor 
takes lodging for the night with a peasant family elides the detail of slumber. In fact, it 
is doubtful that Thor spends the night there at all. The peasants’ son fails to treat “the 
goat’s bones with proper care” during the evening meal (38), rendering the animal 
crippled. Once Thor’s wrath is assuaged the text states, ”he left the goats behind there 
and started on his journey east to Giantland” (38), with no mention of his having spent 
the night. The fact that the Skrýmir-episode, uniquely in the Edda, involves sleep calls 
attention to dream-logic at work therein. My point is not to prove whether Útgarða-
Loki episode “really” is a dream or not, but rather to point out how normal conditions 
do not apply to an episode that is wrought by illusion and rounded with a sleep. Thor’s 
journey to Útgarða-Loki is in fact the stuff of dreams—the stuff that anxiety 
nightmares are made of. Thor’s fastest runner, Þjálfi, is hopelessly outrun, the 
ravenous god Loki is out-eaten, and the mighty Thor cannot even lift a mere cat off the 
ground. These are Old Norse versions of classic bad dreams such as having to repeat 
high school because of a missing gym credit, running while stuck in place, or showing 
up to work with no pants on.138   
More quotidian considerations speak against Útgarða-Loki and his companions 
being truly gigantic. If Útgarða-Loki and his men were disproportionately larger than 
their guests, Thor and his companions could pass more easily through the bars of 
                                                
138 Other familiar clinical examples of anxiety nighmares include falling, arriving too late, losings one’s 
teeth, failing an examination, and not being able to move, cf. Michael Schredl, Petra Ciric, Simon Götz, 
Lutz Wittmann, “Typical Dreams: Stability and Gender Differences,” The Journal of Psychology, 138 
(2004), 485. 
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Útgarð’s gate. Útgarða-Loki’s champion runner, Hugi (the embodiment of his thought: 
hugr) is described as “a little fellow” (41). Loki loses his eating-contest to Logi (fire), 
who is faster, not bigger, than Thor’s mischievous traveling companion. Still, it is 
clear from the text that Útgarða-Loki and his men (or many of them) are bigger than 
Thor and his companions. Skrýmir tells Thor not to act “big” and that he will see 
bigger men than himself if he gets into Útgarð (41). Útgarða-Loki also calls Thor a 
“little fellow,” quipping, “you must be bigger than you look to me” (41), and goes on 
to say that “Thor is short and small in comparison to the big fellows here with us” 
(43).139 
More important to note, however, is Útgarða-Loki’s sustained used of 
circumlocution to describe the size of Thor, Loki, and Þjálfi. Útgarða-Loki is a 
circumlocutor. According to Útgarða-Loki, Thor is “not as great a person as the Æsir 
say” (43), “not as great as we thought” (43), and “much less impressive than we 
thought” (43). Útgarða-Loki’s cat (who is really the Midgard Serpeant incognito) is 
“rather big” (43). Thor attempts to drain Útgarða-Loki’s drinking horn, which is “not 
big but rather long” (42). Thor’s draught is “not excessive” (42). (That is to say, it is 
ungiantlike.) Útgarða-Loki has many men, “most of them a fair size” (41). The 
largeness of Skrýmir, Útgarða-Loki, and his men is apparently real, yet most often 
described obliquely. Both Útgarða-Loki and the episode’s narrator, Third, continue to 
use circumlocution parallel to Skrýmir’s use of litotes, as when he takes leave of Thor, 
saying, “I have heard you whispering among yourselves that I am a person of no small 
build” (40). 
We can draw four conclusions from the aforegoing analysis. First, in the only 
example in Snorri’s Edda of beings unequivocally larger than the gods, this difference 
                                                
139 Although when Útgarða-Loki  calls Thor a “Litill drekki maðr,” this does not mean that Thor is a 
small man drinking, but a man who cannot hold much drink. 
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is predicated on an illusion, as Útgarða-Loki makes plain: 
 
En sjónhverfingar hefi ek gert þér. [But I have deceived you with illusions.] 
(47.42) 
 
Second, these illusory beings are never called “giants.” That term is scrupulously and 
painstakingly avoided, yet the author flirts constantly with more direct indications of 
physical difference through a series of litotes, understatements, and other 
circumlocutory effects. Third, this illusory physical difference is a cipher for cultural 
difference; Útgarða-Loki society is bound by its own complex rules in which visitors 
must first be instructed. Fourth and lastly, this cultural difference is depicted as racial 
difference, which brings us back to the illusory difference in size. 
Útgarða-Loki and his men are not really giants, in the same way that the three 
“historical” Æsir (High, Just-as-High, and Third) of the frame narration of  
Gylfaginning are not really the Æsir whose exploits they recount. The parallelism 
could hardly be more precise; only the blinders of an uncritical consensus have 
prevented us from noticing it. 
This difference in size is nowhere else in evidence in Snorri’s Edda. In 
Hymisqviða in the Poetic Edda, Thor takes on the appearance of a “young boy” (46, 
cf. 41, 43) who is “small and just a youth” (46) in comparison to Hýmir, but once 
more this difference in size is predicated on an illusion. Thor and Hýmir set out on a 
fishing expedition where Thor, to the chagrin of his host, attempts a rematch with the 
Midgard Serpeant. When Thor attempts to pull the Miðgarðsórmr in on his line, his 
feet crash through the bottom of the boat and he braces them against the ocean floor, 
just as in Útgarða-Loki’s hall he almost lifts the “cat” up to the sky (45). Thus, it is 
Thor, not the jötunn Hýmir who appears gigantic in size. Yet there is no reason to 
suppose that Thor’s stretching act has any more basis in reality than his shrinking act 
when he “assumed the appearance of a young boy” (46), a stature as illusory as 
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Skrýmir´s gigantic size. There is no indication of a difference in size between Thor 
and Hýmir any greater than that between a young boy and a grown man, and even this 
discrepancy is predicated on an illusion. Snorri’s telling of the tale of Hýmir takes 
place under the same regime of circumlocution as governed Útgarða-Loki’s realm. For 
example, when Thor propels the ship out to sea at breakneck speed, Hýmir thinks that 
there is “some impetus” (47) in the rowing. 
Thor’s duel against Hrungnir would seem at first glance to provide evidence 
that giants are gigantic. However, in Snorri’s Edda, appearances are—more often than 
not—deceiving. With Mokkurkálfi we would appear to finally have solid evidence for 
a general consensus that likes its giants big. Mokkurkálfi, we are told explicitly, is 
“nine leagues high and three broad beneath the arms” (78). This is, to the best of my 
knowledge, the only precise description of gigantic size in the Edda, or for that matter, 
the entire Old-Norse Icelandic corpus. The only example that comes close to this kind 
of precision is the previously-cited passage from Örvar-Odds saga (ch.18, p.76): “and 
as [Oddr] stood there beside her he barely reached her mid-thigh.” And yet, gigantic 
as he indisputably is, giant he is not, but rather a golem like construct—a parody 
(perhaps Snorri’s) of the “basic idea of a giant” that permeates the Scandinavian 
tradition from the sagas, to later folklore, to popular and scholarly conventions. 
Which leaves us with Hrungnir himself. Odin rides into giantland and offronts 
Hrungnir, whose steed is the slower of the two. Hrungnir flies into the usual giant’s 
rage and challenges Thor to a duel. Hrungnir’s size, in conrast to Mokkurkálfi’s, is 
nowhere described in the episode. Hrungnir’s skull is promptly smashed into tiny 
fragments by Thor’s hammer and Hrnungnir falls  
 
forwards over Thor so that his leg lay across Thor’s neck...Thialfi went up to 
Thor and and went to remove Hrngnir’s leg from him and was unable to 
manage it. Then all the Æsir came up when they found out that Thor had 
fallen, and went to remove the leg from him and could not move it at all. (78.) 
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Finally, Thor’s three-year-old half-giant son Magni arrives on the scene and easily 
tosses the giant’s leg off his prostrate father. Neither men nor gods can remove the 
giant’s leg. Presumably, Hrungnir’s limb is so big, it takes a god of super-human (and 
super-divine) strength to move it. And presume one must, for this is pure inference. 
Nowhere does the text address Hrungnir’s size, or state that his leg was so large it 
could not be moved. 
The Norse tradition, however, offers other examples of the immobile dead, 
corpses that cannot be moved by normal means, if at all. None of these examples have 
anything to do with the size of the body. Immobility is in fact the most distinctive 
feature of the dead.140 In Grettis saga, the corpse of the farmhand Glámr cannot be 
moved for church burial by men, horses, or oxen (Complete Sagas of Icelanders, 
II.32.102). The slain body of Baldr also cannot be moved by the combined might of 
the gods, and the task of heaving his death-ship onto the water is left to the giantess 
Hyrrokkin (49). The nineteenth-century Icelandic folktale “How to Raise the Dead” 
attests the difficulty involved in moving the bodies of the dead.141 
The giant Geirrøðr is the last giant Snorri introduces in extended narrative 
form, although obviously not the last giant to feature in mythic history itself (e.g., 
there will be more giants at Ragnarök). (Snorri reintroduces other giant figures, such 
as Ægir with reference to his previous accounts.) Snorri´s account contains no 
indication of gigantic size, unlike its variant Þorsteins þáttr bæjarmagns, in which 
“the heathen god is replaced by a peasant’s son.”142 Saxo Grammaticus alludes to the 
myth of Thorkillus’ journey to the realm of Geruthus, where he encounters several 
giants:  
                                                
140 Einar Haugen, “The Mythical Structure of the Ancient Scandinavians: Some Thoughts on Reading 
Dumézil,” Introduction to Structuralism, ed. Michael Lane (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 170-83. 
141 Jacqueline Simpson, Icelandic Folktales and Legends, 2 ed. (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus 
Publishing Limited, 2004), 149-152 [J.Á. I 317-19]. 
142 Jan de Vries (1933), 57. 
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“One of these creatures, more gigantic than the rest and armed with a massive 
club, waded out into the sea.” (Saxo, 263) 
 
“As evening grew on, a man of extraordinary stature came up and greeted the 
seamen by their names.” (Saxo, 263) 
 
While Saxo alludes only briefly to the tale of Thor and Geirrøðr, it is clear from the 
Gesta Danorum that the giants of Geirrøðr´s (Geruthus) realm are in fact huge, 
whereas Snorri nowhere alludes to a disparity in size in his telling of the myth. 
Finally, backtracking somewhat in Snorri’s narrative order (though not 
necessarily the order of mythic history), Odin, Loki, and Hænir encounter Þjazi “in 
eagle shape” (60) (the only shape in which he is ever encountered) while they are 
unsuccessfully attempting to cook an oxen in an earth oven in the wilderness. Þjazi’s 
size is described with the litotes typical of Útgarðian circumlocution. We are told that 
the eagle was “no small one” (59). Yet Þjazi’s most clearly giant-like attribute is not 
his eagle shape (though another giant with eagle shape is attested in Vafþrúðnismál 
37), nor the fact that eagle-Þjazi is “no small [eagle].” The most distinctive feature of 
the giant Þjazi—the most distinctive feature of all giants—is not size but excess.  
Although excessive size is one such form of excess, it is not represented in 
Snorra Edda. Rage and lack of restraint feature foremost in Snorri’s depiction of 
giantkind. The giant builder wants not only Frejya but also the sun and the moon as 
payment (35) for the building of Ásgarðr. Odin’s steed, Sleipnir, is the poster-boy (or 
poster-horse) for the excess that defines the giants: he has eight legs, as opposed to the 
normal four; his mother is the half-giant Loki (transformed into a frisky mare), and the 
Giant Builder’s excessively strong stallion. Loki himself is product of a monstrous 
union of Ásynja (a female god) and giant sire. Hrungnir rides too far and into Ásgarð, 
and is later killed as a result. Hrungnir is offered a drink, then demands one (78). The 
giants’ excess is also reflected in their inability to control liquids: The giant Suttungr 
is unable to retain control of the Mead of Poetry (63), which is made from the blood of 
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Kvasir, who is in turn made from the spittle of the gods. Mokkurkálfi wets himself 
when Thor arrives for the duel with Hrungnir (78). (Again Hrungnir demands a drink 
after  he is offered one, again suggestive of an association of giant excess and control 
of liquids). The giantess Gjálp (82) raises the water-level by standing “astride the 
river” and presumably urinating in it when Thor tries to cross it. Þjazi, who attemps to 
eat more of the ox than is pleasing to Loki and to abduct the goddess Iðúnn, is a 
creature of excessive gastronomic and sexual appetites. Giant excess is ultimately 
symbolized by Loki breaking his fetters at Ragnarök. It is excess that causes the doom 
of both gods and giants: excess finger nails used to build the ship of the dead, excess 
shoe-leather used to make the  boot with which Viðar smites the ravenous wolf. 
The connection between the giants and appetite is reflected in the possible 
etymology of their name, jötunn, which derives from the Germanic *edu: “to eat.”143 
The excess of the giants is thus variously manifested in their outward proportions and 
their inner appetites. It is a difference between monstrum in fronte and monstrum in 
animo.144 In his “Twilight of the Idols,” the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche 
writes: 
 
Ugliness is often enough the expression of a development that has been 
crossed, thwarted in some way. Or it appears as declining development. The 
anthropological criminologists tell us that the typical criminal is ugly: 
monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo [monstrous in appearance, monstrous 
in spirit]. But the criminal is a decadent. 
 
The giants’ physical excess (read: ugliness) is a transference of their inner nature 
(excess) to their outward form. By externalizing this excess, those who would 
                                                
143 “Etuna m. Riese (eig. (Menschen)fresser?). an. Jötunn Riese; ags. Eoten Gigant, ält. Ud. Eteninne 
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understand the giants as beings primarily of giant size, are able to externalize their 
own undisciplined desires and project them onto an allegedly wholly foreign creature. 
In Snorri, this process does not take place, although, as is clear from the evidence cited 
earlier in this chapter, it does in contemporary sources. Given the scarcity of evidence 
in Íslendingasögur and in Snorri, there may be some evidence from the sources that 
the “basic idea of giant” underwent a development from a creature of excess 
(excessively wise, gluttonous, libidinous) to a large, oftimes stupid, being in whom 
this “excess” is ultimately externalized in terms of physical proportion. However, it 
seems more likely that Snorri is at variance with a mainline tradition of which he is 
well aware. 
Perhaps some giants are of immense stature while others are not? The myths 
do after all speak of “giants,” “frost-giants,” and “mountain giants.” (Their names are 
legion, for they are many.) While I would not suggest rejecting the possibility out of 
hand, the evidence for such differentiation within the species “giant” appears to be 
non-existent.145 For that matter, Snorri states that Ýmir produced male and female 
from giants from his armpits, and males from legs. Yet to my knowledge, no one has 
ever postulated that there are such things as “armpit giants” and “leg giants,” although 
there would be more basis for the existence of such beings than for mountain and 
frost-giants. The giants, though occasionally referred to with different names, seem no 
more distinct from one another as Thor does from “Öku-Thor,” which is, in fact, 
simply a byname for the same being. This form of prefixation merely adds to the 
richness of names used to describe one and the same thing—as should come of no 
                                                
145 Despite some impressive effort attempts to create a comprehensive taxonomy of  
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surprise to the student of Skaldic wordsmithery where this sort of onomastic variety is 
the name of the game. 
High, Just-as-High, and Third are unreliable narrators. Their entire account is 
predicated on a grand illusion. Why should they be treated as reliable informants on 
the giants, and not subject to their own particular biases? Concerning Ýmir, Gangleri 
innocently asks, “do you believe him to be a god whom you have just spoken of?” 
(11). The question seems preposterous to the three Æsir but apparently not to 
Gangleri. The oddly defensive phrasing of the Æsir’s response suddenly makes sense: 
“Not at all do we acknowledge him to be a god. He was evil and all his descendants.” 
Not at all do we acknowledge him to be a god. The Historical Æsir do not 
acknowledge Ýmir to be their kin, just as the gods refuse to acknowledge the giants as 
theirs. This is not that same thing as stating that he is not a god. The historical Æsir’s 
construction of difference explains their aggressive phrasing when it comes to the 
divine hierarchy, and Odin in particular: “This is the name of the one who is the 
greatest and most glorious that we know, and you would do well to agree to call him 
that too” (11, italics mine). 
Furthermore, it is suggestive of the unity of god and giant that both giant and 
Æsir names may be used as heiti and in kennings that commonly refer to “man.” 
Snorri says: 
 
It is normal to refer to man using all the names of Æsir. Names of giants are 
also used, and this is mostly as satire or criticism. (94) 
 
Both god and giants names can be used refer to the same being. The difference is 
merely one of connotation and moral judgment; an Æsir name denotes a good man, a 
giant name a bad one.  
It may be objected that if inordinate size is part of “basic idea of a giant,” there 
would then be no reason for Snorri to make a point of the giants’ (alleged) immense 
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size; simply calling them “giants” would presumably make this clear. What is clear, 
however, after a fresh examination of the evidence, is that this objection takes for 
granted a premise (i.e., giants are bigger than the gods) that cannot be demonstrated on 
the basis of Snorri’s account. Snorri stands at odds with—not on the shoulders of—the 
giants of Scandinavian tradition. 
Simply put, in Snorri’s Edda beings that are big are never called giants, and 
beings called giants are never big. 
A reflection of this paradox, of giants who are not gigantic, can be found in the 
self- contradicting image of Gylfi’s three interlocutors, Hár, Jafnhár, and Þriði 
(“High,” “Just-as-High,” and “Third”). Represented as one on top of the other, their 
names stand in contradiction to their physical disposition. When it comes to the 
language of poetry (what Snorri calls Skáldskaparmál), nomen non est omen. High, 
Just-as-High, and Third represent a rift between words and things, between res and 
verbum. In the context of Skaldic poetics, such a disjuncture makes perfect sense. In 
the terms of classical rhetoric, they are, however, a contradictio—not in terms, but 
between language and reality itself. 
As I argued in the last chapter, Hár, Jafnhár, and Þriði and, alternately, Gylfi 
can appear as victors in their wisdom contest based on the sapiential tradition, 
Christian or pagan, in which their encyclopedic dialogue is framed. Here once more, 
Hár, Jafnhár, and Þriði appear to be a contradiction when viewed through the lens of 
the foreign, Christian, Latinate tradition, but not in the terms of a native, Pagan, 
vernacular poetics. Combining the former and the latter is, once again, the singular 
achievement of Snorri’s encyclopedic poetics. 
  85 
 
II. Gods and Giants? / Gods as Giants 
 
“Waren diese Riesen wirklich von so hoher Statur? Die 
Furcht hat vielleicht ihrem Maße manche Elle 
hinzugefügt. Dergleichen hat sich oft schon ereignet. 
Nicetas, ein Byzantiner, der die Einnahme von 
Konstantinopel durch die Kreuzfahrer berichtet, gesteht 
ganz ernsthaft, daß einer dieser eisernen Ritter des 
Nordens, der alles vor sich her zu Paaren trieb, ihnen, in 
diesem schrecklichen Augenblicke, fünfzig Fuß groß zu 
sein schien.“   
 
(Heinrich Heine. Elementargeister. Werke, zweiter 
Band. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1968, 655) 
 
a. Of Master Builders and Constructions of Difference 
Having established that Snorri’s giants are not bigger than the gods, it is time 
to addresses the reasons why he does not represent them as such. Why does Snorri 
tone down the giantness of the giants? 
The distinction between gods and giants is arbitrary, imposed on the giants by 
the gods’ use of force. It is not an ethnic division but, at root, a class distinction. It is 
not based in race but social status. As with the Indian caste-system, racial thinking 
serves to legitimate a class distinction, not to create it in the first place. The god-giant 
distinction is an attempt to make social and cultural differences appear natural and 
given; in other words, it is ideological. 
The etymology of the word jötunn helps underscore the ideological nature of 
the catagories of Snorri’s mythological ethnography. Although the etymology of many 
basic words is problematic, the depiction of the giants as beholden to insatiable 
appetites, both gastronomic and sexual, lends credence to the derivation of jötunn 
from Germanic *edu (to eat). The unrestrained appetites of the giants stand in stark 
contrast with the disciplined social order of the gods. This contrast closely parallels 
the distinction in European feudal ideology between noble and peasant. The idealized 
self-portrait of the nobility recorded in the literature of courtly romance is 
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distinguished by restraint and self-control in the bedroom, at the dining table, and on 
the battlefield. From the perspective of the nobility, the peasantry is marked by 
uncontrollable, bestial appetites.  
A distinction between gods and giants on the basis of behavior as opposed to 
race makes better sense in a relatively racially undiverse medieval Scandinavian 
context. Behavior, along with birth, is after all, what is supposed to separate the 
nobility from non-nobles. The peasants represented in courtly literature (like Snorri’s 
giants) cannot control their sexual, gastronomic, and economic appetites, and are 
greedy, unlike the always freely-giving nobility. We will have to wait for the 
nineteenth century and Wagner for the economic dimension of Norse myth to be 
played in a register more readily heard by modern ears. The comparison to Wagner is 
not incidental, for like Wagner, Snorri attempts to create a synthetic narrative of Norse 
mythic history based on disparate sources; consequently, my discussion always refers 
to this narrative, never to “actually-existing” Norse pagan belief. 
Although this fact has to my knowledge never been noted, the figures in the 
Norse pantheon who have garnered the most critical attention are those who occupy 
the middle ground between the gods and the giants. This ambiguous terrain is 
occupied by Loki, whose dual nature is a commonplace,146 but also by Thor, who is 
not typically seen in this light. Thor guards the boundary between the two groups. The 
boundary is not natural, since gods and giants can produce offspring—such as Thor 
himself—but cultural, maintained by force and deception. While Thor attempts to 
maintain this distinction through force, Loki, his companion and antipode, defends it 
with the guile that requires the wits that Thor (with the exception of his performance 
                                                
146 See de Vries (1933), 204, on Loki´s “originally...ambiguous character”; also see Finnur Jónsson, 96; 
Orchard, 237; Jeffrey Turco, “Loki, The Tale of Sarcastic Halli, and the Case for a ‘Skaldic Prosaics’” 
[forthcoming]. 
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in the parodic Alvíssmál) lacks. Of course, Loki is a profoundly ambiguous figure and 
not a simple defender of Æsir family-values since he strives to maintain his position in 
a society whose order, values, and rules he also systematically subverts and 
undermines. Be that as it may, Thor and Loki represent two distinct means for dealing 
with the threat to the social order of the gods posed by the giants’ excess, namely, 
force and wit. Loki is Thor’s genealogical antipode as well, since Thor is the product 
of the union of god and giantess, and Loki of goddess and giant. The role of Thor—
smasher of heads and breaker of oaths—in maintaining the distinction between god 
and giant underscores the violence and perjury at the root of the social system, of 
culture, and of the ordered cosmos itself, made from the body of the gods’ slain 
maternal uncle, Ýmir. 
Ýmir is “evil” according to the historical Æsir (11), although there is no 
evidence in Gylfaginning to support this claim, unless one assumes a priori that the 
gods’ killing of him is justified. Ýmir is born (so to speak), gives birth, and is killed—
that is all. Details that would support the Æsir’s value judgement are not offered. The 
first sign of hostility between the gods and the giants is the murder of Ýmir itself. This 
killing is not a response to a prior act of agression on the part of the giants, whose only 
offence, it seems, is their mere existence. The killing of Ýmir appears to be 
unmotivated. No reasons are offered for it, or for that matter asked for. Gylfi’s 
informant, Hár, treats the Æsir’s hostility to the giants as something natural and given: 
“Bor’s sons killed the giant Ýmir.” The next passage reads, “And when he fell…” 
Only the aftermath of Ýmir’s death is significant for the historical Æsir; the 
circumstances that led to it are apparently neither considered relevant nor in need of 
further explanation. This lack of detail or explanation makes the death of the frost-
giant Norse myth’s ultimate “cold case.” 
One striking aspect of Snorri’s depiction of the killing of Ýmir is the absence 
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of the baroque detail regarding wounds that is so well-attested in the sagas (cf. Njáls 
saga): 
 
Mord named witnesses – “to witness that I call on these nine neighbors to the 
scene of the action to ride to the Althing and to form a panel of neighbors to 
determine whether Flosi Thordarson wounded Helgi Njalsson with a brain 
wound or internal wound or marrow wound which proved to be a fatal wound, 
and Helgi died of it at the place where Flosi Thordarson ran at Helgi Njalsson  
in a punishable assault. I call on you for all the findings which the law requires 
you to make and which I ask you to make before the court and which are 
relevant to this case. I call on you with a lawful summons in your own hearing. 
I call on you in the case turned over to me by Thorgeir Thorisson. (Cook, 240) 
 
Legalistic forensics are not merely the provence of the sagas, for Snorri’s Edda itself 
goes to some lengths to describe the nature of specific wounds and killings, e.g., Týr’s 
hand, the death of Baldr by mistletoe missile, the slitting of Baugi’s workers’ throats, 
etc. In the sagas, heads typically fly off without spraying torrents of blood. I am 
unable to find any instance of blood gushing as the result of a decapitation carried out 
in battle, as in the case of Helgi Njálsson, or a posthumous beheading, as in the case, 
e.g., of Glámr or Kár inn gamli in Grettis saga.147  
The pre-history of conflict between the Æsir and jötnar, however, is shrouded 
in silence. This is not to say mystery, for no curiosity regarding it is in fact ever 
expressed. Is the killing of Ýmir a “punishable assault”? A response to one? (If the 
dismembered Ýmir is indeed killed by sneak attack, the irony will not be lost on 
anyone familiar with the biography of Snorri himself—betrayed by his kin, taken by 
surprise, and cut to pieces on an autumn night in 1241.) Are there witnesses who could 
be called on testify to the killing of Ýmir? Such questions neither addressed, nor 
                                                
147 Íslendinga saga has a well-known reference to Kálfr, who is urged upon his execution to move away 
from a church wall  so his blood will not besplatter it. There are also mentions of people walking out of 
church sanctuary unarmed so that the church will not be defiled by their blood (e.g., Holar 1209, and 
also at the tail end of Orlygsstadir 1238). There are not infrequent mentions of people who bled little 
when killed which may suggest that gushing blood is not the perceived norm (cf. the end of Svinfellinga 
saga, and Sturla Sighvatsson in Íslendinga saga). 
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answered. It is this omission, more than any speculation about what is omitted, that is 
relevant to my analysis of Snorri’s mythographic ethnography.  
When it comes to the forensics of killing Ýmir, Snorri’s Æsir gloss over both 
the motive for and details of the primordial hostilities between gods and giants. Their 
conflicts are treated as natural and given. This stands in stark contrast to the tradition 
of Icelandic feud narrative, in which the roots of conflict and precise nature of wounds 
and killings are noted with legal exactitude. In contrast to the parties of feuds in the 
sagas, the giants stand outside the law and hence have no recourse to legal redress for 
their grievances. Instead they variously resort, as we have seen, to barter, theft, and 
predation. The exception to the giants’ outlaw status is the fact that they make oaths 
and contracts with the gods. Yet while the giants themselves never break their word, 
such agreements are honored as long as they are convenient for the gods.  
Egils saga offers an illuminating clue to this murky history of conflict between 
the gods and the giants. In Sonatorek, Egil’s eulogy for his dead son, Egil invokes the 
myth of the Mead of Poetry, which Odin steals from the giant Suttungr: 
 
Esa auðþeystr    Since heavy sobbing 
þvít ekki veldr   is the cause — 
höfugligr,    how hard to pour forth 
ór hyggju stað   from the mind’s root 
fagnafundr    the prize that Frigg’s 
Friggjar niðja,   progeny found, 
ár borinn    borne of old 
ór Jötunheimum,   from the world of giants, 
lastalauss    unflawed, which Bragi 
es lifnaði    inspired with life 
á Nökkvers    on the craft 
nökkva bragi.    Of the watcher-dwarf. 
Jötuns hals   Blood surges  
undir þjóta    from the giant’s wounded neck, 
Náins niðr    crashes on the death-dwarf’s 
fyr naustdyrum.  boathouse door.148 
                                                
148 Egil’s Saga, trans. Bernard Scudder, The Complete Sagas of Icelanders, Including 49 Tales., ed. 
Viðar Hreinsson, Introduction by Robert Kellogg. 5 vols. (Reykjavík: Leifur Eiriksson, 1997), I.40.77-
78. 
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The last four lines “Jötuns hals / undir þjóta / Náins niðr / fyr naustdyrum” refer to the 
“giant’s wounded neck (“Blood surges from the giant’s wounded neck, crashes on the 
death dwarf’s boathouse door”). “Jötuns hals undir” translates as “the giant’s throat-
waves,” i.e., the blood gushing or roaring (þjóta) from his throat, a clear allusion to the 
sea, made from the blood of the giant Ýmir. Gylfaginning itself offers no account of 
the nature of Ýmir’s wounds. The fact that blood gushes from Ýmir’s throat would 
strongly suggest that his throat was cut in stealth. While one might object that the 
blood from Ýmir’s throat could also result from his post-mortem decapitation and 
dismemberment at the hands of the gods, þjóta suggests a very powerful surge of 
fluid, suggestive of a mortal wound to the neck, such as that received by Helgi 
Njálsson, not a posthumous beheading.149 “The giant’s wounded neck,” however, 
seems incompatible with a full-blown decapitation. Thus it seems most likely—at least 
according to the evidence of Skaldic poetry—that Ýmir’s throat was cut, and cut in 
stealth by the gods, not in open conflict or as the result of an aggravated assault.150 
If we accept the theory that Egils saga was written by Snorri Sturluson, this 
strengthens the case for including the evidence of Sonatorrek alongside that of the 
Edda in my investigation of the death of Ýmir. The theory of Snorri’s authorship, of 
course, has its adherents and detractors, the latter of whom rightly point out that there 
                                                
149 I am unable to find any desciption in the sagas of blood gushing from the throat of someone 
decapitated postumously. 
150 Dr. Peter Zelinka, M.D. of San Diego, California, confirms to me that the medical evidence supports 
the stealth-hypothesis: “Gushing blood must by necessity be from an arterial wound, i.e., a deep neck 
wound which could be delivered by stealth or frontal assault. Superficial wounds do not spray blood. 
Secondly, once the heart stops or there is a catastrophic loss of blood pressure, there can be no gushing 
of blood. Generally speaking, even a very low blood pressure just barely compatible with life will cause 
some pulsatile gushing. The saga implies a vigorous gush of blood which can only be delivered by an 
active, healthy heart. Thirdly, a dead body cannot gush blood. Fluid may leak or spill, of course, but it 
will never gush. Perhaps under the gasous pressures of decomposition there could be some spray of 
curruption but this would not be oxygenated ‘red’ blood. Filling and ocean with blood is more likely 
with a venous bleed. Arterial blood stops sooner because those vessels have muscles than can contract 
the vessel and stop the bleeding, veins do not. It is a venous bleed that kills you with a slit throat. As the 
saying goes, go for the jugular, i.e., the big vein in the superficial neck (personal correspondence, Nov. 
2, 2008). 
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is no direct evidence for the claim that Snorri wrote the saga.151 There is no point in 
rehearsing this debate here; but it is worth pointing out that if Egils saga was not 
written by Snorri, it might as well have been. Whoever wrote Egils saga was evidently 
immersed in the same mythographic tradition that finds its way to vellum in Snorri’s 
Edda. 
A possible analogue to the murder of Ýmir is found in another work attributed 
to Snorri Sturluson, namely Heimskringla. Snorri’s account of the murder of Hákon 
Jarl at the hands of the slave Karkr parallels in many respects the murder of Ýmir. The 
tale tells of the Earl and Karkr, suspiciously eyeing one another in turn as the one 
wakes and the other sleeps, until eventually the Earl is betrayed by one who has 
always treated him well:152 
 
En Karkr varð hræddr og felmsfullr og greip kníf mikinn af linda sér og skaut 
gegnum barka jarli og skar út úr. Það var bani Hákonar jarls. Síðan sneið Karkr 
höfuð af jarli og hljóp í brott.153 
 
[But Kark grew frightened and alarmed. He took a big knife from his belt and 
cut the earl’s throat, then slashed it clean through, and that was Earl Hakon’s 
death. Then Kark cut off the earl’s head and ran away with it.154] 
 
This recapitulates rather precisely the circumstances of the gods’ murder of Ýmir, as I 
have reconstructed it. Hákon is asleep; sleep is in fact one of the three activities 
ascribed to Ýmir, along with feeding and procreation. Ýmir sires giants in his sleep 
from his profuse sweats. This fact is never explained; why does Ýmir sweat in his 
sleep? Does he sleep unsoundly for no reason? Or does he, like Hákon Jarl, fear 
treachery from his companions? Lending further creedence to this association of the 
two tales, Hákon tells Karkr something he could not possibly know, namely that “We 
                                                
151 Torfi Tulinius, The Matter of the North: The Rise of Literary Fiction in Thirteenth-Century Iceland, 
trans. Randi C. Eldevik, The Viking Collection, Vol. 13 (Odense: University Press of Southern 
Denmark, 2002), 234-35. 
152 Hollander, 192. 
153 ÍF XXVI.49.297. 
154 Hollander, 192. 
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are born in one and the same night” [Við várum fœddir á einni nótt]. This mysterious 
confession has the effect of making the two a pair of companions if not brothers. The 
same sentence could equally well have been spoken by Ýmir to Odin, Vili, and Vé: 
“We are born in one and the same night.” For while the Edda does not delineate the 
timeline of creation in such a way that we can know this to be the case, the account of 
the birth of Bor’s sons follows immediately after the account of the creation of Ýmir, 
all of which takes place before the formation of the earth, sky, and the sun—in other 
words, in the same primordial ‘night’ of mythic history. The motivation for the slaying 
of Hákon Jarl is also the same as the motivation for the killing of Ýmir: “honor and 
riches” as the saga puts it.155 While this of course is only stated explicitly in Ólafs 
saga Tryggvasonar, the evidence of mythic history makes it clear that the killing of 
Ýmir serves precisely this dual purpose, i.e., of increasing the status of the gods 
(“honor”) and giving them control over the resources of the created world (“riches”). 
Thus the killing of Ýmir seems more likely an act of unprovoked, premeditated 
murder than a response to giant aggression, or revenge for some unknown affront. The 
affront seems to consist in the giant’s mere existence. The killing of Ýmir is hence not 
simply the first of many episodes of racial conflict; the gods’ killing of Ýmir is the 
constitutive moment in the creation of such racial distinctions in the first place—the 
willful construction of a separate Æsir race. The gods do not kill him because he is 
different, but rather in order to make him so. 
While a case can be made for the pre-existence of such a thing as “Æsir” as a 
distinct racial category, it is a weak one. Ýmir is formed when the sparks and molten 
particles of Muspell meet the ice and rime of Niflheim. The Æsir’s paternal ancestor, 
Búri, comes into being when the cow Audhumhla licks his body clear from the rime-
stones. At first glance this would seem to establish a radically different genealogy 
                                                
155 Ibid. 
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from Ýmir, yet this is not the case. Neither of them are procreated using time-honored 
means. Both are in fact formed when a source of heat (i.e., sparks; an animals’s 
tongue) encounter the cold of ice and rime. Their creations are both variations on the 
same theme. It is not until Búri’s son Borr takes a giantess wife that sexual pairing 
between male and female takes place. Is this the beginning of the Æsir “race”? It may 
seem so, but the word “Æsir” has not yet entered Snorri’s enthnographic vocabluarly 
at this stage in mythic history. It is not until Odin, Vili, and Vé kill Ýmir, create 
Miðgarðr, and Odin takes Frigg that Snorri speaks of an “Æsir race” (Ása ættir).156 
  The very act of world-fashioning in Snorri’s cosmogenesis is itself a killing 
and perhaps even a murder (distinguished from killing in the Norse legal system by its 
secretive nature). Snorri´s version of the myth compounds two moments of Christian 
salvation history: In Genesis it is the first-born (as opposed to the first-created) man 
who is the first murderer. Cain’s murder of Abel is the consequence of sin entering the 
world, not its cause. In Snorri’s Edda this stain or “mark of Cain” is not borne by 
mankind, or even ultimately by the gods, but by the world itself which bears them. 
The physical world is the transformed corpse of the first being (a gigantic “body- 
modification”), and product of the first killing. The Norse world is corrupt from the 
beginning, “fallen” before it is first given shape or form. This physical world is a 
constant reminder, a nagging piece of forensic evidence of that primal crime. No 
wonder the giants are hell bent on burning it with fire. At the world-ending 
conflagration of Ragnarök, the giants perform a long-overdue funerary rite for their 
paternal dead ancestor. 
Of the three possible origins of the cosmos (Ýggdrasill, raised from the sea, or 
created from the body of the slain frost-giant Ýmir), Snorri makes use only of the 
Ýmir myth. The reason for this, I suspect, is to establish a primal transgression or 
                                                
156 Faulkes, 13. 
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“original sin” for which a pre-existing tradition of Ragnarök can be reframed as its 
absolution. In so doing, Snorri remaps a pagan tradition onto a Christian concept of 
time, and attempts to demonstrate how his pagan ancestors proleptically grasped the 
truths of Christian revelation. 
In this context, it would be relevant to recall how Cain, who killed his brother 
Abel, goes on to become the first citizen, a city dweller who takes the first step in the 
civil-ization of his culture. A similar tale is told in Snorri’s account of the Master 
Builder, in which the god’s kill their (unacknowledged) kin, the Giant Builder, in 
order to establish their city (borg) of Ásgarðr. Cain’s brother Abel was a shepherd, 
and more closely associated with the land and nature, just as the giants are more 
closely associated with the earth, which is formed from the body of their primordial 
ancestor, Ýmir. As in Genesis, the prophecy of Völuspá relates events in a systematic 
and familiar way, beginning with chaos, progressing to creation, judgment and order, 
and finally leading to the creation of humanity. Within this narrative, there is an 
obvious urban shift of focus—the Aesir become enthralled with the building of “altars, 
temples, high-timbered halls”—followed by a newfound appreciation for the rural and 
the pastoral, “sitting in meadows, smiling over gameboards.” Essentially the Aesir 
discover cottage country—an Ersatz state of nature. They will only be returned to 
nature when the dichotomy of nature and culture implodes at Ragnarök, where “they 
will find a wondrous treasure / gold gameboards, lying in the grass / where they had 
left them so long before” (47, cf. 10). 
Christian and pagan traditions diverge in the chronology of their respective 
archetypal fratricides. In the Christian world-view, the story of Cain and Abel, takes 
place at the beginning of salvation history, whereas the archetypal fratricide of Norse 
myth—the death of Baldr at the hands of his blind brother, Höðr—brings mythic 
history (understood as that which happens between creation and destruction) to an end. 
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Since mythic history ends with fratricide, it is plausible to ask whether this history 
does not perhaps begin with it as well? My reading of the Æsir’s slaying of Ýmir 
would certainly support such a claim. This parallel would in turn support my claim 
that for Snorri the death of Ýmir is a fratricide, and that “gods” and “giants” are 
cultural constructs made by Æsir society. There is a further symmetry in the fact that 
mythic history begins and ends with the killings of Ýmir and Baldr specifically. 
According to the Æsir view of history, Ýmir, is the Ur-giant, whereas Baldr is the 
purest of the gods, literally their “best and brightest.”157 Baldr represents the pinnacle 
of the Æsir racial ideology that, as with all ideologies, attempts to print its culture with 
the stamp of nature. Baldr and Ýmir occupy the extremes of the Æsir’s ethographic 
spectrum; thus it is fitting that they occupy the extremes of Æsir history as well.158 
This dichotomy of nature and culture is a source of tension throughout the 
stories about the Norse gods, who cannot escape the “original sin” caused by their 
abandonment of nature, personified in their kinsmen Ýmir, whose internecine murder 
makes possible the privileged, civilized order on which the culture of the gods 
depends. While “culture” and “nature” are two of the broadest concepts in our 
theoretical vocabulary, everybody has some basic sense of what is implied in their 
distinction. For example, the concepts “woman” and “man” belong to the sphere of 
nature (there would still be men and women even if there were no human societies), 
whereas the concepts “wife” and “husband” are cultural inventions.  In the Norse 
system, they—like all cultural goods—add value to natural resources, as when the 
gods imbue lifeless tree-trunks with breath and life in order to make the first human 
beings, Askr and Embla.  
                                                
157 Faulkes, 23. 
158 Æsir history is not the same thing as world history; there is a cosmos before the Æsir, and a world 
without them (see pp. 111-112, below) after Ragnarök. It is parallel to the Christian Saeculum: that 
which happens between Fall and Last Judgement.  
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The metaphoric work or Arbeit am Mythos performed by the concepts of 
“male” and “female” in the myths, however, requires more fleshing out. In some ways 
these categories reflect sexist assumptions that seem familiar enough: women are 
passive—men are active; men are orderly, rational—women are chaotic, always 
change their minds (“la donna e mobile”), etc. Yet it will hardly suffice to 
superimpose our own weird ideas about the sexes on the Norse's weird ideas about 
them. Male and female are at the root of the culture-nature binary that Ragnarök 
destroys, and at the root of the god-giant distinction itself.  
The first being in the cosmos, the giant Ýmir, plays a female role in that the 
other giants are “born” from him parthenogenically. Procreation up to this point is still 
strictly a male prerogative. The female role in reproduction is limited to a nurturing 
function by the primeval cow, Auðhumla, whose name Orchard interprets as meaning 
“hornless and fecund.”159 The myths give the female no role in the dynamic, form-
giving aspect of procreation, which is ascribed to the male. This is consistent with the 
prevailing notions of medieval and ancient Greek medicine, which view woman as a 
mere incubator and provider of raw material for the form-giving male artisan-creator. 
Any female share in reproduction for which there is not overwhelming visual evidence 
(e.g., lactation) is ascribed to the male agent. The female role in reproduction is 
acknowledged in the Edda only when individuals begin to marry outside their kinship-
group (i.e., exogamously). Hence the first giantess we learn of by name is the also the 
first wife: Bestla, married to the second-generation Ás, Bor. The male usurpation of 
the female role in procreation is also evident in Loki, who turns himself into a mare 
and begets Hel, Fenrir, and the Midgard serpent with the stallion, Svaðilfœri. The Æsir  
also create (or rather engineer) the natural world out of the body of their maternal 
kinsman, Ýmir, and from this male body arise a race of spontaneously generated, all-
                                                
159 Orchard, 142. 
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male creatures known as dwarfs. 
The metaphors “male” and “female” are bound by the Norse conception of the 
female as the Natural, providing raw material, and the “male” as Cultural, giving 
shape or form to that material. Thus in the myth of Þjazi the Æsir try to transform a 
raw ox into a cooked ox, but are thwarted because they are in giantland, i.e., in the 
realm of Nature or the raw, not the cooked. The giant Þjazi , on the other hand, begins 
to devour the beast, tearing off its hams and shoulders. His threat to Loki is not limited 
to dragging him over stones and tree-tops: Loki thought his arms “were going to be 
wrenched from his shoulders” (60), which is precisely what just happened to the ox. 
Þjazi threatens to turn Loki into an animal. This underlying potential for bestialization 
underscores Loki's ambiguous and precarious position between the culture and nature, 
between man (and, indeed, woman) and beast. 
Iðunn must also be noted in this context. Iðunn tends (cultivates = culture) the 
golden apples of the gods. Þjazi  (giant = nature) uses an intermediary (neutralization 
= Loki) to bring Iðunn “back to nature”—not as his wife (marriage is after all a 
cultural institution), but presumably for a more “natural” extra-marital relationship. 
Loki transforms her into a nut (something raw) in order to transpose, or rather, 
transplant, her back into the gods’ realm of culture, where she can continue tending 
the golden apples. Interestingly, Þjazi´s daughter Skaði seeks compensation from the 
gods in the form of a marriage with one of the Æsir. While the male giant abjures the 
social constraints of marriage for concubinage, his daughter is willing to submit to the 
disciplining force of culture. 
What do gods want? Women: more specifically, Æsir wives and giant 
concubines—as well as the riches of material culture. What the giants want is equally 
clear: Æsir and Vanir women. The giants may take, or threaten to take, the gods' 
possessions (Mjöllnir, Valhalla), but not, it seems, as ends in themselves, but as means 
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to attain Æsir brides. Tellingly, the giants cannot make any use of cultural resources 
after they take them (e.g., Mjöllnir). The dwarfs, who are born of the giants, can 
produce cultural goods, but cannot make use of them themselves (e.g., Sif's hair). 
Giant women seem more interested in entering into legitimate relationships with the 
gods, and seek out Æsir husbands (Skaði); however, they are deflected into less 
desirable marriages with the Vanir (Njórðr, Freyr), who as fertility figures occupy a 
medial position between culture and nature. In Ynglingasaga the condition of the Æsir 
-Vanir truce and integration of the Vanir into Æsir culture is the abandonment of their 
usual practice of incest (associated here as in Wagner with untamed nature). Gerðr, of 
course, does not actively seek out an Æsir husband, but her unwillingness to accept 
Freyr's marriage proposal might stem from a reluctance to accept such a match. (She is 
the most beautiful woman in the world, after all. Why settle for a Vanir?) Both 
Freyr/Gerðr and Njórðr/Skaði fail to reproduce (not a good thing if you happen to be a 
fertility god). After their “divorce,” Snorri says “Njórðr of Noatun had afterwards two 
children” (24). He does not say he had them with Skaði (although some sources 
indicate this); Ynglingasaga is clear that he had them with his unnamed sister. Freyr 
and Gerðr do not have any children either. A kenning in Snorri’s Edda describes 
Odin's wife, Frigg, as “the rival of Jörð and Rindr and Gunnlöð and Gerðr” (86); the 
first three are mistresses of Odin, which leaves the possibility that Gerðr could be 
another. 
The pattern that emerges in the myths is the desire on the part of the Æsir  to 
maintain a strict monopoly on cultural and reproductive resources. Schematically, this 
can be represented as follows: 
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Culture —————   Nature 
 
(flight) 
Order  (Odin/Þjazi )  Chaos 
Culture  (Freya)  Nature 
Male  (Loki/Thor)  Female 
Cooked                           Raw 
Wit  Skírnir   Wisdom 
  (neutralization) 
 
 
Ethnographically, this translates into the following pattern: 
 
 
 Gods_______           _____ 
 Æsir   Vanir           Giants (& Dwarfs) 
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<Giving -Mead of Poetry, Hýmir’s cauldron, 
Dwarven treasures 
Taking <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<  -Mead of Poetry, Iðunn, Mjöllnir 
Males>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -Giantess (& Vanir) concubines, 
Gunnlöð, Jörð (-Þjazi ) 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<Females -Marry Vanir (Skaði, Gerðr), 
concubines to the Æsir (Jarnsaxa) 
 
The gods and giants are not set apart by any physical differences and they interbreed 
freely. The gods take giant brides, and the union of giants and goddesses is taboo, but 
this is a social boundary, not a natural one. The gods marry giantesses, never dwarfs 
(cf. Alvíssmál ) or elves. Permeability in fact seems to be a distinguishing feature of 
the Æsir clan, which counts the lower Vanir and even the giant-sired Loki among its 
members. Linguistically, there is also less division between the gods and the giants. 
The list of the names of things in Alvíssmál shows that the language the gods is closer 
to the language of the giants than it is to the language of elves, dwarfs, or men.160 The 
evidence suggests that the gods are not only biologically identical with the giants, but 
that their cultural differences are not as great as one might suppose, or the gods might 
                                                
160 Cf. Alvíssmál. 
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wish. 
Just how different are the giants from the gods? The Giant Builder is clearly 
aware of Æsir hostility, since oaths of truce must be sworn before he agrees to 
undertake the work. But why would the giants agree to build an invulnerable fortress 
for the gods if they considered the animosity of the gods permanent? It seems, rather, 
that the Builder is attempting to establish economic and even marital relations, perhaps 
as a means of securing peace. Is the truce between the gods and the builder valid only 
for the length of construction, or is the Builder’s agreement predicated on the idea of a 
permanent truce? A closer examination of Snorri’s exact wording would suggest the 
latter: 
 
But at their agreement there had been might witnesses invoked and many 
oaths, for the giants did not think it safe to be among the Æsir without a 
guarantee of safety if Thor were to return home, but at that time he was gone 
away into eastern parts to thrash trolls. (35) 
 
Snorri’s text says, “the giants did not think it safe,” even though the tale speaks of 
only one giant, the Builder. This can be interpreted two ways: (1) the giants in general, 
and this giant in particular, did not think it safe to be among the gods, or (2) the 
agreement to build the gods’ impregnable fortress is indicative of a general cease of 
hostility between the gods and the giants, or at least interpreted as such by the latter. 
The text does not allow us to draw a firm conclusion, but we should not let our 
preconceptions blind us to the existence of such ambiguities. It seems the gods 
perceive the giants as a threat more than vice-versa. It is certainly impossible to 
imagine the Æsir agreeing to build an impregnable fortress for the giants.  
Since one purpose of the fortress is to protect Æsir women against the constant 
threat of giant predation, the fortress would arguably have no longer served any 
purpose once Freyja, i.e., the reproductive capacity of the gods, had been hauled off to 
giantland. We see the same catch-22 at work in Þrýmsqviða, where the gods must 
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choose between Freyja and Thor’s hammer, or, more abstractly, a goddess and the 
means for protecting her. This is also the case in the tale of Freyr, who must relinquish 
his sword in order to attain a bride.  
The giants, as we have seen, are marked by their rapaciousness, their desire for 
Æsir women, and their excesses and appetites in general. Odin’s own rapaciousness 
for culture, for wisdom, and the lengths at which he goes to obtain them is suggestive 
of the same excess. The ways in which Odin’s excesses are construed as different from 
giant excess is exceedingly suggestive. Odin, more than any of the other gods, seems 
particularly sensitive about the lack of degrees of separation between the gods and the 
giants, which is more acute in his case than in that of his offspring. Particularly telling 
of this anxiety, Odin berates Thor for giving the Hrungnir’s horse to his son Magni, 
“the son of a giantess.” But Odin is no less the “son of a giantess” than Thor’s son, 
since he is the son of the giantess Bestla. 
The excesses of Hrungnir, who rushes too far past the gates of Ásgarðr, 
“demands” a drink after he is offered one, gets drunk, threatens to remove Valhalla, 
kill all the gods, and abduct Sif and Freyja, are matched by those of his opponent 
Thor, who can lower the sea-level with his draughts, eat a whole ox and eight salmon, 
drink three casks of mead, and flies into a rage at the slightest provocation. If being 
out of control is a sign of giant excess, it is also a stark reminder of Thor’s own 
genealogy.161 The perilous consanguinity is also signaled by the fact Hrungnir takes 
Thor’s place, drinking out of the Thor’s golden goblets, while Thor is away (77). 
Loki is a link between the gods and the giants, and hence is rejected by both 
sides. For both, Loki is an uncomfortable reminder of the lack of real distance between 
Æsir and jötnar. Both Thor and his companion Loki are walking reminders of the 
                                                
161 For a contemporary parallel, Thor’s aggression towards the giants he so closely resembles reminds 
one, mutatis mutandis, of the gay-bashing bigot who is himself a repressed homosexual. 
  102 
 
violence necessary to maintain this arbitrary opposition—by force in the case of Thor, 
by wit in the case of Loki. 
There is a common thread between the Giant Builder and Hrungnir episodes as 
well. Hrungnir is threatened with an anal assault. But the threat of sexual violence 
soon gives way to a sexually uncharged display of brute force. When Þjálfi warns 
Hrungnir of the impending threat to his posterior, wit, along with sex and force, joins 
the arsenal deployed against the giant. Hence the Hrungnir episode is a showcase of 
the three means for dealing with giant aggression: wit, sex, and force. In the case of 
Loki and Svaðilfœri, the gods initially abstain from the use of direct force, which is 
initially forbidden them by oath, by using the same sexual submission, this time 
proffered by Loki, with which Hrungnir is threatened by Þjálfi. In both cases, the gods 
trick the giants into mistaking a deployment of brute strength for a sexual encounter. 
The evidence suggests that the giants do not so much represent disorder or 
chaos (as is commonly supposed by scholars who take their cues from the gods), as 
they do their own counter-order. This is most evident in the Gerð/Skírnir episode, and 
also in Þrýmsqviða, where the ordered social structure of the giants is in the 
foreground. Curiously, the giant’s own social order is most in evidence when 
giantesses are concerned (Gunnlöð, Gerðr, Skaði, Thor-as-bride, etc.). This can be 
represented on a spectrum as follows: 
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God/Giant spectrum 
 
Pure Æsir                                                                                             Pure jötnar 
 
    Baldr – Odin  –  Thor  –  Magni, Viðar,etc  –  Loki  –  Giantesses – Giants 
      (1)        (2)        (3)          (4)         (3)    (2)         (1) 
 
- 1st degree are slain or suffer as a result of treachery (cf. Baldr, 
Hrungnir. 
- 2nd degree are female or engage in female practices (cf. 
giantess, Odin’s practice of seiðr); consort with one another 
- 1st and 2nd degree both noted for their wisdom 
- 3rd degree is sexually ambiguous; gender-bending; hyper 
masculine and hyper feminine (cf. Thor’s cross dressing in 
Þrýmsqviða; Loki’s androgyny); companions to each other, 
both possessed of wit, but not wisdom 
- 4th degree are god/giant half-breeds, all are male, all are 
victorious; survive Ragnarök  
 
1. Baldr, Hóðr, Týr, Hermóðr, Bragi; the Giant Builder, Hrungnir, Hýmir 
2. Odin & the giantesses Jorð, Rindr, Gunnlöð, and Gerðr 
3. Thor and Loki 
4. Moði, Magni, Viðar,Váli 
 
Of course, this spectrum does not represent real, natural differences but rather 
differences perceived and imagined from the perspective of culture. After Ragnarök, 
all catagories collapse into the 4th group in recognition of the post-ideological nature 
of the new world.   
However, these similarities should not blind us to actual differences between 
the two sides either. The relation of the giants to the “nature” side of the equation is 
very important, since most of the gods’ raw materials come from giants and dwarfs. 
Although, to follow this line of argument, saying that the god-giant distinction is 
unsustainable is perhaps another way of saying that the distinction between nature and 
culture is also unsustainable—not counterfeit, but predicated on willful (as opposed to 
natural) violence, deception, and subordination of “natural” impulses to social order. 
This explains the gods’ Gewaltmonopol (monopoly of violence), whereby they may 
regularly violate their own oaths and bonds with the giants. The racial distinction 
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(god/giant) is the surface feature of a class distinction (rich/poor, noble/peasant, 
us/them), perhaps ultimately rooted in something as questionable as the culture-nature 
binary on which the veneer of civilization depends.  
 
 
b.  Ragnarök and Roll 
Ragnarök depicts the collapse of these binaries—culture and nature, god and 
giant, male and female—and the breaking of the bonds, fetters, and constraints which 
kept them from collapse. At Ragnarök a being called Surtr (whom Snorri never calls a 
giant, although “Surtr” is among the giant names in Skáldskaparmál) will set the 
world ablaze with his flaming sword. A sword of flame—a human artifact composed 
of one of the four elements of medieval science—neatly symbolizes the merger of 
culture and nature, and is the ideal instrument with which to cancel out these binaries. 
From the giants’ perspective the world must be destroyed. The world—the scattered 
remains of their kinsman, Ýmir—is being used as a stomping ground for the gods. 
Burial by fire is a logical closure to the gods slaying of Ýmir. 
While all the giants and most of the gods perish at Ragnarök, the lesson of 
Ragnarök is not that giants are stronger. Ultimately only a synthesis of opposing 
forces survives the old world. The new world, purged of conflict, is not ruled by gods 
or giants by the bastard offspring of both. Móði, Magni, Víðarr , and Váli are all sons 
of Æsir fathers and their giantess concubines, born out of wedlock. This signals that 
the new world will function harmoniously and naturally without any of the social 
constraints, oaths, or bonds invoked and broken in the old one. Baldr and Höðr, the 
purest of the pure Æsir survive as well, but I would note that they—unlike Móði, 
Magni, Víðarr, and Váli—have to be brought back from the dead. Baldr is united in 
peace with his slayer Höðr; Höðr is reunited in peace with his slayer Váli. The lions do 
not lay down with the lambs—the lions are the lambs and vice versa. 
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Snorri’s account of the world after Ragnarök highlights the merging of god and 
giant bloodlines in Móði, Magni, Víðarr, Váli, or, rather, the recognition that these 
bloodlines are not different to begin with. There is a contrast between the resurrected 
gods of the Poetic Edda and the addition of the Æsir-giant half-breeds in Snorri. The 
pure Æsir do not survive Ragnarök: they are resurrected in its wake. The survival of 
Baldr, the poster-boy for Æsir racism, is potentially ambiguous. Does Baldr’s 
continued existence suggest a carry-over of the old racial ideologies that led to the 
final conflagration in the first place? This ambiguity is resolved by the fact that Baldr 
does not survive; rather, he returns from the dead, reborn and purged of the sins of the 
old world. 
How do the gods’ (both Æsir and Vanir) legitimate, endogamous marriages 
pan out compared to their relationships with their giant mistresses? How do the 
legitimate offspring of the gods fare compared to their illegitimate half-siblings? What 
are their respective fates/accomplishments? One might expect legitimate marriages to 
produce the most favorable consequences for the Æsir, but the exact opposite is the 
case. Thor himself is the illegitimate son of Odin with the giantess Jörð, not with his 
wife, Frigg. Odin’s legitimate children all meet with disaster before Ragnarök, while 
his illegitimate son Thor triumphs. The illegitimate children of the gods routinely 
prove more successful: Thor’s children Móði, Magni, and Þrúðr (Thor doesn’t have 
any children with his wife, Sif), as well as Odin’s sons Víðarr (with the giantess Grið) 
and Váli (with the giantess Rindr) all fare well: 
 
- Magni throws Hrungnir’s leg off his father when the other gods cannot. 
- Móði and Magni will posses their father’s hammer after Ragnarök. 
- Víðarr defeats the Fenris Wolf. 
- Váli avenges Baldr. 
- Þrúðr escapes abduction by the dwarf Álvíss. 
Compared with these bastards, most of Odin’s legitimate children (Baldr, Höðr, 
Hermóðr, Týr, Bragi) fare badly: 
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- Baldr – accidentally killed by Höðr 
- Höðr – accidentally kills his brother Baldr 
- Hermóðr – fails to retrieve Baldr from Hel 
- Týr – hand bitten off by Fenris Wolf 
- Bragi – his wife Iðúnn is abducted by giants 
  
Since Loki is also “counted among the Æsir,” we must also ad Loki’s legitimate sons 
Váli and “Nari or Narfi” (26) to the mix. According to Snorri, the Æsir turn Váli into a 
wolf who tears his brother to pieces, whereupon the Æsir use his entrails to bind Loki 
until such time as all bonds break. Arguably the illegitimate children of Loki born to 
the giantess Angrboða (Hel, the Midgard Serpent, and the Fenris Wolf) give a much 
more distinguished account of themselves, even though they ultimately perish at 
Ragnarök.162 
Assuming that the myths leave little to chance, the issue of who fights, slays, 
and is killed by whom, and who survives at Ragnarök is of considerable symbolic 
import. What is the significance of these parings? The pattern that emerges is that the 
offspring of gods and giantesses slay of offspring of giants and goddesses: 
 
Gods       “Hel’s people”(54) 
  kills 
Thor   –  Midgard Serpent 
Víðarr   –  Fenris Wolf 
Heimdallr  –  Loki 
 
Add Týr and Garmr and Freyr and Surtr to the list for a complete account of single 
combats. While we do not know Garmr´s pedigree, his conflict with Týr is parallel to 
Fenrir´s battle with Odin. Surtr is generally assumed to be a giant, although there is no 
concrete evidence that this is the case. Only two of the ten beings whose five final 
battles Snorri describes in detail survive the ordeal: Víðarr and Surtr. In Víðarr we 
have a figure who embodies the unity of the gods and the giants, and in Surtr we have 
                                                
162 One wonders, although there are few points of comparison against which to measure, if Snorri’s 
versions exhibit a particularly Icelandic take on the myths that reflects the fear of inbreeding on a small 
isolated island with an estimated peak medieval population of 30,000. 
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a being who represents the fiery element of a formerly strifeful nature with which the 
survivors of Ragnarök now live in harmony. 
The pattern noted above, whereby “pure” offspring meet disaster while their 
mixed siblings achieve fame and fortune, is not only evident in myth but also in the 
saga tradition as well. In Völsungasaga, the most mythologically-minded of the 
fornaldarsögur, Sinfjötli, the most racially pure Völsung (born from the incestuous 
union of brother and sister) meets an ignominious death by poison; he furthermore 
suspects it is poison but drinks at the exhortation of his drunken father, Sigmundr. 
Sinfjötli stands in stark contrast to his successful half-brother Helgi, who is only half 
Völsung. Notably, the half-breed Helgi is the only character in the saga who makes it 
“out of the saga”—a tale best described as Ragnarök on a human scale—alive. And 
Helgi wins fame, fortune, and a wife in the process. The saga draws heavily on the 
mythological tradition as we know it via Snorri. Sigmundr battles a wolf while his son, 
Sigurðr, defeats a dragon (or “worm” in Old Norse), thus recapitulating the conflict of 
Odin and the Fenris Wolf and Thor and the Midgard Serpent. Sigmundr is angered 
when he is surpassed in battle by Sinfjötli, who kills 11 men. I do not believe that 
anyone has ever suggested this a possible pyschological clue behind Sigmundr’s bad 
advice to his son that he drink the poison. This would also explain why Odin later kills 
Sigmundr himself. After all, Sigmundr succeeds where Odin will eventually fail, 
namely, Sigmundr kills a wolf who tries to eat him, whereas Odin will one-day be 
eaten by a wolf. It is quite plausible that Odin kills Sigmundr out of the same envy out 
of which Sigmundr appears to let Sinfjötli die.   
Is the post-Ragnarök world of Snorri’s Edda a triumph of reconciliation of 
opposing groups or of ethnic cleansing? It is ultimately difficult not to see the co-
existence of Höðr with his killer, and the sons of mixed god-giant parentage, as 
evidence of an age of reconciliation. Will it last? Or will violence repeat itself in 
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circular fashion? This speaks to the much-debated question as to whether Old Norse 
mythic time is circular or linear.163 Here we must ultimately refocus on the disparity of 
the sources; there seem to be different answers to this question. 
Divergent interpretations have been adduced for the ending of Völuspá. Is it a 
brave new world, or one full of dark portent? Much of this debate has been focused on 
the dragon, Níðhöggr of the last stanza: 
 
There comes the dark    dragon flying, 
Flashing upward    from Nidafells; 
On wide swift wings    it soars above the earth, 
carrying corpses.    Now she will sink down.  
(Terry 8.50) 
We cannot adequately address the question as to whether the dragon, Níðhöggr, is a 
“purifying” or a “threatening presence.”164 The other question as to who the “she” of 
the last line is—the dragon or the Völva herself—cannot be adequately addressed 
here. What we can note, in either case, is that the threatening presence of monsters in 
the new world is at least externalized as a dragon and no longer represented as a racial 
Other. Hence the potential for the old racial divisions is eliminated after Ragnarök. 
This speaks against the theory that Old Norse mythic time is circular. 
None of the survivors of Ragnarök are female. There is no accounting of the 
fate of the goddesses at or after Ragnarök. Snorri speaks of Líf and Lífþrasir, “two 
people” (57) whose names both simply mean “life.” Logically, one of must be male 
and the other female since “from these people there will be descended such a great 
progeny that all the world will be inhabited” (57) Nevertheless, Snorri avoids any 
direct reference to womankind. Furthermore, the evidence of early mythic history 
raises the possibility of continued male parthenogenesis. This seems unlikely given the 
precedent of the first human couple, Askr and Embla, but cannot be ruled out. The 
                                                
163 Lindow, 39-45; Clunies Ross (1994), 229-241. 
164 Patricia Terry, 10. 
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question is academic. The salient fact is that after Ragnarök there is no clear reference 
to female procreation, which is relegated to the cosmic realm in the form of the sun 
who will miraculously bear a daughter who will “follow the paths of her mother” (57). 
Cosmogenesis was previously relegated to the male in the form of Ýmir’s body and its 
subsequent act of “male pseudo-procreation”165 and the male Æsir who put the 
heavenly lights in place. After Ragnarök, the normal female role of reproduction is 
restored. Not even Odin’s Valkyries play a role at the end of the world; perhaps 
because there is not going to be a Valhalla for them to bring the slain to under this 
reign of peace? Even so, it is remarkable that there is no accounting of their fate. 
Perhaps it will be an age of peace because the main source of tension between the 
gods and giants will no longer be extant—there will be no more women to fight about. 
Despite this lack of female inhabitants, Snorri’s post-Ragnarök world is more 
densely populated than either of his sources: Völuspá (46) lists only Báldr and Hóðr; 
Vafþrúðnismál lists Móði, Magni, Víðar, and Váli as the future inhabitants of this 
brave new world. Snorri’s account combines both sets: Völuspá’s pure Æsir and 
Vafþrúðnismál’s god-giant half-breeds. Commentators have been quick to point out 
Snorri’s antiquarian reflexes, and assume he is simply too thorough a compiler to let 
any strands of tradition slip away.166 This, however, ignores that Snorri is in fact 
highly selective with his sources and leaves accounts out of his retellings of certain 
stories (Hýmisqviða, For Skírnis, Völuspá) that do not suit his cultural milieu or his 
agenda. I believe we should hesitate to ascribe Snorri´s more complete accounting of 
the inhabitants of this new earth to mere antiquarian thoroughness. 
Two of the accounts are disparate; Snorri’s is synthetic. All three reveal 
something about the subject position of their fictional speakers, and perhaps, at 
                                                
165 Clunies Ross (1994), see note 134, above. 
166 As evinced, for example, by the sometimes contradictory mythography of the Edda and 
Heimskringla. 
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another remove, about their historical authors, especially Snorri and his priorities as a 
mythographer. Under closer scrutiny, two facts about the post-Ragnarökian accounts 
of Völuspá, Vafþrúðnismál, and Gylfaginning become clear: the Völva (or seeress) of 
Völuspá tells Oðínn that Báldr and Hóðr—the two “pure” Æsir—will survive 
Ragnarök; in other words, the Völva tells Oðínn exactly what he—whose efforts have 
been wholly directed at upholding this cultural distinction as racial—wants to hear. 
Vafþrúðnir caters less to Oðínn’s sensibilities. (They are, after all, engaged in a 
contest.) The names Vafþrúðnir lists are the god-giant halfbreeds, sons of pure Æsir 
and their giantess concubines, whom Oðínn denies membership in the Æsir club (SnE 
79, Faulkes). Vafþrúðnir’s list is very much a wish-fulfilment for his giant kin who 
have heretofore been exluded from Æsir society. Thus, whereas the Völva tells Oðínn 
exactly what he wants to hear (she wants this unwelcome inquisition to be over with), 
Vafþrúðnir does the opposite: his census of the god-giant mixed beings of the post-
Ragnarökian period is an affront to Oðínn’s racial program, an additional provocation 
to the god whose death Vafþrúðnir fortells. Therefore the accounts of survival that 
Vafþrúðnir and the Völva give are not merely bits of lore that vary from source to 
source. The traditions themselves have an agenda, one pro-Æsir, the other pro-giant.167 
These are selective readings, even prescriptive ones. Each has its own Sitz im Leben; 
each speaks from one of two positions in the conflict of the gods and the giants. 
By combining the post-Ragnarökian personae from both sources, Völuspá and 
Vafþrúðnismál, and creating a more populous post-apocalypse, Snorri is not merely 
being a more thorough compiler; he is taking a position on cultural difference. The 
evidence—both of his version of life after Ragnarök and of his depiction of the giants 
generally—indicates that for Snorri the difference between Æsir and jötnar is cultural, 
                                                
167 The Völva’s pro-Æsir stance perhaps strengthens Ursula Dronke’s case (Völ., 30-31) for the human 
identity of the Volva.  
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not physical. According to Snorri, this distinction will fade away when the baggage of 
mythic history is consumed in the flames and washed away by purging waters of 
Ragnarök.  
That is why Snorri’s giants are not big. 
 
 
 
Illustration 3: A present-day giant in Seattle, Washington, occupies “the margins of the known world” 
underneath a busy traffic bridge. Photo: Michael Hanson for The New York Times. 
 
 
 
c. Iceland & Norway 
In this ethnographic dimension the “political unconscious” of Snorri’s 
encyclopedic mythography comes to the surface. The relationship of the gods and the 
giants—two groups whose perceived differences are cultural, not racial—is a close 
parallel to the relationship of the Æsir to Gylfi and, more importantly, of Iceland to 
Norway. 
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Let us review the parallels between the gods and the giants, the Norwegians 
and the Icelanders: 
 
- They share a common ancestry, but occupy different geographic locations. 
- Both groups share a common language, with minor regional variations (cf. 
Alvíssmál) 
- The stronger group looks to the weaker for natural resources and marriageable 
females. 
- Peace between opposing sides depends on achieving some sort of political 
unity whose exact nature is unclear but is attained through a world-historical 
upheaval. 
While the sagas are replete with tales of Norwegians who settle in Iceland and take 
local brides, there do not seem to be many sagas that feature Icelanders who journey to 
Norway to take a wife. The evidence of Njáls saga, in which Hrutr is seduced by the 
Queen of Norway with disastrous results, suggests that a system of “negative 
reciprocity”168 in matters of matrimony governs the social relations of the Icelanders 
and the Norwegians no less than it does those of the gods and the giants.  
This is not to claim that the gods are merely ciphers for the Norwegians or the 
giants for Icelanders. The myths do not allude in a neatly linear fashion. The reason 
they still resonate today is that than can be read in any number of fashions. What 
interests us is the Sitz im Leben of the myths with the inhabitants of medieval Iceland. 
thirteenth-century Icelanders could alternately relate to either group depending on the 
social context or situation. When dealing with the Norwegian nobility, how like a 
giant, when dealing with their own households and thingmen, or raiding abroad, how 
like a god. 
The notion of “land-taking” or landnám is fundamental to medieval Icelandic 
nationalism. Land-taking, or rather “land-making” is also the first act performed by 
the gods at the dawn of mythic time. Thus the tales of the gods resonate in what I 
would call “the psycho-mythology of everyday life” in medieval Iceland. It is telling 
                                                
168 Clunies Ross (1994), 103-106. 
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that Snorri prefaces his own account of Norse mythology and mythic history with 
another “land-taking,” drawing on a bit of Skaldic verse to create a frame story of 
mythic land-taking—Gefjun’s seizure and transfer by oxen of a lake-sized chunk of 
Sweden to Denmark—which, most notably, is in essence about the transferal of an 
island (or what, at any rate, becomes and island) between two rival Scandinavian 
powers. The tale of Gefjun is a tale of the creation of a new island state founded by 
giants.169 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the encyclopedic dimension of Snorri’s 
Edda as Snorri’s attempt to serve as middle-man between the “two cultures” of 
Iceland and Norway. In this chapter, I argue that Snorri’s mythic ethnography, 
especially as it regards the “giantness” of the giants, is central to this project. In so 
doing I want to suggest that long-standing notions about the inhabitants of Snorri’s 
mythic world have little basis in his actual work. Standing once more on the shoulders 
of frost-giants (even though they are not especially tall in Snorri), we are now in a 
position to delineate the “two cultures” model more broadly as follows: 
 
“Two Cultures” 
 
Norway – Iceland  
Gods - Giants 
Æsir - Gylfi 
 
Wisdom & Wit – Wisdom only 
Colonizer - Colonized 
Male - Female 
 
Christian – Pagan   
Foreign – Native   the Encyclopedia 
Latin – vernacular    
 
 
The difficulty faced by the mythical Æsir in maintaining an ethnic and cultural identiy 
                                                
169 Margaret Clunies Ross, “The Myth of Gefjon and Gylfi and its Function in Snorra Edda and 
Heimskringla,” Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi, 93 (1978), 149-65. 
 } 
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distinct from that of the giants is analogous to the plight of thirteenth-century 
Icelanders struggling to maintain their own ethnic and cultural identity distinct from 
Norway. The thirteenth century was a period in which that distinction, to the extent it 
once existed, was quickly devolving under conditions of renewed political and 
economic dependence. 
I propose that Snorri maintains the “giantness” of the giants as “false 
appearances” in certain cases, as with Skrýmir and Mökkurkálfi, paralleled by the 
illusions cast on Gylfi by the historical Æsir, and on Thor and his companions by 
Útgarða-Loki. The perceived cultural and ethnic differences between Iceland and 
Norway collapse into one another in the political Dämmerung of the mid thirteenth 
century, just as those between god and giant do at Ragnarök. The differences that 
separate Them and Us are illusory constructs, just as Skrýmir and Mökkurkálfi are 
literally just that. Even so, these differences form an important part of a distinct 
Icelandic identity, and must be respected if only on the level of “deceptive 
appearances.” 
The trials of Thor and his companions in the hall of Útgarða-Loki anticipate 
the events of Ragnarök. Like that final battle, in Útgarða-Loki’s hall the god and his 
companions are defeated by the Midgard Serpent, all-consuming fire, a sea whose tide 
they cannot stem, the passage of time, and ultinately by an illusory idea. The parallels 
to all but the last require no lengthy spelling out: Útgarða-Loki’s cat, the eating contest 
with Logi, Thor’s drinking match against the sea and wrestling with old age. But what 
is the “thought” that, like Hugi, the gods cannot catch? I would submit that it is the 
Æsir´s racist ideology itself, an idea that leads to their own defeat and destruction at 
Ragnarök. The giants, like Útgarða-Loki’s contestants, are not what the gods perceive 
them to be. 
Thus the outer trappings of giantness are illusory, but still meaningful. The 
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“basic idea of a giant” (to quote Eldvik once more pace Eldvik) stems from the 
inability to regard other cultures as fully human. The giant is the outsider who “em-
bodies” his cultural difference (in the sense of our current theoretical jargon). Thus 
dehumanized, his extermination is legitimated by the alleged threat he poses to human 
society. European conquerors and colonizers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
from Columbus onwards, sent back reports of Native Americans they regarded as 
“giants.”170 To quote Heinrich Heine once more, “Die Furcht hat vielleicht ihrem 
Maße manche Elle hinzugefügt” (Fear perhaps added many a cubit to their measure). 
To perceive differences between one’s social group and another as cultural as 
opposed to natural requires the ability to conceive one’s own values and institutions as 
mutable and contingent rather than fixed and eternal. Despite, or perhaps even because 
of its own recent religious conversion, this was no more the mindset of medieval 
Iceland than it was of the Spanish conquistadors. In the mainline Scandinavian 
tradition, differences that cannot be conceived in terms of culture are often projected 
onto the nature of things, as is the case with the giants. But for Snorri, who played a 
unique role as cultural and political mediator between all things Norwegian and 
Icelandic, Christian and pagan, foreign and native, Latin and vernacular, these gigantic 
differences remain “deceptive appearances.” 
                                                
170 John F. Moffin, “‘Een West-Indien Landtschap met Vreet Ghebouw’: Jan Mostaert on the 
Architectural Primitivism Characterizing a ‘Golden Age’ Reborn in the New World,” Art and the 
Native American: Perceptions, Reality, and Influences, ed. Mary Louise Elliot Krumrine and Susan C. 
Scott, Papers in Art History from the Pennsylvania State University (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania State 
University Dept. of Art History: 2002), 111. 
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III. Wit, Wisdom, and the Sapiential Arms-Race 
 
If the gods are fundamentally no different than the giants, how are they to 
distinguish themselves from them? 
The answer to this question is bound up with the status of wisdom in Old 
Norse mythological tradition. Why do does Odin attempt to outdo the giants in all 
things sapiential? Why do the gods value wisdom in the first place? This is indeed a 
conundrum for the student of the sapiential tradition in Old Norse literature. Based on 
the evidence of the sources, it is clear that wisdom, once acquired, is of precious little 
avail, or in some cases even a detriment to the gods. Wisdom is of little use in 
forestalling, and no use whatsoever in preventing Ragnarök. Hávamál warns against 
the aquisition and display of excessive wisdom; the tales of Kvasir, Mímir, Baldr, 
Álvíss, Ýmir, and Vafþrúðnir bear this warning out. The ultimate futility of Odin´s 
pursuit of wisdom is evident from the events of Ragnarök depicted in Snorri’s Edda 
and the Poetic Edda, and in the two sagas that reduce the narrative of Ragnarök to a 
human scale, Völsunga saga and Njáls saga. Wisdom, it seems, is not good for 
anything—much less defeating the giants at Ragnarök. It would be difficult to point to 
a single figure in Norse myth or saga who prevails on the basis of hard-gained 
wisdom; certainly neither Odin, nor Sigurðr, nor Njáll does.  
Paradoxically, this is precisely why wisdom is essential to the gods’ 
construction of a distinct Æsir identity predicated on alleged differences between Æsir 
and jötnar. I would argue that superior wisdom is a status symbol the gods use to 
construct that difference. Thus, the episodes where gods and giants match wits and 
other instances where wisdom plays a role in Old Norse myth are not isolated episodes 
but part of an ongoing “arms race.” 
How can wisdom be a weapon if its pursuit appears to be futile? Why does 
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wisdom confer status if it is not “useful” in any obvious sense? The answers to these 
questions clear up many enigmas. As with any status symbol, the more useless, the 
greater the status. Wisdom does not perform work (a task left to cunning, as I will later 
argue). Only the need to maintain the cultural distinction between gods and giants 
accounts for Odin’s pursuit of this useless knowledge. 
The sapiential tradition in Old Norse Icelandic literature spans several genres, 
all of which share the agonistic (and antagonistic) element that characterizes the gods’ 
interactions with the giants. Scholars have coined the name “wisdom contest” (a term I 
also use in chapter 1) to describe Odin’s sapiential dueling in Vafþrúðnismál, and have 
discussed Snorri’s application of this model in Gylfaginning and Skáldskaparmál. 
Chapter 1 made a case for moving beyond the competing either/or theories and argued 
that Snorri consciously merges the indigenous wisdom contest with the master-student 
dialogue of the Latinate Christian encyclopedic pedagogical tradition to address his 
own unique situation as a mediator between the “two cultures.” 
The Old Norse sapiential tradition poses an ethnographic question that can 
accurately be answered in contradictory ways: Are the giants wise or foolish? On the 
one hand, they are depicted as beholden to physical urges—lust, gluttony, and anger—
acquisitive as well as stupid, and always a step behind the gods’ machinations. Yet the 
giants are also venerable, older and wiser than the gods, and are sources of resources 
and wisdom. The stupid giant is more a creature of saga tradition than mythography, 
as evinced by the passages cited early in this chapter, and most succinctly by this 
Kári´s ally Björn in Njáls saga: 
 
“Let’s fool them all like dumb giants” (við skulum ginna þá alla sem þursa) 
(Njáls saga ch. 151.) 
 
Although the giants are regularly outwitted by the gods (like, e.g., the Giant Builder, 
Hrungnir, Þýrm, Þjazi, Skaði, and Hýmir), they are nevertheless depicted as wise. 
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Wisdom is in fact he first attribute mentioned of the first of their kind, Ýmir, “the wise 
giant” (inn fróði jötunn) (10:10). The giants’ store of wisdom is on its fullest display 
in Vafþrúðnismál. Aptly enough, giants are almost always killed by blows to the 
head—the seat of wisdom (cf. Vafþrúðnismál 7, 55; Hýmisqviða 25;  SnE 36, 47, 62, 
79, cf. 8).  
The “wisdom contest” is a scholarly construct since no one example of the 
genre—neither Vafþrúðnismál, nor Gylfaginning, nor Alvíssmál—quite follows the 
“rules” as gleaned by scholars.171 The discussion of a common genre is only possible 
in terms of the Wittgensteinian “family resemblances” I discuss in chapter 1. The 
wisdom contest belongs to an extended family with many cousins in saga literature, 
such as the riddle contest of Heidreks saga konungs ins vitra, or the dialogue of 
Sigurðr and Brynhild in Völsungasaga. 
  It is possible, however, to make more theoretical and less normative 
distinctions between the genres of Old Norse sapiential tradition. Whereas an 
inductively derived, normative theory of genre gives us the “wisdom contest,” a more 
fundamental distinction can be made between works that represent the acquisition of 
wisdom and those that represent its performance; Völuspá would be a prime example 
of the former, Grímnismál of the later. This is, of course, depends on an Æsir-centric 
perspective. Odin acquires wisdom and performs it in Grímnismál; but the Völva also 
performs wisdom, and Grímnir’s son, Agnar, acquires it. With that proviso in mind, I 
would suggest dividing Old Norse-Icelandic sapiential literature into Wisdom 
Acquisitions: Völuspá (Odin), Grímnismál (Agnar), Gylfaginning (Gylfi); and 
Wisdom Performances: Vafþrúðnismál (Vafþrúðnir, Odin), Alvíssmál (Alvis), 
Hávamál (Odin); noting that all Acquisitions (Völuspá, Grímnismál, Gylfaginning) are 
performances from the perspective of one of the parties (the Völva, Odin, and the 
                                                
171 Judy Quinn (see note 77, above), 245-74. 
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Æsir). 
“Wisdom” in the Old Norse sources is interchangeable with “knowledge.” The 
word víss (wise) refers primarily to someone who “knows much.” Only secondarily 
does it refer to the quality of “sound judgment” we are likely to associate with it. This 
is a secondary meaning predicated on the former; sound judgment stems from superior 
knowledge. Njáll serves as the prime example of this sound judgment in the sagas. 
However, as the examples of Njáll and Odin make clear, wisdom and judgment are 
ultimately futile when it comes to forstaying violence in an inherently violent system. 
Hence, wisdom’s status in a tradition that at first glance seems to value it above all 
else is radically called into question. 
 
  
a. The Double Standard 
 
The status of wisdom is a question at the very center of Snorri´s Edda. Gylfi 
and the historical Æsir’s attempts of to outwit each other in the frame narrative of 
Gylfaginning recapitulate the main theme and subject matter of Snorri´s mythic 
history: the gods’ and the giants’ attempts to outwit one another. I discuss the wisdom-
contest dimension of Gylfaginning in the previous chapter (esp. pp. 37-39). But 
wisdom is explicitly thematized on other occasions as well.  
Much of the wisdom of the Old Norse sapiential tradition is onomastic lore. As 
we all know from the fairy tale Rumpelstilzchen, knowing the name of something is 
the first step towards controlling it. Knowing a name gives one power over the thing 
named. This is why Sigurðr hesitates to betray his name to the dragon Fafnir whom he 
has mortally wounded. This ability to control names is a constitute feature of Old 
Norse wisdom poetry (Völuspá, Grímnismál, Alvíssmál) and of Snorri´s Edda as well, 
as evinced in Gylfi´s mock ironic response to the sixty names of Odin (or Oðinsheiti) 
that Third recites for him: 
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What a terrible lot of names you have given him! By my faith, one would need 
a great deal of learning to be able to give details and explanations of what 
events have given rise to each of these names. (22) 
 
This is one of the more playful moments in the Edda. The wise reader gets no points 
for guessing just who has the requisite learning (hint: a certain fellow by the name of 
Snorri). High chimes in, “You cannot claim to be a wise man if you cannot tell of 
these important happenings” (22) which give rise to these names in the first place. 
With a similarly self-referential wink-and-nudge, High, on a later occasion, goes on to 
say, “But this question you are now asking, it seems to me very likely that there can 
be few so wise as to be able to give the correct answer to it” [all italics mine] (32). 
Snorri makes a distinction between the onomastic arcana appropriate to “scholars” 
(and, one might add, composers of Skaldic poetry) and the narrative lore that is part of 
popular and saga tradition, the most widely read and remembered part of Snorra Edda 
itself:  
 
High replied: “It is no secret, even among those who are not scholars, that 
Thor achieved redress for this expedition [i.e., to Útgarðr] that has just been 
recounted.” [italics mine] (46) 
 
Once more, there is no royal road to wisdom, only competing traditions (Christian and 
pagan, foreign and native, and Latin and vernacular), some perhaps more popular, 
such as we find in the sagas, others more linked to the high court culture for which 
Snorri and his circle (i.e., whoever was the target audience of the Edda) cultivated 
Skaldic verse.  
The gnomic wisdom poem Hávamál warns against excessive wisdom (stanzas 
54-56) and praises good “common sense” (manvit) at the expense of what we might 
call book learning (stanza 10). Snorri puts some narrative meat on the bones of 
Hávamál’s warning in the tale of Kvasir: 
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The origin of [poetry] was that the gods had a dispute with the people called 
Vanir, and they appointed a peace conference and made a truce by this 
procedure, that both sides went up to a vat and spat their spittle into it. But 
when they dispersed, the gods kept this symbol of truce and decided not to let 
it be wasted. And out of it made a man. His name was Kvasir, he was so wise 
that no one could ask him any questions to which he did not know the answer. 
He travelled widely through the world teaching people knowledge, and when 
he arrived as a guest to some dwarfs, Fialar and Galar, they called him to a 
private discussion with them and killed him. They poured his blood into two 
vats and a pot, and the latter was called Odrerir, but the vats were called Son 
and Bodn. They mixed honey with the blood and it turned into the mead 
whoever drinks from which is becomes a poet or scholar. The dwarfs told the 
Æsir that Kvasir had suffocated in intelligence because there was no one there 
educated enough to be able to ask him questions. (62) 
 
The fact that the dwarfs’ bogus explanation strikes the gods as plausible is not the 
kindest commentary on Kvasir’s brand of learning. Despite his vaunted wisdom, the 
wisest of all beings lacks the common sense to turn down an invitation from a bunch 
of crafty, malicious dwarfs, and their wits trump his wisdom. Kvasir is book-smart, 
but not streetwise. Kvasir is ultimately an artificial being, and like Mökkurkálfi, the 
constructed companion of the giants, he fares badly. Kvasir’s blood is turned into the 
Mead of Poetry. Beer takes away wit, as Hávamál tells us (stanza 18); so while Kvasir 
is all-wise, he is literally a walking intoxicant who lacks wit to avoid falling prey to 
treacherous dwarves. The stealthy dwarfs proceed to kill a giantess with a millstone to 
the head (62)—again, the seat of wisdom—demonstrating that head-blows are the 
preferred means of dispatching giants for both dwarfs and gods.172 One suspects that 
Ýmir, “that wise giant” (10), may have been killed in a manner similar to the dwarfs’ 
killing of the all-too-wise but unsuspecting Kvasir. 
The dangers of pursing universal knowledge for its own sake (in other words, 
of a detached, unworldly encyclopedism) are made clear by the dwarf Álvíss in 
Alvíssmál. Thor turns Álvíss’s lore-mongering against him, prompting him to show off 
                                                
172 For a Germanic analogue to the tale’s death-by-millstone-to-the-head motif, cf. Grimms’ Märchen 
von dem Machanelboom (The Juniper Tree) (KHM 47). 
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his great wisdom until he, unwisely, stays out after sunrise, and forgets that bit of 
wisdom about dwarfs turning to stone when struck by daylight. Álvíss’s disquisition 
from stanza 9 to 26 constitutes a compete ordo rerum, an encyclopedia of topics: the 
Earth, sky, moon, sun, clouds, winds, water, and fire. The order of this order-of-things 
is largely the same as found in Snorri (12-13) and Völuspá. After water and fire (the 
elements that create and destroy the world), we might logically expect Álvíss to be 
finished; but Thor stalls for time, egging him on with a series of topics that are “out-
of-order”: forests, night (n.b.: but not day), seed, and ale, the last of which is 
suggestive of a dulling of wits. Much like Kvasir, who allegedly drowns in his own 
intelligence, Álvíss’s wits are petrified by excessive wisdom, and the “day,” which is 
introduced out of order, catches him off guard.  
This is one of the many occasions in Snorri’s Edda and the larger mythological 
tradition where wisdom is trumped by wit. Thor has struck many commentators as out 
of place in a contest of wisdom, and this parodic element of Álvíssmál has been lost on 
few. Still, I would argue that Thor is very much in character in so far as he is the gods’ 
instrument of choice when it comes to violating contracts (in this case a marriage 
agreement). What is unusual, or perhaps even carnevalesque in Alvíssmál is that Thor 
usually accomplishes this with force, not with his wits. In so doing, Thor performs a 
role usually assigned to Loki.  
Encyclopedic wisdom is ultimately as futile for Alvíss as it is for the Gods 
leading up to Ragnarök. Wisdom is, however, of short-term tactical advantage, as in 
the case of Vafþrúðnismál; it wins the battle, but not the war. Such tactical usefulness 
is also on display in Grímnismál, where a bound and captive Odin delivers a wisdom 
performance (see above), compiling an encyclopedia of cosmic-onomastic lore. Jere 
Fleck, as noted in the previous chapter, has discussed the “Knowledge Criterion for 
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Succession to the Germanic Sacred Kingship.” 173 Regardless of whether such a 
criterion actually existed in real life, in the world of the sources a ruler must be 
sovereign, strong, and fertile,174 but also wise. Wisdom, along with generosity are 
constitutive of “sovereignty.” King Geirrøðr demonstrates his unfitness for command 
when he fails to realize who Odin is, despite numerous clues. Grímnismál is Wisdom 
101 for Geirrøðr’s son Agnar. The farmer whispers something into his favorite son’s 
ear before sending him off in a boat. This is a widely noted analogue to Odin’s 
whisper in Baldr’s ear on the funeral pyre (Snorra Edda 49; Vafþrúðnismál 44). 
Knowledge of this lore gives Odin the tactical edge in the wisdom contest against 
Vafþrúðnir. Vafþrúðnismál and Alvíssmál show that mere knowledge is not enough; 
one must have the wits to put such knowledge to use, lest one lose one’s head. 
Disembodied wisdom without the practical application of wit subject to a 
thorough critique in Ýnglingasaga in the tale of Hœnir and Mímir. The two are given 
as hostages to the Vanir after their war with the Æsir. Hœnir, “a large man and 
exceedingly handsome” and “well fitted to be a chieftain” (Hollander 8) is promptly 
made one over the Vanir but appears unable to render judgments without Mímir at his 
side. This leads the Vanir to suspect that they have been defrauded and behead Mímir 
in retaliation for perceived deceit. (Note as in the case with giants, beings who are 
wise but not witty are killed by headblows or decapitation.)  
Odin is the consummate encyclopedist. The mythological tradition including 
Snorri, the poems of the Poetic Edda, and scattered cameo appearances in the sagas all 
portray Odin as a collector and compiler of cosmic and gnomic wisdom. Odin roams 
                                                
173 Jere Fleck, “Konr-Óttarr-Geirroðr:  A Knowledge Criterion for Succession to the Germanic Sacred 
Kingship,” Scandinavian Studies, 42 (1970), 39-49. Also see “The ‘Knowledge Criterion’ in the 
Grímnismál: The Case against ‘Shamanism,” Arkiv for nordisk filolgi, 86 (1971), 49-65.   
174 Harkening back to Dumézil’s heuristically useful theory of the “three functions”; cf. Einar Haugen. 
“The Mythical Structure of the Ancient Scandinavians: Some Thoughts on Reading Dumézil,” 
Introduction to Structuralism, ed. Michael Lane (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 170-83. 
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the worlds consulting his “sources,” such as the giant Vafþrúðnir and the undead 
Völva of Völuspá, as one would consult a reference work. Statim invenire! 175 Odin’s 
world (Snorri’s version of it) is catalogued, indexed, and complied into a coherent 
order of things, persons, and events, much like any world chronicle or medieval 
encyclopedia. Odin’s exploits as recounted by Snorri consist of so many 
reconnaissance missions, with the ultimate goal of filling in the remaining gaps in his 
knowledge in order to prevent or forestall the doom of the gods. It is a race against 
time, and against the rival wisdom of the giants. 
In Völuspá Odin embarks on one of his reconnaissance missions with the goal 
of acquiring new wisdom, which he mobilizes against his enemy in Vafþrúðnismál. 
Read in conjunction, this provides a useful insight into the economy of wisdom in 
Snorri’s mythography and in the broader tradition. Wisdom that is acquired by the god 
from a female source is then deployed, with the aid of wit, against a male adversary in 
Vafþrúðnismál. This gathering of natural resources with the aid of females 
corresponds to a general pattern in the myths (cf. Gunnlöð, Hýmir´s wife), as well as 
the giants as the metaphorically female half of the male/female-culture/nature binary, 
in which the giants and other beings of lesser social status furnish the gods with 
women and resources (e.g., Hýmir’s cauldron, the dwarven treasures, the Mead of 
Poetry). The same pattern is in evidence in Völsungasaga, when Sigurðr  acquires 
wisdom from Brynhild, but then—deprived of his wits—fails to put it into use.  
This active use of wisdom for tactical advantage is what I call cunning. In 
Alvíssmál, Thor embodies the very notion of cunning when he is able to turn Alvíss’s 
                                                
175 Mary A. and Richard H. Rouse, “Statim invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the 
Page,” Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts and Manuscripts (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 191-220.  
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lore-mongering against him, prompting him to show off his great wisdom until he, 
unwisely, stays out after sunrise and turns to stone. This is the sort of “excessive 
wisdom” that Hávamál warns against and which the figures of Kvasir and Mímir 
embody. The ability to rapidly change appearances is also a constitutive part of 
cunning. This is evident not only in Odin and Loki’s transformations into animal 
shape, but also, for example, by Thor’s ability to change the appearance of a wisdom 
contest to a contest of wit in Alvíssmál; likewise when Gylfi (as I argue in chapter 1) 
makes the historical Æsir mistake a Christian master-student dialogue for a pagan 
wisdom contest. 
It seems that only the dwarf Alvíss and the giant Vafþrúðnir play the wisdom 
contest by the rules, whereas the gods win by superior wit, not wisdom. It is striking 
that there is no example of a “wisdom contest” not won by wit. According to game 
theory, every game is an implied contract, with defined sets of expectations, rules, and 
penalties for their violation. Yet these violations never seem to have any negative 
consequences for the gods (at least not in the short term). 
 
 
b. Contracts and Oaths 
Oaths, truces (not to mention physical fetters and bonds), agreements, and 
other forms of contract, implicit and explicit (such as marriage) play a central role in 
the mythological world of the Edda. The gods act as guarantors of contracts and oaths 
(at the very least, they swear an awful lot of them), yet they themselves appear to be 
the chief oath-breakers, as the following review of the evidence makes clear: 
- Odin makes a vow of blood-brotherhood with Loki (Lokasenna 9). Loki will 
violate this bond at Ragnarök, when all social bonds and physical fetters break. 
- The Æsir make an oath with the Fenris Wolf to release it if it is incapable of 
breaking the fetter they place on him. Týr’s hand is the surety of this oath. 
(Ironically, the gods violate their promise to break the physical bond by 
breaking their legal bond.) 
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- The gods make a contract with the Giant Builder for the construction of 
Ásgarðr; they furthermore swear oaths to leave the Builder unmolested which 
are broken when they realize that he is a giant. 
- Freyr grants Skírnir his sword in exchange for acting as an intermediary with 
the giantess Gerðr. The unarmed Freyr is killed by Surtr at Ragnarök as a 
consequence. 
- Loki makes a contract with dwarven smiths regarding a contest to produce 
treasures for the gods; Loki wagers his head in the bargain, but cleverly avoids 
beheading with a clever bit of legal trickery (the wager does not include his 
neck). 
- Thor enters into a contract with a human family regarding the proper 
consumption of his magically regenerating goats; the contract is violated when 
Þjálfi cracks the marrow out of the bone, laming one goat. Thor’s anger is 
assuaged by another oath, a promise of lifelong service from the farmer’s 
children. 
- Oaths with the giants are always made when Thor is away, e.g., when Freyja is 
promised to the Giant Builder, in Alvíssmál when Thor’s daughter is promised 
in marriage to a dwarf, when Loki arranges for the return of Thor’s hammer by 
means of marrying Freyja into giantland in Þrýmsqviða. 
- The gods promise Þjazi “his share” of the ox, but Loki attempts to break this 
promise when “his share” turns out to be more then they bargained for. 
- Skaði is granted a husband among the gods in compensation for the death of 
her father, Þjazi, but is deceived into selecting a match of lower social status 
with Freyr of the Vanir. 
- The Dwarfs Fjalar and Galar give the mead made from Kvasir's blood to 
Suttungr as atonement for killing his father, the giant Gillingr (62).   
- Baugi comes to an agreement with Odin (disguised as a certain “Bolverkr”) 
that he will help him get some mead from his brother, Suttungr, in exchange 
for Odin’s labor.  Baugi asks his brother on Odin’s behalf, but Suttungr 
refuses. When Odin tries to steal the mead, Baugi attempts to trick Odin by not 
boring through the mountain completely and by trying to stab him with the 
auger, apparently breaking his agreement that he would help him get the mead 
(63). This would at first seem to be the one example of a giant breaking his 
half of a bargain, but a careful reading shows that Baugi is no longer bound to 
Odin. The stated agreement was that Baugi “would go with Bolverk [Odin] and 
try whether they could get the mead. Once Suttungr refuses his brother request, 
Baugi has tried and lived up to his half of the bargain. 
- Frigg considers the mistletoe that will eventually kill Baldr too “young…to 
demand an oath from” (48).  
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- An agreement is made with Hel that Baldr “shall go back to the Æsir” on the 
condition that “all things in the world, alive and dead, weep for him” (50). 
- For all their dishonesty and oath-breaking trickery, there is a goddess named 
Vár (30) whose prime purpose is to uphold contracts—especially between men 
and women—and punish oathbreakers. The Æsir themselves, however, are not 
subject to such punishment, at least not until Ragnarök. 
- At Ragnarök all fetters will break and oaths will be disregarded. Brothers will 
betray the bonds of their kinship, not only in terms of alluded incest (realized 
only in Völsungasaga, but also when Loki betrays the bonds of his blood-
brothership with Odin by leading the armies of Muspell (not least his own 
monstrous children) against him. “There is nothing in this world that will be 
secure when Muspell’s sons attack” (15). 
- When Loki breaks the bonds of his kinship with Odin, this is closure to the 
gods’ breaking of the bonds of their kinship with Ýmir. 
 
The gods’ wanton disregard for their own oaths and contracts is striking, given the 
harsh punishments promised to breakers of oaths and vows in the Edda: 
 
On Nastrands there is a large and unpleasant hall, and its doors face north. It is 
also woven out of snakes’ bodies like a wattled house, and the snakes’ heads 
all face inside the house and spit poison so that poison rivers flow along the 
hall, and wading those rivers are oathbreakers and murderers, as it says here: 
 
I know a hall that stands far from the sun on Nastrand. North face the 
doors. Poison drops flow in through the smoke-hole. The hall is woven 
from snakes’ backs. There shall wade heavy streams men who are 
perjured and murderers. (56) 
 
To the best of my knowledge, scholars have not noticed that Snorri’s description of 
oathbreakers is also a fitting description of Thor. Thor is the gods’ main instrument of 
when it comes to violating or undermining oaths of truce with the giants by force (e.g., 
Giant Builder, Hrungnir) or vows of marriage, as in Þrýmsqviða or with the dwarf in 
Alvíssmál. Like the oathbreakers of Nástrandir, Thor is frequently depicted in the 
Edda (18, 47, 52, 80, 82) as wading across rivers and other waters, and he is 
eventually killed at Ragnarök by the poison of a serpent. 
Loki is the gods’ preferred tool when oaths must be broken by cunning, often 
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in conjunction with Thor’s brute force as in Þrýmsqviða. Like the oathbreakers after 
Ragnarök (and, as I have argued, Thor) Loki is also punished by poison dripping from 
a snake (52). The close parallel between Thor, Loki,and the oathbreakers of 
Nástrandir is highly suggestive of the more critical attitude of Snorri towards the gods 
that I have argued. 
   Although the gods make oaths, which are often broken with impunity, the 
giants are rigorously held to their half of various bargains. Thus one must speak of a 
“double standard” in the gods’ dealings with the giants. Oaths have a way of begetting 
more oaths, as the gods’ broken oaths frequently requires an additional oath or 
agreement as compensation. For example, Loki makes an oath to the giant-eagle, 
Þjazi, promising him “his fill” of an ox if he agrees to let it cook (59-61).  Loki breaks 
the promise or implied contract, and this requires a secondary oath, this time a promise 
to lead Iðunn to the Þjazi, who is ambushed when giving chase after Loki steals her 
back.  One of the gods is obliged to make an oath of marriage to Skaði, the daughter of 
Þjazi, in compensation for the death of her father, and Loki must also make her laugh 
by means of a bizarre testicular tug-of-war with a nanny goat. Thus an episode that 
begins with a broken oath and Loki bound to an animal ends with another oath and 
Loki bound to another animal. Clearly, if the initial oaths had not been disregarded, 
further oaths of compensation and related troubles would not have been necessary. 
Why are oaths broken then? When this happens, Loki is not far behind. But it 
has not been sufficiently acknowledged that he is the instrument and not the cause of 
the gods’ oathbreaking. The cause is the double standard that allows the gods to 
violate agreements with beings of lesser social status when it is convenient for them to 
do so. Contracts are implemented to reach a truce between two parties; they imply a 
legal parity ultimately incompatible with the Æsir’s racial ideology. Since Loki is 
“reckoned among the Æsir” (26) yet, by their standards, not truly one of them, he 
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allows the gods to keep their hands clean by doing their dirty work. Loki is disruptive 
to oaths and contracts, although he himself never breaks them. The gods contract with 
the Builder results from Loki’s counsels, and Loki is called on again when the contract 
must be circumvented. He disguises himself as a woman to discover the one thing that 
has not sworn an oath to do Baldr no harm (48).  
The entire order of things—fire, water, iron, all kinds of metal, stones, the 
earth, trees, diseases, the animals, the birds, poisons, snakes—swears to do Baldr no 
harm. This list is a veritable encyclopedia, and could practically serve as a table of 
contents for Isidore’s Etymologiae (books XII and XIII), Hrabanus Maurus’ De rerum 
naturis (books VIII and IX), or De Proprietatibus rerum of Bartholomaeus Anglicus 
(books VII, VIII, XIII, XVI, XVII, and XVIII). The list of things and beings that 
swear to do Baldr no bodily harm 
 
- Fire 
- Water 
- Iron 
- Other Metals 
- Stones 
- The earth 
- Trees 
- Diseases 
- Animals 
- Birds 
- Poisons 
- Snakes 
 
could very well be taken from any one of the aforementioned works. The failure to 
save Baldr, by failuring to secure an oath from the mistletoe, is ultimately the result of 
a failed encyclopedism. 
The failure of universal wisdom is a recurring theme in the myths; the demise 
of Vafþrúðnir, Álvíss, Kvasir, Mímir, Baldr, and eventually Odin all bear witness to 
this. But this failure of wisdom is linked to a failure of contracts and bonds in a way 
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that has not been appreciated.  
Kvasir, the being that according to Snorri embodies the collective wisdom of 
the gods, is himself the by-product of a contract, a peace treaty between the Æsir and 
the Vanir. Thus there is an implicit yet fundemental relationship between wisdom on 
the one hand, and contracts, oaths, and bonds on the other. This claim is a logical 
extension of the theory of the French comparative philologist Georges Dumézil who 
associates Odin and Týr, whom he associates with contracts based on his role in the 
myth of the binding of the Fenris Wolf,176 with his first function of Sovereignty.  
This alliance between wisdom and contracts is becomes a mésalliance at 
Ragnarök, which the gods’ wisdom is unable to prevent, and where all contracts 
dissolve. 
 
 
c. Vexed to Nightmare by a Ragna-Röking Cradle 
The biggest challenge for Odin’s wisdom and, hence, in for wisdom itself in 
the world of the myths, is the prevention of the death of Baldr, who “dreamed great 
dreams boding peril to his life” (48). Baldr is the culmination of a racial experiment 
that begins with the killing of Ýmir. He is the “best” and “wisest” (23) of the Æsir, 
and the purest. Yet his wisdom is furthest removed from the real world of practical 
decision making, since “none of his decisions can be fulfilled” (23). Since the 
ideology of racial purity that Baldr embodies collapses at Ragnarök, it makes sense 
that he should be the first casualty of the last battle of this ongoing war. 
The death of Baldr is widely viewed as the catalyst for Ragnarök. The link 
between the Death of Baldr and Ragnarök takes foothold when the giantess Hyrrokkin 
arrives at his funeral with wolves and snakes, and pushes Baldr’s burial ship out to 
                                                
176 Although of little relevance for the present argument, I take issue with the idea of Týr as a guarantor 
of oaths. While Týr does live up to his own bargain that the Wolf shall have his hand as collateral if the 
gods do not release him from his fetters, the gods’ larger agreement with the Wolf is hardly made in 
good faith. 
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sea. Similarly, the giants, with the help of wolves and one very big snake (i.e., the 
Midgard Serpent) set the Æsir and their world aflame. Hence, the doom of the gods is 
prefigured by a giantess arriving with wolves and snakes who sends a funeral boat out 
to sea with a dead god on it.  
This assumes (as I do) that there is an at least inherent, coherent mythological 
“plot” that accounts for the isolated episodes of myth recounted by Snorri and in the 
Poetic Edda from creation to apocalypse: a “mythic history” counterpart to Christian 
salvation history. The death of Baldr forms the turning point ff this narrative. Scholars 
of  “actually-existing Norse paganism” need not furrow skeptical brows at this 
suggestion; regardless of whether there ever was such a history, Snorri clearly thought 
there was. 
Baldr’s death has traditionally been viewed as the pivotal event that “triggers” 
Ragnarök, a settling of accounts between the gods and the giants that have been piling 
up since the creation of the world. The death of Baldr has been interpreted in a number 
of ways: as the death of the nature god, an enactment of a lost cultic ritual, etc. What 
scholars have overlooked, however, is the practical dimension of Baldr’s death. 
Having received oaths from all animate and inanimate beings except one to do him no 
harm, Baldr is almost completely invulnerable. Perforce Baldr would be the last man 
standing at Ragnarök, even if all the other gods were vanquished. He can be harmed 
by neither by fire nor water, the two elements that destroy the world, nor by wolves or 
snakes, nor by anything else.177 Baldr would have prevented the destruction of a world 
that, by Snorri’s account, is purged of the racism that Baldr represents. Hence the 
world would not be restored, nor Baldr been reborn; the cosmic flaw inherent since the 
killing of Ýmir would remain. 
                                                
177 The complete list: Fire, Water, Iron, Other Metals, Stones, The earth, Trees, Diseases, Animals, 
Birds, Poisons, Snakes. 
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Further evidence for such a view is provided by the grief of Odin, who “took it 
the hardest because he had the best idea what great deprivation and loss the death of 
Baldr would cause the Æsir” (49). Even though all the wisdom in the world could not 
protect the Æsir at Ragnarök, there would have been hope in Baldr’s invincibility. 
It is debatable from the perspective of Snorri’s mythic history what would have 
been the greater catacylism: the death of Baldr, or preventing the purging and rebirth 
that his death sets in motion. Clearly, the new world is vastly preferable to the old. It is 
a world of racial harmony, free of feuds and strife, populated, according to the giant 
Vafþrúðnir, by the god-giants, Víðarr, Váli, Móði, Magni, and by the “pure“ Æsir 
Baldr and Höðr according to Völuspá—joined together in Snorri’s vision of post-racial 
harmony. None of the “pure“ Æsir survive Ragnarök. Baldr and Höðr return from Hel, 
but must be resurrected, reborn, in order to be fit for the new world order, freed from 
the racial ideology of a system of which they had been the purest fruits. The image of 
the golden gamepieces suggests a harmonious state of free-play, rather than fruitless 
labor, broken contracts, conflict, and suffering until death.  
Baldr’s purity can only be cancelled out by an equal purity: his innocent blind 
brother. Masterminding this is Loki’s ultimate coup. It is also a fulfillment of the 
prophecy of the Völva that:  
 
Brothers will die,  slain by their brothers, 
Kinsmen betray their close kin. 
(stanza 32) 
  
The binding of Loki is itself instrumental in bringing about Ragnarök. Although Loki 
“counsels most ill,” he is also the gods’ mediator and regulates their interactions with 
giantkind. Only Loki, the giant who is “reckoned among the Æsir” (26) has the 
freedom to test and define the limits and boundaries that separate gods and giants, 
culture and nature, order and chaos, male and female. The gods are bound by their 
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ideology to considering these distinctions as sacrosanct. Once Loki is taken out of the 
equation there is no force in that serves as a buffer or a go-between for these groups 
and their ideological and conceptual oppositions. This makes open hostilities 
inevitable. The binding of Loki is the end of the gods’ Cold War against the giants, 
and the end of their wisdom.  
Loki is viewed a deceiver, but he is more conscientious than is generally 
supposed. According to High, some call Loki “the Æsir’s calumniator and originator 
of deceits and the disgrace of gods and men.” He is “evil in character” and “very 
capricious in behavior. He possessed to a greater degree than others the kind of 
wisdom [speki]178 that is called cunning [slœgð], and tricks for every purpose. He was 
always getting the Æsir into a complete fix and often got them out of it by trickery” 
(26, modified). 
And yet unlike the rest of the Æsir, Loki seems to be rather meticulous about 
upholding his bargains. Loki could have agreed to do Þjazi’s bidding and then gone 
back on his word once Þjazi released him (60); the same is true of Loki’s dealings 
with Geirrøðr (81-82). Loki finds a way of delaying the Giant Builder that in itself is 
not a violation of their contract, and it is the Æsir who violate the terms of the terms of 
the truce with the giant. Loki, in fact, maintains his oath of blood-brotherhood with 
Odin until such time as after he is bound, which one might consider Odin’s violation 
of that oath. Could it be that Loki is more fastidious about keeping his oaths than we 
thought? Loki’s machinations may not be just, but they are always perfectly legal. 
According to a theory first proposed by Finnur Jónsson, Loki’s eschatological 
role is omened in his nomen; Loki is “the being who makes an end to everything (hann 
                                                
178 Faulkes translation originally reads, “He possessed to a greater degree than others the kind of 
learning that is called cunning.” I consider “learning” misleading, since it is clear from my analysis that 
“cunning” is an innate ability that, unlike wisdom, cannot be acquired. “Cleverness,” “talent,” or even 
“understanding” would be adequate translations for ON speki. 
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er sá sem lýkur [loka: to lock, shut] öllu).” What scholars have failed to notice, 
however, is that from a strictly narratological perspective the binding of Loki brings 
about the end of the world because without this agent provocateur, nothing much else 
of interest can happen. Loki plays a pivotal role in an overwhelming number of the 
mythological narratives in the Edda. Loki is the one who disturbs the order, and then 
helps reaffirm it. He is the stuff that narrative is made of. Once he is out of the story, 
the story itself is out. Expressed at a higher level of generality, once Loki is bound, 
further narrative development becomes impossible. The only discord requiring 
narrative resolution is the negation of opposites in the final dénouement of Ragnarök. 
There the culture-nature binary collapses and opposing sides merge into one. It stands 
to reason that this process should be catalyzed by Loki who himself embodies the 
tensions and ambiguities—between gods and giants, culture and nature, male and 
female, order and chaos—that are resolved in the final cataclysm. 
To an extent that has perhaps not been sufficiently realized, Ragnarök is Loki’s 
battle. He fights it with himself throughout mythic history; with the death of Baldr, he 
finally succeeds in drawing others into it. This requires the full measure of his craft. 
Ultimately, Odin’s wisdom does not prove a match for Loki’s wits. Yet even Odin’s 
wisdom needs to be conditioned by wit in order to be of any profit; as in the case of 
Vafþrúðnismál, or by means of negative example, in Alvíssmál. A being may also be 
wise but wholly lacking in wit, like Kvasir or Álvíss. The possession of wit without 
wisdom, however, seems to be something wholly unique to Loki. 
The unfortunate role of wisdom in the death of Baldr has not been sufficiently 
recognized. One of the factors that lead to Baldr’s demise is Frigg’s unfortunate 
display of encyclopedic botanical learning; “all things” have sworn oaths not to harm 
Baldr. To receive oaths from “all things” requires one to know what “all things” are in 
the first place. This fact puts Odin’s pursuit of wisdom in its proper perspective. For 
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“fire and water, iron, and all kinds of metal, stones, the earth, trees, diseases, the 
animals, the birds, poisons, [and] snakes“ (48) to swear oaths requires an encyclopedic 
knowledge of the order of things. It is this all-encompassing knowledge that, as in the 
cases of Kvasir and Álvíss, leads to demise when Frigg betrays the one thing that has 
not sworn an oath to Baldr. While all beings except one have sworn to do Baldr no 
harm, only one being has sworn to do Loki (the instigator and efficient cause of 
Baldr’s death) no harm: Loki’s blood-brother Odin. The inverse proportionality of this 
relationship (all minus one vs. zero plus one) highlights that despite the role of Loki, 
Frigg, Baldr, and Höðr in the narrative dénouement of Baldr’s death, this is just the 
penultimate episode in the ongoing conflict between the wit of Loki and the wisdom 
of Odin.  
The strategic significance of the death of Kvasir for this conflict has not been 
recognized in Old Norse scholarship. All actions in the myths, such Freyr’s gift of his 
sword to his servant Skírnir, can be measured proleptically against their consequences 
at Ragnarök. Thus if Kvasir had not been killed by dwarfs, he would have been able to 
advise the Æsir on how to prevent the death of Baldr and forestall Ragnarök. Kvasir’s 
wisdom is demonstrated to be of exactly this kind of tactical value when in a fireplace 
he discovers the shape of the net that is used to capture Loki (51). This fact explains a 
persistent enigmas Norse myth: Why does Thor kick the dwarf Litr into Baldr’s 
funeral fire for no apparent reason? For lack of better explanation, scholars have long 
posited that Thor kicks the dwarf out of a displaced frustration he cannot unleash upon 
the giantess Hyrrokkin. I would argue, however, that Thor’s kicking of Litr into the 
fire is first and foremost revenge for the death of Kvasir, killed by dwarfs. 
Only Kvasir had the wisdom to prevent or forestall Ragnarök. The gods’ lack of 
wisdom leads to the death of Baldr; the gods unwisely play games with Baldr’s life, 
and Frigg deems it unnecessary to secure and oath from all beings. (Surely Kvasir 
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would have counseled otherwise?) The deaths of Kvasir and Litr present two 
unrecognized problems: the gods engage in no random acts of violence; furthermore, 
they never allow violence against them to go unanswered. The deaths of Litr and 
Kvasir would appear to be the two great aberrations in mythic history. These problems 
are solved if we accept that Thor´s seemingly arbitrary killing of Litr is revenge for the 
murder of Kvasir, seemingly arbitrarily murded by the dwarfs. The killing of Litr is 
also the gods’ last act of willful violence to go unmet, since after that  they will meet 
their match at Ragnarök The doomsday clock that begins ticking with the death of 
Baldr strikes its final hour with the “thud” of a dwarf punted into the fire. The death of 
Baldr and Ragnarök are about the settling of old scores and a balancing of accounts. 
The burning of the dwarf signals the end of the “cold” war and the beginning of open 
conflict with the giants, from whose kinsman’s flesh the dwarfs came to life. 
Thus the death of Baldr is ultimately a statement on wit, wisdom, and their 
uses and uselessness. The role of Kvasir (wisdom) in the binding of Loki (wit) (52) is 
confined to an advisory position; Loki is ultimately captured by Thor, his counterpart 
and sometime companion in both his sexual ambiguity (cf. Þrýmsqviða) and command 
of wit (cf. Álvíssmál). The subsequent death of Kvasir at the hands of the dwarfs again 
shows the profitlessness of wisdom unconditioned by wit. With that in mind, we can 
divide the divine beings into three groups along a continuum: (1) the purely wise, (2) 
the purely witty, and (3) those who combine wisdom and wit: 
 
(1) the purely wise: Kvasir, Baldr, Álvíss, Mímir, Ýmir,                                    
Vafþrúðnir 
(2) the purely witty: the dwarfs Fjalar and Galar, Loki, Thor 
(3) wise and witty: Odin  
 
Three things can be gleaned from this comparison: (1) only beings at one extreme or 
another of the god-giant spectrum can be regarded as purely wise (Kvasir and Baldr on 
the one hand, dwarfs and giants on the other); (2) only beings who straddle the 
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ethnographic Ginnungagap between god and giant, and who are associated to some 
degree with the Female, such as Loki, Odin, and Thor, can be regarded as witty; (3) 
Odin alone combines the qualities of wisdom and wit. 
 
 
d. Wit and Wisdom 
Why do the gods resort to wit in the first place? Why not just let Thor come 
smashing, which is what he almost always ends up doing anyway? Clearly the gods 
are bound by certain parameters.179 What is the precise nature of the ties that bind 
them, and how does wit help them escape these fetters? The distribution of wisdom 
and wit along the ethnographic lines I have argued shows that the question of when to 
trick and when to smash has everything to do with who is tricking, who is smashing, 
who is tricked, who smashed, and their relative social status. The division of labor 
between wisdom, wit and physical violence mirrors the social hierarchy of Norse 
myth. 
  The “double standard” applies to gods and giants when it comes to both social 
contracts and to the usefulness of wisdom. While the wisdom of the gods is key to 
their sovereignty, the wisdom of the giants is merely another resource for the gods to 
plunder. Just the gods’ oaths with the giants do not count, the giants’ wisdom does not 
count either. 
The giants are sources of wisdom but their wisdom is a resource to be 
conquered and plundered, like a raw material or natural resource. As we have seen, 
wisdom needs to be “processed” by wit before it is useful. Since the gods alone 
command wit, only they can make use of this wisdom. This economy of wit and 
wisdom corresponds to a more general pattern of exchange whereby the beings on the 
lower end of the social hierarchy, such as the dwarfs, craft a material culture for the 
                                                
179 Nowhere is this point made more forcefully than in Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen. 
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gods that the dwarfs are unable to keep and use for themselves (96-7) The dwarfs are 
alienated laborers in the classical Marxist sense. Similarly, the giants grant the gods 
their brewing cauldron, but are promptly killed if they are so uncouth as to stop by for 
a drink. The giants serve as repositories of wisdom but unable to put that wisdom to 
use. Even so, the gods’ wit is less of an advantage than one might suppose. Wit is only 
useful to the gods in the short term, as when dealing with the Giant Builder, et al.; it 
does not provide solutions to long-term problems, such as Ragnarök. Wit ensures that 
the gods, like their human warriors in Valhalla, live to fight and die another day, but it 
cannot postpone that day indefinitely. 
Wit and Wisdom are good for fundamentally different things. More precisely, 
wisdom is only good for one thing, whereas cunning is capable of addressing various 
challenges. Wisdom is a status symbol, a bauble, “bling” in today’s vernacular: a 
symbol of status rather than something which produces that status. The status of the 
gods is based on violence and suppression rather than superior knowledge or ability. 
Wit, along with brute force, is one of the two forms of violence with which the gods’ 
exalted status is maintained. As I have argued, wisdom is found only at the extremes 
of the ethnographic spectrum, among both gods and giants, whereas wit dwells only in 
the middle, among the ambiguous figures—Loki, Thor, and Odin. Odin, as I have 
argued, is unique in possessing both wisdom and cunning; knowing when to be witty 
and when to be wise is half the battle—not just a question of “know-how” but “know-
when”—and is the prerogative of a being like Odin who possess both wisdom and 
cunning. As Kvasir and Baldr, Álvíss and Vafþrúðnir learn the hard way, wisdom 
without the aid of wit is defenseless.  
The dialectic between wit and wisdom can be formulated as follows: wisdom 
(status) is the legitimation of sovereignty and power; cunning, on the other hand, is the 
means with which this power is actually maintained, as is clear from any number of 
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tales, e.g., Thor vs. Alvíss, Loki vs. Master Builder, the binding of the Fenris Wolf, 
Thor and Hrungnir. A topsy-turvy image of this world is presented in the illusory hall 
of Útgarða-Loki, where the two most cunning gods, Loki and Thor, are themselves 
defeated by cunning. 
Although his star has dimmed since the heyday of comparative mythology in 
the 1960s and 1970s, George Dumézil´s structuralizing theory of the “three functions” 
has tremendous explanatory force applied to the status of wit and wisdom (which 
something which Dumézil himself does not address). Dumézil famously posits a 
tripartite division of the divine functions of Indo-European mythology into of 
Sovereignty, Force, and Fertility, and Norse myth played a central role in the 
elaboration of this theory.180 According to the tripartite theory, Odin is equated with 
Sovereignty (Týr with its contractual aspect), Thor with Force, and Freyr with 
Fertility.  
Wisdom and wit can be viewed as factors of Dumézil’s first two functions, 
Sovereignty and Force, respectively. Unlike wisdom, cunning performs work which is 
of lower social status. Wisdom does not “do” anything; it is a part of the status on 
which Sovereignty rests. With its spiritual and material abundance, manifested as 
wisdom and generosity, Sovereignty moves Force to act on its behalf. The cunning of 
Loki, like the violence of Thor, does the gods’ dirty work. Because their role as 
enforcers casts them as laborers, both gods can only ever be marginal members of the 
aristocratic divine community; Loki, who is merely “reckoned among the Æsir” (26), 
is kept on is genealogical margins, Thor, who is almost always away, on its 
geographic ones.  
Using Dumézil’s language, I would align Baldr with Sovereignty. Baldr is the 
highest born of Odin’s sons, and his presumable heir (assuming it makes sense to talk 
                                                
180 Georges Dumézil, 1939, 1940, 1959, 1973; Lindow, 43-44. 
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about an heirs in a group that does not age). Sovereignty is useless in the most literal 
sense. As under feudalism, the sovereign nobility performs no work. All useful tasks 
are executed by Force, i.e., figures lower on the class scale, such as Thor and his 
déclassé sons Móði and Magni (whom Odin refers to disparagingly as the “son of 
giantesses”). While Dumézil and his critics never found a place for Loki in the 
tripartite system, I would argue that Loki’s wit should be equated with Force alone 
with his companion Thor’s brute strength.  Loki’s cunning or wit is distinct from 
Odin’s sovereign wisdom. The trials and hardships Odin endures shows the high 
regard in which wisdom is held. Wit, by contrast, is valued for less exalted and more 
practical purposes. Wisdom is really only good for one thing—status and prestige—
whereas wit can multi-task. Wisdom is the unique foundation and legitimation of 
sovereignty and power (Odin), but wit—more often than not—is the varied means 
with which this power is maintained (Thor, Loki, etc.). True wisdom, perhaps, like 
true sovereignty, consists in knowing when to “outsource” the dirty-work that wit is 
good for. 
The tenuous status of wit vis-à-vis wisdom has its analogue in figure of Loki, 
who most embodies both wit and uncertain social status, since he is an intermediary 
between the gods and the giants. Although Loki successfully brings about the death of 
Baldr, one cannot speak of a triumph of wit over wisdom, since Loki is ultimately 
captured, punished, and killed. 
While I assign wit to Force in Dumézil’s terms, wit can be viewed as a 
mediator between wisdom (Sovereignty) and brute force (which explains Loki’s role 
as the companion of Thor). In many of the myths (e.g., the Giant Builder, Þrýmsqviða, 
Hrungnir), the cunning stratagems of Loki or another of Thor’s companions serve as a 
prelude to Thor’s head-bashing. Wisdom can create and force can destroy; but only 
wit can do both; therefore wit can prevail over either. This is particularly clear in 
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Alvíssmál, where force (Thor) cannot defeat wisdom (Alvíss) without resorting to wit.  
In the tales just cited, wit defeats force. In the tale of the dwarf’s treasures, Loki’s wit 
serves as a creative force. Wit is the rock that miraculously defeats both scissors and 
paper. 
Loki plays a mediating role not only between Sovereignty and brute Force, but 
between Sovereignty and Fertility, e.g., when he helps secure the return of Íðunn and 
Freyja from giantland, or when he bears children himself; he also mediates between 
Sovereignty and Fertility in the sense of creativity, as when he arranges for dwarfs and 
to produce their treasures and the Giant Builder their fortress. Loki plays a role similar 
to that which management plays in modern capitalist economies. Loki serves as an 
intermediary between capital and labor.181 His essential ambiguity makes Loki the 
ideal middle-manager.182 
It is Loki’s autonomy from both Sovereignty and Fertility that give him the 
freedom necessary to play this managerial role. Loki’s wit, and wit in general, is self-
sufficient, and does not require the heavy maintenance that Wisdom/Sovereignty and 
Force do. This is because cunning is innate whereas wisdom is acquired, a commodity 
that can be exchanged as opposed to an ability which one either has or does not. While 
wisdom can be nurtured, wit is a force of nature. Hence in the myths we see many 
instances of beings acquiring wisdom, but no examples of them learning cunning.183  
Wisdom is cultural; wit is natural. I have argued that only the mediary figures 
between culture and nature, god and giant, male and female (Thor, Odin, and Loki) 
command wit. Odin’s wisdom is linked with his practice of “unmanly” magic (seiðr). 
                                                
181 Barbara and John Ehrenreich, “The Professional-Managerial Class,” Between Labor and Capital, ed. 
Pat Walker (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 5-45. 
182 The Ehrenreichs—unwitting mythologists both—describe the position of the Professional-
Managerial Class as “salaried mental workers [i.e., wit] who do not own the means of production and 
whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of 
capitalist [i.e., Æsir] culture and class relations.” 
183 The practical wisdom of Hávamál arguably points in this direction, but it is strictly for human, not 
divine, consumption. 
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Thor is at his most cunning when disguised as a woman in Þrýmsqviða. Loki assumes 
female form when he is at his wittiest, as Svaðilfœri´s mare, as Thor´s bridesmaid in 
Þrýmsqviða, and finally as the giantess Þökk, who refuses to weep Baldr out of hell. 
 
 
e. Loki and Other Shit-Disturbers 
 
“Loki was a hacker. The other gods feared him, but they 
needed his tools.”184 
 
Loki’s wits are a double-edged sword for the gods. All references to Loki’s 
“evil” nature, however, are explicitly marked as from the Æsir’s perspective: 
 
That one is also reckoned among the Æsir whom some call the Æsir’s 
calumniator and originator of deceits and the disgrace of all gods and men. His 
name is Loki or Lopt, son of the giant Fábauti. Laufey or Nál is his mother. 
Byleistr and Helblindi are his brothers. Loki is pleasing and handsome in 
appearance, evil in character, very capricious in behavior. (26) 
 
… 
 
It was presumed that this was Loki Laufeyarson, who has done most evil 
among the Æsir. (51) 
 
The same can be said of the passage previously quoted regarding the “evil” nature of 
Ýmir. When Gangleri asks if the Historical Æsir “believe him to be a god whom you 
have just spoken of?”, they reply: 
  
“Not at all do we acknowledge him to be a god. He was evil and all his 
descendants.” (11) 
Loki’s true nature, however, resides in his pervasive ambiguity: genealogical, 
ethnographic, sexual, and moral. He is only “evil” from the perspective of a racially 
exclusive Æsir society and its values, which, like any good subaltern, he 
simultaneously serves and undermines. 
                                                
184 Mattathias Schwartz, “The Trolls Among Us,” NYT Magazine, August 3, 2008. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/magazine/03trolls-t.html?pagewanted=5&_r=1&hp> 
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Internet users use the word “troll” to describe someone who intentionally 
disrupts online communities. The adoption of the Norse word “troll” to describe such 
disruptive forces holds a more than incidental fascination for the student of Norse 
mythology. Like their electronic namesakes, the trolls of Scandinavian folklore are 
“hidden people” who intentionally disrupt the order of a community. While “troll” in 
modern Internet parlance is probably gleaned from children’s’ tales of unsuspecting 
billy-goats unwarily crossing bridges or tales of other young naïves gobbled up by 
lurking dangers, the connection between mythic and modern-day disturbers of the 
peace yields interesting parallels for the student of Norse myth.  
In a New York Times Magazine article on Internet trolls of August 2008, 
Mattathias Schwartz makes comments that are as applicable to the mythic order of the 
gods as they are to the “hidden people” of the Internet age:  
 
That the Internet is now capacious enough to host an entire subculture of users 
who enjoy undermining its founding values is yet another symptom of its 
phenomenal success.185 
Schwartz’s comments, mutatis mutandis, apply equally well to the society of the 
Norse gods. For most of its history, the society of the Æsir was strong enough to 
tolerate a force devoted to undermining the very foundations of that society. Thus 
Loki (that consummate hacker) is accepted as a member of divine society. This is the 
case up until his final “hack,” orchestrating the death of Baldr—an act too 
destabilizing to be tolerated. The need to control (“con-troll?”) and contain the forces 
that Loki embodies signals the end of the strength of that society and its social 
experiment. As such, the binding of Loki is a symptom of decline. There is nothing 
new about Loki’s machinations against the gods, which have been ongoing throughout 
mythic history and do not represent some sudden, unheralded crisis. Loki ‘s actions do 
not “cause“ the doom of the gods; rather, the gods’ inherent decline—an internal 
                                                
185 Schwartz, ibid. 
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decadence that requires no help from the outside—renders them suddenly vulnerable 
to Loki’s ongoing machinations. A society that is no longer “capacious enough to host 
an entire subculture of users who enjoy undermining its founding values” is not long 
for this world. Hence, Loki is something of a canary in the gods’ coal mine. Or as one 
of my students put it best, Loki is the gods’ “reality-check.”186 
 
 
f. “Uncle Ýmir” and the Self-Hating Giants 
Like the Jews in nineteenth-century Germany, or blacks in ninteenth-century 
America (and beyond), the giants furnish the dominant culture with resources and 
women but are deemed incapable of assimilating or producing “true” culture. Whether 
Jew, Negro, communist, or giant, the dominant culture regards its enemies 
simultaneously as both too strong and too weak.187 Umberto Eco describes this 
ideology in the context of his upbringing under Italian fascism: 
 
When I was a boy I was taught to think of Englishmen as the five-meal people. 
They ate more frequently than the poor but sober Italians. Jews are rich and 
help each other through a secret web of mutual assistance. However, the 
followers of Ur-Fascism must also be convinced that they can overwhelm the 
enemies. Thus, by a continuous shifting of rhetorical focus, the enemies are at 
the same time too strong and too weak. Fascist governments are condemned to 
lose wars because they are constitutionally incapable of objectively evaluating 
the force of the enemy. 
The giants are physically potent, yet beholden to lust, gluttony, and anger; wise yet 
unwitting and easily duped; possessed of vast resources, yet greedy and acquisitive; 
they are unable to make use of these resources or assimilate into the dominant culture, 
although their sexually-coveted females may to a limited extent. Anyone vaguely 
acquainted with the histories of European anti-Semitism and racism recognizes the 
structures of oppression that underlie the gods’ relations with the giants. They are 
                                                
186 I owe this apt formulation to my student Yazan Hijazi in my course “Myth, Legend, and Folklore: 
From Elves to Elvis,” at The University of Western Ontario, Fall 2006. 
187  Umberto Eco, New York Review of Books, June 22, 1995, 12-15. 
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fundamentally identical to any number of constructions of otherness with which  
dominant groups re-imagine minority cultures as less than human. 
I began this chapter with three theses, based on my reading of the “two 
cultures” which emerged from my discussion of the encyclopedic dimension of 
Snorri’s Edda. The reader will have to decide whether they have been proven, but to 
recount, they are 
 
(1) that the giants of Snorri’s Edda are not “gigantic.” 
 
(2) that the distinction between the gods and the giants is cultural, not physical or 
racial. 
 
(3) and that only the need to maintain this cultural distinction accounts for Odin’s 
pursuit of useless knowledge. 
To these three theses, I now make explicit a fourth which has been implicit in my 
discussion all along: (4) ultimately, the gods’ drive to maintain a unique cultural 
identify predicated on an ideology of racial, material, and spiritual superiority to the 
giants, but in fact founded on force and deception, is the root of their ongoing conflicts 
and their eventual demise. It is this ideology that is the source of the discord that is in 
turn resolved at Ragnarök. 
The Cold War of the twentieth-century taught us (or should have taught us) of 
the ultimate futility of any and all arms races. Both politically and intellectually, 
Snorri served as a mediator (often a very self-interested one) between the “two 
cultures” of Iceland and Norway. In the Edda Snorri demonstrates the futility of 
conflict between god and giant, colonizer and colonized, Christian and pagan, foreign 
and native, Latin and vernacular, Norway and Iceland—not because these wars are 
unwinnable, but rather because the dichotomies on which they are based are deemed 
illusory in the first place, just like the vanishing edifices of the Æsir and Útgarða-Loki. 
If not in the halls of medieval Icelandic power, then at least in the imagined halls of 
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the Edda, Snorri’s syncretic encyclopedic vision disallows the existence of these 
essential dualities. 
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Chapter 3:  Dante: “Bound with Love in a Single Volume”  
 
 
 The Commedia is arguably the most widely read work of an age whose cultural 
production remains largely closed to us on account of what many (starting with Hans 
Robert Jauß) have called its “alterity,” or the gap that separates our naive 
understanding of its products from the linguistic, social, philosophical, theological, 
and scientific assumptions that inform them. Of the handful of medieval authors 
whose literary afterlife does not depend entirely on the life-support provided by high-
school and university curricula, none can boast as broad a readership among the quick 
as Dante. The contemporary popularity of Dante’s poem, and the relative obscurity of 
other literary “monuments” of the Middle Ages, cannot be explained exclusively by 
considerations of artistic merit or altezza d’ ingenio—regardless of how little inclined 
one is to call either into question. Dante’s accessibility (if the term can be applied) to 
the non-specialist, I would offer, is best viewed as a consequence of the dialogic 
conception of the Commedia; the same alterity that renders most works of medieval 
literature inaccessible to latter-day readers is paralleled in the experience of the 
pilgrim—whose encounters in the afterlife are hardly less strange to him than to us. If 
writing the poem required Dante to conceive multiple worlds, reading the Commedia 
critically requires no less of us, be it the “medieval world,” the early 14th-century 
Florentine commune, or the “world beyond” of Dante’s Catholicism. This experience 
of alterity—for us, this “medieval world,” for Dante, the unprecedentedly lucid and 
all-encompassing vision of the afterworld—is constantly mediated by a process of 
question and answer which takes place both on the level of the text, as Dante 
interrogates his interlocutors concerning the nature of these worlds, and on the level of 
the reader, as we interrogate the horizon of expectations within which the poem was 
conceived and attempt to overcome a cultural divide of space (Ithaca, NY vs. 
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Florence, Italy) and time (our cultural present vs. the early fourteenth century). The 
process of understanding that we undergo as readers is reproduced (or, rather, 
reproduces us) in the figure of the poet: Just as Dante the pilgrim is guided by Virgil, 
Beatrice, and St. Bernard of Clarivaux through the other world, Dante the poet guides 
his latter-day reader like no other through the otherness of his “medieval world.” 
 
 
 
1. Making the World Safe for Encyclopedism in Paradiso XXVI 
 
 As an institution, the encyclopedia is systematic, hierarchical, and impersonal; 
Dante’s encyclopedic pilgrimage, on the other hand, is as personal as it gets. In what 
follows I focus on dialogue as a constitutive element of Dante’s encyclopedic project. 
It is possible to make a basic distinction between two kinds of dialogue in this poem. 
On the one hand, there is that series of dialogues which Dante engages in throughout 
his cammino with his guides: Virgil (from Inferno I to Purgatorio XXX), whom the 
pilgrim does not select for himself but is chosen for him by his second guide, “a lady” 
who accompanies him from Purgatorio XXX to Paradiso XXXI, before ceding this 
task to Bernard of Clairvaux in Paradiso XXXI. On the other hand, there is the array 
of episodic dialogues in which Dante engages with the personnel of the afterworld. 
Certain of these “dialogues with the dead” (paralleled, of course, by Aeneas’s 
dialogues with the Sibyl and Anchises in the Aeneid) are particularly relevant to a 
discussion of the encyclopedism of the Commedia; Dante’s conversation with 
Brunetto Latini (Inf. XV), his early mentor (since confined to hell) and author of both 
Li Livres dou Tresor, considered the first encyclopedia written in the French (or any) 
vernacular, as well as the Tesoretto (a shorter rhyming version in Italian), merits 
special consideration in a discussion of Dante’s encyclopedic project.
188
 Finally, we 
                                                
188
 And has received it, with massive erudition, in Giuseppe Mazzotta’s Dante’s Vision and the Circle 
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might extend the ideal of dialogue to include the ongoing dialogue the author conducts 
with himself, as Dante the poet confronts Dante the pilgrim as the author of earlier 
works whose positions he had sometimes abandoned between the experience and the 
writing of the Commedia.189 
 The author’s choice of the pagan poet as his primo guida and primary 
interlocutor needs to be viewed in the context of twelfth-century Neoplatonist 
discourses rehabilitating the “noble pagans” of pre-Christian times. Although cut off 
from divine revelation by priority in time to the crucial moment of salvation history, 
they nevertheless were attributed a proleptic apprehension of those gospel truths 
available to unaided reason. Recruited posthumously as part of a noble intellectual 
ancestry, certain exemplary figures of the past, although cut off from the divine light 
                                                                                                                                       
of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Pointing to the long-standing tradition of 
distinguishing between Dante as poet and Dante the pilgrim, Charles T. Davis, writes “Undoubtedly 
Dante the pilgrim reveals limitations in his doctrinal knowledge and in his moral understanding 
throughout most of the poem.” He asks, “Has Dante’s vision of hell therefore only the negative 
educational value of a deterrent? In that case, Brunetto’s words [in Inferno 15] must be regarded merely 
as self-deception. If this theory is accepted, it is difficult to see why Virgil does not rebuke Dante’s 
admiration for the four illustrious sodomites [Brunetto and his fellow Florentines, Tegghiaio 
Aldobrandi, Guido Guerra, and Iacopo Rusticucci], or why the conversation between Dante and 
Brunetto about conditions in Florence is echoed and amplified by Cacciaguida. In view of the close 
parallels in content and tone between the Brunetto and Cacciaguida episodes, it seems far-fetched to 
conclude that Dante meant his meeting with his old master to be interpreted ironically,” Dante’s Italy 
and Other Essays (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 194-5. This is precisely how 
Giuseppe Mazzotta does interpret this encounter; see Dante and the Circle of Knowledge, Ch. 1. 
 Contini suggests that Brunetto had intended to write a prosimetrum (cf. Tesoretto, line 1121) 
in order to communicate those things which he did not feel could be expressed per rima: 
non dico ch’io m’afidi 
di contarlo pe’ rima 
dal piè fin a la cima, 
ma ‘n bel volgare e puro,  
tal che non sia oscuro,  
vi dicerò per prosa   
quasi tutta la cosa  
qua ‘nanti da la fine,  
perché paia più fine.  
Obviously, Dante did not feel bound by such constraints. (Brunetto Latini, Tesoretto, in G. Contini, 
Poeti del duecento, vol. 2. Milan: Mondadori, 1995, 215.) 
189 See Ruedi Imbach / Silvia Maspoli, “Philosophische Lehrgespräche in Dantes Commedia,” 
Gespräche lesen: Philosophische Dialoge im Mittelalter, ed. Klaus Jacobi (Tübingen: G. Narr, 1999), 
303. 
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of revelation, were deemed not wholly unilluminated.190 While the dictum “extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus” remains in force, it is tempered by a new enthusiasm for a 
“dialogue with the heathens.” It was first and foremost Virgil, whose famous puer of 
the fourth eclogue was widely read as a prophecy of the birth of Christ, who embodied 
the idea of a revelatio ante Christum natum. This is why Dante’s Statius can confess 
to the author of the Aeneid, “per te poeta fui, per te cristiano” (Through you I became 
a poet, through you a Christian) (Purgatorio XXII, 73). At the same time Dante 
celebrates Paulus Orosius, “avvocato de’ tempi cristiani” (Paradiso. X, 119), whose 
Historiarum adversus paganos libri septem defended Christianity from the charge that 
it was the source of the calamities that had befallen the same earthly Roman empire to 
which Virgil (only an honorary citizen of Christendom) ultimately remains relegated. 
While the long-standing interpretation of Virgil strictly as the personification of the 
poet’s rational faculty inevitably stales Virgil’s infinite variety, it does make it clear 
why a pagan (and not, say, a Christian saint) makes a fitting guide for that part of the 
afterworld (from Inferno I to Purgatorio XXX) where unaided reason (“intelletto 
humano,” Par XXVI, 46) is still able to guide (cf. Par. XXVI, 38-9), before it must 
abdicate to theology and the poet’s Christian donna.     
 Dante’s generic debt to Christian master-student dialogue has often been noted. 
The ultimate goal of the master-student dialogue is always moral-philosophical or 
ethical in nature. In his article on philosophical dialogue in the Commedia, Ruedi 
Imbach offers the following pertinent observation: “Zur Verwirklichung seines 
umfassenden ethischen Programms, das der Commedia zugrunde liegt, mußte Dante 
allerdings eine literarische Gattung und Form finden, die geeignet ist, den Leser zu 
                                                
190 A doctrine adopted by the Second Vatican Council in 1965: “Those who, through no fault of their 
own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere 
heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they know it through the dictates of 
their conscience — those too may achieve eternal salvation” (Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium, 
16). 
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einer moralischen Besinnung hinzuführen. Daß aus didaktischen Gründen der Dialog 
deswegen zu einem stukturbildenen Moment der Commedia geworden ist, mag 
niemanden erstaunen” [In order to realize the comprehensive ethical program 
underlying the Commedia, it was necessary for Dante to find a genre and form suited 
to lead the reader on to moral reflection. It is no surprise that, for didactic reasons, the 
dialogue should therefore have become a structural building-block of the 
Commedia].191 And yet, the master-student dialogue of ecclesiastic tradition is not 
open to the surprises, intrusions, or narrative detours of literary fiction; the curiositas 
of the student is always regulated by the auctoritas of a magister who knows which 
questions lead to edification and which do not. The discipulus undergoes a disciplining 
process in which his questioning is increasingly directed toward specific conclusions, 
as the “wheat” of licit questions is separated from the “chaff” of the illicit by one who 
(in Isidore’s definition) is “maior in statione.”192 Within these parameters, the 
auctoritas of the latter is never at stake.  
 The topics of Dante’s master-student dialogue, by contrast, are typically 
suggested by the visibilia encountered along the journey’s path. This represents a 
complication of a genre in which, typically, hardly any attention is ever paid to the 
locus of dialogue. And yet, even those setting-less dialogues still presume a certain 
space; if anywhere, they can be located in the schools where any such interaction 
between magister and discipulus would have taken place. This static backdrop could 
presumably be provided by any one of the centers of medieval education: the cathedral 
or court school, the monastery, or the early university: centers of clerical education (as 
in the vast Elucidarium tradition), or of lay learning (as in the Dragmaticon of 
William of Conches). The setting of these dialogues is always irrelevant, however, to 
                                                
191 Imbach, 295. 
192 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae. ed. W.M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), 170: 
“Magister, maior in statione: nam †steron† Graece statio dicitur.” 
  152 
 
their course, or relevant only insofar as it fulfills a need for a non-setting against 
which the dialogue can unfurl unimpeded. Fundamentally, this is the solitary space of 
quiet study and mental discipline within a hierarchy of learned authority. The authority 
of the magister is never subject to empirical review by the student (in other words: 
objects of discourse are not subject to inspection by the discoursing subject). Nor is 
the ebb and flow of question and answer dictated—as it is for Virgil and Dante—by 
the experiential dimension of the ever-shifting frame of reference that is provided by 
the empirical world through which the journey’s course is set. 
 How can all this be tied in more squarely with Dante’s encyclopedism? The 
Convivio, a work that places itself squarely in the vernacular encyclopedic tradition 
established by Dante’s maestro, Brunetto Latini, presents an image of the 
encyclopedic reader as one who has acquired the “habit of knowledge” that comes 
from eating “lo pane delli angeli.” Dante states, “poci rimangano quelli che all’abito 
[di sapere] da tutti desiderato possano pervenire, e innumerabili quasi sono li ‘mpediti 
che di questo cibo sempre vivono affamati” (There remain few who are capable of 
achieving the habit of knowledge desired by all, and the handicapped who live forever 
starved of this food are almost to numerous to count). This image of the sated few and 
the meager many is invoked again in the beginning of the second canto of the 
Paradiso. Here Dante distinguishes between two groups of readers of his work, whose 
course now turns to waters uncharted by other poets (“L’aqua ch’io prendo già mai 
non si corse”) (The water that I take was never coursed before)193: there are those 
whose piccioletta barca (little bark) is not quite sea-worthy and “voi altri pochi che 
drizzaste il collo per tempo al pan de li angeli” (you other few who lifted up your 
necks betimes for bread of angels). This introduction, with its clear echo of Dante’s 
earlier, incomplete attempt to produce a lay encyclopedia in the vernacular, casts the 
                                                
193 All citations, as well as translations, are from Singleton’s edition of the Commedia.  
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ensuing dialogue between Beatrice and Dante—a natural-philosophical disquisition on 
the “segni bui” or “dark spots” of the moon—squarely in the mold of encyclopedic 
discourse on natural philosophy and the tradition of the dialogus magistri et discipuli. 
The ensuing dialogue on the lunar sphere provides an exemplary instance of just how 
the ebb and flow of question and answer is dictated by the experiential dimension of 
the empirical world. 
  The irregularity of the moon’s surface, in fact, presents a unique challenge to 
medieval cosmology. Like all heavenly bodies, the moon is purported to occupy a 
realm of uniform perfection. Explanations of the irregular appearance of the moon’s 
surface are, unsurprisingly, a stock fixture of medieval encyclopedic discourse. 
Konrad von Megenbergs’s Buch der Natur, for instance, explains that “der môn hat in 
im swarz flecken, und sprechent die laien, ez sitz ein man mit ainer dornpürd in dem 
mônen” (The moon has dark spots, and the layfolk say there is a man with a bundle of 
thorns sitting on the moon). This explanation from folklore is rejected, however, by 
Konrad (“daz ist aber niht wâr”) in favor of a scientific one:  “ez ist dar umb, daz der 
môn an den stucken dicker ist an seinem antlütz wann an andern enden, und dar umb 
nimt er dâ selben der sunnen schein niht, dâ von scheinet uns diu selben stuck vinster” 
(rather, it is because the moon is more dense in some parts on its face than it is on the 
other side, and therefore the light of the sun is not visible in those places, which is why 
they appear dark to us).194 While the question of the moons may be a “cosmological” 
constant of medieval encyclopedic discourse, the answer is decidedly not—as a 
corresponding passage from the Middle High German Lucidarius illustrates: 
 
Do sprach der junger: Waz ist der swarze flecke, den wir in dem manen 
sehent? 
  
Der meister sprach: Alse der mane daz lieht hat von der sunnen, alse het er 
ouch die hize von der sunnen. Da von kumet daz, swie uol der mane werde, 
                                                
194 Konrad von Megenberg, Das Buch der Natur, ed. Franz Pfeiffer (Stuttgart: Karl Aue, 1861), 65. 
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iedoch  blibet der alten keltin ein teil in dem liehte. Daz ist daz swarze. daz wir 
sehent in dem manen.195 
 
 [Student: What are those dark spots we see in the moon? 
  
Master: Just as the moon receives its light from the sun, it also receives its heat 
from the sun. Thus is comes about that a little of the old frigidity lingers in the 
light no matter how full the moon becomes.] 
  
William of Conches gives a similar account of these “segni bui” in his Philosophia: 
 
Cum luna frigida et humida sit, quamvis a sole illuminatur, aliquid naturalis 
obscuritatis in aliqua parte retinet, quae sibi semper apparet.196 
 
(Since the moon is cold and damp, even though it is illuminated by the sun, it 
retains in a given spot something of its natural darkness, which always remains 
visible.) 
 
Beatrice, of course, gives an entirely different, lengthier, spiritual explanation 
for these “segni,” the details of which need not concern us here. The lesson for the 
pilgrim is that earth-bound knowledge based on sense-experience and human reason is 
not enough to comprehend the universe in its spiritual dimension; sufficient 
explanations will only be arrived at through formal principles and general propositions 
which are ultimately theologically grounded. Then—and only then—will it be possible 
to view the “scattered leaves” of the universe, of which the moon is but one, as part a 
single and coherent encyclopedic volume, as the pilgrim does in his final vision of la 
luce eterna (in Paradiso XXXIII, 85-87):  “Nel suo profundo vidi che s’intera, legato 
con amore in un volume, ciò che per l’universo si squaderna” (In its depth I saw 
ingathered, bound by love in one single volume, that which is dispersed in leaves 
throughout the universe.) Before this can happen, however, he must be purged not 
only of sin but also of the “dark spots” of false opinion. It is to this end that ensuing 
                                                
195 Der deutsche Lucidarius, ed. Dagmar Gottschall and Georg Steer, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1994), 52-53. 
196 Philosophia, ed. and trans. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1980), 72. 
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“theological examination” of Cantos XXIV-XXVI takes place. 
 Here Dante is quizzed on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity by 
Saints Peter, James, and John the Evangelist, respectively. Upon passing this “entrance 
examination” (to use Singleton’s phrase), Dante the discipulus is once again allowed 
to pose questions to a magister, who in this case is none other than the padre antico of 
the human race, Adam himself. The mere presence of Adam, who in biblical history 
responds (evasively) to the first question ever posed by God (“Adam, where are 
you?”), although he does not himself pose humanity’s first question (a dignity, it 
seems, reserved for the first murderer: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”)—is enough to 
signal the centrality of “question and answer” in the canto and, given the pivotal 
moment in the pilgrim’s progress, in Commedia as a whole. Once Dante passes his 
“examination,” the discourse shifts markedly from an interrogatio—where the pilgrim 
is quizzed and tested—to a dialogus in which Dante reassumes the role of questioning 
student. As if to underscore this fundamental shift in Dante’s role from examinee to 
inquirer, the pilgrim’s first questions are directed to Adam, biblical history’s first 
answerer of questions.197 
 For Dante, it is Adam in whom humanity’s first aspiration and temptation to 
encyclopedic knowledge (eritis sicut deus scientes bonum et malum) is so fatefully 
punished. Dante’s questions to Adam, concerning the time elapsed since his fateful 
lapsus, the amount of time he dwelled in paradise,198 the true cause of mankind’s 
                                                
197 Not Eve, as one might expect: Dante considers the account of Genesis 3 to be in error (!) when it 
ascribes the first act of human speech to Eve, an act of such import in human history that it could not 
possibly—in Dante’s misogynistic view—have been granted to a woman. See De vulgari eloquentia (I, 
iv, 1-7). It is worth noting that in the Hebrew the serpent does not actually pose a question at all, as in 
the Latin “cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi” (Genesis 3:1). Rather, it 
says, “Even though God told you not to eat of the fruit of the garden,” upon which Eve promptly 
corrects this intentional distortion. Dante’s knowledge of Hebrew, for which there is no direct evidence, 
is a question of some controversy. My own complete lack of Hebrew is, however, is entirely non-
controversial; I rely here on E.A. Speiser’s translation in The Anchor Bible: Genesis (Doubleday: New 
York, 1962), 21; see the note to this passage on 23. 
198 The chronology of Adam’s fall (by Dante’s conservative account, during the seventh hour of the day, 
beginning just after noon) has, of course, a broader symbolic significance, reflected in the canonical 
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punishment, and the Adamic language to which he lends his name, are, without 
exception, stock questions of medieval encyclopedic discourse.199 
 Since this is not a dialogue about Adam but rather a dialogue with Adam, 
Dante’s third question about the true cause of mankind’s punishment, which the padre 
antico—prioritizing his answers—addresses first, occasions nothing less than a 
confession. Thus it is granted to Dante, purged of sin and false opinion in preparation 
for his ascent to the empyrean, to hear the confession of the Original Sin from the 
original sinner. As he crosses the bound from the last intellectual sphere into the 
purely spiritual heaven in canto XXVII, Dante will re-enact primal man’s 
“overpassing of the bound” (il trapassar del segno)—this time with divine sanction.  
 The ties that bind the poet with the sinful progenitor of the human race seem as 
close as the temporal gulf that separates them is vast. Surely, if anyone, it is Dante’s 
pilgrim, having just completed his inspection-tour of hell, purgatory, and the better 
part of paradise, who is now “scientes bonum et malum.” However, when he 
transcends the last intellectual sphere (the last domain of the scientia Adam was 
punished for acquiring illicitly) and ventures into the purely spiritual heavens, he is 
not guided by the superbia or presumptio that led to Adam’s fall, but rather by the 
“right love” (XXVI, 63) that leads to the vision of the divine. Thus, in contrast to 
Adam, Dante’s transgression of the bound that guards the spheres of moral knowledge 
takes place with divine approval (“Santo, santo, santo!” – XXVI, 69). Daringly, Dante 
here casts himself typologically in the role of Adam novus, Although it is certainly true 
that every Christian is a “new Adam” bearing the name of Christ, Dante “transgresses 
the bound” of this thoroughly familiar sensus analogicus by representing himself 
                                                                                                                                       
hours of divine office. Noon is, of course, also the hour at which Adam’s counterpart, the “new Adam,” 
is crucified. 
199 “Wie lange lebete adam?” (Lucidarius, I.39); “Quamdiu fuerint in paradiso?”; “quid peccavit homo 
quod expulsus est de paradiso?” (Elucidarium, ed. Lefèvre, 90, 94; 377). 
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literally as the redeemer of Adam’s illegitimate pursuit of encyclopedic knowledge. 
 In answering Dante’s final question concerning the Adamic language, the 
padre antico couches his response in reference to humanity’s most infamous post-
lapsarian attempt to attain encyclopedic knowledge: the ovra inconsummabile (XXVI, 
125) of the Tower of Babel (cf. Genesis 11:1-9). The overt reference to this massive, 
thwarted encyclopedic project—humanity’s last, best hope for constructing an ordered 
totality—makes it clear that this same project, and more specifically Dante’s 
rehabilitation of it, is the underlying theme of the canto: Dante casts himself in the role 
of rightful redeemer of the wrongful encyclopedism of both Eden and Babel. 
 That Dante’s encyclopedic project now proceeds with divine sanction is 
underscored by the implicit imprimatur granted to the questions he asks. In fact, 
Dante’s authority as examiner is attested by the fact that his questions need not even 
be posed at all; they are perceived by Adam as the reflections of thoughts in the divine 
mind. The usual reciprocity of dialogue is here realized at a level of transcendent 
ideality in so far as Adam is able to “read” Dante’s questions as such reflections. 
Moreover, the fact that Adam is never asked directly is, I would argue, an invocation 
(not without irony?) of Adam’s interrogation in Genesis. The situation in the Paradiso 
is, in fact, an inversion of that story: God’s question to Adam (“Where are you?”—the 
first interrogative of Salvation History) is, notably, a question to which God already 
knows the answer; it is posed in speech, and Adam never responds to it directly. Dante 
both invokes and inverts the scenario of this primal interrogation, presenting a 
redeemed Adam who now answers questions that need not even be posed in spoken 
language, asked by one who does not already know the answers. Thus, although Dante 
casts himself typologically as Adam novus, he does not let this sensus analogicus lapse 
into outward blasphemy by casting himself in the role of the inquiring Creator 
addressing his creature. In fact, he inverts every aspect of God’s interrogation of 
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Adam, or, schematically: 
 
-God already knows answer.  -Dante does not know the answers. 
-God poses question in speech. -Questions are read as reflections in the Divine 
mind. 
-Adam evades question.  -Adam answers all questions. 
 
 If this is a radical departure from the framework in which the four questions 
Dante poses—or, again, does not pose—have been asked heretofore, it is an equally 
radical departure from the kind of authority that has traditionally been invoked in 
response to such questions. As mentioned, all four questions belong to the standard 
repertoire of medieval encyclopedic dialogue. Yet Dante does not address them to a 
doctor or a magister; rather, he eliminates the need for any recourse to learned 
authority, since here the addressee of his inquiries is also their subject. In this rather 
pointed subversion of the master-student dialogue, Dante eliminates the middleman. 
Since this facie ad faciem dispenses with the usual practice of knowledge-transmission 
through learned intermediaries, the potential claims of any competing authority are 
superfluous at best. Dante’s pilgrim supplants the dialogus magistri et discipuli of 
medieval encyclopedic tradition with something radically different: substituting 
recourse to learned authority with the drama of the author’s own acquisition of 
auctoritas. The narrative renders explicit the credentials of its own encyclopedic 
auctor. 
 At the end of the interrogatio on love with St. John the Evangelist that leads up 
to the dialogue with Adam, Dante invokes the idea of an encyclopedic totality when he 
speaks of “le fronde onde si infronda tutto l’orto”(Par. XXVI, 64) (the leaves 
wherewith all the garden of the eternal Gardiner is enleavened). Singelton’s 
commentary on this passage clearly, if unwittingly, supports this view: “Dante is 
saying that he loves the various creatures of God’s creation (the leaves of His garden) 
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that make up the world in proportion to the goodness with which their maker (the 
eternal Gardener) in His predestination has bestowed upon them.” These fronde with 
which Dante invokes the image of an ordered totality (the encyclopedist’s ever-present 
goal) are, of course, things, not beings; still, as a distinctly bio-organic metaphor, they 
stand not only for the res but also for the animata of the created world—no less 
clipped and pruned into order by their “eternal Gardener.” 
 These fronde will resurface two more times in the canto with rather different 
meanings. In describing his reaction to the appearance of the first human interlocutor 
and anima prima, whose dialogue was previously discussed, Dante compares himself 
(XXVI, 85) to the “fronda che flette la cima nel transito del vento, e poi si leva per la 
propria virtù che la soblima” (“the bough which bends its top at passing of the wind, 
and then uplifts itself by its own virtue which raises it”). This image underscores the 
underlying ambivalence of Dante’s position vis-à-vis the padre antico: First Dante 
“bows” in awe, humbled by the presence of a venerable magister, but then he is borne 
back aloft by a confidence in his own recently demonstrated auctoritas and a desire to 
speak (“e poi mi rifece sicuro un disio di parlare ond’ io ardeva”) (and then a desire to 
speak, wherewith I was burning, gave me assurance again). That the pilgrim’s position 
vis-à-vis Adam is not necessarily subordinate is hinted by Dante’s exercise of his new 
privilege as examiner. As Hans Robert Jauß has observed, “it is the prerogative of the 
master to interrogate; to have to answer, and to speak only when asked, is the lot of the 
underling.”200 The assertion that the right to ask questions is only a “prerogative of the 
master” would not seem to apply to the dialogus magistri et discipuli, where it is not 
“having to answer” but rather being able to answer that is the mark of the magister. 
Here the matter is more complicated. The Commedia, up to this point, has traced 
                                                
200 “Das Recht des Fragens ist ein Vorrecht der Herrenseite, antworten zu müssen und nur reden zu 
dürfen, wenn man gefragt wird, ist das Los des Untertans”: Hans Robert Jauß, Ästhetische Erfahrung 
und literarische Hermeneutik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 378. 
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Dante’s progress from questioner, to examinee, and once again to inquirer, only now 
the inquirer imbued with a new-found authority. The progress is from master-student 
dialogue, to interrogatio, to a dialogus magistrorum. 
 When Adam answers Dante’s question about la lingua ch’io parlai, he does so 
in reference to two different names of God, who was first called I and later El.201 
Dante has not asked about the names of God; Adam merely wants to illustrate that the 
names of things, even the names of God, bear no necessary relation to their essence: “e 
ciò convene, chèl’uso di mortali è come fronda in ramo, che sen va e altra vene” (Par. 
XXVI, 136-8) (and that is fitting, because the usage is as a leaf on a branch, which 
passes away and another comes). In this third instance, fronde (137) refer to the 
mutability of verba in rejection of any strict equation of verbum and res (what a later 
age might call  “the arbitrary nature of the signifier”). Whereas Dante has heretofore 
employed fronde of the Garden (l. 64) to refer to “things” (res), both animate and 
inanimate, this third instance of fronda, in Adam’s explication, clearly refers to 
“words” (verba). Thus Dante, the referent of the second instance of fronda in the 
canto (la fronda che flette la cima), positions himself between the res of the first 
fronde and verba of the third, suggesting that he is one who mediates between words 
and things. One might see this merely as an expression of the self-understanding of the 
poet or the encyclopedist. Yet in doing so, we risk missing something crucial.  
  Dante’s association of words (verba) and botanical imagery ultimately derives 
from Jesus’ parable of the vine and the branches in the Book of John in which Christ 
commands his followers to “love one another,” and whose author happens to be 
Dante’s examiner on “love” in the canto, as well as the preeminent theologian of the 
Word (i.e., in pricipio erat verbum). As I hope to have shown, the pilgrim has already 
cast himself literally as a “second Adam” who redeems the encyclopedic transgression 
                                                
201 “Primum apud Ebreos Dei nomen Eli dicitur,” cf. Rabanus Maurus, De rerum naturis, Book 1. 
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of the first. Now, Dante assumes the role of the tertium comparationis, the true second 
Adam, Christ himself:  In other words, in order to redeem the corrupt encyclopedism 
of Eden and Babel, Dante mediates—both as metaphorical fronda, and as 
encyclopedic compilator of “ciò che per l’universo si squaderna” (that which is 
dispersed in leaves throughout the universe)—between the material and the spiritual, 
between things and words, just as Christ mediates between word and flesh. 
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2. Encyclopedism: Old School and New Styles 
 
Dante’s predecessors in the Sicilian “school” of poets in and around the court 
of Emperor Fredrick II (1194-1250) produced a poetry no less versed in the 
encyclopedic discourses of cosmological, lapidary, and bestiary lore, or questions 
subject to theological and scientific disputation. The Sicilian poets, most of them 
university-trained jurists and court administrators, are almost unique in the extent to 
which they are in the throws of the newly available Greek and Arabic science that is 
first translated into Latin in the late 1100s and forms the core of the encyclopedic 
tradition. To read them is to glimpse at the scientific works at their elbows. Pietro 
della Vigna, for example, describes the effect of love on the lover as the same as that 
of the magnet on metal: 
Per la vertute de la calamita 
Como lo ferro atira no se vede 
Ma sì lo tira signorevolemente202 
 
[In spite of the power of the magnet, 
one cannot see how it attracts iron, 
yet it attracts it in a powerful manner] 203 
 
The founder of the so-called scuola siciliana, Giacomo da Lentini, in line with the 
optical theory of his day, famously asks in a verse how the image of his lady comes to 
dwell in his heart: 
 
Or come pote si gran donna entrare 
per gli occhi mei, che sì piccioli sone?204  
 
[Now how could so great a Lady enter  
my eyes which are so tiny?] 
 
                                                
202 Poesia italiana: il Duecento. Introduzione, scelta dei testi, note e commenti, ed. Piero Cudini 
(Milano: Garzanti, 1978), 22. 
203 Tuscan Poetry of the Duecento: An Anthology, Garland Library of Medieval Literature, ed. and 
trans. Frede Jensen (New York: Routledge, 1994), 132-33. 
204 Poesia italiana, 22. 
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The question is, since the lady is bigger than his eyes, how does she enter them “sanza 
far rottura” (without breaking them)? A question of a seemingly amorous nature is 
framed as a matter of exact science reminiscent of Dante’s disputation with Beatrice 
on the spots of the moon. Giacomo’s poem is a perfect illustration that not all is as it 
seems in regards to the seemingly objective “scientific” discourse on love held by the 
siciliani. The question of how a woman can “enter” a man without “breaking” 
anything (sanza far rottura) lends itself ambiguously to variously erotic 
interpretations, perhaps no less part of the gioco of Sicilian poetics than their scientific 
disputations. Moreover, the scientific analogy the poet makes to answer this question 
radically confounds the boundaries between subject and object, the distinction 
between inner and outer world, phenomenon and observer: 
 
Or come pote sì gran donna entrare 
per gli ochi mei che sì piccioli sone? 
e nel mio core come pote stare, 
che 'nentr'esso la porto là onque i' vone? 
Lo loco là onde entra già non pare, 
ond'io gran meraviglia me ne dòne; 
ma voglio lei a lumera asomigliare, 
e gli ochi mei al vetro ove si pone. 
Lo foco inchiuso, poi passa difore 
lo suo lostrore, sanza far rotura: 
così per gli ochi mi pass'a lo core, 
no la persona, ma la sua figura. 
Rinovellare mi voglio d'amore, 
poi porto insegna di tal criatura. 
 
[Now how could so great a Lady enter  
my eyes which are so tiny? 
And how could she stay in my heart 
that I carry her in it wherever I go?  
The spot she enters is not seen, 
whence I give myself great surprise— 
but I want to compare her to a lamp 
and my eyes to its glass. 
The fire closed within then passes its 
luster outside without shattering: 
thus through my eyes it passes to my heart— 
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not her person, but her image. 
I want to renew myself with love, 
Then I’ll carry the image of such a creature.]205 
 
The poet’s heart does not contain the lady herself but rather her image. The lady is 
compared to the flame of a lamp, which passes through the glass enclosure that divides 
it from the outer world, but without shattering the glass. The poet’s eye is like the 
glass. But the structure of the analogy belies its seeming relation to the world of causal 
fact. Whereas the light of the flame passes from within the lamp, through the glass and 
into the outer world, the image of the lady passes through the eye and into the inner 
world of the poet’s heart. In the case of the lamp the journey is from within the lamp 
to the world without, whereas the image of the lady passes from the outer world to the 
poet’s own interior: 
 
Flame = Lady 
 Glass = Poet’s Eye 
 World = Poet’s Heart 
 
At first glance, Lentini seems to write about the lady the way a post-Galilean scientist 
would write about the natural world. But this impression is as fleeting as it is 
misleading. The external world of things and internal world of the poet are so 
thoroughly intermeshed that the distinction itself breaks down. Not the scientific fact 
is important, but rather the impression that it makes on the poetic subject. 
And yet precisely these scientific facts—the behavior of basilisks, tigers, and 
swans, and the properties of magnets, mirrors, water and fire—fuel the Sicilians’ 
poetic speculation on love. Giacomo da Lentini invokes several of these images to 
invoke the conventional notion of the lover’s blissful despair: 
 
                                                
205 Melancolia Poetica: A Dual Language Anthology of Italian Poetry 1160-1560, ed. and trans. Marc 
A. Cirigliano (Leicester: Troubador Publishing, 2007), 14. 
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  Lo bascilisco a lo spleco lucente 
Traggi a morire cum risbaldmento, 
Lo cesne canta è presso a lo so finimento 
  Lo paon turba, istando plù guadente, 
Cum a soi pedi fa riguardamento, 
L’augel fenice s’arda veramente 
Per ritarnare in novo nascimento. 
  In tai natura eo sentom’abenuto, 
Chi allegro vado a morte a le belleze, 
E ‘nforzo ‘l canto presso a lo finire. 
 
  [The basilisk before the shining mirror 
dies with pleasure; 
the swan sings with greatest rapture 
when it is nearest death; 
  at the height of its pleasure the peacock 
gets upset when it looks at its feet; 
the phoenix burns itself all up 
to return and be reborn. 
  I think I have become much like these creatures, 
I who go gladly to death before her beauty 
And make my song lusty as I approach the end.] 
 
Conveying the same thought, Stefano Protonotaro invokes the image of the tigress 
held captive by its own gaze before a mirror while its whelps are stolen, another stock 
item of medieval bestiary lore (also depicted as a tableux on the Hereford 
Mappamundi): 
 
quandu eu la guardu, sintir la dulzuri 
chi fa la tigra in illu miraturi; 
chi si vidi livari 
multu crudilimenti 
sua nuritura, chi ill’ha nutricatu; 
e sì bonu li pari 
mirarsi dulcimenti 
dintru unu speclu chi li esti amustratu 
chi l’ublïa siguiri. 
 
[when I look at her, I feel the same sweetness 
as does the tiger at a mirror; 
which sees taken away from it 
in a very cruel manner 
the young which it has nourished; 
and yet it finds great pleasure 
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in looking at itself sweetly 
in a mirror which is shown to it, 
that it forgets to follow them.]206 
 
Concerning the tiger, Bartholomaeus Anglicus writes similarly in De proprietatibus 
rerum: 
 
and [the hunter] that will bear away the whelps, leaves in the way great 
mirrors, and the mother follows and finds the mirrors in the way, and looks on 
them and sees her own shadow and image therein, and mistakenly believes that 
she sees her children therein, and is long occupied therefore to deliver her 
children out of the glass, and so the hunter has time and space to escape, and so 
she is beguiled with her own shadow, and she follows no farther after the 
hunter to deliver her children.207 
 
These images convey the impression of love as a phenomenon that can be explained 
by reference to the external world, or at least in analogy to it. Yet the analogy, in the 
attempt to render the experience of love comprehensible, also perforce creates a gap 
between the poet’s love and the reader’s understanding of it. The encyclopedism of the 
siciliani is overt, yet static, the stuff of disputations, learned demonstrations, 
analogies, not a poetic representation of life as lived and loved, which we find first in 
Dante and the stilnovisti. 
This is nowhere more evident than in the difference in the structure of the love 
relationship as conceived by the stilnovisti and the siciliani, which, as far as I am 
aware, has not been noted before. Guido delle Colonne says that “Love has become 
aware that it could not have attracted me to it, if it had not been through [his lady]:  
 
Ancor che l'aigua per lo foco lassi 
la sua grande freddura 
non cangeria natura 
s'alcun vasello in mezzo non vi stassi; 
                                                
206 German and Italian Lyrics of the Middle Ages: An Anthology and a History, ed. and trans. Frederick 
Goldin (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1973), 84-85. 
207 Mediaeval Lore from Bartholomew Anglicus, ed. Robert Steele (London: Alexander Moring, The 
King's Classics, 1905), ch. 18 (modified). 
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anzi averria senza lunga dimura 
che lo foco astutassi, 
o che l'aigua seccassi; 
ma per lo mezzo l'uno e l'autra dura. 
Cusì, gentil criatura, 
in me à mostrato Amore 
l'ardente suo valore: 
che senza Amore er'aigua fredda e ghiaccia, 
ma Amor m'à sì allumato 
di foco che m'abraccia, 
ch'eo fora consumato,        
se voi, donna sovrana, 
non fustici mezzana 
infra l'Amore e meve, 
ca fa lo foco nascere di neve. 
 
[Although water, because of fire, loses 
its great coldness, 
it would not change its nature  
if there were not some vessel in between, 
but rather it would happen without much delay 
that the fire would burn out 
or that the water would dry up; 
but because of what’s between, both endure; 
thus, oh noble creature, 
in me Love has shown 
its burning force, 
for without love, I was cold water and ice; 
but Love has so strongly kindled in me 
a flame which envelops me 
that I would have been consumed by it, 
if you, sovereign lady, 
had not been between 
me and love, 
which makes fire issue from the snow.]208 
 
This same notion of the poet being attracted to love through the mediating influence of 
the lady occurs later in the poem in the image of the magnet: 
 
La calamita contano i saccenti 
che trare non poria 
lo ferro per maestria, 
se no che l'aire in mezzo le 'l consenti. 
Ancor che calamita petra sia, 
                                                
208 German and Italian Lyrics, 44-45. 
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l'altre petre neenti 
non son cusì potenti 
a traier perché non hano bailia. 
  Così, madonna mia, 
l'Amor s'è apperceputo 
che non m'avria potuto 
traer' a sé se non fusse per voi 
 
[The learned say that the magnet 
could not attract 
iron through its power, 
if the air in between does not permit it. 
Even thought the magnet may be a stone, 
no other stones are 
so powerful 
that they can attract (iron), for they do not have the power. 
  Thus, my lady, 
Love has become aware 
That it could not have attracted me to it, if it had not been through you.]209 
 
The lady is a conduit to love. Guido delle Colonne describes the lady as a vessel that 
separates “water” and fire” (i.e., the lover and Love) such that the latter does not 
extinguish the former (lines 6-7). Thus in the scuola siciliana the lady acts as a 
conduit to Love rather than Love as a conduit to the lady, as we would expect—an 
expectation established by Dante in the Vita nuova. This can be represented 
schematically as follows: 
 
scuola sicliana: the Poet [>] the Lady [>] Love 
 
stilnovo:  the Poet [>] Love [>] the Lady  
 
At root of this distinction is the attempt of the stilnovisti attempt to represent a poetic 
subject who feels, whereas the siciliani reflect on Love (capital “L”) in the abstract. 
The question of real or autobiographical referents are unknowable and furthermore 
irrelevant. What is important is that the stilnovisti affect the portrayal of actual 
emotions. Thus, the stilnovisti tend to focus on the specific instance (“one day”) as 
                                                
209 Ibid., 49. 
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opposed to intellectual contemplation of love as a concept. 
The poetic vocabulary of the siciliani—water, air, earth, and fire—reflect an 
“earthbound materiality.” Yet all such images are under tension since these visibilia 
can be read as signifiers of higher, spiritual truths. Dante explores these tensions 
between things and things signified more conspicuously than any of his predecessors. 
Still, we should exercise caution before buying into the teleological notion of literary 
progress embodied in Dante’s designation of his style as “new.” Dante, naturally, 
writes literary history from his own perspective, and his view is conditioned by the 
sense of spiritual progress that is a constitutive feature of his poetics as a whole. In 
effect, Dante projects his pilgrimage backwards in time onto his immediate poetic 
predecessors and makes their preparations prefigurations and prerequisites of his own 
journey. The “new” style is already old and gone, transcended by Dante, by the time it 
is first invoked by name; Dante’s designation is “curatorial” and antiquarian. We must 
distinguish between Dante’s perspective, the idea that he is getting right what others 
before him got wrong, and fact of the novelty of Dante’s view of love. Dante’s 
rhetorical move obscures a historical development. 
The image of fire, so pervasive in the writings of the siciliani, provides a 
contrast with which to determine the focal points of the differing status of scientific 
discourse in Dante and his predecessors. Giacomo da Lentini attempts to describe fire 
from the vantage point of an (almost Newtonian) neutral observer: 
   
Chi non avesse mai veduto foco 
no crederia che cocere potesse, 
anti li sembraria solazzo e gioco 
lo so isprendore, quando lo vedesse.        
  Ma s'ello lo tocasse in alcun loco, 
be·lli sembrara che forte cocesse: 
quello d'Amore m'à tocato un poco, 
molto me coce - Deo, che s'aprendesse! 
  Che s'aprendesse in voi, madonna mia, 
che mi mostrate dar solazzo amando, 
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e voi mi date pur pen'e tormento. 
  Certo l'Amore fa gran vilania, 
che no distringe te che vai gabando, 
a me che servo non dà isbaldimento. 
 
[A man who had never seen fire before 
would never think that it could burn; 
rather, its splendor would strike him, 
when he first saw it, as a delight, great amusement. 
  But if he ever touched it anywhere, 
Then it would seem to him it burned—and badly. 
The one that belongs to Love has touched me a little: 
It burns me greatly. God, if it only took hold! 
  If it only took hold in you, my lady, 
Who make me think you mean to comfort me by loving me 
And give me only torments and distress. 
  Certainly Love acts ignobly, 
For he does not tie you down who come forth only with words; 
I serve. Yet he gives me no happiness.210 
 
The imagined neutral observer of Lentini’s discourse on fire is replaced in the Vita 
nuova by Dante’s dream vision of his own flaming heart, clutched in the hand of the 
god Amor. Lentini’s hypothesis of the neutral observer is supplanted by the interiority 
of the dream; the fire observed set in the poet’s own conflagrating cardiac organ: 
 
A ciascun'alma presa e gentil core 
nel cui cospecto ven lo dir presente, 
in ciò che mi riscriva 'n suo parvente, 
salute in lor segnor, cioè Amore.  
Già eran quasi che aterzate l'ore 
del tempo che omne stella n'è lucente, 
quando m'apparve Amor subitamente, 
cui essenza membrar mi dà orrore.  
Allegro mi sembrava Amor tenendo 
meo core in mano, e nelle braccia avea 
madonna involta in un drappo dormendo. 
Poi la svegliava, e d'esto core ardendo 
lei paventosa umilmente pascea. 
Apresso gir lo ne vedea piangendo. 
 
[To every loving heart and captive soul 
into whose sights these present words may come 
                                                
210 Ibid., 218-221 (modified). 
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for some elucidation in reply, 
greetings I bring for their sweet lord’s sake, Love. 
The first three hours of the night were almost spent,  
the time that every star shines down on us, 
when Love appeared to me all of a sudden, 
and I still shudder at the memory. 
Joyous love looked to me while he was holding 
My heart within his hands, and in his arms 
My lady lay asleep wrapped in a veil. 
He woke her then and trembling and obedient 
She at that burning heart out of his hand; 
Weeping I saw him depart from me.] 
 
Dante’s A ciascun’alma presa e gentil core (“To every loving heart”) is a 
recapitulation or poetic synopsis of the stilnovo: the lover, the lady, Love, the heart, 
fire—all the inherited elements are there. All these images are also present in the 
various poets of the scuola siciliana, but they are used to opposite effect. Dante 
appropriates the scientific-encyclopedic discourses of the siciliani but transforms them 
into a romance of knowledge, as opposed to a knowledge of romance (in the 
contemporary sense of “love”), such as we find in Lentini’s poem. In the Vita nuova 
Dante appropriates the “fuoco” of the scuola’s scientific discourse for his own new 
subjective discourse on Love. There is a marked shift between Giacomo and Dante 
from the image of fire as an element of a scientific discourse to an intuitive image of 
burning passion that has since become cliché. Of course, the latter only seems more 
natural and intuitive to us because the image has become a commonplace. They are in 
their original context both equally technical explanations. 
While Dante in his own depiction is merely describing love more accurately 
and appropriately than those who came before him, he is in fact changing the concept 
of Love itself. Representations of Love as “Lord” are less popular among the Siciliani, 
who actually lived within a feudal power structure, than among the citizen stilnovisti 
of the city-state of Florence, who lacked such lords. But what ultimately separates 
Dante from his predecessors and even a contemporary like Guido Cavalcanti is the 
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narrative dimension of his undertaking; the focus on the specific instance becomes a 
focus on a series of instances. The analogy borrowed form natural science becomes a 
story that requires a hero. 
The image in the Vita nuova usurps the fire from the pages of the Sicilians’ 
encyclopedias and sets Dante’s disembodied heart aflame. For Dante, encyclopedic 
knowledge is located within the mind and soul of an individual on a path to salvation 
who is availed by it, not in a mind diseased, like Cavalcanti’s anima sbigotitia, which 
no amount of ministering can avail. 
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3. Cavalcanti’s Counter-Encyclopedia of the Heart  
 
It is no wonder then that Guido Cavalcanti had no use for Dante’s sapiential-
salvific vision. Cavalcanti dispenses with the sapiential dimension of the scuola 
siciliana and the early stilnovisti, though he is hardly unaware of their claims for love 
as a conduit to understanding—a love which can itself be understood by intellectual 
means. Yet he violently denies these claims and insists on love’s purely irrational, 
destructive power. It is easy to see how Cavalcanti, the poet of spiritual fragmentation, 
whose mind is most frequently the site of ravaging and “destruction,” not amorous 
enlightenment, would have been skeptical, perhaps violently so, of any attempt to 
gather “bound by love in one single volume, that which is dispersed in leaves 
throughout the universe.” Cavalcanti’s theory of love is directly at odds with Dante’s 
encyclopedic vision. Dante and Guido’s famous but still ill-understood rift can be seen 
to have its roots in their respective reactions to the intellectual inheritance of the 
siciliani. This ultimately has ramifications for both Dante’s intellectual enterprise in 
the Commedia and Guido’s rejection of it in his famous “disdegno” (Inferno X, 59)  
for Beatrice, who is its embodiment and representative. After a brief biographical 
sketch, I argue in what follows, that Cavalcanti’s disdegno for Beatrice is ultimately 
rooted in Guido’s rejection of Dante’s encyclopedic poetics.  
Guido Cavalcanti is unquestionably one of most enigmatic figures of Italian 
literature: poet, philosopher, courtly lover, suspected heretic—the list can be (and has 
been) extended. The details of his life are scarce by modern standards, but his are 
better documented than those of most of his contemporaries—a testament to his 
prominence in the Florence of his day.  Born into a prominent family of Florentine 
patricians, probably around 1255, his father arranged a marriage for Guido when he 
was perhaps as young as twelve: a union designed to reconcile feuding factions (his 
bride was the daughter of the great Ghibelline leader Farinata degli Uberti; Guido’s 
  174 
 
father, Cavalcante de’ Cavalcanti was a Guelf). Guido most certainly received an 
education commensurate with his social standing and it is at least plausible to suppose 
a period of study in Bologna, where he would have become aquatinted with local 
Aristotelian traditions and with the work of the great Bolognese poet, Guido 
Guinizelli, who did not die until around 1276. We have chronicle evidence of a 
pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela and a report of an attempt on Guido’s life along 
the way. We also know something about Cavalcanti’s participation in Florentine 
politics during the last fifteen years of the thirteenth century: in 1284 he was a member 
of the General Council of the Commune of Florence, on which sat other contemporary 
luminaries such as the scholar Brunetto Latini. In 1300 the city council sent Guido into 
exile along with certain other members of the White Guelf faction as well as an even 
number of leading Black Guelfs in an attempt to quell incessant feuding by 
temporarily depriving both sides of their leaders. Guido’s death following his short 
exile is recorded by the chronicler Giovanni Villani: 
[T]he Popolo sent the leaders of the other party [Whites] into exile at Sarzana 
[in the Tuscan territory near La Spezia]: namely Messer Gentile and Messer Torrigano 
and Carbone de’Cerchi and some of their relations...Guido Cavalcanti and some of his, 
and Giovanni Giacotti Malispini. But this party stayed less time in exile, for they were 
recalled from the unhealthy place, and Guido Cavalcanti retired ill, whence he died: 
and he was a great loss since he was as a philosopher an accomplished man 
[virtudioso] in many things, though he was too sensitive and irascible [troppo tenero e 
stizzoso].211  
This, in outline form, is what we can actually know about Guido’s life; the rest 
                                                
211 Villani’s Chronicle, Book 8, chapter 42, quoted in The Poetry of Guido Cavalcanti, ed. and trans. 
Lowry Nelson, Jr. (New York: Garland, 1986), xviii. The details of Guido’s life presented above are 
taken from the same, pp. xiii-xviii.  
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is silence—or speculation. 
 It will come as little surprise then that the limited biographical material on 
Cavalcanti has given rise to such speculation. The fascinating elusiveness of his 
enigmatic figure is perhaps best illustrated by Boccaccio’s fictional account of the 
Florentine poet in a novella of the Decameron (VI, 9). Boccaccio presents Cavalcanti 
as an austere philosopher wandering lost in thought among the marble tombs of a 
Florentine church cemetery. A band of youths, lead by Guido’s rival, Betto 
Brunelleschi, rides around the city, frequenting celebrations at various patrician 
households. Cavalcanti was, according to Boccaccio, not well liked by them because, 
although rich and elegant, his refusal to join their band was an affront to the noble 
youth of his native city and his mysterious philosophical speculations were suspected 
of impiety: 
 
One day Guido set out from Orto San Michele and chanced to come to San 
Giovanni by way of Corso degli Adimari, a route he frequently took; the great 
marble tombs now in Santa Reparata used to be located around San Giovanni, 
along with many others, and he was standing there between those tombs and 
the porphyry columns flanking the church, and the church door itself, which 
was locked. Along came Betto and his friends, crossing Piazza Santa Reparata 
on horseback, and they spotted Guido among the tombs. “Come on,” they said, 
“let’s go and needle him!” They spurred their horses and mounted a playful 
charge upon him, catching him unawares. “Guido,” they cried, “here are you, 
refusing to join our club. When you’ve found out that God does not exist, 
where will that have got you?” Finding himself hemmed in, Guido promptly 
retorted: “Seeing that here you are at home, my lords, you can say to me what 
you please.” With this he rested his hand on a tomb—they were not small—
vaulted over it as one who weighed almost nothing [sì come colui che 
legerissimo era], and vanished from their sight.212 
                                                
212 Boccaccio, Decameron, trans. John Payne/Charles Singleton (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982) 402-403 (modified). “Ora avvenne un giorno che, essendo Guido partito d’Orto San 
Michele e venutosene per lo Corso degli Adimari infino a San Giovanni, il quale spesse volte era suo 
cammino, essendo arche grandi di marmo, che oggi sono in Santa reparata, e molte altre dintorno a San 
Giovanni, e egli essendo tralle colonne del porfido che vi sono e quelle arche e la porta di San 
Giovanni, che serrata era, messer Betto con sua brigata a caval venendo su per la piazza di Santa 
Reparata, vedendo Guido là tra quelle sepolture, dissero: “andiamo a dargli briga”; e spronati i cavalli, a 
guisa d’uno assalto sollazzevole gli furono, quasi prima che egli sen ne avvedesse, sopra e 
cominciaronogli a dire: “Guido, tu rifuti d’esser di nostra brigata; ma ecco, quando tu avrai trovato che 
Idio non sia, che avrai fatto?A’ quali Guido da lor veggendosi chiuso, prestamente disse: “Signori, voi 
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“That which interests us here,” writes one commentator 
 
is not so much the joke attributed to Cavalcanti, (which can be interpreted in 
light of the fact that the poet’s supposed Epicureanism was in fact Averroism, 
according to which the individual soul is a part of the Universal Mind: the 
tombs are your house and not mine in as far as physical death is conquered by 
those who raise themselves to the contemplation of the universal by means of 
intellectual speculation). That which strikes us is the visual image that 
Boccaccio evokes of Cavalcanti, who liberates himself in a single bound “sì 
come colui leggerissimo era.”213  
Although Boccaccio’s picture of Cavalcanti is purely fictional, it is indeed consistent 
with the few contemporary descriptions we do have: Dino Compagni in his Cronica 
(one of two contemporary biographical sources, along with Villani’s Cronica), 
famously describes Guido as “cortese e ardito ma sdegnoso e solitario e intento allo 
studio” [courtly and bold but haughty and given to study].214 Boccaccio also writes of 
Guido that he was “one of the best logicians in the world and the best natural 
philosopher.” What fascinates more than any given detail of Boccaccio’s fictive 
echoes of contemporary characterizations is the uncanny manner in which his fiction 
presages a Cavalcanti who continues to evade his pursuers (be they Florentine ruffians 
or contemporary scholars) with the effortless grace of a speedy leap. 
 There is still little critical commentary on the poetic works of Guido 
Cavalcanti: at first glance, this statement would seem at odds with the facts; the most 
complete and current bibliography on Guido lists well over one-hundred items.215 The 
bulk of scholarly writing on Guido, however, is not about him, but rather about 
Dante—Guido and Dante, Guido in Dante: tracing the explicit and the not so explicit 
                                                                                                                                       
mi potete dire a casa vostra ciò che vi piace”; e posta la mano sopra una di quelle arche, che grandi 
erano, sì come colui che leggerisimo era, prese un salto e fusi gittato dall’altra parte, e sviluppatosi da 
loro se n’ andò.” Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron, ed. Vittore Branca (Milan: Mondadori, 1989) 537-
538. 
213 Italo Calvino, Lezioni Americane: Sei proposte per il prossimo millennio (Milan: Garzanti, 1988), 
13. 
214 Quoted in The Poetry of Guido Cavalcanti, ed. and trans. Lowry Nelson, Jr. (New York: Garland, 
1986), xvii.  
215 Enrico Fenzi, La canzone d’amore di Guido Cavalcanti e i suoi antichi commenti (Genova: Il 
melangolo, 1999), 289-300. Cavalcanti is the main subject of only a quarter of these. 
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strains of an ongoing intertextual exchange between the two authors. Excluding his 
“doctrinal” poem, “donna me prega,” almost none of Cavalcanti’s poems have 
received sustained analysis for their own sake, but rather as pieces that fit the puzzle 
posed by the infamously difficult and aforementioned “doctrinal poem” or the more 
complicated and ultimately insolvable puzzle of the exact nature and delineation of his 
relationship with Dante. Here, to be sure, it is prudent to use the term “relationship” 
and not “friendship”; while we have unmistakable evidence of the former, the latter 
term would exclude the period following the demise of that friendship, after which we 
have evidence of an ongoing and increasingly hostile exchange whose exact outlines 
elude us. The rift between Dante and Guido did not remain without practical 
consequences for the latter. As alluded to above, after an outbreak of civil strife in 
June, 1300, that ended in bloody riots, Dante, a priore of the city of Florence, voted to 
banish Guido and other leaders of the White and Black Guelphs in an effort to ease 
tensions between factions. 
 
Guido in Dante: From dissidio to disdegno 
 Presenting a new edition of Cavalcanti’s Rime in 1966, as part of the 
celebration surrounding the seventh centennial of Dante, Gianfranco Contini 
synthesizes the complex relationship between these two figures, the greatest Italian 
poet of all time and the greatest Italian poet of the thirteenth century: the latter is 
exalted by the former as his “primo amico” and “primo de li miei amici,” not to 
mention as dedicatee of his first effort as an author, the Vita Nuova, the most 
significant work of early Italian literature. Contini also registers the immense 
difficulty involved in evaluating the traces of this relationship in Dante’s oeuvre: 
 
Se la fase detta stilnovistica di Dante è poi di derivazione prevalmente 
cavalcantiana, l’ombra e il pensiero di Cavalcanti lo accompagnano fino al 
termine d’una carriera tanto indeducibile dai suoi principi, ma in cui si sèguita 
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a fare i conti col padrono della sua giovinezza poetica...Nella Commedia la 
presenza di Cavalcanti aleggia in modo tanto piú inquietante quanto piú 
indiretto: inquitante per i posteri, non per lo scrittore, i cui silenzi, le cui 
reticenze, le cui oscurità e ambiguità sono ferree quanto tutto il resto.”216  
 
[Although what is called Dante’s stil nuovo phase is of predominantly 
Cavalcantian derivation, Cavalcanti’s shadow and thought accompany him up 
to the end of a career that is as such not deducible from his [Cavalcanti’s] 
principles, but during the course of which he continued to settle his accounts 
with the padrono of his poetic youth...The presence of Cavalcanti wafts 
through the Commedia in a manner all the more unsettling on account of its 
indirectness: unsettling for posterity, not for the author, whose silence, 
reticence, obscurity, and ambiguity are as tangible as the rest.] 
 
Inferno X, 63 
 Cavalcanti, who even in his native Italy is not a household name, is known to 
English-speaking readers, if at all, as a the subject of two footnotes to Dante’s 
Commedia. In Inferno X, 55-72, Dante encounters Guido’s father Cavalcante 
(alongside his father-in-law Farinata) in the tombs of the heretics—Cavalcante was, 
like his son in Boccaccio’s tale, popularly suspected of impiety or, more specifically, 
Epicureanism: “Suo cimitero da questa parte hanno / con Epicuro tutti suoi seguaci, / 
che l’anima col corpo morto fanno” [In this part Epicurus with all his followers, who 
make the soul die with the body, have their burial place] (Inferno X, 13-15). When 
Dante mentions Guido, in what is one of the most debated passages in the poem 
(Inferno X, 61-63), he refers his famous disdegno: 
 
 Da me stesso non vegno:   
 colui ch’attende là per chi mi mena, 
 forse cui Guido vostro ebbe a disdegno. 
 
Part of the difficulty in interpreting this passage lurks in the exact translation of cui. 
Here there are essentially two contending readings. An older commentary tradition—
nearly unanimous up to the beginning of the previous century—read cui as “whom”: 
                                                
216 Gianfranco Contini, Varianti e alttra linguistica; una raccolta di Saggi (1938-68) (Turin: Einaudi, 
1970), 433.  
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(to paraphrase) “I do not come here through my own power; he who is waiting there 
[Vergil], whom perhaps your Guido disdained, leads me through here”. A more recent 
tradition reads cui as to whom: “he who is waiting there leads me through here, 
perhaps to the one [Beatrice] whom your Guido disdained.” (A third, but 
comparatively minor tradition reads cui as God, whom Guido supposedly held in 
disdain.) In recent years, something approaching a consensus has been reached among 
scholars that cui does in fact refers to Beatrice.217 “The other mystery-word,” writes 
Contini,” is the perfective ‘ebbe,’ the key to this equivocation,[...]:  past historical and 
not durative, it indicates that Guido’s aversion to Beatrice or his rejection of her was 
not a mere state, but rather a specific act and gesture.”218 While there is no evidence 
that Guido developed a disdain for the historical Beatrice, “there is no reason not to 
suppose that the two poets had at one time a fundamental disagreement about the 
salvific power of love between man and woman.”219 Thus, Guido’s disdegno is not 
directed at Beatrice as a historical woman but rather “at the possibility that an earthly 
lady may be a divine signifier and hence a carrier of beatitude.”220 Guido’s experience 
of women, his concern with love’s psychological and physiological effects on the 
lover, the catalogue of sighs and sufferings that wrack the mente sbiggotito and the 
body it inhabits are certainly remote from Dante’s far grander conception of his donna 
gentile as a signifier and mediatrix of divine love and the path to salvation.221 
 Guido’s famous disdegno for Beatrice, and what we can safely conjecture 
about its effect on Dante, is balanced, however, by the backhanded compliment that 
                                                
217 See Teodolina Barolini, Dante’s Poets: Textuality and Truth in the ‘Comedy’ (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 146n. 
218 Contini, 440: “L’alta parola misteriosa è il perfetto ebbe, chiave sì del equivoco[...]. Tempo storico, 
e non durativo, esso indica che l’avversione o il rifuto di Guido non fu un mero stato, ma un gesto e 
un’azione determinati[.] 
219 Nelson, xxviii. 
220 Barolini, 146. 
221 Although, one might still note, Guido’s experience of love is, unlike Dante’s, immediately accessible 
to the modern reader. 
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Dante seems to pay him in the lines preceding “Da me stesso no vegno...”: Guido’s 
distraught father asks Dante accusingly, 
 
 “Se per questo cieco  
 carcere vai per altezza d’ingegno,  
 figlio mio ov’é? é perché non e teco?”[italics mine] 
    
[“If you go through this blind prison on account of your high genius, where is 
my son? Why is he not with you”? (Singleton, modified)]  
Cavalcante de’ Cavalcanti believes that Dante has been chosen for this journey to hell 
on account of intellectual merit and wonders why, that being the case, is his son not 
alongside him? To be sure, the mere suggestion that Dante the author had even a 
potential intellectual equal—even if put in the mouth of a proud and doting father—
must be considered very high praise indeed.  
 
Paradiso XI, 97 (l’altro Guido) 
 For the second and final direct reference to Guido in the Commedia we must 
wait until the eleventh book of the Paradiso. Here Dante further complicates his praise 
of Cavalcanti. In Paradiso XI, 94-99, Dante the pilgrim is given the following 
assessment of his position relative to his great poetic contemporaries:  
  
Credette Cimabue ne la pittura 
   tener lo campo, e ora ha Giotto il grido, 
   sì che la fama di colui è scura. 
 Così ha tolto l’uno a l’altro Guido 
   la gloria de la lingua; e forse è nato 
   chi l’uno e l’altro cacerà del nido. 
 
Cimabue thought to hold the field in painting and now Giotto is all the rage, so 
that his [Cimabue’s] fame is dark. In the same manner, one Guido has snatched 
the glory of our language from the other; and perhaps there is yet one born who 
will chase them both from the nest. [My trans.]  
The first Guido is none other than Cavalcanti who “snatched” the poet’s laurels from 
his (and Dante’s) great predecessor, Guido Guinizelli. Dante of course intends himself 
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when he writes of “one who will chase them both from the nest.” As with Inferno X, 
Dante’s praise of Cavalcanti is deeply ambiguous: we should keep in mind that 
Cavalcanti’s implied altezza d’ingegno accords him what Barolini calls “the negative 
privilege of a position in hell.”222 In a similarly ambiguous (or perhaps not so 
ambiguous) vein, the glory that Guido attained through his altezza d’ingegno is 
subsequently and summarily “snatched” from him by his younger contemporary.    
 Apart from these “due passi cavalcantiani”—which have given rise to enough 
hermeneutic travail to last several scholarly lifetimes—every other “elogio di 
Cavalcanti” passes in silence. Despite this fact, a significant trend within Dante 
scholarship has taken its cue from Contini’s assertion that “l’elogio in fatto di Dante a 
Cavalcanti non cessò mai” [In fact, Dante’s eulogy for Cavalcanti never ends], 223 and 
has devoted itself to fleshing out the bare skeleton of the history (and precise nature) 
of Dante’s relationship with Cavalcanti. 
 Critical interest in the evolution of the relationship between Dante and Guido 
is thus neither recent nor superficial, nor is it a mere matter of biographical interest 
surrounding two great figures of Italian literature on the threshold of the thirteenth 
century. Viewed from one angle there is in fact an initial declaration of friendship 
between the two, which was almost certainly a matter of intellectual solidarity and 
possibly of genuine mutual affection. This is attested by the by the nature of the 
ongoing early poetic correspondence between the two—beginning with Dante’s very 
first sonnet A ciascun’ alma presa e gentil core [To every loving heart and captive 
soul] (Vita nova, III), to which Guido responded with Vedeste, al mio parere, onne 
valore [You saw, in my opinion, every power] (Cavalcanti, XXXVIIb), followed by 
Dante’s Guido, i’ vorrei che tu e Lapo ed io [Guido, I wish that you and Lapo and I] 
                                                
222 Barolini, 127. 
223 Contini, 441. 
  182 
 
and Guido’s first reply to this sonnet in S’io fosse quelli che d’Amor fu degno [If I 
were he who was worthy of love], followed by his Se vedi Amore assai ti priego, 
Dante [I earnestly beg of you, Dante, if you see Love] and Dante, un sospiro messager 
del core [Dante, a sigh, the heart’s messenger] (Cavalcanti, XXXVIIIb-XL). Then 
there is the “Primavera” episode of the Vita Nuova involving the poets’ two lady-
loves, Guido’s “monna Vanna” and Dante’s “monna Bice” (to which I will return in 
my discussion of the Vita Nuova). Further evidence of friendship and mutual esteem 
would seem to be furnished by Dante’s dedication of the his “libello” to Guido, “mio 
primo amico a cui io ciò scrivo” [my primo amico to whom I write this] (Vita Nuova, 
XXX), as well as abundant other references to “quelli cui io chiamo primo de li miei 
amici” [that one whom I call the first among my friends].224  
Then we have evidence of a grave yet unspecified crisis in their friendship, the 
exact cause, chronology and nature of which still remain the elusive subject of 
ongoing scholarly debate.225 However this crisis came about, it clearly had a profound 
impact on the remainder of Dante’s biography and presumably on Guido’s as well. 
First, there is the much discussed226 “scolding” of Dante at the hands of Guido in the 
sonnet I’vegno ‘l giorno a te ‘nfinite volte [I come to you during the day countless 
times] (Cavalcanti, XLI). Then, in the words of Contini as quoted above, there are the 
disconcerting silenzi, reticenze, oscurità and ambiguità surrounding the conspicuous 
absence of the one-time “primo amico” in the Commedia; “conspicuous” not only in 
light of the vast “presenza cavalcantia” in the early poetry and the Vita Nuova, but also 
because of the diffuse and ineluctable intertextual “presence” of Cavalcanti in the 
                                                
224 Vita nova, III. For more of Dante’s references to his “primo amico” see books XXIV, XXV. 
225 Most recently: Enrico Malato, Dante e Guido Cavalcanti. Il dissidio per la Vita Nuova e il 
“disdegno” di Guido (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 1997); Antonio Gagliardi, Guido Cavalcanti e Dante. 
Una questione d’amore (Catanzaro: Pulano Editori, 1997); Teodolinda Barolini, “Dante and Cavalcanti 
(On Making Distinctions in Matters of Love): Inferno V in Its Lyric Context,” Dante Studies, 116 
(1998), 31-63. 
226 For a relatively recent summary of this discussion see Letterio Cassata, “La paternale di Guido” 
(“Rime” XLI), Studi Danteschi, 53 (1981), 169-185.   
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Comedy.227 
 
Intertextual Guido? Reconstructing the dissidio  
 An unwieldy scholarly debate has evolved around the attempt to establish a 
chronology for this dissidio between Guido and Dante. How far back can this rift be 
traced? Is Guido’s “poema dottrinale,” Donna me prega, a polemic against the vision 
of love expounded by Dante in the Vita Nuova228 or is the latter already a salvo of 
Dante’s against the reputed pessimism of Guido’s introspective love-drama? All 
attempts at reconstructing the exact stages of the ultimate and obvious rift must remain 
hypothetical in nature—it will remain to Dante to write the implicit history of his one 
true poetic predecessor of genius and one-time “primo amico,” since he will in fact 
outlive him. Enrico Malato argues that Guido intended his poem as a polemical reply 
to Dante’s libello. The opening line of Cavalcanti’s discourse on the nature of love 
(“donna me prega per ch’eo voglio dire / du’ acidente che sovente è fero / ed è sí 
altero ch’è chiamato amore”) “can’t help but remind us,” writes Malato, of the passage 
in the Vita Nuova (XVIII) where Dante writes, “mi disse questa donna che m’avea 
prima parlato, queste parole: “Noi ti preghiamo che tu ne dichi ove sta questa tua 
beatitudine” [this lady who had spoken to me before then said these words to me: “I 
ask you that you might say where your beatitude resides”].229 One is equally free, 
however, to read these lines in the Vita as an echo, perhaps even an implicit parody, of 
the incipit of Guido’s poem.230 There is no shortage of such comparisons in the works 
                                                
227 Most notably Contini in his famous essay “Cavalcanti in Dante,” where he shows other instances of 
how “Cavalcanti aveva salato il sangue a Dante”; see Varianti e altra linguistica; una raccolta di Saggi 
(1938-68) (Turin: Einaudi, 1970), 433-445; also see Theodolina Barolini, Dante’s Poets: Textuality and 
Truth in the ‘Comedy’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially 123-153. 
228 This thesis was first put forward by Giuliano Tanturli in “Guido Cavalcanti contro Dante,” Le 
tradizioni del Testo: Studi di letteratura italiana offerti a Domenico De Robertis, ed. Franco Gavazzeni 
and Guglielmo Gorni (Milano-Napoli: Ricciardi, 1993).  
229 Malato, 23. 
230 See Vita Nova, ed. Guglielmo Gorni (Torino: Einaudi, 1996), 89n. 
  184 
 
mentioned: at times Dante seems to be paraphrasing Cavalcanti—or vice versa—
sometimes with polemical intent. No amount of philological sifting, however, 
produces a stable chronology.  
 Teodolina Barolini argues, not only against Malato’s thesis, but against any 
attempt to violate the opacity of the Vita Nuova as far as it regards Dante’s “first 
friend.” Against Giuliano Tanturli (who finds an air of “perfetta intesa”231 in Dante’s 
remarks on Guido in the Vita—and argues on that account that the polemicist must 
have been Cavalcanti), she supports the claim of Giorgio Inglese that “[t]ra l’autore 
della Vita nuova e il suo destinario si percepisce un distacco” [One senses a rift 
between the author of the Vita nova and its dedicatee].232 Inglese claims that “further 
precision as to the degree, intentionality, and trajectory of that divergence cannot be 
reconstructed from the data at hand”: ‘che esso [il distacco] già corrisponda,—in piena 
conscienza dell’uno, dell’altro o di entrambi,—alla distanza obiettiva che corre fra la 
dotrina del ‘libello’ e quella esposta in Donna me prega,—questo non si potrà 
affermare (perché Dante ne tace), e non si potrà negare, perché le effetive 
dichiarazioni di ‘intesa’ fra l’autore della Vita nuova e il suo primo amico non 
consentono la conclusione.”233 It sometimes appears that whether one grants the “last 
word” in the ideological debate that ended their friendship to one or the other depends 
largely on which figure the critic has chosen as his subject. If Cavalcanti is a footnote 
to Alighieri, then surely Dante must be responding to him. If Cavalcanti is our main 
concern, then his “doctrinal poem” should be granted the dignity of the status of a 
reply—to the Vita Nuova, the poetic manifesto that Dante wrote for his “first friend.” 
 Although Barolini is right to be pessimistic about our ability to reconstruct the 
                                                
231 Tanturli, 8. 
232 Barolini, “Dante and Cavalcanti,”61. 
233 Giorgio Inglese, “‘...illa Guidonis de Florentis Donna me prega’ (Tra Cavalcanti e Dante),” Cultura 
neolatina, 55 (1955), 182. 
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dissidio on the basis of what we know, it should certainly be possible to give a more 
nuanced account of the competing scenarios. What aside from the unquestionable 
ideological rift on the subject of love were the potential sources of tension between 
Dante and his “primo amico”? 
 
Cavalcanti’s Poetic Ego: Drama versus History 
 In Guido’s canzoniere, the subject (“io”) of the poems is quintessentially an 
actor in the drama of his own demise at the hands of Love; Cavalcanti’s interest lies in 
depicting all the psycho-physiological processes at work in the lover and mobilizes 
vast armies of spiriti that bring him both solace and distress, but lead him inexorably 
to self-destruction. The “I” of Dante’s poems, by contrast, is always identical with 
their author, and takes part in a narrative history, which is the history of Dante’s own 
salvation. “Dante’s radical innovation in the genre of the lyric sequence was the 
introduction of prose passages, which...provided, in Sara Sturm-Maddox’s 
formulation, 
 
the systematic testing of the sentiments and solutions proclaimed in the poems 
in terms of a life experience directly attested in the prose’ (“Transformations of 
Courtly love poetry” 130]. Dante insists on the truth of the poems and on their 
literal (rather than allegorical and paradigmatic) import. The narrative passages 
establish an identity between the author and the first person subject.”234  
Unlike Dante, Guido is not telling a story in the first person and there is, in stark 
contrast to Dante, rarely anything in his works that allows an unmediated 
identification of the “Io” of the poems with their author. Although many of the poems 
are concerned with depicting and delineating the physio-psychological effects of amor 
on the “io” of the loving subject, there is nothing to suggest that Guido is presenting 
his audience with sublimated bits of his amatory autobiography. Throughout the 
                                                
234 Olivia Holmes, Assembling the Lyric Self: Authorship from Troubador Song to Italian Book Poetry 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 19.  
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poems, which are replete with destructive love spirits, and physiological descriptions 
of love’s effects on the lover—which has justly been called a phenomenology of 
love—there is a lack any explicitly personal element that would proclaim that their io 
to their author are one and the same. Guido’s ladies do not have names and, if not for 
Dante, we would never have heard the name of his lady, Giovanna. If Guido’s poems 
reflect lived experience, then it is precisely as a reflection—quite unlike Dante’s 
autobiographical account of his love for a once concrete, historical woman whose 
mere greeting [saluto] he transformed into the source of his beatitude [salute]. Contra 
Dante, Guido refuses to engage in autobiography.  
 Guido’s poems are almost all written from the perspective of a first person 
narrator—either explicitly, through the use of io or the first person possessive pronoun 
mio, or implicitly, when the implied subject issues imperatives, either to the audience 
or to the poem itself in the envoi. Only two poems (XVIII and XXVIII) break with this 
pattern. In the first,  “Pegli occhi fere un spirito sottile” (XXVIII), the Cavalcantian 
key-word “spirito” or some variant thereof (“spiritel,” “spiriti”) returns in each line of 
the sonnet in a whimsical moment of Cavalcantian self-parody: “Pegli occhi fere un 
spirito sottile, / che fa ’n la mente spirito destare, / dal qual si muove spirito d’amare, / 
ch’ogn’altro spiritel face gentile” [Through the eyes strikes a delicate spirit / That 
awakens a spirit in the mind / From which stirs the spirit of loving / That ennobles 
every other little spirit]. The other poem that dispenses with the first person stance, 
XVIII (“Noi siàn le triste penne isbigotite”) replaces the customary love-lovelorn 
narrator with the bewildered quills, little scissors and grieving pen knife who report 
the lamentable state of the hand that used to guide them: 
 
Noi siàn le triste penne isbigotite, We are the poor bewildered quills 
le cesoiuzze e ‘l coltellin dolente, The little scissors and the grieving penknife 
ch’avemo scritte dolorosamente Who have sorrowfully written 
quelle parole ch vo’ avete udite. Those words that you have heard. 
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Or vi diciàn perché noi siàn partite Now we tell you why we have left  
e siàn venute a voi qui di presente: And presently come here to you: 
la man che ci movea dice che sente The hand that used to move us says it feels 
cose dubbiose nel core apparite; Dreadful things that have appeared in the 
heart 
 
le quali hanno destruto sì costui Which have so undone him 
ed hannol posto sì presso a la morte, And brought him so close to death 
ch’altro non n’é rimaso che sospiri. That nothing else is left of him but sighs 
  
Or vi preghiàn quanto possiàn più forte   We now beg you earnestly as we can 
che non sdegn[i]ate di tenerci noi, That you not scorn to keep us 
tanto ch’un poco di pietà vi miri. For so long as a little compassion suits 
you.235 
Curiously, the orphaned writing utensils’ tale of their proprietor’s demise produces a 
greater sense of intimacy and sincerity than the usual complaints of the io that speaks 
its sufferings itself. Ostensibly, only traces of an authorial presence remain within the 
sphere of the poem: the author’s informant-hand breaks the news to distraught 
stationary-set of the dire events in the poet’s heart. Transmitted through a series of 
distaccated and autonomous body parts, the relating of the ubiquitous lover’s lament 
by proxy reduces the expected first person narrator to a mute producer of mere sighs. 
Since Cavalcanti is such an expert producer of stylized accounts in rime of the mind 
ravaged and destroyed by love, his assignment of the role of describing his painful 
travails to a set of orphaned writing implements produces a much more pathetic and 
personal picture of the suffering poet than we otherwise find in Cavalcanti’s works: it 
is the only moment where depth of feeling becomes inexpressible. Yet, this 
inexpressibility is actually only a sly means of overcoming the lacquer of stylization 
that makes it impossible to write about genuine suffering, distress and vulnerability. It 
is here, if anywhere, that the implied subject of the poem might be identified with the 
poem’s author. Cavalcanti’s thoroughgoing sense of intellectual fragmentation—the 
opposite of Dante’s encyclopedism—is realized metaphorically by a series of 
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  188 
 
disassociated body parts, whose governing intellect has fled the field.  
 One then rightly wonders if the totalizing autobiographical nature of the Vita 
Nuova might have presented a problem for Cavalcanti. He, unlike Dante, does not 
have a vita. Guido does in fact seem to resist the self-referential, overtly 
autobiographical nature of Dante’s early writings and the way that they insert their 
author’s “I” into the discourse on love. We recall that Dante sends the very first poem 
of the Vita, “A ciascun’alma presa  e gentil core” to Guido and other “fedeli d’amore.” 
The poem recounts his vision of the sleeping Beatrice who, borne asleep in the arms of 
Love, is awakened and fed the poet’s burning heart:236 
 
A ciascun'alma presa e gentil core   
nel cui cospetto ven lo dir presente,     
in ciò che mi rescrivan suo parvente, 
salute in lor segnor, cioè Amore.  
Già eran quasi che atterzate l'ore 
del tempo che onne s tella n'è lucente, 
quando m'apparve Amor subitamente, 
cui essenza membrar mi dà orrore.   
Allegro mi sembrava Amor tenendo  
meo core in mano, e ne le braccia avea 
madonna involta in un drappo dormendo.  
Poi la svegliava, e d'esto core ardendo 
lei paventosa umilmente pascea:   
appresso gir lo ne vedea piangendo. 
 
[To every loving heart and captive soul 
into whose sight these present words may come 
for some elucidation in reply, 
greetings I bring for their sweet lord’s sake, Love. 
The first three hours of the night were almost spent, 
the time that every star shines down on us, 
when love appeared to me all of a sudden, 
and I still shudder at the memory. 
Joyous Love looked to me while he was holding 
my heart within his hands, and in his arms   
my lady lay asleep wrapped in a veil. 
He woke her then and trembling and obedient 
                                                
236 Dante Alighieri, Vita nouva e Rime, ed. Guido Davico Bondino, Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori 
Editore, 1985. The English translations are from Vita Nuova, ed. and trans. Mark Musa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
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she ate that burning heart out of his hand; 
weeping I saw him depart from me.] 
 
Guido responds to Dante’s request for an interpretation with Vedeste, al mio parere 
onne valore; Dante informs us that this poetic correspondence “fue quasi lo principio 
de’l amistà tra lui e me” [was more or less the beginning of the friendship between 
us]: 
 
Vedeste, al mio parere, onne valore 
e tutto gioco e quanto bene om sente, 
se foste in prova del segnor valente 
che segnoreggia il mondo de l’onore, 
poi vive in parte dove noia more, 
e tien ragion nel cassar de la mente; 
si va soave per sonno a la gente. 
che ‘l cor ne porta senza far dolore. 
Di voi lo core ne portò, veggendo  
che vostra donna alla morte cadea: 
nodriala dello cor, di ciò temendo. 
Quando v’aparve che se ‘n gia dolendo. 
fu’l dolce sonno ch’allor si compiea, 
ché ‘l su’ contrario lo venìa vincendo 
 
[You saw, in my opinion, every power 
and all joy and whatever good man feels, 
if you had experience of the powerful lord 
who lords it over the world of honor, 
since he lives in a place where vexation dies 
and holds council in the turret of the mind; 
he goes so gently to people in sleep 
that he takes away the heart with out causing pain. 
He took away your heart seeing 
that your lady was inclining toward death: 
fearful of that, he nourished her with the heart. 
When it appeared that he was going away in grief, 
it was sweet sleep that was then ending, 
for its opposite came routing it. 
 
In this famous first act of friendship, Cavalcanti responds to Dante’s account of his 
profoundly novel and personal vision with only the vaguest of generalities (“onne 
valore...tutto gioco...quanto bene om sente” [“every power...all joy...whatever good]. 
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Even the most superficial acquaintance with Cavalcanti assures that he was capable of 
producing more than commonplaces such as these. What does the “primo amico[’s]” 
response actually achieve? Cavalcanti first takes great care to depersonalize Dante’s 
vision—hence reinscribing it the terms of more familiar discourse on love—before he 
offers an interpretation in the two final stanzas of his poetic explication de texte. The 
departure of the weeping Amor is also given a purely generic explanation—routed by 
the opposite of dolce sonno. It is no wonder then that Dante could still claim that “[l]o 
verace giudico del detto sogno non fue veduto allora per alcuno” [The true 
interpretation of the dream I described was not perceived by anyone then] even after 
directly referring to Cavalcanti’s response, where Guido does in fact predict Beatrice’s 
death (“che vostra donna alla morte cadea”). Guido’s failure to arrive at the “verace 
giudico” that is now, according to Dante, “manifestissimo a li più semplici [very clear 
even to the least sophisticated] can only consist, then, in his failure to appreciate the 
true significance of Beatrice, which, at this stage in the narrative, has yet to become 
fully apparent even to Dante.  
 
Guido and the Vita Nuova  
Primo amico?   
 There is general agreement that the main current of the dissidio between Dante 
and Cavalcanti, perhaps fed by smaller streams of growing intellectual disagreement 
on the subject of love, has its source in Guido’s disdegno for Beatrice. It is strange 
then that the implications of this widely accepted scenario have never been 
satisfactorily brought to bear on the debate surrounding the position of the Vita Nuova 
in the chronology of the dissidio. If we assume that the rift between the two poets was 
precipitated by the death of Beatrice, it indeed seems rather strange that Dante should 
continue to refer to Guido as his “primo amico” when he recounts her death years after 
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the fact. By the time Dante wrote his libro de la [...] memoria the foundation of their 
friendship would have at least begun to fracture. Yet it is precisely on the basis of 
Dante’s references to the “primo amico” in the Vita Nuova that scholars have (almost 
unanimously237) found in it the terminem post quem for establishing the chronology of 
the dissidio. While there is no evidence to suggest that the rift had already taken shape 
by Dante’s composition of the Vita238—his remarks about his “first friend” belie 
this—there is no reason to suppose that Dante’s references to his “primo amico” are 
not perhaps more nuanced than they appear. 
 Dante’s use of the term “primo amico” for Cavalcanti throughout the Vita 
Nuova has been generally taken to mean that the two were best friends; and no one 
doubts that there was a period of intense intellectual and perhaps even affective 
intimacy between the two. “Primo amico” is, however, a slightly unusual way of 
saying this; in modern Italian one would simply say amico migliore and not “primo 
amico.” Scholars have gotten around this problem by taking “primo amico” to mean 
something like first among my friends, which preserves this reading of “primo” as  
“best.” But might not Dante’s insistence on the term “primo” imply a contrast with a 
later secondo? Mark Musa comes close to suggesting something like this in the 
introduction to his translation of the Vita. He first reminds us that the poems of the 
Vita fall into three distinct “movements.” In the first movement (Chapters I-XVI), 
                                                
237 Teodolinda Barolini, “Dante and Cavalcanti,” 60-63. 
238 Even here, however, one could speculate that Dante employs the artifice that he is not, in fact, 
writing, but rather copying from the “book of his memory” to allow him to speak in the present tense 
about a friendship that was already part of the past:  In quella parte del libro de la mia memoria 
dananzi a la quale poco si potrebbe leggere, si trova una rubrica la quale dice: Incipit vita nova. Sotto la 
quale rubrica io trovo scritte le parole le quali è mio intendimento d’assemplare in questo libello...(Vita 
Nuova, I) [“In that part of the book of my memory before which little is to be read is found a chapter 
heading which says: “Here begins a new life” It is my intention to copy into this little book the words I 
find written under that heading...”] This would not be the last time Dante was suspected of having 
employed chronological slight-of-hand in order avoid directly addressing his rift with Cavalcanti: there 
is general suspicion that Dante set the fictional date of the beginning of the Comedia five months prior 
to Guido’s death precisely in order to spare himself the bitter task of assigning the former “first friend” 
a place in the poem’s infernal topography. 
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Dante describes three encounters with Beatrice: when he first sees her; when she first 
greets him; when she denies him her greeting. Musa adds: 
 
it is perhaps not without significance that Dante mentions his ‘first friend’ in 
the opening section of his book, for when he treats love in the first movement, 
it is from the point of view adopted by Cavalcanti in his own canzoniere: no 
poet had ever investigated more thoroughly and successfully the dramatic and 
mysterious possibilities of love or its manifold effects on the lover. It is as 
though Dante had assigned himself a guide for the first phase of the journey 
[my italics], particularly for the closing self-analytical sonnets in which he 
probes into the workings of love on the human heart.239  
When, in the second movement of the “libello” (Books XVII-XXXI), Dante takes up 
praise of his lady as the new and exclusive theme of his rime, he adopts the general 
practice of a second Guido: Guido Guinizelli, the famous Bolognese poet and “sage” 
who Musa calls “Dante’s new guide for his second movement in love” (although while 
missing the opportunity to point to the suggestiveness of Dante’s two “guides” in the 
Vita Nuova both being named Guido—only a vowel away from Italian guida or 
“guide”). Another at least potential nuance of Dante’s use of “primo amico” emerges 
from this general picture.  The exact wording of Dante’s first reference to Cavalcanti 
in the Vita Nuova (Book III), “quelli cui io chiamo primo de li miei amici” [the one 
whom I call the first of my friends], leaves us enough room to ponder if this emphasis 
could not in fact mean something to the effect of  “my first friend as opposed to 
another, later one who supplanted him.” 
 
Prima verrà: “monna Vanna and monna Bice” 
 A matter further complicating any conception of Dante’s relationship to his 
“primo amico” is the “Primavera” episode in Book XXIV of the Vita Nuova. Dante 
recounts how one day when sitting in thought in “a certain place,” Love appears to 
him and tells him to prepare to bless the day he took hold of him, and Dante’s heart is 
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soon so overcome with joy that he is no longer able to recognize it as his own. 
Thereupon he sees a certain woman famed for her beauty walking in his direction; she 
was nicknamed “Primavera,” supposedly on account of her beauty and was called 
Giovanna: “la quale...fue già molto donna die questo primo mio amico” [who had 
been formerly the much-loved lady of my first friend]. Dante spies Beatrice 
approaching “appreso lei” [behind her]; after both Guido’s Giovanna and the “mirabile 
Beatrice” have passed by, Love tells Dante that the first lady is only called 
“Primavera” only because of the manner in which she has appeared today: she will 
come first (“prima verrà”) on the day when Beatrice first reveals herself after the 
poet’s last vision of her in Book XXIII. This prefiguration of the one lady by the other 
seems particularly fitting to Dante since the very name “Giovanna” comes from that 
“Giovanni lo quale precedette the verace luce” [John (the Baptist) who preceded the 
true light]. Dante then proceeds to quote Matthew 3.13: “Ego vox clamantis in deserto: 
parate viam Domini.” We might ask ourselves if we should take statements at face 
value about a “primo amico” who is cast as “precursor John the Baptist to Dante’s 
resurgent Christ.”240 When Dante decides to send verses dealing with the episode to 
his “first friend,” it is no wonder that he decides to “keep silent about certain things 
that seemed best to keep silent about” [tacendomi certe parole le quale pareano da 
tacere]. One can only wonder what effect these passages must have had on the 
dedicatee of Dante’s libello, “mio primo amico a cui io ciò scrivo” [my primo amico 
to whom I write this] (Vita Nuova, XXX). It is difficult to see the dedication of book 
containing such passages an entirely amicable gesture. One might furthermore 
interpret Dante’s use of Latin to punctuate this and other episodes as a deliberate 
flaunting of Cavalcanti’s injunction that he should write only in vulgare. 
 Perhaps we can now form a more plausible picture of the evolution of the 
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relationship between Dante and his “primo amico.” It is now possible to assert that 
when Dante wrote the Vita, his feelings towards Cavalcanti were at least ambivalent. 
If there was no open hostility or dissidio, there was perhaps an increasingly bitter 
awareness of a drifting apart. Hope of rapprochement may still have been 
accompanied by a need to send warning signals about the growing weakness both 
were beginning to perceive in the foundations of their friendship. The inherent 
ambiguity of this situation is best illustrated by the questions raised surrounding a 
passage that has not previously been considered as part of the dissidio debate.   
 
Inferno X, 59 and Vita Nuova XXXI: “Li occhi dolenti per pieta del core” 
 Let’s recall the question posed by Guido’s father, Cavalcante del Cavalvante, 
in the first Cavalcantian passo of the poem, the famous interpretive crux, Inferno 10. 
58-60: “se per questo cieco / carcere vai per altezza d’ingegno, / figlio mio ov’é? é 
perché non e teco?” [if you go through this blind prison on account of your high 
genius, where is my son, and why is he not with you—Singleton, modified]. If, as 
noted, there is anyone else worthy to undertake the pilgrim’s journey on the basis of 
intellectual merit (altezza d’ingegno), surely it is Guido, whom Dante here suggests as 
his one possible intellectual equal.  
 This term ingegno appears a total of eighteen times in the Commedia, but only 
twice in conjunction with the word altezza, or its adjectival form, alto241. In Inferno 
10.59, as we have seen, Dante explicitly associates this particular quality of mind with 
Guido. Previously, in Inferno 2.7-9, Dante had invoked his own242 alto ingegno, so 
                                                
241 Inf. 34.26; Purg. 1.2, 9.125, 11.9, 12.66, 14.54, 18.40, 27.130; Par. 4.40, 5.89, 7.59, 13.72, 14.117, 
22.114, 24.81 
242 The question of whether Dante is here invoking his own, or some higher power is irrelevant for 
present purposes. “Those who believe that in the earlier passage Dante had invoked his own poetic 
powers see in Cavalcanti's doting father's reaction a simple sense of rivalry: which of these two poets is 
more gifted? If, on the other hand, we believe that Dante, in the invocation, calls for aid from a Higher 
Power, then the father's question indicates that he doesn't understand, materialist that he is, the nature of 
true Christian poetic inspiration. His son's genius and that inspiring Dante are not commensurable” (The 
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that it might bless his bold poetic undertaking: 
 
O Muse, o alto ingegno, or m'aiutate; O muses, O High genius, help me 
now! 
o mente che scrivesti ciò ch'io vidi, O memory that wrote down what 
I saw, 
qui si parrà la tua nobilitate.[italics mine] here shall your worthiness appear! 
 
The altezza d’ingegno that the deceased Cavalcante claims for his son in Inferno 10.59 
is clearly meant as an echo of Dante’s earlier use of the word. (The implication, it 
would seem, is that Guido’s ingegno is an “echo” of Dante’s, equal in kind but not in 
degree.) Thus, in the Commedia, the attribution of alto or altezza to ingegno occurs 
only in contexts with explicit—or implicit, but obvious—reference to Cavalcanti. All 
other instances of ingegno—the first, twenty-four books later in Inferno 34, with 
fifteen others scattered throughout the Purgatorio and the Paradiso—come with 
sufficient infrequency, and after a large enough period of total disuse, to further 
underscore the (near) uniqueness of this particular quality, which Dante attributes only 
to himself and, at least to some degree, to Guido. Thus in the Commedia, the altezza 
d’ingegno that Dante claims for himself and at least associates with, if not attributes 
to, Cavalcanti reveals his opaque homage to the once strong ties between himself and 
his former amico. Yet, this quality, shared in kind but not degree, ultimately only 
further separates and distinguishes the two poets since Guido is not—despite his 
altezza d’ingegno—allowed (either by the poet or by the forces that lead him in the 
poem) to accompany Dante on the journey.  
 In the Commedia the phrase altezza d’ingegno / alto ingegno, thus appears in 
contexts which contrast Dante and Cavalcanti—in a manner that is at least agonistic, if 
not antagonistic. Now I would like to posit another instance of “Cavalcanti in 
                                                                                                                                       
Princeton Dante Project, commentary on Inferno X, 59, http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp/). Either 
way, the altezza of Dante’s ingegno is not attained by Guido. 
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Dante”243 which has not previously been recognized, but which calls for such an 
interpretation. 
 In the Vita Nuova, Dante devotes exactly three books (XXVIII-XXX), written 
exclusively in prose, to the death of Beatrice244 before composing his first lament for 
her in the form of a poem: “Li occhi dolenti per pietà del core,” in book XXXI. Dante 
“divides” or adds a prose commentary to most of the poems in the Vita Nuova. Prior to 
and including book XXVI this commentary follows the poems; beginning with  “Li 
occhi dolenti” in book XXI, the order is reversed—prose commentaries begin to 
precede the verse. Dante does not divide the intervening fragmentary canzone of book 
XXVII, which itself quite literally divides those poems with following divisioni 
(books III-XXVI) from those preceded by them from “Li occhi dolenti” in book XXXI 
onward.  
 Dante divides this first poem on the death of Beatrice into three parts, the first 
and sixth stanze forming parts one and three, respectively, and stanzas 2-4 forming the 
second part. This second part is then further divided into three parts: “ne la prima dico 
chi non la piange; ne la seconda dico chi la piange; ne la terza dico de la mia 
condizione” [in the first part I tell who did not mourn her; in the second, who mourned 
her; in the third I speak of my state]. In the third stanza, beginning “Partissi de la sua 
bella persona,” Dante speaks of “chi non la pianga”: 
 
Partissi de la sua bella persona 
piena di grazia l’anima gentile 
ed éssi gloriosa in loco degno. 
Chi no la piange, quando ne ragiona, 
core ha di pietra sì malvagio e vile, 
                                                
243 See Contini’s article of the same name in Varianti e alttra linguistica; una raccolta di Saggi (1938-
68) (Turin: Einaudi, 1970), 433-445. 
244 This is only fitting, since three is the square root of the number nine which, Dante points out in the 
middle passage of the three just mentioned (Vita nova XXIX), is symbolic of Beatrice herself: “...lo tre 
é fattore per sé medesimo del nove, e lo fattore per sé de li miracoli é tre, cioé Padre e Figlio e Spirito 
Santo, li quali sono tre e uno, questa donna fue accompagnata da questo numero del nove a dare ad 
intendere ch’ella era uno nove, cioé un miracolo.” 
  197 
 
 ch’entrar no i puote spirito benegno. 
 Non é di cor villan sì alto ingegno,  
 che possa imaginar di lei alquanto, 
 e però no li ven di pianger doglia: 
[italics mine] 
 
And once from its enchanting form, 
the tender soul, perfectly filled with grace, 
now lives with glory in a worthy place. 
Who speaks of her and does not weeping speak, 
possesses heart of stone so hard and vile  
no kindly sentiment could penetrate 
No evil heart could have sufficient wit 
to conceive in any way what she was like, 
and so it has no urge to weep from grief. 
We recall here that the phrase altezza d’ingegno occurs twice in the Commedia, both 
in reference to Cavalcanti: first when Dante invokes his own poetic powers, and again 
(this time in explicit reference to Guido) in implicit contrast with Dante’s earlier use 
of the term as a description and evocation of his own poetic genius. The Cavalcantian 
echo of Dante’s first use of the term is only realized through the explicit contrast with 
Cavalcanti when it is used again. In the above passage—after the Cavalcantian signal-
word, “spirito”—Dante speaks of the “alto ingegno” which is lacking in the “cor 
villan” of the man who neither comprehends the true significance of Beatrice nor 
mourns her death. Since the phrase “alto ingegno” and its potential variants do not 
occur elsewhere in the Vita Nuova, the Rime, or anywhere else in Dante, one is lead to 
wonder if the “alto ingegno” of “Li occhi dolenti,” the only other occurrence of the 
phrase in Dante, is in fact another instance—hitherto unnoticed—of  “Cavalcanti in 
Dante,” ardently traced by Contini and others in his wake. 
 During the last fifty years, scholars have become increasingly unanimous in 
declaring Beatrice (not Vergil, or God) the subject of Guido’s famous disdegno245. In 
the aftermath of Beatrice’s death, we may safely assume that Dante places Guido, on 
                                                
245 For a summary, see Theodolina Barolini, Dante’s Poets: Textuality and Truth in the ‘Comedy’ 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 146n. 
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this very account, among the ranks of “chi non la piange.” Clearly, there is much at 
stake if Cavalcanti is actually among those here intended, given the harsh terms Dante 
uses to describe the base (vile) and wicked (or evil—malvagio) nature of those who 
fail to mourn at the death of Beatrice.  
 Here one needs to take into consideration the considerable chronological 
distance between “Li occhi dolenti” and the Commedia; if the phrase “altezza 
d’ingegno” is not associated with Cavalcanti until years later in Inferno 10.59, how 
can we possibly view the passage in “Li occhi doltenti” as a reference to him? 
Certainly we should pause before entertaining that a phrase which occurs exactly three 
times in Dante’s opera—twice, as we have seen, under the specter of Cavalcanti—is 
here used a third time without any relation to the other two occurrences of this curious 
Dantean coinage. And who among “chi non la piange,” we must ask,  had (in Dante’s 
mind) a more alto ingegno than Guido?   
 One possibility is that Dante actually had Cavalcanti in mind when he wrote 
“Li occhi dolenti,” but only unveiled the insult after Guido’s death; a more subtle but 
perhaps more psychologically realistic variation on this theme would be to suggest 
“[n]on é di cor villan sì alto ingegno” as an implicit reproach to Guido: one with such 
a lofty mind should be capable of grasping Beatrice’s significance. Such reproaches 
are not unknown to their poetic correspondence: recall Guido’s famous rimenata, 
“I’vegno ‘l giorno a te ‘nfinite volte” where he bemoans Dante’s “mente invilata.” 
Clearly Dante’s reproach in “Li occhi” would belong to the earlier phase of the 
growing dissidio when both poets began to perceive the growing stress fractures in 
their friendship. A more modest hypothesis would be that after an irreconcilable split, 
Dante recalled in his own earlier work an apt description of his one-time primo amico 
and then proceeded to apply these lines to him retroactively, overwriting the 
chronologically prior passage as an allusion to Guido by means of the later self-quote 
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in the Inferno passage, put in the mouth of Guido’s father. The linking of these two 
passages, which seems certain, provides us with a basis for the more radical conjecture 
that the famous dissidio can in fact be traced back well into the biographical course 
traced by the Vita Nuova. At the very least, it provides one more rare opportunity to 
probe the full depth and measure of “Cavalcanti in Dante” and the ultimate rift 
between the two ingenii.246 In what follows, I proceed from the biographical towards 
the intellectual basis for the dissidio, which I argue is rooted Cavalcantis opposition to 
the encyclopedic project itself. 
 
Cavalcanti’s Discursive Counter-encyclopedism 
Cavalcanti’s disdegno for Beatrice is at root an opposition to the entire 
Dantean project and its rationalist conception of Love as an encyclopedic, order-
giving motive-force. Guido’s famous “disdegno” for Beatrice is rooted in Cavalcanti’s 
discursive counter-encyclopedism. The lady can never serve as a focal point for 
knowledge, or a means to knowledge or salvation, as Cavalcanti writes: 
 
Chi è questa che vèn, ch'ogni'om la mira,  
che fa tremar di chiaritate l'are 
e mena seco Amor, sì che parlare 
null'omo pote, ma ciascun sospira? 
  O Deo, che sembra quando li occhi gira, 
dical' Amor ch'i' nol savria contare: 
cotando d'umiltà donna mi pare, 
ch'ogn'altra ver di lei i' la chiam' ira. 
  Non si poria contar la sua piagenza, 
ch'a le s'inchin' ogni gentil vertute, 
e la beltate per sua dea la mostra. 
  Non fu sì alta già la mente nostra 
e non si pose 'n noi tanta salute, 
che propriamente n'aviàn canoscenza. 
 
                                                
246 See Enrico Malato, Dante e Guido Cavalcanti. Il dissidio per la Vita Nuova e il “disdegno” di 
Guido (Roma: Salerno Editrice, 1997), 22; For a “contestatione globale” of Malato’s position, see 
Teodolinda Barolini, “Dante and Cavalcanti (On Making Distinctions in Matters of Love): Inferno V in 
Its Lyric Context,” Dante Studies, 116 (1998), 60-63. 
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[Who is she who comes, that everyone looks at her, 
Who makes the air tremble with clarity 
And brings Love with her, so that no one 
Can speak, though everyone sighs? 
  O God, what she looks like when she turns her eyes 
Let love say, for I could not describe it. 
To me she seems so much a lady of good will 
That any other, in comparison to her, I call vexation. 
  One could not describe her gracefulness, 
For every noble virtue inclines towards her 
And beauty displays her as its goddess. 
  Our mind was never so lofty 
And was never was such beatitude granted us 
That we could really have knowledge of her.] 
 
Cavalcanti’s poem is a deconstructive antidote to the intellectualized disputations of 
the siciliani and stilnovisti in the mode of Guido Guinizelli. Whereas the latter 
elaborate learned definitions and complex metaphors based on the natural science of 
the day, Cavalcanti’s “Chi è questa che vèn” stresses the ineluctability and 
indeterminacy of the love experience, far removed from anything resembling the 
rationalist poetics of Dante and the stilnovisti. Central to Guido’s lady is her 
unknowability, her boggling of the poet’s ravaged mind. Despite the fact that 
“everyone looks at her,” her true nature can never be seen, even though, paradoxically, 
she makes the air “tremble with clarity.” The poem instead focuses on the lady as a 
locus of the impossibility of knowledge, or at least of communicating it in a manner 
that is—like Dante’s encyclopedic project—systematic, rationally ordered, and 
universally accessible:  
 
“no one can speak, though everyone sighs” … 
 
“I could not describe it” … 
 
“To me she seems so much a lady of good will” … 
 
 “One could not describe her gracefulness” … 
 
“Our mind was never so lofty…that we could really have knowledge of her.” 
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The Cavalcantian donna is a summa of the virtues (“For every noble virtue inclines 
towards her”), but these, too, can neither be described nor communicated. Cavalcanti’s 
experience of the beloved, as is clear from the rest of his corpus, is universally 
destructive and mind-numbing, most succinctly represented in his poem beginning: 
 
L’anima mia vilement’ è sbigotita  
De la battaglia ch’ell’ave dal core.247 
 
[My mind is abjectly bewildered 
by the assault it had from the heart (my trans.)]  
 
Whoever the lady of these poems is, she is the anti-Beatrice. 
Cavalcanti denies love the crown of epistemic sovereignty with which Dante 
would coronate it. Aside from a fixation on the pneumatic operations of the soul—the 
spiriti that dwell in Cavalcanti’s œuvre—notably absent in Guido’s poetry are the 
encyclopedic discourses, the lapidary and bestiary lore that intrigue the siciliani and 
the stilnovisti. Given Dante’s admiration for Guido as his one possible intellectual 
peer, and given what we know of Guido’s intellectual achievements from the poems 
themselves, his ignorance of these discourses can be safely ruled out. Yet Cavalcanti’s 
poems are devoid of the ubiquitous four elements, magnets, tigers, phoenixes and 
other scientific topics that pervade the poetry of his Sicilian predecessors and Tuscan 
contemporaries. 
The only book-length study of Cavalcanti to appear in almost sixty years goes 
badly astray in its admittedly brief discussion of Cavalcanti’s relation to the 
encyclopedic tradition. Maria Luisa Ardizzone states that with Cavalcanti “Poetry 
becomes a language able to encompass the different topics furnished by the 
encyclopedia of the time. By connecting logic, science, and philosophy, Cavalcanti is 
able to answer old and new questions alike.”248 While this is true to a limited extent in 
                                                
247 Poesia italiana, 336. 
248 Maria Luisa Ardizzone, Guido Cavalcanti: The Other Middle Ages (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002), 15. 
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the “doctrinal” poem, Donne me prega, where Cavalcanti takes issue with competing 
love theories of his day, Cavalcanti’s poetics is, on the contrary, overwhelmingly 
characterized by a pervasive sense of the failure of logic, science, and philosophy to 
provide answers to any questions whatsoever. Cavalcanti is as much or more versed 
than any of his contemporaries, including Dante, in the logic, science, and philosophy 
that Dante and the Sicilians before him had trusted to furnish a phenomenology of 
love, as well as answers to fundamental questions of human experience, but Guido 
does not share their faith in them. The second-most intellectual poet of the duecento is 
its foremost devotee of the irrational. Love for Cavalcanti is fundamentally unbound, 
both in the sense that it is limitlessness, but also in that for Guido it can never act as an 
organizing, ordering force—as it does so famously in Dante’s image of the universe as 
the scattered pages of words and things legato con amore in un volume. Dante’s idea 
of love as an ennobling, intellectual, and salvific force has no place in the 
Cavalcantian canon. The leaves of Guido’s Book of Love remain scattered, never to be 
bound in a single volume.  
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Chapter 4: Per ordinem: “Getting it Straight” in Wolfram’s Parzival 
 
1. Compilatio: the Audience as Encyclopedist 
Wolfram’s closes the book on Parzival with the assertion that its narrative, or 
rather that of its fictional source Kyot, is reht (correct/straight),249 whereas Chrétien’s 
narrative is unreht (incorrect/crooked) (827.16).250 Wolfram’s authority—like that of 
the medieval encyclopedist—is grounded in his ability to discern, select, and transmit 
the authoritative, and hence true, sources of the Parzival story and fashion them into a 
coherent whole. Wolfram, however, does not present himself as encyclopedic 
compilator.251 Rather, the narrative, Wolfram claims, is taken over en masse from a 
single source and not ordered from varied bits and pieces gleaned from multiple 
authorities (453.11-22). He defers to his fictive source, the heathen scholar Kyot, who 
has already performed the role of compilator for him.252 
This state of affairs presents an obvious problem—or at the very least a very 
Wolframian puzzle—for a reading of his work under the rubric of an “encyclopedic 
aesthetics.” Wolfram’s implicit disavowal of the role of compilator seems at first 
glance to foreclose the possibility of any such understanding. However, Wolfram is in 
the habit of making pronouncements that his audience would have recognized as 
palpably counter-factual. Indeed, Wolfram’s disavowal of the compiler’s role is cut 
from the same cloth as his once hotly-debated claim about his own illiteracy: “ine kan 
                                                
249 A quality attributed to prose in classical rhetoric; prose is “straightforward” (rectus) according to 
Isidore of Seville, cf. Etymologiae, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), 
I.xxxviii.1. 
250 Wolfram is fond of the formulaic opposition of krump (crooked, bent) and sleht (straight) (246.16, 
347.23, 509.20, 589.26; see also the pun on this pair in 827.15-16 (geslehte-rehte), where the spatial 
and linear notions of order explicit in reht is reintegrated with the ordering principle of genealogy 
(geslehte) on which note the narrative of Parzival begins. 
251 Malcolm B. Parkes, “The Influence of the Concepts of Ordinatio and Compilatio on the 
Development of the Book,” Scribes, Scripts and Readers: Studies in the Communication, Presentation 
and Dissemination of Medieval Texts (London: The Hambledon Press, 1991), 35-70. 
252 Arthur Groos, Romancing the Grail: Genre, Science, and Quest in Wolfram's “Parzival” (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 141. 
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decheinen buochstap” (I don’t know a single letter of the alphabet) (115.27), or that 
Parzival is not a book and proceeds “without the guidance of books” (115.25-30; 
116.1-4). Scholars have amply documented the extent of bookish guidance that 
Wolfram so stubbornly denies. Wolfram’s numerous polyglossic debts, what he owes 
to specific narrative, theological, and scientific sources, 253 reveal him perhaps as the 
most widely read of the medieval German poets. Most critics accept the view that his 
authorial self-construction as illiterate laie (layman) requires him to disavow the 
ability to consult such works.  
Wolfram’s patently false claim about his illiteracy—his best-known exercise in 
unreliable narration—is hardly without company. The same pattern of obfuscation is 
at work in the Kyot-puzzle. Wolfram habitually disavows his greatest achievement: 
the compilation of the vast (one might proleptically say Wagnerian) narrative expanse 
of Parzival from various sources. Indeed, Wolfram performs the role of an 
encyclopedic compilator, drawing on Chrétien de Troyes’ Perceval as well as other 
narrative, theological, and scientific sources.254 At the same time he denies his role as 
                                                
253 Ibid. 
254 Adrian Stevens, “Fiction, Plot, and Discourse: Wolfram’s Parzival and Its Narrative Sources,” A 
Companion to Wolfram’s Parzival, ed. Will Hasty (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1999), 99-123; 
Ulrich W Eisenecker, “Einflüsse des ‘Lucidarius’ im ‘Parzival’ Wolframs von Eschenbach, 
Granatapfel: Festschrift für Gerhard Bauer zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Bernhard Dietrich Haage, 
Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik 580 (Kümmerle, Göppingen, 1994), 149-165; Thomas Bein, 
review of André de Mandach: Le »Roman du Graal« originaire. Bd. 1. Sur les traces du modèle 
commun en code transpyrénéen de Chrétien de Troyes et Wolfram von Eschenbach, Göppinger 
Arbeiten zur Germanistik 581 (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1992) in Germanistik, 34 (1993), 634; János 
Harmatta, “Les Sources iraniennes de la légende du Gral,” Neohelicon, 21, 1 (1994), 209-216; Arthur 
Groos, 1995; Paul Kunitzsch, “Quellenkritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Wolframschen Orientalia,” 
Reflexe des Orients im Namengut mittelalterlicher europäischer Literatur: Gesammelte Aufsätze, 
Documenta onomastica litteralia medii aevi, Reihe B: Studien, 2, (Hildesheim: Olms, 1996), 91-103; 
Eberhard Nellmann, “Zu Wolframs Bildung und zum Literaturkonzept des Parzival,” Poetica, 28 
(1996), 327-344; Danielle Buschinger, “Französisch-deutsche Literaturbeziehungen im Mittelalter,” 
Zeitschrift für germanisches Altertum, 11 (1990), 172-183; Ulrike Draesner, Wege durch erzählte 
Welten: Intertextuelle Verweise als Mittel der Bedeutungskonstitution in Wolframs “Parzival,” 
Mikrokosmos 36 (Frankfurt a. M: Peter Lang, 1993); Eberhard Nellmann, “Produktive 
Mißverständnisse. Wolfram als Übersetzer Chrétiens,” Wolfram-Studien, 14: Übersetzen im Mittelalter, 
Cambridger Kolloquium 1994 (Berlin: Schmidt, 1996), 134-148; Roger Sherman Loomis, The Grail. 
From Celtic Myth to Christian Symbol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Walter Haug, 
“Hat Wolfram von Eschenbach Chrétiens Conte du Graal kongenial ergänzt?”, Arturus Rex. Volumen 
II. Acta conventus Lovaniensis 1987, ed. Wener Verbeke, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, 17 (Leuven: 
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compiler, claiming to have received the tale from a single monolithic source. Wolfram 
addresses his readers and listeners at the end of Book 2, stating that he will continue to 
tell his story so long as his audience does not “attribute it to any book” (50). Wolfram 
in fact makes a series of claims which are demonstrably false:  
 
1) Parzival is not a book. 
2) It is not based on books. 
3) Its author is illiterate. 
4) Chrétien de Troyes does fundamental injustice to the tale.255 
 
Not only are these claims false, they would have been transparently so to Wolfram’s 
medieval audience. “Very well then….I contradict myself” seems to be Wolfram’s 
implicit motto, as is also evident in the surface tension his narration maintains between 
the written transmission he disclaims and the tale’s allegedly oral reception: 
 
Nu weiz ich, swelch sinnec wîp, 
ob si hât getriwen lîp, 
diu diz mære geschriben siht, 
daz si mir mit wârheit giht, 
ich kunde wîben sprechen baz 
denne als ich sanc gein einer maz. (337, 1-6) 
 
[Now I know that any sensible woman, if she is true, seeing this tale written 
down, will admit to me sincerely that I am capable of speaking better of 
women than the song I once aimed at one woman in particular (107-8).]256 
 
This passage, with its overt invocation of both literate modes of reception (“seeing 
these tales written down”) and orality (“speaking”) has fed academic debates about 
Wolfram’s and his audience’s alleged literacy or illiteracy that have lasted several 
                                                                                                                                       
Leuven University Press, 1991), 236-258; Joachim Bumke, Wolfram von Eschenbach. 6th ed. (Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1991), 7-9, 156-161. 
255 Wolfram perhaps assumes his audience’s familiarity with Chrétien’s work when he asserts that “it 
has irked many people that this tale has been kept locked away from them,” although this can also refer 
to Wolfram’s own “crooked” narrative technique. 
256 Unless noted, all translations are from Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, trans. Cyril Edwards 
(Suffolk: D.S. Brewer, 2004), here modified. The tension between “written tales” and “speaking of 
women” can also be understood as a tension between the genres of romance and Minnesang, which 
Wolfram addresses in the “Selbstverteidigung” between books 2 and 3. 
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scholarly lifetimes. 
Why bother with such disingenuous contortions? The varied answers to this 
question invariably take the form of a commentary on Wolfram’s conception of 
authorship: Is Wolfram taking credit where it is due, albeit tongue firmly in cheek? Or 
does he deny all claims to originality, in line with prevalent medieval theories of 
authorship, or as part of a more elaborate scheme of authorial self-fashioning?  
While previous interpretations have focused on Wolfram’s construction of an 
authorial persona (Erzähler-Ich) in order to explain these contradictions, 257 the role of 
Wolfram’s obfuscations in the construction of his audience as encyclopedist has not 
been recognized.258 I would argue that Wolfram denies his role as compilator in order 
to force an unaccustomed audience to play this part themselves. By compelling his 
audience to sift, order, and arrange his crooked, disjointed narrative into a 
comprehensive whole, Wolfram casts his reader-listenership into the role of 
encyclopedic compilator that he himself plays but playfully abjures. 
While scholars have analyzed the representations of literacy and education 
within Wolfram’s text,259 critical attention to the poem’s construction of its audience 
has focused almost exclusively on the tension between oral and literate modes of 
reception.260 Thus the critical discourse on Parzival has failed to recognize Wolfram’s 
                                                
257 Siegfried Christoph, “Authority and text in Wolfram's Titurel and Parzival,” Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, Vol. 73 (1999), 211-227, esp. 211; 
Arthur Groos (1995), 41-45; Eberhard Nellmann, “Zu Wolframs Bildung und zum Literaturkonzept des 
‘Parzival,’” Poetica, 28 (1996), 327-344; Horst Wenzel, Hören und Sehen: Schrift und Bild. Kultur und 
Gedächtnis im Mittelalter (Munich: Beck, 1995). 
258 Steven Harrofft argues that Wolfram’s machinations force the audience to experience the tale as 
quest and hence as “quester-audience.” See Wolfram and His Audience: A Study of the Themes of Quest 
and of Recognition of Kinship Identity (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1974), 2. In a similar vein, see Robert 
Lee Bradley, Narrator and Audience roles in Wolfram’s “Parzival” (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1981). 
259 Albrecht Classen, “Reading, Writing, and Learning in the Parzival,” A Companion to Wolfram’s 
Parzival, ed. Will Hasty, (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1999), 189-202; D. H. Green, Medieval 
Listening and Reading: The Primary Reception of German Literature 800-1300 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
260 Cf. Michael Curschmann, “Hören - Lesen - Sehen. Buch und Schriftlichkeit im Selbstverständnis der 
volkssprachlichen literarischen Kultur Deutschlands um 1200,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Sprache und Literatur, 106 (1984), 218-257; D. H. Green, “On the Primary Reception of Narrative 
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construction of his audience as encyclopedist. Wolfram’s “crooked” narrator feeds his 
audience the scattered bits and pieces of information essential to understand the 
narrative, as one commentator notes, “like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which make 
sense only when fitted together.”261 (Some may consider even this too optimistic an 
assessment.) Wolfram’s de-centering of all authority—even, or especially, his own—
is hardly what one would expect from a medieval author; but in disavowing his own 
author-ity, Wolfram transfers (in the sense of Latin translatio) this authority to his 
audience. Ultimately neither the hero of Parzival nor its author fulfills the 
encyclopedist’s task of ordering universal knowledge in a way that is both accessible 
and useful. Wolfram’s compiling audience must discern, pick, and choose—relying on 
their own judgment and authority in order to put Wolfram’s crooked narrative “in 
order” (per ordinem) in their own minds: 
 
ouch erkante ich nie sô wîsen man, 
ern möhte gerne künde hân, 
welher stiure disiu mære gernt 
und waz si guoter lêre wernt. 
dar an si nimmer des verzagent, 
beidiu si vliehent unde jagent, 
si entwîchent unde kêrent, 
si lasternt unde êrent. 
swer mit disen schanzen allen kan, 
an dem hât witze wol getân, 
der sich niht versitzet noch vergêt 
und sich anders wol verstêt. (1.5-15) 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Literature in Medieval Germany,” Forum for Modern Language Studies, 20 (1984), 289-308; Rüdiger 
Krohn, “Kulturgeschichtliche Bedingungen,” Aus der Mündlichkeit in die Schriftlichkeit: Höfische und 
andere Literatur 750 -1320, Deutsche Literatur: Eine Sozialgeschichte 1, ed. Ursula Liebertz-Grün 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1988), 29-45; Manfred Günter Scholz, Hören und Lesen. Studien zur 
primären Rezeption der Literatur im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980; Linda 
Sue Sussman, The Speech of the Grail: A Journey toward Speaking that Heals and Transforms 
(Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Press, 1995); Haiko Wandhoff, Der epische Blick: Eine 
mediengeschichtliche Studie zur höfischen Literatur, Philologische Studien und Quellen 141 (Berlin: 
Schmidt Verlag, 1996); Horst Wenzel, Hören und Sehen. Schrift und Bild: Kultur und Gedächtnis im 
Mittelalter (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995). 
261 Hermann J. Weigand, “Spiritual Therapy in Wolfram's Parzival,” The German Quarterly, 51 (1978), 
444-464. For more on Wolfram’s narrative obscuantism see D.H. Green, The Art of Recognition in 
Wolfram’s “Parzival” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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[Nor did I ever know a man so wise that he wouldn’t gladly gain acquaintance 
with what guidance these tales crave, and what good doctrine they confer. 
They are never daunted, but they both flee and give chase, retreat and turn 
back, disgrace and honour. He who can cope with all these turns of the dice is 
well blessed with wit, if he does not sit too long or go astray, and keep as clear 
mind in other respects (1).] 
 
This task of “ordering” is the encyclopedist’s task par excellence, formulated 
by Vincent of Beauvais in chapter IV of his Libellus apologeticus, the general 
prologue to his Speculum Maius:  
 
Nam ex meo ingenio pauca, et quasi nulla addidi…meum autem sola partium 
ordinatio.262 
 
[I have added little, almost nothing of my own invention…the ordering alone 
has been my task.] 
 
Wolfram, supposedly a humble illiterate, can or will not perform this ordering task of 
compilation for the reader. To read or listen to Parzival is thus, willy-nilly, to become 
an encyclopedist. The singular popularity of Parzival in the Middle Ages perhaps 
derives not least from the fact that Wolfram requires and constructs a new generation 
of reader: one who appropriates the tools of clerical learning and the elliptical reading 
practices of sacred exegesis for the interpretation of secular texts. 
The story of Loherangrin introduced in Book 16 is an exercise in precisely the 
sort of compressed, linear narrative that Wolfram has studiously avoided throughout 
Parzival, and has in fact mocked his audience for expecting in the first place. This 
brief genealogical epilogue, a model of narrative compression, is every bit as succinct 
and linear as Parzival’s five years of wandering are protracted and crooked.  
At the opening of Book 15, Wolfram speaks of the frustration of those whom 
the tale has been “locked away from” (Vil liute des hât verdrozzen, den diz mær was 
                                                
262 Quoted from the edition of Douai 1624 (reprint Graz 1964), p. 4. Cf. M. Paulmier-Foucart, “Ordre 
encyclopédique et organisation de la matière dans le Speculum maius, de Vincent de Beauvais,” 
L’Encyclopédisme: Actes du Colloque de Caen 12-16 janvier 1987, ed. Annie Becq (Paris: Aux 
Amateurs de livres, 1991), 201-226. 
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vor beslozzen: genuoge kundenz nie ervarn, 734, 1-3).263 Wolfram’s comment has 
been taken to refer to Chrétien’s unfinished Perceval.264 Yet it just as readily applies 
to the broken-off story of Parzival and his pursuit of the Grail, now resumed after the 
lengthy Gawan adventure. This reading is supported by Wolfram’s ensuing 
proclamation: “Now I shall hold back no longer (nu wil ich daz niht langer sparn, 734, 
4). It is Wolfram, not Chrétien, who has been holding out on the audience. Chrétien de 
Troyes attributes his Perceval to an unidentified and unidentifiable book given to him 
by his patron, Count Philip of Flanders: 
 
Donc avra bien sauve sa peinne 
Crestiens, qui antant et peinne 
a rimoier le meillor conte, 
par le comandement le conte, 
qui soit contez an cort real. 
Ce est li contes del graal, 
don li cuens li baille le livre, 
s'orroiz comant il s'an delivre.265 
 
[Therefore Chrétien will not be wasting his efforts as he labors and strives, on 
the count’s orders, to tell in rhyme the finest story ever related in a royal court. 
That is the story of the Grail, found in the book the count gave him.266] 
 
Like Chrétien, Wolfram attributes his tale to an unidentifiable text, ironically repeating 
Chrétien’s appeal to written sources while simultaneously disavowing Chrétien as a 
written source.267 Wolfram’s narrative appears to be “out of order,” like the scattered 
leaves of an unbound book, what Dante calls “ciò che per l’universo si squaderna” 
                                                
263 “Locked away” might also refer to the lockable clasps sometimes found on the bindings of 
thirteenth-century manuscripts. See J.A. Szirmai, The Archeology of Medieval Bookbinding (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1999). 
264 “The opening of Book XV refers to Chrétien de Troyes’ incomplete work, which also inspired 
several Old French continuations. Wolfram is asserting his exclusive claim as a continuator”: Wolfram 
von Eschenbach, Parzival, trans Cyril Edwards (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2004), 233. 
265 Chrétien de Troyes, Le Roman de Perceval ou Le conte du Graal, ed William Roach (Geneva: Droz, 
1959), lines 62-69.  
266 Chrétien de Troyes, Arthurian Romances, ed. and trans. D.D.R. Owen (London: Everyman, 1987), 
375. 
267 Cf. Walter Falk, “Wolframs Kyot und die Bedeutung der ‘Quelle’ im Mittelalter,” Die Entdeckung 
der potentialgeschichtlichen Ordnung: Kleine Schriften 1956-1984, 1. Teil: Der Weg zur 
Komponentenanalyse (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1985), 99-155. 
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(that which is dispersed throughout the universe in leaves).268 It is only at the moment 
of reception that Wolfram’s “leaves” are gathered together in a single volume, i.e., 
from a unitary standpoint. Yet this is not the standpoint of Wolfram’s authorial 
persona, who “scatters” himself by introducing multiple competing authorial 
personae. Like the Judeo-Christian creator-God, Wolfram’s authorial persona’s true 
nature is hidden both from and in his creation.269 Encyclopedic synthesis is achieved 
only at the level of the reader who reconstructs (or re-authorizes) Wolfram’s narrative. 
Wolfram’s use of a pseudo-source is consistent with own his tongue-in-cheek 
claims to illiteracy. Yet it is through this technique that Wolfram establishes his 
authority. Presenting himself as an illiterate laie, Wolfram creates a persona with 
whom his lay, secular audience can identify. Whereas the bookish meister and 
probable cleric Chrétien de Troyes has deceived his audience in the past by doing the 
tale an “injustice” (827.1-2), the knightly Wolfram claims to bypass the written 
authority of the churchmen; Wolfram’s lore is (allegedly) transmitted directly from 
“heathen” sources into the Provençal and German vernaculars. The misinformation 
supplied by Trevrizent in Book 9 (who is not strictly speaking a cleric, but rather a 
“holy man”) is suggestive of the unreliability of clerical authority and transmission. 
This unreliability suggests a need for a vernacular “bypass” of clerical tradition.  
Similarly, Wolfram casts doubt on his own narratorial persona in the famous 
metaphor of the bow, wherein he remarks with approval of “straightforward tales” 
(mæren sleht. 241.13) and states, “Whoever tells you of crookedness desires to lead 
you astray” (swer iu saget von der krümbe / er wil iuch leiten ümbe, 241.15-16). The 
use of Trevrizent as an unreliable narrator hints at Wolfram’s awareness of the theme 
                                                
268 Perhaps it is for this reason that Gottfried von Strassburg famously refers to Wolfram as “der maere 
wildenare” in the literary excursus in Tristan (4636-88). Usually understood as “teller of wild tales” (an 
expression of Gottfried’s dislike of Wolfram’s complex and obscure style), der maere wildenare might 
also plausibly be interpreted to mean “the savager of tales.” 
269 Wolfram’s exhortation “nu lât mîn eines wesen drî” (4.2), with its Trinitarian overtones, would 
support such a reading.   
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of unreliable narration in his work, and, by extension, the unreliability of Flegetanis 
and Kyot.270 When even Christian hermits lie, the narratorial authority of a heathen is 
doubtless doubly suspect. With his words, “If I have not lied to you” (ob ich iu niht 
gelogen han, 216.9) Wolfram undermines his own credibility as narrator, just as he 
undermines Trevrizent’s, and surrounds himself with the unreliable narrators 
“Flegetanis” and “Kyot.”271 
It would appear that Wolfram’s de-centering of clerical authority requires an 
all-out assault on the notion of authority itself. Thus Wolfram is required to dismantle 
his own mantle of authority no sooner than he snatches it up from Chrétien and other 
clerical sources. Wolfram questions Chrétien’s and his own reliability as a way of 
calling into question authority more generally. Wolfram, always irascible and quixotic, 
also stridently defends his authority at times; thus for him authorship is a dialectical 
and dialogical process which both foresees and reacts to the audience’s ongoing 
negotiation of the text, not a hegemonic discourse ex cathedra (as exemplified by his 
sometimes browbeating narrator). Wolfram’s textual anti-authoritarianism takes on 
sudden political relevance if we accept Ronald Murphy’s recent thesis that Parzival is 
written at least partly as an act of resistance to one particular authority’s contemporary 
call to action: namely, the fourth crusade to the Holy Land.272 
In many ways, Wolfram’s ongoing discursive games can be seen as a solution 
to the problem of authority raised by the composition of encyclopedic texts. It has 
been argued that any attempt to systematize the totality of knowledge in a single book 
needs to be legitimated against a looming theological proscription of curiositas.273 The 
                                                
270 Trevrizent’s “retraction” is discussed by Arthur Groos, “Trevrizent’s Retraction: Interpolation or 
Narrative Strategy?” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 55 
(1981), 44-63; see also “Inconclusive Speech Acts: Trevrizent’s ‘Retraction’” in Groos (1995), 220-
241. 
271 For the Kyot problem in general, see Carl Lofmark, “Zur Interpretation der Kyotstellen im Parzival,” 
Wolfram Studien, 4 (1977), 33-70. 
272 Ronald Murphy, Gemstones of Paradise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11-12, 69-97. 
273 See Hans Blumenberg, “Aufnahme der Neugierde in den Lasterkatalog” and “Schwieigkeiten mit 
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encyclopedic compiler may well be wary of the wrath of a secretive Creator-God who 
punished the first humans for tasting from the arbor scientiae. Thus there is a 
theologically grounded apprehension concerning a Creator who withholds 
fundamental knowledge from his creatures, and who, perhaps, still desires to confine 
human knowing to the same state of disorganized multiplicity to which language was 
reduced at Babel.274 The pseudo-illiterate Wolfram playfully circumvents this problem 
by denying his role as encyclopedic compiler in the first place. As I noted in the 
“Introduction” to this dissertation, the transmission of “heathen” Greco-Arabic 
learning, first into Latin and then the vernacular, is at the core of the medieval 
encyclopedic project. Wolfram bypasses the first, Latinate phase of this transmission, 
removing or at least de-centering the mediating authority of the church, and hence 
mainstreaming the transmission of encyclopedic knowledge for secular audiences.275  
Like the encyclopedia, the narrative of Parzival is bound up in questions of 
and anxieties about the transmission of heathen culture within the framework of 
Christian morality. These anxieties are expressed in Parzival by a series of dynastic 
relationships: Parzival’s father, Gahmuret, wins fame and a queen among the heathens 
and sires the hero’s half-brother, Feirefiz, with his heathen bride. In fact, the tale of 
Parzival was, according to Wolfram, first discovered written “in heidenischer schrifte” 
(453.13) in Toledo, where the Middle Age’s greatest dialogue of heathen and 
Christian—the translation of Greek and Arabic learning into Latin—took place:276 
                                                                                                                                       
der Natürlichkeit der Wißbegierde im scholastischen System,” Die Legitimität der Neuzeit: Dritter Teil: 
Der Prozeß der theoretischen Neugierde (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), 358-400.  
274 See Jacques Le Goff, “Pourquoi Le XIIIe Siècle a-t il été plus particulièrement un siècle 
d’encyclopédisme?” L’enciclopedismo medievale, ed. Michelangelo Picone (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 
1994), 23-40, esp. 25-27. 
275 It is possible to glimpse in Wolfram the first inkling of the revolt against the mediating role of the 
Latin church that took place under Luther three centuries later. Yet Wolfram is no revolutionary and 
certainly no Protestant, although, as Heinrich Heine once famously argued (in his Zur Geschichte der 
Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland), the Germans were a protesting lot long before they became 
Protestants. 
276 Cf. Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1927), especially chapter 9, "The Translators from Greek and Arabic”; also see 
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Kyôt der meister wol bekant 
ze Dôlet verworfen ligen vant 
in heidenischer schrifte 
dirre âventiure gestifte. 
der karakter â b c 
muoser hân gelernet ê,  
ân den list von nigrômanzî. 
ez half daz im der touf was bî: 
anders waer diz maer noch unvernumn. 
kein heidensch list möht uns gefrumn 
ze künden umbes grâles art,  
wie man sîner tougen innen wart. 
(453.11-22) 
 
[Kyot, the renowned scholar, found in Toledo, lying neglected, in heathen 
script, this adventure’s fundament. The a b c of those characters he must have 
learned beforehand, without the art of necromancy. It helped that baptism 
dwelt with him, or else this tale would still be unheard. No cunning heathen 
could avail to tell us about the Grail’s nature – how its mysteries were 
perceived (145).] 
 
Thus, just as baptism allows Feirefiz to see the Grail, baptism allows Kyot to 
communicate the Grail’s nature to the extent possible in fallen human language. 
The broader theme of heathen “transmission” should not obscure Wolfram’s 
debts to specific encyclopedic works. Wolfram’s penchant for descriptions in the form 
of run-on lists is suggestive of his consultation of medieval glossaries and other 
encyclopedic texts. The description of Anfortas’ bed in Book 16 is a case in point:  
 
ez was rîche an allen sîten: 
niemen darf des strîten 
daz er bezzerz ie gesæhe. 
ez was tiwer unde wæhe 
von der edeln steine geslehte. 
die hœrt hie nennen rehte. 
791 Karfunkl unt silenîtes, 
balax unt gagâtromes, 
ônix unt calcidôn, 
coralîs unt bestîôn, 
unjô unt optallîes, 
                                                                                                                                       
Charles Burnett, “The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth 
Century,” Science in Context, 14 (2001): 249-288, esp. 249-51, 270. 
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cerâuns unt epistîtes, 
jerachîtes unt eljotrôpîâ, 
panthers unt antrodrâgmâ, 
prasem unde saddâ, 
emathîtes unt djonisîâ, 
achâtes unt celidôn, 
sardonîs unt calcofôn, 
cornîol unt jaspîs, 
echîtes unt îrîs, 
gagâtes unt ligûrîus, 
abestô unt cegôlitus, 
galactîdâ unt jacinctus, 
orîtes unt enîdrus, 
absist unt alabandâ, 
crisolecter unt hîennîâ, 
smârât unt magnes, 
sapfîr unt pirrîtes. 
ouch stuont her unde dâ 
turkoyse unt lipparêâ, 
crisolte, rubîne, 
paleise unt sardîne, 
adamas unt crisoprassîs, 
melochîtes unt dîadochîs, 
pêanîtes unt mêdus, 
berillus unt topazîus. (790.25-791.30) 
 
[Carbuncle and moonstone 
balas and gagathromeus 
onyx and bestion, 
union and ophthalamite, 
ceraunite and epistites, 
hierachite and heliotrope, 
pantherus and androdragma, 
prasine and sagda, 
hæmatite and dionise, 
agate and celidony, 
sardonyx and chalcophonite, 
cornelian and jasper, 
aetites and iris, 
gagate and ligurite, 
asbestos and cegolite, 
galactite and hyacinth, 
orites and enhydrite, 
absist and alabandine, 
chrysolectrus and hyæna, 
emerald and loadstone, 
sapphire and pyrites. 
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Here stood also 
Turquoise and liparite, 
chrysolite and sardine, 
diamond and chrysoprase, 
malachite and diadochite, 
beryl and topaz (252-253).] 
 
The fifty-eight stones of Wolfram’s so-called Edelsteinliste correspond 
precisely with fifty-three of the sixty stones treated in Marbod von 
Rennes De lapidibus (ca. 1090), which lists their qualities and 
medicinal properties.277 Nellmann argues against a possible oral 
derivation for the list due to the difficulty involved in composing such a 
catalogue in rhyme without a written source.  
Such effusions of encyclopedic learning are in fact a pervasive feature of 
Parzival.278 The Gawan narrative of Book 12 also displays Wolfram’s knowledge of 
lapidary as well as the geometric tradition of the quadrivium: 
 
Ûf durch den palas einesît 
gienc ein gewelbe niht ze wît, 
gegrêdet über den palas hôch: 
sinwel sich daz umbe zôch.  
dar ûffe stuont ein clâriu sûl: 
diu was niht von holze fûl, 
si was lieht unde starc, 
sô grôz, froun Camillen sarc 
wær drûffe wol gestanden.10  
ûz Feirefîzes landen 
brâht ez der wîse Clinschor, 
werc daz hie stuont enbor. 
sinwel als ein gezelt ez was. 
der meister Jêometras, 
solt ez geworht hân des hant, 
diu kunst wære im unbekant. 
ez was geworht mit liste. 
adamas und amatiste 
                                                
277 Cf. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, ed. Eberhard Nellmann, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1994), 774. Nellman rejects a derivation from the lapidary of Arnoldus 
Saxo on chronological grounds.  
278 See, for example, Feirefiz's name-list of the knights accompanying him (770.1-30), which, like the 
list of gems, takes up exactly thirty lines or one manuscript column. 
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(diu âventiure uns wizzen lât), 
thôpazje und grânât, 
crisolte, rubbîne, 
smârâde, sardîne, 
sus wârn diu venster rîche. (589.1-23) 
 
[Up through the hall on the one side rose a vault, none too wide, with steps 
mounting high above the hall; the vault wound in a circle. On top of it stood a 
lustrous pillar. It was not made of rotten wood, but was bright and sturdy, so 
huge that Lady Kamille’s sarcophagus could easily have stood on top of it. 
From Feirefiz’s lands wise Clinschor had brought the edifice that rose there. 
Round as a pavilion it was. If the hand of Master Geometras had had to design 
it, such artistry would have been beyond him. It was wrought with cunning: 
diamond and amethyst – so the adventure informs us – topaz and garnet, 
chrysolite, ruby, emerald, sardine – such were its sumptuous windows (189).]  
 
Naturally, Wolfram is quick to disavow any and all written, Latin sources (“so the 
adventure informs us”). In his desire to make the world of encyclopedic learning not 
only accessible but useful to his lay, largely illiterate audience, Wolfram’s project is 
analogous to the so-called tumben-bibel (biblia pauperum), the “dumb” or picture 
Bibles of the thirteenth century; these visually depict the elements (and sometimes the 
implements) of Christian salvation history with the aim of making the central tenets of 
faith knowable and accessible to illiterate elites and, eventually, a broader public.279 In 
Wolfram’s hands, the narrative material of the Perceval-Parzival tradition becomes a 
“tumben-encyclopädie”; it renders traditional encyclopedic discourses on astronomy, 
medicine, lapidary, herbal, bestiary, and world history accessible and useful to a partly 
Latinless public. 
Thus Wolfram’s integration of encyclopedic topics in Parzival is not merely a 
conspicuous display of the author’s own wide learning, but a fundamental part of his 
construction of an ideal audience. Wolfram famously refers to “tumbe liute” (foolish 
people) (1.16) for whom his literary machinations are too sophisticated, dividing his 
                                                
279 Cf. Maurus Berve, Die Armenbibel: Herkunft, Gestalt, Typologie: Dargestellt anhand von 
Miniaturen ans der Handschrift Cpg 148 der Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg (Beuron: Beuroner 
Kunstverlag, 1969). 
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imagined readers into two distinct interpretive communities, exoteric and esoteric. 
Wolfram constructs his true audience as “wise” (swer mit disen schanzen allen kan, an 
dem hât witze wol getân, 2.13-14), if unread. For Wolfram, knowledge is integral to 
morality, but the intellectual capacity of the reader/listener, or witze (2.14), is 
insufficient without the moral agency or muot (2.17) to make use of it.  
The interest of vernacular audiences (such as at the court of Wolfram’s patron, 
Hermann of Thuringia) in the classical encyclopedic topics, in conjunction with the 
role of knowledge and science in an emerging sense of lay piety, is evident in 
Wolfram’s introductory prayer in his Willehalm, which like Parzival focuses on the 
reconciliation of “heathen” and Christian faiths. In his introductory prayer, Wolfram 
portrays God as the supreme encyclopedist by invoking a nearly all the classical 
encyclopedic topics common since Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (indicated in 
italics):  
 
Ane valsch du reiner, 
du drî unt doch einer, 
schepfaere über alle geschaft, 
âne urhap dîn staetiu kraft 
ân ende ouch belîbet. 
ob diu von mir vertrîbet 
gedanc die gar flüstic sint, 
sô bistu vater unt bin ich kint. 
hôch edel ob aller edelkeit, 
lâ dîner tugende wesen leit, 
dâ kêre dîne erbarme zuo, 
swa ich, hêrre, an dir missetuo. 
lâz, hêrre, mich niht übersehen 
swaz mir saelden ist geschehen, 
und endelôser wünne. 
dîn kint und dîn künne 
bin ich bescheidenlîche, 
ich arm und du vil rîche. 
dîn mennischeit mir sippe gît 
dîner gotheit mich âne strît 
der pâter noster nennet 
zeinem kinde erkennet. 
sô gît der touf mir einen trôst 
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der mich zwîvels hât erlôst: 
ich hân gelouphaften sin, 
daz ich dîn genanne bin: 
wîsheit ob allen listen, 
du bist Krist, sô bin ich kristen. 
dîner hoehe und dîner breite, 
dîner tiefen antreite 
wart nie gezilt anz ende. 
ouch louft in dîner hende 
der siben sterne gâhen, 
daz sin himel wider vâhen. 
luft wazzer fiur und erde 
wont gar in dînem werde. 
ze dîme gebot ez allez stêt, 
dâ wilt unt zam mit umbe gêt. 
ouch hât dîn götlîchiu maht 
den liehten tac, die trüeben naht 
gezilt und underscheiden 
mit der sunnen louften beiden. 
niemer wirt, nie wart dîn ebenmâz. 
al der steine kraft, der würze wâz 
hâstu bekant unz an daz ort. 
der rehten schrift dôn unde wort 
dîn geist hât gesterket. 
mîn sin dich kreftec merket: 
swaz an den buochen stêt geschriben, 
des bin ich künstelôs beliben. 
niht anders ich gelêret bin: 
wan hân ich kunst, die gît mir sin. 
diu helfe dîner güete 
sende in mîn gemüete.280 
   (1.1-2.24) 
 
[You Purity immaculate 
You Three yet One, 
Creator over all creation, 
Your constant power is without beginning and endures 
Without end. 
If that Power banishes from my mind thoughts which 
Lead to the death of my soul, then You are my 
Father and I your child. 
You who are supremely noble beyond all nobility, 
Have compassion in Your goodness and turn Your 
Pity towards me, 
Lord,  
                                                
280 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Willehalm, ed. Werner Schröder (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2003). 
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No matter how I sin against You. 
Let me be mindful,  
Lord, 
Of whatever blessings and infinite joy 
Have fallen to my lot. 
I am assuredly Your child and of Your lineage, 
Poor as I am and mighty as You are. 
Your own humanity grants me that kinship. 
The Paternoster does indeed call me a 
Child of Your divinity 
And acknowledges me as such. 
Likewise does Holy Baptism give me an assurance that 
Has freed me from despair, for I have the certainty 
That I am Your namesake: 
Wisdom above all knowledge, 
You are Christ, 
Thus I am a Christian. 
No one has ever fathomed the ordering of Your Height, Your Breath, Your 
Depth. 
The course of the seven planets, too, is in Your hand, 
So that they counteract the movement of the heavens. 
Air, water, fire and earth are all in Your Power. 
All that surrounds the creatures wild and tame 
Stands at Your command. 
Moreover, Your divine Power has separated the bright day 
And the dark night, and has set limits on each of them 
Through the courses of the sun. 
There never was Your equal, nor will there ever be. 
The power of all stones, the scent of all herb, 
You know in every detail. 
Your Spirit has informed the sound and the words of 
Holy Scriptures. 
My mind feels the force of Your Presence. 
I have remained ignorant of what is written in books 
And I am tutored in this way alone: if I have any skill, 
It comes from my mind.281 
 
A comparison of Wolfram’s prayer with the table of contents of Isidore’s 
Etymologiae, the foundational text of the medieval encyclopedic tradition, reveals a 
striking continuity of topics: 
 
1) Grammar: der rehten schrift dôn unde wort (2.16) 
                                                
281 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Willehalm, trans. Marion E. Gibbs and Sidney M. Johnson (New York: 
Penguin, 1984), 17-18 (modified). 
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2) Rhetoric and Dialectic: swaz an den buochen stêt geschriben (2.19) 
3) Mathematics, Music: dîner hoehe und dîner breite, dîner tiefen antreite (1.29-
30) 
  Astronomy: der siben sterne gâhen (2.3); himel (2.4); der sunnen louften 
(2.12) 
4) [Medicine] 
5) Laws and Times: den liehten tac, die trüeben naht (2.10) 
6) Books and Offices of the Church: swaz an den buochen stêt geschriben (2.19); 
Offices of the Church: pâter noster  (1.21); der touf (1.23) 
7) God, Angels, Saints (1.1-1.28) 
8) Church and Sects: du bist Krist, sô bin ich kristen. (1.28) 
9) Languages of foreigners (i.e. Greek, Latin, Hebrew):: der rehten schrift dôn 
unde wort (2.16) 
Family Relationships: sô bistu vater unt bin ich kint (1.8) 
10) Vocabulary: du bist Krist, sô bin ich kristen. (1.28) 
11) Man and Portents: mennischeit  (1.19)  
12) Animals: wilt unt zam (2.8) 
13) The Cosmos and its Parts: luft wazzer fiur und erde (2.5) 
14) [The Earth and its Parts] 
15) [Of cities, of Edifices Urban and Rural, of Farms, of Boundaries and Measures 
of Farms, of Travel] 
16) Stones and Metals: der steine kraft (2.14) 
17) Rustic Things: der würze wâz: (2.14) 
18) [War and Games] 
19) Ships, Building, Weaving: kunst (2.22)  
20) The Home and Domestic Implements: kunst (2.22)  
 
This is no mere act of citation; Wolfram transforms the classic encyclopedic topics 
(since Isidore) into an overtly religious discourse in the form of a prayer. Wolfram’s 
prayer addresses roughly three-quarters of Isidore’s encyclopedic topics and, by 
comparison, more than half of those of Hrabanus Maurus’ De universo. Only four 
Isidoran topics (i.e., War, Medicine, Geography, and Cities) are not invoked in 
Wolfram’s invocation, and these omitted topics nonetheless play major roles in both 
Willehalm and Parzival.  
 The nature of Wolfram’s Grail must also be considered in light of the 
encyclopedic topics. Since Wolfram’s Grail is a stone, unlike Chrétien’s or Robert de 
Boron’s Grail-cup, Wolfram’s is the only Grail-object which has any counterpart in 
medieval encyclopedic discourse, namely, in the lapidary tradition. (Wolfram 
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enigmatically calls it “lapsit exillis,” 469.7) The Grail is also overtly connected with 
writing (and hence the encyclopedia) by means of the divine inscriptions on it. Since 
the Grail-narrator’s view of the world is from a divine perspective, gazing down from 
the heavens, it shares the same top-down view of the celestial ordo reproduced in the 
canonical encyclopedic tradition from Isidore onwards.  
Wolfram’s invocation of the encyclopedic topics is pervasive. He begins his 
narrative with an exemplum concerning the magpie, in which he invokes elements of 
medieval bestiary tradition. The magpie is known as a thief who steals from others to 
make its own nest, much as Wolfram “steals” from multiple genres and discourses 
(e.g., romance, science, hagiography, epic) to construct his narrative, and like Parzival, 
who steals his armor from the Red Knight. The Gahmuret prologue introduces the 
theme of geography; Wolfram’s indebtedness in subsequent books to specific 
astronomical, calendrical, and medicinal sources is documented as well.282 Wolfram’s 
Parzival, one might claim, is in a sense Chrétien’s Perceval plus the encyclopedia. 
What is remarkable is that, of the two, the text with a sustained indebtedness to the 
Latinate encyclopedic tradition is by the layman and supposed illiterate, Wolfram, not 
by the presumed Latin-schooled cleric, Chrétien. This speaks to the status of what I 
have called “encyclopedic literature” (here exemplified by Wolfram, Dante, and 
Snorri) as the self-assertion of a lay, vernacular culture vis-à-vis the clergy, and its 
first attempts to formulate a comprehensive secular literary discourse. 
There is scant contemporary parallel in thirteenth-century Latin literature to the 
encyclopedic vogue in vernacular narrative. Arguably one can look back to the earlier 
Boethian tradition and the Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris for attempts to locate 
encyclopedic learning in the context of a comprehensive pedagogical narrative, 
although without the focus on an individual, lay literary subjectivity. In its vernacular 
                                                
282 Cf. Groos (1995), 119-219. 
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manifestations where it mediates between clerical and lay culture, the medieval 
encyclopedia reconciles conflicting codes and value systems, synthesizes them, and 
renders them mutually useful. Similarly, Parzival reconciles the conflicting dictates of 
the Grail society and courtly society, the clerus and the laity, the learned and the 
vernacular, the sacred and the secular, heathen and Christian, black and white. But the 
encyclopedism of Parzival (the poem) is not the encyclopedism of Parzival 
(Wolfram’s hero).  
Nothing in Parzival’s slow development towards wisdom suggests that 
universal knowledge is either his goal or a prerequisite for his salvation. In fact, it is 
debatable precisely how much more Parzival knows at tale’s end than at its beginning. 
Doubtless his knowledge of fundamental religious doctrines and courtly etiquette are 
much improved, but the encyclopedic knowledge that figures so prominently in his 
story plays no discernable part in his salvation. (The same can by no means be said of 
Dante’s pilgrim, for example.) What is necessary, however, is for Parzival to take the 
first step in the dialogical process of becoming wise, which begins with his words, 
“ich bin niht wîs” (178.29). This “quest” is tied to its etymological cousin—the 
question. Yet despite the educative process that Parzival undergoes, the 
encyclopedism of Wolfram’s Parzival is ultimately not manifest in its slowly-wise 
(træclîche wîs) hero, nor in its evasive narrator, but rather in its audience. 
As one critic states, “a vital part of [Wolfram’s] narrator’s arsenal is precisely 
his ability to keep both his audience and his hero in a baffled and questioning state of 
mind.”283 While Wolfram’s narrative roles may be various, the role of his audience 
remains consistently that of questioner who slowly puts together (compilare) the 
narrative’s disjointed pieces. The compiling reader/listener is thus compelled to play 
                                                
283 Neil Thomas, “Wolfram von Eschenbach: Modes of Narrative Presentation,” A Companion to 
Wolfram’s Parzival, ed. Will Hasty (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1999), 124-139, esp. 132.  
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discipulus to Wolfram’s magister. Elements of the narrative, such as Parzival’s 
master-student dialogue with Trevrizent among others (including his mother and 
Cundrie) reproduce this fundamental relationship between reader and text diagetically, 
and represent a moment of identification between audience and hero in their shared 
role as quester/questioner/compiler. 
The question-and-answer format constitutes one of the primary modes of 
medieval encyclopedic discourse. In few works of the period is the problem of 
question and answer as crucial as in Wolfram’s Parzival. The question of question-
and-answer—and of the one redeeming question in particular—furnishes the tale with 
a central organizing principle. The hero’s encounter with Trevrizent in book 9 invokes 
the conventions of master-student dialogue familiar to readers of the Lucidarius and 
other widely transmitted encyclopedic-didactic texts of the period, as well as the 
conventions of the confessional dialogue and the disputatio between heathens and 
Christians. But the dialogue with Trevrizent is merely the most explicit realization of 
the poem’s most fundamental organizing principle: the dialogue between author and 
reader.   
The construction of Parzival is fundamentally a dialogue: between author and 
audience, audience and work, and among different works—between competing source 
and genre traditions such as the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, classical science, 
pastoral, romance, dynastic chronicle, and the saint’s life—all within the poem itself. 
In the whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, Parzival constitutes an enkuklios 
paideia, what Giuseppe Mazzotta (speaking of Dante), calls a “mixture of 
encyclopedic structure and the narrative of the education of the self.”284 Yet this whole 
is assembled neither by Parzival nor by his author but by Wolfram’s compiling reader. 
                                                
284 Giuseppe Mazzotta, Dante’s Vision and the Circle of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), 27.  
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2. nune mac ich disen heiden vom getouften niht gescheiden: Heathen and 
Christian, Compiled 
 
compilatio as Dialogue 
This notion of dialogue is integral to the act of compilation as practiced by 
Wolfram both as author of Parzival and as “author-izer” of his ideal reader. Dialogue 
is a means for the descriptio of a world that is unsanctioned and heterodox. The 
dialogic principle anchors (much like the “anchor” emblem on Gahmuret’s armor) the 
heterodox in the familiar, while also allowing what is orthodox to seem strange and 
open to question. Yet the concept of dialogism in Parzival needs to be broadened to 
encompass its pervasive thematic dualities as well as its structural ones, or what one 
might call the poem’s “binocular” vision: a field of vision that comes into resolution, 
only from the unitary standpoint of an individual readerly subjectivity. The prologue 
introduces, in order, the following binary oppositions: 
 
Doubt (zwîvel, 1.1)   Constancy (stæten gedanken, 1.14) 
Heart (herzen, 1.1)   Soul (sêle, 1.2) 
Black (die swarzen varwe, 1.11)  White (die blanken[varwe], 1.13) 
Woman (wîp, 2.25; wîp, 3.25)  Man (manne, 2.24; man, 3.25) 
Foolish (tumben, 1.16)   Wise (witze, 1.30; wîsen, 2.5; witze, 2.14) 
Hell (helle, 1.9)    Heaven (himels, 1.9)  
Blindness (blinden, 1.21)   Vision (schîn, 1.24) 
Hair (wer roufet mich, 1.26)   Baldness (dâ nie kein hâr gewuohs, 1.26-
27) 
Water (in dem brunnen, 2.3; daz tou, 2.4)  Fire (viur, 2.3; von der sunnen, 2.4)  
Loyalty (triuwe, 3.2)   Falsity (valsche, 3.7) 
Straight (sleht, 4.12)   Bent (gebouc, 4.13) 
 
This recurrent dualism promptly reemerges in section 5 of Book 1: 
 
age (altest, 5.4 ; alter, 5.12)   youth (jungern, 5.6; jugent, 5.13)  
death (tôt, 5.7)    life (leben, 5.7) 
poverty (armuot, 5.16)   riches (guot, 5.12) 
 
[W]and an im sint beidiu teil (1.8)—“for both have a share in him,” states Wolfram’s 
narrator, both Heaven and Hell, thus demarcating Parzival as a narrative space for a 
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marriage of seemingly irreconcilable contraries, though it is ultimately Wolfram’s 
reader/compiler who officiates at this “wedding.” 
The medieval encyclopedia provides the foremost example and model of 
precisely this sort of forced marriage, since it is fundamentally the site of a merger 
between “heathen” science and Christian morality. In this regard, Wolfram’s 
encyclopedism is a product and expression of his ecumenicalism, as well as of the 
broader dialogic dimension of his work.285  
 The dualities of Parzival are of one piece with Wolfram’s aforementioned 
contradictory claims that Parzival is not a book; that its author is illiterate; that it 
fundamentally different from Chrétien de Troyes’ Perceval; and that it is not based on 
books, i.e., that it is not the product of learned compilation. Wolfram presents the 
reader with a final puzzle in his assertion that, contrary to all appearances, his 
narrative is in fact “straightforward” (reht) and linear, as opposed to “crooked” (unreht 
or krump). This assertion, like the others, is patently false, unless the lay reader, 
employing the clerical tools of the encyclopedic and typological traditions, is able to 
“get it straight.” The remainder of this chapter demonstrates this process at work. 
 
Getting it Straight  
The influence of the medieval encyclopedia on Parzival is evident not only on 
the level of theme and ideology, but in the novel and often perplexing structure of the 
poem. Regardless of organizational principle, be it master-student dialogue, order of 
arts (ordo artium) or things (ordo rerum), or universal history, the encyclopedia 
fundamentally provides a framework for the integration of heathen matière, i.e., 
classical and Arab science, with Christian morality and salvation history. Thus, the 
encyclopedia’s structural principle and historical outlook are Christian, although its 
                                                
285 For the latter, cf. Groos (1995), esp. 96-118. 
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sources are pagan in origin. While the frame story of Parzival—the first two and last 
two books—are deeply intertwined with the heathen world, the vast narrative center 
(Books 3-14) is almost totally devoid of actual heathens, and spare in references to 
heathendom. (Seeming exceptions to this rule, such as Trevrizent’s accounting of 
Greco-Arabic medical lore in Book 9, serve rather to confirm it, as I will show.) In 
contrast to the pro- and epilogues, heathens play no substantial roles as actors in the 
drama of Books 3-14. 
Proceeding first on the level of assertion (to be backed up with detailed 
arguments below), I claim that, with the exception of Trevrizent’s description of failed 
attempts to heal Anfortas, the “heathen” material of Parzival is predominantly found 
in the first and last two heathen books (1 and 2, and 15 and 16), which frame the 
Christian narrative Wolfram appropriates from Chrétien de Troyes. The framework of 
Parzival is literally encyclopedic, since the first two books contain a wealth of 
geographic and bestiary lore, whereas the latter two draw extensively on herbal, 
lapidary, and astronomical traditions. The encyclopedic elements of the master-student 
dialogue in Book 9 are theological in nature and eschew the heathen learning of the 
pro- and epilogues. Trevrizent’s lengthy account of heathen medical lore, which would 
seem to belie this, belongs, as I will show, to another genre altogether, and is no 
longer part of the encyclopedic dialogus magistri et discipuli. 
The narrative structure of Parzival is a drama of Christian education within the 
framework of the heathen world-history of the pro- and epilogues. Parzival’s 
framework is heathen, its content Christian. Hence, in its structure Parzival inverts the 
basic idea of the medieval encyclopedia, which, since Hrabanus Maurus (ca. 850), had 
provided a Christian framework for heathen content. An examination of the books in 
question will make this ordering evident. 
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Heathen Elements in Books 1 and 2 
The Prologue begins with an invocation of Bestiary lore (i.e., magpie, hare, 
horsefly, heron, and fish), as well as metallurgic and lapidary (tin, glass, gold, ruby, 
brass), as well cosmology and meteorology (ice and sun)—all topics of the medieval 
encyclopedic tradition since Isidore’s Etymologiae.286 Descriptions of the provenance 
of various warriors in Books 1 and 2 constitute something of an imago mundi: Rome, 
Baldac, Nineveh, Morrocco, Persia, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandria, France, Scotland, 
Greenland, Seville, and Toledo. Only the problematic “Waleis” and fictive 
“Zazamanc” and  “Azagouc” lack counterparts in Isidore or later encyclopedic works. 
This rehearsal of canonical encyclopedic topics is (as we shall also see in 
Books 15 and 16) set against the looming background of the heathen world. Of 
Gahmuret’s military service of the heathen Baruch, we are told 
 
sîn manlîchiu kraft 
behielt den prîs in heidenschaft, 
ze Marroch unt ze Persîâ. 
sîn hant bezalt ouch anderswâ, 
ze Dâmasc und ze Hâlap, 
und swâ man ritterschaft dâ gap, 
ze Arâbîe und vor Arâbî... (15.15.21) 
 
[His valiant prowess won the prize in heathendom, in Morocco and in Persia. 
His hand took such toll elsewhere, too—in Damascus and in Aleppo, and 
wherever nightly deeds were proffered, in Arabia and before Araby (5-6, 
emphasis mine)] 
Later, Gahmuret fights to defend the heathen Queen, Belcane, against partly Christian 
forces. This potential misalliance of Christian warrior and heathen sovereign is 
legitimated, however, by Wolfram’s description of Belcane as implicitly Christian in 
her virtue, if not in her faith: 
 
Gahmureten dûhte sân, 
swie si wære ein heidenin, 
                                                
286 See Isidore, pp. 267, 248, 270, 265, 259-63, 332, 328, 329, 330, respectively. 
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mit triwen wîplîcher sin 
in wîbes herze nie geslouf. 
ir kiusche was ein reiner touf, 
und ouch der regen der si begôz, 
der wâc der von ir ougen flôz 
ûf ir zobel und an ir brust. 
riwen phlege was ir gelust, 
und rehtiu jâmers lêre. (28.10-19) 
 
[Gahmuret’s immediate thought was that, although she was a heathen, a more 
womanly and royal disposition had never glided into a woman’s heart. Her 
chastity was a pure baptism, as was the rain which poured upon her, the flood 
that flowed from her eyes down upon her sable and her breast. Contrition’s cult 
was her delight, and true grief’s doctrine (9).] 
Gahmuret’s death and burial also highlight the special status of encyclopedic 
learning in the four “heathen” Books of Parzival (also see pp. 254-57, below). A 
Christian, Gahmuret is buried in Baldac by the heathen Baruch (106.29-30) at great 
expense. “Heathens worship Gahmuret, in all sincerity, as their honoured god, not 
because of the Cross's honour, not because of baptism's doctrine” [ez betent heiden 
sunder spot / an in als an ir werden got / niht durch des kriuzes êre noch durch des 
toufes lêre] (107.19-22). Feirefiz's initial attachment to Repanse de Schoye recalls this 
image of the personal devotion of the heathens, ignorant of Christian doctrine, to an 
individual Christian. Like the Gahmuret-worshipping heathens, Feirefiz knows 
nothing of “that care of the Cross by which Christ's death bequeathed us benediction” 
[kan niht kriuzes phlegm / als Kristes tôt uns liez den segn.] (107.17-18). In the case of 
Feirefiz, however, devotion to an individual Christian is transformed in the Grail 
community into devotion to Christ. There is no concomitant transformation of 
heathens into Christians through their idolatrous worship of Gahmuret. The devotion 
of the heathens to Gahmuret prefigures Feirefiz’s devotion to Repanse de Schoye, but 
this typological relationship is marked not only by repetition but also by difference, 
intensification, and fulfillment, since Feirefiz actually converts to Christianity. 
The story of Gahmuret’s adventures, wooing and abandonment of the heathen 
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Queen, Belcane, subsequent marriage to Herzeloyde, and founding of a new line has 
been shown to correspond structurally with the adventures of Veldeke’s Aeneas.287 
Aeneas/Gahmuret come to Dido/Belcane after the fall of Troy/Niniveh, plagued en 
route by a dangerous storm (16.20-21). Aeneas/Gahmuret later abandons 
Dido/Belcane by order of the gods/due to religious difference. The Parzival narrative 
can be considered a fulfillment of the Gahmuret prologue, which is itself, through its 
association with the tale of Aeneas, linked typologically with the classical/heathen 
past. Feirefiz’s conversion sub gratia thus represents the fulfillment of the typus 
represented by the heathen’s personal devotion to and quasi-religious veneration of 
Gahmuret. The typological relationship between Gahmuret in heathendom and 
Feirefiz the heathen convert bridges the history of Parzival’s salvation—a 
Hauptgeschichte that is largely devoid of heathen elements. 
 
Heathen Elements in Books 3-14 
Books 3-14 contain reports of heathens and of heathendom, but heathen 
figures themselves play no real role in the narrative. This is a stark contrast to the 
active role heathen figures play in Books 1 and 2 and 15 and 16. The seeming 
exception to this pattern in fact confirms the rule: the heathen Queen of Janfuse briefly 
appears at Arthur’s court (328.1-30), but her function is limited to giving a report of 
Feirefiz. Cundrie is not identified as heathen although she speaks heidensch (782.2) 
and is sent from Tribalibot as a representative of Feirefiz’s lady, the heathen Queen 
Secundille. Cundrie is a member of the Grail community (albeit a peripatetic one) and 
spanned between two worlds, although she can be said to a degree to represent the 
                                                
287 Cf. Petrus W. Tax, “Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival in the Light of Biblical Typology,” 
Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies, 9 (1973), 1-14; also see “Gahmuret zwischen Aneas und 
Parzival: Zur Struktur der Vorgeschichte von Wolframs Parzival,” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie, 
92 (1973), 24-37, which supplements this discussion  Cf. p. 253 and note 308, below, for the derivation 
of Gahmuret’s grave from Veldeke’s Eneit. 
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interests of heathendom. Her role is that of messenger, and messengers (e.g., Mercury) 
have a foot (sometimes a winged one!) in both worlds. Representatives of the heathen 
world are not actors in the narrative time of Books 3-14, but, rather, vehicles for 
reporting and back-narration. 
 References to heathendom in Books 3-14 construe it as a place of sumptuous 
garments, coverings (269.8-11, 679.8-11), and riches (326.20-27). The silk of Orilus' 
“surcoat and tabard” are “made in heathendom” (261.1-15), as are the clothes 
Cunneware has brought to Parzival (306.10-13). The emphasis on rich heathen clothes 
and “coverings,” worn not only by heathens but also by Christians, is perhaps 
analogous to Parzival as a whole, whose “body” is wrapped in the heathen frame-story 
of the first and last two books. The recurring image of heathen coverings for Christian 
bodies perhaps serves as a inverse-metaphor for Wolfram's work, which dresses up 
heathen science with Christian meanings. Thus Wolfram's obession with exotic 
accoutrements, while a typical courtly fetish, can be seen not only as a feature of his 
orientalism288 but also of his encyclopedism. 
 Disembodied heathen language also plays a role between the pro- and 
epilogues as well. We are told that Cundrie speaks heidensch (312.22), as well as 
Latin and French. Wolfram also speaks of Kyot, who sees the tale written down in 
“heathen tongue” (416.27). Kyot translates this lore from “heathen” to French. The 
only works translated from Arabic in the twelfth century and in Wolfram's day were of 
a natural-scientific and theological-philosophical nature, not literary fictions. By 
positing a Heathen origin for his narrative, Wolfram locates Parzival in the context of 
the transmission of Greco-Arabic encyclopedic works, translated into Latin by the 
                                                
288 Arthur Groos, “Orientalizing the Medieval Orient: The East in Wolfram von Eschenbach's 
Parzival,”Kulturen des Manuskriptzeitalters, ed. Arthur Groos and Hans-Jochen Schiewer (Göttingen: 
V&R Unipress, 2004), 61-86.  
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“Toledo school.” However, the tale of Parzival is not translated from “heathen” into 
Latin, but into French, and then by Wolfram into German. Wolfram’s continuation of 
Kyot’s vernacular transposition underscores his ongoing vernacular “bypass” of 
clerical authority.  
 Parzival’s lack of knowledge of heidensch is mentioned implicitly in passing in 
Cundrie’s invective after Parzival fails to ask the redeeming question in Book 5: 
 
wær ze Munsalvæsche iu vrâgen mite, 
in heidenschaft ze Tabronite 
317 Diu stat hât erden wunsches solt: 
hie het iu vrâgen mêr erholt. 
 
[“If questioning had kept you there—in Heathendom, in Tabronit, a city holds 
earth's perfection’s reward—yet there at Munsalvæsche your questioning 
would have fetched you more.”] (316.29-317.2). 
Once more, the heathen world is marked in the central books (3-14) by its absence, 
both physical and linguistic. The Grail is mentioned in Book 10 as an object of 
heathen longing, hence also in the context of a lack—something the heathen world 
fails to possess but still desires (519.2-30).289 This heathen desire is described against 
the background of a disquisition on wondrous peoples, astronomy, herb lore, and 
Adamic theology, thus hinting at the interconnectedness of heathendom, natural 
science, and the Grail. 
 The heathen desire for the totality represented by the Grail is most fully 
realized in the figure of the sorcerer Clinschor, who provides a model of “wrongful 
encyclopedism” (see p. 169, above), akin to the evil desire for universal knowledge 
that was struck down in Eden and Babel. Clinschor holds dominion over all “who 
dwell between the firmament and the earth’s compass” (658.28-29), and his power 
extends over mal unde bêâ schent (658.27)—a totality topos similar to “young and 
old,” meaning simply “everyone” whom God does not protect. Clinschor’s domain is 
                                                
289 The heathen who wounds Anfortas is likewise questing for the Grail (479.13-19). 
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also full of pagans and Christians (659.11-17); and it seems increasingly clear that 
Wolfram, hardly incidentally, emphasizes encyclopedic discourses in the context of 
the conjunction of these two groups.  
 In the midst of this locus cohabited by Christians and heathens, Clinschor 
possesses a magic pillar, in which all earthly things can be beheld (589.27-590.14) 
within a range of six miles. But the “heathen vision” of the magic pillar, which Gawan 
is thwarted from investigating (590.15ff.), is limited by its range and narrow focus on 
the natural world. Despite its all-encompassing nature, it reveals only the outward 
surfaces of things. Therefore it can be regarded as a sort of heathen “encyclopedia,” 
whose scope is limited to the things of the natural world, without the explication of 
them as moral allegory, which characterizes the Christian encyclopedia. A precedent 
for such heathen “counterparts” to Christian institutions is provided in the figure of the 
Baruch, who rules in Baldac as the pope does in Rome (13.25-14.2). For a moral 
explication of encyclopedic learning, however, we must turn back to Parzival’s 
dialogue with Trevrizent in Book 9. 
 
Heathen Elements in Book 9 
The dialogic aspect of Book 9 is foreshadowed with a miniature reprise of the 
thematic dualism of the prologue, as discussed (pp. 239-40):  
…wie vert er nuo? 
den selben mæren grîfet zuo, 
ober an freuden sî verzagt, 
oder hât er hôhen prîs bejagt? 
oder ob sîn ganziu werdekeit 
sî beidiu lang unde breit, 
oder ist si kurz oder smal? (433.20-21) 
 
[How does he fare now? Take up these tales: is he daunted of joys, or has he 
won high fame? Is his unimpaired honour both long and broad, or is it short 
and narrow? (139, emphasis mine).] 
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These dualities are introduced in a process of rhetorical question-and-answer that 
anticipates the pending master-student dialogue between Parzival and Trevrizent. The 
dialogue between the knight and the saintly man—more abstractly, the secular and the 
sacred—takes place, not incidentally, in the narrative center and turning point of 
Wolfram’s poem.  
Scholars have failed to distinguish between the master-student dialogue proper 
of Book 9 (462.1-467.15) and the counsel that Trevrizent offers Parzival (467.16-
502.30), which constitutes a new generic frame of reference. This transition is marked 
by Parzival’s words to Trevrizent: 
 
Parzivâl sprach zim dô 
“hêrre, ich bin des immer frô, 
daz ir mich von dem bescheiden hât, 
der nihtes ungelônet lât, 
der missewende noch der tugent.” (467.11-15) 
 
[Parzival then said to him: “Lord, I am eternally grateful that you have 
informed me about Him who leaves nothing unrewarded, neither misdeed nor 
virtue” (150).] 
It is typical of the medieval Latin master-student dialogue and its vernacular offshoots 
for the discipulus to express gratitude and amazement to the magister at the dialogue’s 
end. Parzival’s valediction recalls the closing words of the student to the teacher in the 
Latin Elucidarium: 
 
O mirabilis contrarietas! Sicut illorum guadia erunt inexcogitabilia et 
indicibilia; ita istorum supplicia erunt incomparabilia et ineffablilia.290 
 
[Oh marvelous contradiction! Just as the joy of these [i.e., the saved] is 
unthinkable and indescribable, so the punishment of those [i.e., the damned] is 
incomparable and ineffable.] 
 
Parzival’s statement marks the end of the master-student dialogue. Trevrizent’s next 
                                                
290 Honorius Augustodunensis, Elucidarium sive dialogus de summa totius Christianae Theologiae in 
Migne, Patrologia Latina, 172, 1176a-b. 
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words mark the beginning of his “wise counsel,” which constitutes the generic mode 
of the remainder of their encounter. Whereas the master-student dialogue has dealt 
with Christian theology, Trevrizent’s counsel contains the heathen encyclopedic lore 
of Book 9, which consists largely of herbal, lapidary, and medicine. The transition 
from master-student dialogue to “counsel” is explicit in the text: 
 
der wirt sprach aber wider zim 
“nimts iuch niht hæl, gern ich vernim 
waz ir kumbers unde sünden hât. 
ob ir mich diu prüeven lât, 
dar zuo gib ich iu lîhte rât, 
des ir selbe niht enhât.” (467.19-24) 
 
[The host replied in turn: “If you’ve no cause to conceal it, I’ll gladly learn 
what troubles and sins you have. If you let me judge of them, perhaps I can 
give you counsel which you yourself lack (150).] 
This invitation to reveal one’s woes has no counterpart in master-student dialogue and 
constitutes a change in generic register. Trevrizent’s “counsel” is distinguished from 
master-student dialogue by its character as confession: gern ich vermin waz ir kumbers 
unde sünden hât. This is confirmed by Trevrizent’s parting words: 
 
er sprach “gip mir dîn sünde her: 
vor gote ich bin dîn wandels wer. 
und leist als ich dir hân gesagt: 
belîp des willen unverzagt.” (502.25-28) 
 
[Trevrizent spoke: “Give your sin over to me. Before God I am your 
atonement’s guarantor. And act as I have told you—remain undaunted in your 
resolve!” (161)] 
The encyclopedic lore of Parzival’s master-student dialogue proper (i.e., as 
distinct from Trevrizent’s wise counsel) is theological in nature. This includes the 
short salvation history of lines 463.1-465.30. The topics of heathen science (bestiary, 
herbs, and medicine), on the other hand, are relegated to Trevrizent’s “counsel” and 
the ensuing confessional dialogue, which are no longer an encyclopedic genre. As I 
have noted, the Gahmuret prologue and Parzival’s winning of the Grail in Books 1 and 
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2 and 15 and 16, respectively, are marked both by the presence of the heathen world 
and by a concomitant proliferation of discourses on astronomy, botany, herbs, 
lapidary, geography, and medicine.291 I would suggest that the formal generic division 
between pagan science and Christian theology in Book 9 indicates a failure on 
Trevrizent’s part to integrate the topics of heathen science with the poem’s 
ecumenical, Christian encyclopedism—a task that will be left for his nephew to 
complete in the attainment of the Grail in Books 15 and 16. 
The account of the catechism of Book 9 is itself introduced with a catechistic 
admonition: Swerz niht geloubt, der sündet (435.1) (Anyone who doesn’t believe this 
[story] is a sinner). The discreet treatment of strictly theological concerns in Book 9 is 
in fact consistent with the German vernacular encyclopedic tradition. The most 
widespread vernacular German encyclopedia of the period, the Lucidarius, is divided 
into three sections: natural science, theology, and eschatology. Hence, the Lucidarius 
proceeds from a reading of the world according to the literal sense of things and events 
(i.e., historice), followed by their spiritual explication (i.e., allegorice). The moral 
explication of the ordo rerum is in turn followed by an account of the end of the world 
and the afterlife. This tripartite division is evident in Parzival as well.  
In his ignorance, Parzival experiences his adventures (Books 3-9) in their 
merely literal-historical dimension, until their spiritual meaning is explicated by 
Trevrizent in Book 9. The Gawan adventure (Books 10-14) has often been understood 
as commentary on the Parzival-Grail narrative and can thus be seen as a continuation 
by other means of the exegesis Trevrizent provides of Parzival’s previous adventures 
in Book 9. The remaining books, 15 and 16, provide an eschatological account of the 
Grail world. Thus, the broad trajectory of the narrative of Parzival shows a basic 
                                                
291 None of which, of course, can be wholly separated from the Theological in a transcendent world-
order. 
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structural similarity with the trajectory of the most influential German vernacular 
encyclopedia of Wolfram’s age, a work with which there is good evidence that he may 
have been directly acquainted.292 
Book 9 is not only the most “theological” of Parzival but also the book least 
hospitable to heathens. Heathens are mentioned here only to mark their absence from 
the Good Friday narrative and their exclusion from salvation. Immediately before 
Parzival is counseled to seek out the holy hermit Trevrizent, pilgrims exhort him: 
 
ez ist hiute der karfrîtac, 
des al diu werlt sich freun mac 
unt dâ bî mit angest siufzec sîn. 
wâ wart ie hôher triwe schîn, 
dan die got durch uns begienc, 
den man durch uns anz kriuze hienc? 
hêrre, pflegt ir toufes, 
sô jâmer iuch des koufes: 
er hât sîn werdeclîchez lebn 
mit tôt für unser schult gegebn, 
durch daz der mensche was verlorn, 
durch schulde hin zer helle erkorn. 
ob ir niht ein heiden sît, 
sô denket, hêrre, an dise zît. (748.7-20) 
 
[Today is Good Friday, because of which all the world may rejoice, and at the 
same time sigh in anguish. Where was greater loyalty ever shown than that 
which God manifested for our sake—He whom they hung on the cross for us? 
Sir, if you practice baptism’s faith, then grieve for that purchase. He gave his 
noble life, by His death, for our guilt, by which mankind had been doomed, 
allotted to Hell because of guilt. If you are no heathen, then think, lord, upon 
this season (114, emphasis mine).] 
The catechism offered by the pilgrims and by Trevrizent is not universally accessible, 
but only if you are no heathen. Earlier and later on (especially in Books 1 and 2 and 15 
and 16) encyclopedic discourses are bound up with heathendom, but the fact that 
heathen elements are excluded from Trevrizent’s “hidden tidings concerning the 
Grail” (452.30) is made explicit in his account of Kyot’s discovery of the Grail 
                                                
292 For the Lucidarius in Parzival, see Groos (1995), 155, 299; also see Edwards (trans.), 166, 210. 
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âventiure:  
 
Kyôt der meister wol bekant 
ze Dôlet verworfen ligen vant 
in heidenischer schrifte 
dirre âventiure gestifte. 
der karakter â b c 
muoser hân gelernet ê, 
ân den list von nigrômanzî. 
ez half daz im der touf was bî: 
anders wær diz mær noch unvernumn. 
kein heidensch list möht uns gefrumn 
ze künden umbes grâles art, 
wie man sîner tougen innen wart. (453.11-22) 
 
[Kyot, the renowned scholar, found in Toledo, lying neglected, in heathen 
script, this adventure’s fundament. The a b c of those characters he must have 
learned beforehand, without the art of necromancy. It helped that baptism 
dwelt with him, or else this tale would still be unheard. No cunning heathen 
could avail to tell us about the Grail’s nature—how its mysteries were 
perceived (145, emphasis mine).] 
 
Not only would the heathens remain ignorant of the Grail’s nature if they tried 
to fathom it, they “neglect” the story of the Grail in the first place. A report is given of 
“Flegetanis the heathen” (453.23), who reads the name of the Grail in the 
constellations (454.18-22), but who lived in the time before baptism (453.29-30). 
Flegetanis knew “what it was called” (wie der hiez, 454.23), but nothing of the Grail’s 
nature, save that it had to be tended by the baptised. This is consistent with the 
tendency of the heathens to grasp only the surfaces of things (as evinced by 
Clinschor’s all-seeing pillar) but not their spiritual dimension; which is only revealed 
after baptism. Flegetanis’ knowledge avails him nothing, since he continues to 
worship “a calf as if it were his god” (454.2-3). Flegetanis can name the Grail, but the 
Grail cannot name him, which Trevrizent posits as the precondition for attaining it (cf. 
468.12-14).  
Other references to heathens and heathendom in Book 9 further serve merely 
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to underscore the heathen world’s absence, ineffectuality, or perdition: Trevrizent tells 
Parzival that his father was slain by a heathen (479.13): ez was ein heiden der dâ streit 
unt der die selben tjoste reit [“It was a heathen who fought there and rode that joust 
against him” (479.13-14)].  He remarks that in his soldiering days “Heathen and 
Christian were all alike to me in battle” (der heidn unt der getoufte wârn mir strîtes al 
gelîch, 495.28-29), as long as he received the love of his lady. This recalls Gahmuret, 
who slays both heathens and Christians for the love of the heathen queen Belcane.  
Trevrizent also describes Aeneas' twig (481.30-482.10) and the other ineffectual cures 
attempted on the Fisher King. 
 In fact, it is Anfortas’ wounding at the hands of a heathen with a venom-tipped 
spear that prompts the lengthy, and futile, attempts to heal him, of which Aeneas' twig 
is but one. Other failed remedies include the herbs and aromatics described in Book 16 
(789.21-790.8) and the gems set in Anfortas’ bed (discussed above, p. 223-225). 
Parzival’s reconciliation with his heathen half-brother is also a de facto, if not 
theological, precondition for returning to Munsalvæsche and healing the Fisher King.  
Thus, both the cause of Anfortas’ wound, its potential, but failed, cures, and its true 
remedy owe something to heathen “sources.” But it is only when this last heathen 
“source” (i.e., Feirefiz) is integrated into a Christian worldview—in a manner that 
reflects the merger of Christian morality and heathen science in the encyclopedia—
that healing is ultimately possible. 
 Yet it is not the heathen world that presents Parzival with the greatest obstacles 
on his question to heal the Fisher King. The misinformation Trevrizent provides 
Parzival regarding the way the Grail is attained—his attempt to divert Parzival, his 
comment on the status of the neutral angels, and his so-called “retraction” in Book 
16—have long presented scholars with a puzzle.293 Trevrizent’s deception would seem 
                                                
293 See Groos (1995), 221-224 for an overview and succinct bibliography of attempts to solve it. 
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to violate the bounds of the master-student dialogue, the encyclopedic-didactic 
framework in which their conversation takes place: the magister may not lie to his 
discipulus. None of the arguments adduced to explain Trevrizent's retraction can be 
dismissed out of hand (except perhaps the unlikely proposal that it is an 
interpolation).294 Either the conditions for winning the Grail have changed, Wolfram is 
confused, or these merely seeming contradictions are the product of a “decentered and 
pluralistic discourse”295 that allows for a polyphony of overlapping voices, even when 
they sing off key. 
A complementary solution to this long-standing crux—one which takes the 
encyclopedic dimension of Wolfram’s poem into account—is that Trevrizent may 
indeed include contradictory facts, but in so doing he is in fact a model encyclopedic 
compiler. His didaxis conjoins discourses on theology, genealogy, bestiary, lapidary, 
herbal, medicine, and astronomy, and is one of the most densely encyclopedic 
moments in Parzival. Wolfram, like Snorri, also complies different dialogue genres: 
master-student dialogue, confession, and disputatio, which may account for some of 
his apparent discrepancies. “We cannot rationalize all the inconsistencies in 
Trevrizent’s ‘Retraction.’”296 But the inclusion of mutually contradictory explanations 
of natural phenomena, things, or events has a precedent in the medieval encyclopedic 
tradition which partly frames his dialogue in Book 9. For example, William of 
Conches’ dialogue between “Duke” and “Philosopher” in his Dragmaticon explores 
contrary positions, objections, and alternatives, and contradictory accounts find a place 
in the compendium.297 Similarly, Snorri Sturluson describes the gods as divine beings 
in his Edda but as euhemerized human beings in Heimskringla. As Arthur Groos has 
                                                
294 As argued by Peter Wapnewski, “Trevrizent: Widerruf und Gralprämissen,” Wolfram's Parzival: 
Studien zur Religiösität und Form (Heidelberg: Winter, 1955), 172-73. 
295 Groos, ibid., 224. 
296 Ibid., 226. 
297 See note 72, above. 
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argued, Trevrizent’s confusion is not necessarily Wolfram’s.298 Such contradictions 
are prominent in encyclopedias in the dialogue form that Parzival’s encounter with 
Trevrizent reproduces, such as the Dragmaticon and the German Lucidarius. I have 
already argued that Wolfram’s discussion of theology in Book 9 may reflect a 
tendency toward the separate treatment of religious topics in the German vernacular 
encyclopedic tradition. Wolfram’s inclusion of Trevrizent’s contradictory “Retraction” 
may appear puzzling, but is also consistent with the encyclopedic tradition. 
Ultimately, Trevrizent’s deception shows that Parzival’s encyclopedic questioning 
(which is merely the beginning of the slow process of becoming wise), is not a 
sufficient condition for salvation. This reveals the limits of encyclopedic learning 
without Christian moralization, as exemplified by the works of classical and heathen 
antiquity. The redeeming question is only possible sub gratia. 
 
Heathen Elements in Books 15 and 16 
Wolfram refers to the tale having been “locked away,” perhaps not strictly 
metaphorically, but also in reference to the metal clasps that sometimes held a bound 
manuscript closed (“verslozzen”).299 Thus Wolfram’s return to the heathen frame 
narrative may also refer to the physical frame or binding of the book itself. This is 
perhaps another of Wolfram’s sly acknowledgements of Parzival’s status, contrary to 
his own famous statement, as a “book” and perhaps even of the frame of reference of 
the medieval encyclopedia. 
There is indeed a marked increase in the volume of encyclopedic lore in Books 
15 and16 that accompanies the reintroduction of the heathen world, now as an active 
                                                
298A modern parallel is afforded by the problem of Hamlet's age. Shakespeare's play furnishes evidence 
that allows us to plausibly calculate the Prince of Denmark's age as around both 18 and 30, but the 
information provided to reach those numbers is provided not by Shakespeare but by other characters; 
Shakespeare merely includes these confused, variant interpretations. 
299 See note 264. 
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player in the theological drama of Parzival. Feirefiz is the first heathen introduced 
since the Gahmuret prologue who plays an active role in the narrative, since, as I have 
argued, other heathen figures are mentioned only by report, or serve to report events 
known to them.  
The influx of heathen riches that has since become a commonplace in Parzival 
(cf. 261.1-15, 279.8-11) is linked in Book 15 with the encyclopedic tradition in the 
description of Feirefiz’s accoutrements. Wolfram draws on the encyclopedic sub-
genres of bestiary and lapidary to account for Feirefiz’s heathen riches: 
 
waz diende Artûses hant 
ze Bertâne unde in Engellant, 
daz vergulte niht die steine 
die mit edelem arde reine 
lâgen ûf des heldes wâpenroc. 
der was tiure ân al getroc: 
rubbîne, calcidône, 
wârn dâ ze swachem lône. 
der wâpenroc gap planken schîn. 
ime berge zAgremuntîn 
die würme salamander 
in worhten zein ander 
in dem heizen fiure. 
die wâren steine tiure 
lâgen drûf tunkel unde lieht: 
ir art mac ich benennen nieht. (735.15.30) 
 
[All that served Arthur’s hand in Britain and in England would not pay for the 
stones, which, with their noble, pure nature, studded the warrior’s surcoat. It 
was costly beyond all deception: rubies and chalcedony would fetch a poor 
price there. The surcoat gave off a dazzling sheen. In the mountain of 
Agremontin the salamander worms had woven it together in the hot fire. True 
precious stones lay upon it, dark and bright—I cannot name their nature (234).] 
Descriptions of gems and of the salamander are a staple of medieval encyclopedic 
works. In Latin, the salamander was reported to live in flames at least since Isidore.300 
The legendary Letter of Prester John, a wonder-tale which circulated widely in Europe 
from 1165 onwards, reported that the salamander produces an inflammable, asbestos-
                                                
300 Etymologiae, XII.iv.36. 
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like material out of which precious clothing can be produced.301 Yet the description of 
the surcoat also represents a failure of the encyclopedic tradition, since some of 
Feirefiz’s wondrous stones are beyond even its grasp (ir art mac ich benennen nieht).  
The continued association in Parzival of encyclopedic lore and heathen 
“coverings” is perhaps suggestive of a ongoing metaphorical relationship between the 
influx of heathen material riches and the influx of heathen intellectual goods in the 
form of encyclopedic learning, such as the lapidary and bestiary lore that informs the 
description of Feirefiz’s vestments. While sumptuous heathen clothing is a fixation of 
courtly romance, novel toWolfram is the description of heathen accoutrements almost 
always in terms borrowed from Christian encyclopedic discourses. 
 This interweaving of heathen and Christian is suggested in particular by the 
origin of Feirefiz’s surcoat in the fires of Agremuntîn. This is likely a reference to Mt. 
Acremonte in Sicily.302 The history of Sicily is palimpsest of Roman, Germanic, 
Christian, Greek, and Arab/Muslim influences. Medieval Sicily, although 
predominantly Christian, was, due to its status as a crossroads of several major trade 
roots, especially open to the influence of Muslim and Jewish culture. This unique 
history perhaps prepared the ground for the famous tolerance and admiration of the 
Muslim world noted of Wolfram’s younger contemporary, Fredrerick II, the king of 
Sicily and later Holy Roman Emperor.303 Frederick is reputed to have spoken Latin, 
Sicilian, German, French, Greek, and Arabic (thus trumping even Wolfram’s 
Cundrie).304 His court was open to Muslim scholars, and his tolerance of non-
Christians extended to allowing the Sicilian Saracens to remain on the mainland, build 
mosques, and live according to their traditions.305  
                                                
301 Nellmann (1994), 756. 
302 Cf. Nellmann (1994), 756. 
303 Cf. Herbert Nette, Friedrich II. Von Hohenstaufen (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975), 43. 
304 Ibid., 7, 43. 
305 Ibid., 28-29. 
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The literal conflict of heathen and Christian in Parzival is almost always 
accompanied by citations from encyclopedic sources, which reconcile heathen and 
Christian on a level that is intellectual and spiritual. During the battle between Parzival 
and Feirefiz in Book 15, Wolfram cites lore also found in Isidore’s Etymologiae on the 
lion, born dead but brought to life by his father’s roar—pagan lore later endowed with 
Christological meaning. The context of this encyclopedic citation is hardly incidental, 
since Wolfram uses an encyclopedic topic to describe the struggle for supremacy 
between heathen and Christian. The Christian bestiary tradition has its origin in Greek 
pagan sources, such as the Physiologus, works of Aristotle, Herodotus, Pliny the elder, 
Solinus, and Aelian.306 Thus the physical struggle and reconciliation between Parzival 
and Feirefiz reproduces the spiritual rapprochement between heathen science and 
Christian moralization at the core of the encyclopedic tradition. This conflict is made 
explicit in course of the battle, (235) during which Feirefiz and Parzival are 
exclusively referred to as “the heathen” and “the Christian” (from 738.11-12 to 
748.13), particularly in the refrain, der heiden tet em getouften wê [The heathen hurt 
the Christian hard] (739.23, 741.1). Only after they recognize each other as brothers 
does the narrator refer to them once again as “Parzival” and “Feirefiz” (749.15, 23). 
The same pattern, whereby references to encyclopedic lore surface at a 
moment of conflict between heathen and Christian, is evident in the episode of 
Gahmuret’s death: 
 
gunêrtiu heidensch witze 
hât uns verstoln den helt guot. 
ein ritter hete bockes bluot 
genomen in ein langez glas: 
daz sluoger ûf den adamas: 
dô wart er weicher danne ein swamp. (105.16-21) 
 
                                                
306 Cf. Wilma B. George, The Naming of the Beasts: Natural History in the Medieval Bestiary (London: 
Duckworth, 1991).  See also Debra Hassig, Medieval Bestiaries: Text, Image, Ideology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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[Cursed heathen's guile stole the goodly warrior from us. A knight had poured 
he-goat’s blood into a tall glass; he broke that upon the adamant. Then it 
became softer than a sponge” (33).] 
 
According to a twelfth-century Latin bestiary, 
 
the nature of goats is so extremely hot that a stone of adamant, which neither 
fire nor iron implement can alter, is dissolved merely by the blood of one of 
these creatures.307 
As in the Parzival-Feirefiz episode, the conflict of heathen and Christian is 
accompanied by an invocation of pagan science, which the bestiary tradition imbues 
with a Christian moral explication. The fact that the heathen warrior uses bestiary lore 
to deadly advantage against a Christian underscores the originally heathen provenance 
and danger of this “science.” Another instance of the conflict of heathen and Christian 
in the context of pagan science is the description of Gahmuret’s tomb, which draws on 
both lapidary lore and Heinrich von Veldeke’s description of Dido’s tomb in his 
Eneide, a work Wolfram made frequent use of.308 The tomb is described as an 
amalgam of heathen and Christian elements (106.29-107.24), a contested site with 
competing agendas, “compiled” (as it were) under the highest earthly hand of the 
Baruch. The battle between Gahmuret and the heathen who sends him to his death 
prefigures the confraternal conflict of his sons Parzival and Feirefiz, yet with the 
crucial difference that their battle results in reconciliation and the realization that 
Christian and heathen are in fact brothers. 
The conflict of the heathen and Christian half-brothers continues with 
reference to the tension between Heathen and Christian Science. Wolfram draws on 
lapidary lore to describe Feirefiz’s gem-encrusted shield (741.11-14): 
 
ûf dem buckelhûse stuont 
ein stein, des namn tuon ich iu kuont; 
                                                
307 The Book of Beasts: Being a Translation from a Latin Bestiary of the Twelfth Century, ed. T.H. 
White (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1954), 75. 
308 Cf. Groos (1995), 15-16, 31, 36, 37, 86, 151.  See also Nellman (1994), 512, and Gabriele Schieb, 
ed., Eneide: Henric van Veldeken (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1965), 76, note to line 2510. 
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antrax dort genennet, 
karfunkel hie bekennet. 
 
[On the boss-point itself was a gem with whose name I will acquaint you: 
“antrax” it is called yonder; here it is known as “carbuncle” (emphasis mine) 
(236).] 
Wolfram’s etymology of karfunkel and antrax is derived from Isidore’s 
Etymologiae.309 Isidore gives the Latin carbunculus along with the Greek Άνθραξ 
(anthrax). Thus the tension between heathen and Christian that culminates in the battle 
of the brothers extends even to the scientific nomenclature of Heathendom and 
Christianity, the language of “here” and “there.” Regarding such nomenclature, it is 
typically assumed that Feirefiz’s invocation of the Roman gods “Juno” and “Jupiter” 
(748.17,19; 749.16; 750.2) reflects Wolfram’s ignorance of Islamic monotheism (or is 
perhaps, at best, an interpretatio romana of Islam). But Wolfram’s  (or Feirefiz’s?) 
“mistake,” which gives Roman names to heidensch deities, closely mirrors the role of 
12th-century “heathen” Arabic scholars, whose translations into Latin restored the 
Greek scientific and philosophical tradition to the Christian West. Feirefiz’s “Roman” 
gods adhere to the same basic pattern as the encyclopedic transpositions of the 12th-
century “heathen” scholars, whereby something originally Greek (Zeus/Hera) is 
translated into Latin (Jupiter/Juno) by a “heathen.” Feirefiz's ongoing Greek frame-of-
reference, as when he compares his army with the forces at Troy (768.1-9), conforms 
to this pattern, as does the narrator’s description of Feirefiz’s shield in terms (antrax 
dort genennet / karfunkel hie bekennet) from from Greek to Latin. 
The reconciliation of heathen and Christian culminates in the attainment of the 
Grail. Parzival, Feirefiz, and Cundrie ride together to Munsalvæsche (784.26-27, 
793.15-30) to heal the Fisher King—the prerequisite for gaining the Grail. An 
outpouring of encyclopedic knowledge attends the reintroduction of the Grail, which 
ranges from heathen astronomy (782.1-21, 789.5) to herbal (789.21-790.8), bestiary 
                                                
309 XVI.xiv.1 (see note 87, above). 
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(790.10, 22), and lapidary lore (791.1-30). Although Parzival is “slowly wise,” he is at 
this point assuredly wîs, if he ever is.310 As long as he remains a heathen, Feirefiz, 
whose skin resembles “a written-on leaf of parchment” (747.26), is a loose leaf that 
remains to be bound (“with love in a single volume,” as it were) to the Grail 
community. The attainment of the Grail, the object of both heathen and Christian 
desire, is Feirefiz’s achievement as much as it is Parzival’s. 
The union of heathen and Christian promised by the reconciliation of the 
brothers is consummated by Feirefiz’s betrothal to the Grail bearer, Repanse de 
Schoye (818.15-19). The Grail can only be attained once heathen and Christian are 
reconciled (784.24-27), just as the encyclopedia is only possible through a marriage of 
heathen and Christian elements. The encyclopedic dimension of the reconciliation of 
heathen and Christian through and for the Grail is thus fourfold: 
 
1) The Grail is not only accompanied by a plurality of encyclopedic discourses 
but is itself an herbal and a bestiary; since it contains “all that the earth is 
capable of bringing forth” and “whatever game lives beneath the sky, whether 
it flies, runs, or swims” (470.1.20) 
 
2) The Grail grants command over an encyclopedic totality: the Grail King 
“shall have sovereign power over all that the air has touched” (252.5-8).  
 
3) The Grail’s messenger, Cundrie, posses both encyclopedic learning of 
Heathendom and the ability to transpose that learning into Latin and the 
vernacular. (312.20-21) 
 
4) The Grail thus integrates heathen elements, be they scientific discourses or 
heathen persons, into a Christian worldview.  
Previous commentators have remarked on the nature of Wolfram’s Grail as a stone 
(distinct from the cup, plate, or even human head of other traditions), but they have 
failed to note that, in all crucial respects, Wolfram’s Grail is encyclopedic. The 
                                                
310 The journey of the three (now wise) figures to the Grail King, who is on the cusp of his spiritual 
rebirth, has an aspect of pilgrimage, and may hence recall the visit of the magi to Christ.   
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encyclopedism of the Grail solves what Ronald Murphy calls “the polar dilemma of 
the epic and frame[story]—how...the Chivalrous Christian knight balance[s] the 
ecumenical understanding of Islam with loyalty to Christ through baptism.”311 
The heathen-Christian juxtaposition that guides the narrative from A to Z, 
culminating in the attainment of the Grail, is introduced with an invocation of 
encyclopedic totality in Book 1. Gahmuret, the errant knight, determines to serve none 
other than “that one whose highest hand held sway over all lands on earth” (eines der 
die hœhsten hant trüege ûf erde übr elliu lant, 13.13-14). He finds such a lord in the 
Baruch: 
 
doch wânde der gefüege, 
daz niemen krône trüege, 
künec, keiser, keiserîn, 
des messenîe er wolde sîn, 
wan eines der die hœhsten hant 
trüege ûf erde übr elliu lant. 
der wille in sînem herzen lac. 
im wart gesagt, ze Baldac 
wære ein sô gewaltic man, 
daz im der erde undertân 
diu zwei teil wæren oder mêr. 
sîn name heidensch was sô hêr 
daz man in hiez den bâruc. 
er hete an krefte alsolhen zuc, 
vil künege wâren sîne man, 
mit krôntem lîbe undertân. 
dez bâruc-ambet hiute stêt. 
seht wie man kristen ê begêt 
ze Rôme, als uns der touf vergiht. 
heidensch orden man dort siht: 
ze Baldac nement se ir bâbestreht 
(daz dunket se âne krümbe sleht), (13.9-30) 
 
[Yet that compliant man believed that there was no-one who wore a crown – 
king, emperor, empress – whose household he would join, except that one 
whose highest hand held sway over all lands on earth. That was the desire that 
lay in his heart. He was told that in Baldac there was a man so mighty that two 
thirds of the earth or more were subject to him. His name was held so high that 
                                                
311 Murphy (2006), 106. 
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in the heathen tongue he was called the Baruch. So great was his grip on power 
that many kings were his subjects, crowned but subordinate to him. The office 
of the Baruch still exists today. Behold, just as Christian rule obtains in Rome, 
as baptism tells us, there heathen order is seen to prevail – from Baldac they 
obtain their papal law. They believe that to be unwaveringly straight (5).] 
The decision of a Christian Knight to serve a heathen lord raises problems from a 
medieval Christian perspective.312 What has not been noted, however, is that with 
these three elements—a Christian knight, serving a heathen lord, whose power extends 
over nearly all the earth—the essential components of the encyclopedic Christian-
heathen synthesis that will preoccupy, unify and ultimately “straighten” Wolfram’s 
“crooked” (805.14) narrative are already present in outline form. The prologue’s 
thematization of the heathen, the Christian, and “the world” provides a “prefiguration” 
of the encyclopedic synthesis of Parzival.313 
Both the typological and the encyclopedic traditions synthesize heathen and 
Christian culture, but they do so in fundamentally different ways. With its overt  
moralization of heathen science (following the practice established by Hrabanus 
Maurus), the encyclopedic tradition reconciles heathen and Christian synchronically, 
its elements presented a contemporaneous whole. As noted previously, for Wolfram 
the division between heathen and Christian is primarily one of space, not time: 
“There” and “Here,” as opposed to “Then” and “Now.” Heathens are part of a 
historical present; they merely occupy a different part of the globe than Christians. (As 
Wolfram’s Gyburc points out in Willehalm, “we are all pagans at birth.”) In 
comparison, for Snorri pagans are exclusively, and for Dante mostly, denizens of 
former times. Across the chasm of time, the task of harmonizing Christian and heathen 
is performed by biblical typology.  
                                                
312 See Walter Haug, “The Literary-Theoretical Conception of Wolfram von Eschenbach: a New 
Reading of Parzival’s Prologue,” Beitrage zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur, 123 
(2001-2), 211-236. Also see Groos (2004), 61-86.  
313 Cf. lines 699.28-30: daz wurden wîtiu mære, / solt der kristen und der Sarrazîn / kuntlîche dâ 
genennet sîn [The tales would stretch far and wide if boths Christians and Saracens were to be named in 
full there (223)]. 
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Yet the harmonizing task of typology is not performed by authors of sacred 
texts but by commentators and readers. The establishment of typological relationships 
between the Old and New Testaments had been one of the foremost tasks of patristic 
thought. Wolfram, in providing his reader with the material to establish typological 
relationships within his own text, (a) imbues his own reader with an auctoritas 
analogous to that of the church fathers, and (b) imbues the romance of Parzival with 
an aura of authority proper to a sacred text, further blurring the lines between secular 
and sacred discourses. 
Wolfram’s synthesis empowers a secular readership to combine two formerly 
distinct tools of clerical learning: the diachronism of the typological tradition and the 
synchronism of the encyclopedia. This set of relationships can be represented 
schematically as follows: 
Typology 
 
      Past (Heathen) <> Present (Christian) 
 
Encyclopedia 
 
Past 
(Heathen) 
 
^ 
v 
Present 
 (Christian) 
Typology thus integrates heathen and Christian space/time horizontally, just as it does 
Hebrew and Christian; the encyclopedia, in contrast, integrates them vertically. 
Typology salvages older traditions that would otherwise be condemned from a 
Christian standpoint; yet in so doing it denies them their singular validity. The 
“typological moment” may salvage the pagan past, but it savages it as well; it is a 
species of intellectual colonialism—an aggressive ecumenicalism in which all other 
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religions (which are always the religions of others) are merely imperfect, proleptic 
apprehensions of the one true faith. 
This is not to say that the heathens serve Wolfram as mere foreshadowings of 
redemption. Rather, Wolfram’s synthesis of Christian and heathen is a mix of these 
two modes of integrating heathen and Christian culture—in time and in space—as 
represented by the typological and encyclopedic traditions, respectively. These two 
modes are not mutually exclusive, although Snorri (whose pagans occupy a distant 
past) privileges the former, and Dante (whose heathens share space in hell and even 
purgatory with Christians) the latter. The function of both the encyclopedia and of 
typology is essentially the same: to reconcile what at first appear to be incompatable 
traditions, and to make discourses of distant places and times available, useful, and 
subservient to a Christian worldview. Wolfram, perhaps uniquely, combines these two 
tools of Christian learning. He employs diachronic typological structures and, like the 
medieval encyclopedia, places heathen and Christian together synchronically and 
dialogically. 
 Wolfram’s reliance on the exegetical tradition of biblical typology is well 
documented, in particular regarding the figure of Adam-Christ, and in his depiction of 
the young Parzival as another Adam,314 later redeemed (in Christ-like fashion) by 
Parzival himself. The Gahmuret episode prefigures Parzival’s adventures. As with all 
typologies, there is repetition and similarity, but also fundamental difference. Thus 
just as Gahmuret never again sees his mother, his brother, or his land (12.15-17), 
Parzival never sees his mother again, but is later reunited with brother and realm. 
Wolfram’s use of typological relationship not only empowers a new practice of lay 
reading that avails itself of the intellectual tools of the church; it forms part of the 
puzzle Wolfram leaves his readers—the “crookedness” which they must set straight, 
                                                
314 Groos, (1995), 66-68, 108-9, 126, 142, 167-68, 186, 187, 193-94. 
  251 
 
or, rather, bend like the bow of Wolfram’s much-discussed bow-metaphor. 
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3. Wolfram’s “Bow-Metaphor” (241,1-30) — a Codex-Metaphor?  
 
Wolfram’s bow-metaphor (Bogengleichnis) has been the subject of much 
critical commentary and debate.315 Whereas “most commentators have interpreted the 
entire passage as statement of stylistic principles,” Arthur Groos argues that 
“Wolfram’s initial [241.1-30] and concluding [805.14-15] statements in the “bow-
metaphor” are a presentation of his narrative technique in terms similar to those of the 
ordo artificialis” of classical rhetoric, as opposed to a “natural” ordering of the story 
that corresponds with the succession of events depicted, as I have already noted in the 
case of Wolfram’s brief account of Loherangrin.316  (Wolfram’s “crooked” narrative, 
where, as noted, essential information is withheld, and events are introduced whose 
meaning only later becomes clear, distinguishes itself from a post-modern disciple of 
Wolfram’s crooked, interwoven narrative only in so far as Wolfram’s narrator 
announces his strategy and technique to the audience.) I do not wish to supplant earlier 
interpretations of the bow-metaphor, but merely suggest that they are incomplete, and 
that, in conjunction with the language of archery, there is a parallel series of puns on 
the vocabulary of medieval manuscript production.  
Groos discusses the commonplace of the bow image in biblical exegesis in the 
early thirteenth century.317As an image of the typological relation between Old and 
New Testament, the bow is not only an image of the relation of two faiths, Judaic and 
                                                
315 Arthur Groos, “Wolfram von Eschenbach’s ‘Bow Metaphor’ and the Narrative Technique of 
Parival,” Modern Language Notes, 87 (1972), 391-408; Walter Haug, “Wolfram von Eschenbach’s 
Literary Theory: Parzival, the Metaphor of the Bow, and the Self-Defense,” Vernacular Literary 
Theory in the Middle Ages: The German Tradition, 800-1300 in Its European Context (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Bernd Schirok, “Diu senewe ist ein bîspel. Zu Wolframs Bogengleichnis,” 
Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur, 115 (1986), 21-36. For additional 
bibliography, cf. Groos (1995), 392. On Wolfram’s narrative technique in general, cf. Groos, 1995; 
Eberhard Neumann, Wolframs Erzähltechnik: Untersuchungen zur Funktion des Erzählers (Wiesbaden: 
Steiner Verlag, 1973). Alexandra Katerina Stein, ‘Wort und werc’: Studien zum narrativen Diskurs im 
‘Parzival’ Wolframs von Eschenbach. Mikrokosmos, Beitrage zur Literaturwissenschaft und 
Bedeutungsforschung 31 (Frankfurt, Berlin, and Bern: Peter Lang, 1993); Neil Thomas, 99-123 
316 Arthur Groos, “Wolfram von Eschenbach’s ‘Bow Metaphor,’” 392-3. 
317 Groos (1995), 396. 
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Christian, but image of the relation of heathen and Christian in Wolfram’s text. Given 
its history in patristic thought, the bow is an inherently literary metaphor. Thus the 
Bogengleichnis already implicitly has a place in Wolfram’s ongoing tongue-in-cheek 
dialogue with his audience on the status of his work (arbeit, 241.26) as buoch. 
The metaphorics of the book are far more pervasive in Parzival than 
Wolfram’s denial of bookishness would suggest.318 The bow unites the themes of 
heathen and Christian and the status of Wolfram’s tale as “book” in unexpected and 
hitherto unnoticed ways. What has not been noted in the commentary on this passage 
is an ongoing series of allusions and puns based on the process of manuscript 
production and bookbinding in particular: 
 
Wer der selbe wære, 
des freischet her nâch mære. 
dar zuo der wirt, sîn burc, sîn lant, 
diu werdent iu von mir genant, 
her nâch sô des wirdet zît, 
bescheidenlîchen, âne strît 
unde ân allez für zogen. 
ich sage die senewen âne bogen. 
diu senewe ist ein bîspel. 
nu dunket iuch der boge snel: 
doch ist sneller daz diu senewe jaget. 
ob ich iu rehte hân gesaget, 
diu senewe gelîchet mæren sleht: 
diu dunkent ouch die liute reht. 
swer iu saget von der krümbe, 
der wil iuch leiten ümbe. 
swer den bogen gespannen siht, 
der senewen er der slehte giht, 
man welle si zer biuge erdenen 
sô si den schuz muoz menen. 
swer aber dem sîn mære schiuzet 
des in durch nôt verdriuzet: 
wan daz hât dâ ninder stat, 
und vil gerûmeclîchen pfat, 
                                                
318 Obscure, learned book-metaphors constitute a genre in the Middle Ages. Cf. Jean-Marie Kauth, 
“Book Meteaphors in the Textual Community of the Ancrene Wisse,” The Book and the Magic of 
Reading in the Middle Ages, ed. Albrecht Classen (New York: Routledge, 1999), 99-121.  
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zeinem ôren în, zem andern für. 
mîn arbeit ich gar verlür, 
op den mîn mære drunge: 
ich sagte oder sunge, 
daz ez noch paz vernæme ein boc 
  odr ein ulmiger stoc. 
   (241.1-30) 
 
[Who that man was – hear tidings of that later, and of the host, his castle, his 
land. These shall be named to you by me later, when the time comes, as is 
fitting, uncontentiously, and with no delay whatsoever. I tell the string without 
the bow. The string is an image. Now, you think the bow is quick, but what the 
string dispatches is faster still, if I have told you true. The string is like 
straightforward tales, as indeed meet with people’s approval. Whoever tells 
you of crookedness desires to lead you astray. If anyone sees the bow strung, 
he concedes straightness to the string, unless someone wishes to stretch it to 
the curve, as when it must propel the shot. If someone, however, shoots his tale 
at a man who is perforce disgruntled by it – for it has no staying-place there, 
and a very roomy path – in one ear, out the other – I’d be altogether wasting 
my toil, if my tale were to press itself upon him. Whatever I said or sang, it 
would be better received by a billy-goat – or a rotting tree-trunk.] 
 
Wolfram says that his tale tells the “senewen âne bogen” (the string without the bow) 
(241.8). In addition to the “bow” of this much discussed metaphor, “bogen,” I would 
argue, can also refer to the folded vellum sheets gathered together in a “quire” or 
“gathering” (NHG Bogen; MHG boge) of medieval manuscript production. This 
Bogen would have been sewn together, sometimes using animal sinew (senewe),319 
and bound to form a codex or book. 
There is no extant vernacular description of manuscripts or their production in 
Middle High German where one might look for boge used in this sense, nor would one 
expect there to be, since early thirteenth-century vernacular descriptions of craft labor 
are few and far between in German.320 Nonetheless, there must have been a name for 
                                                
319 J.A. Szirmai, The Archeology of Medieval Bookbinding (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 147-8. 
320 A possible instance is found in Der Jüngere Titurel, Stanza 417, Zeile 2 – 4:  
man sach in all der kanzel bogen krumbe  
zwelfboten, bichtaer, meide, patriarke, 
martires, propheten.     ir briefe seiten da materje starke. 
[One saw in the chancellery folded volumes: apostles, confessors, virgins, partriarchs, martyrs, prophets 
– the pages of their letters weighty matters.] 
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“quire” in Middle High German and, in the absence of any counter-indication, there is 
no reason to suppose that it was not the etymological ancestor of Modern German 
Bogen. It is unlikely that boge in this sense would have found its way into print, as 
vernacular descriptions of literacy are rare in MHG literature. The monks of the 
scriptorium would have referred to it as quaternum (originally four sheets of paper 
folded into a quire, but later generalized to indicate gatherings of other quantities as 
well). But it would have been unusual for a vernacular variant not to exist alongside 
Latin usage, as Middle High German-Latin glossaries attest. While the Middle High 
German sources are not forthcoming, Boga meaning “quire” is indeed attested in Old 
English.321 It seems likely that Wolfram had in mind a folk etymology that related 
buoch and boge,322 an association that resonates in Wolfram’s use of boge – gebouc 
(4.13) – boc – buoch throughout the book of Parzival. 
No one has ever adduced a rhyme or reason (or a reason other than the rhyme) 
for the enigmatic boc (billy-goat) and ulmiger stoc (rotting tree-trunk) that close 
Wolfram’s bow-metaphor. At first, they appear to be rhyming non-sequiturs, far-flung 
examples of the kind of insensate creatures and objects to which it would be fruitless 
to address a tale. On closer inspection, however, they appear to belong as well to 
Wolfram’s pervasive codical metaphor. The play on buoch is perhaps registered as a 
pun on boc (NHG Bock: Eng. billy-goat) (241.29). Phonetically, boc also calls to mind 
MHG buoche (NHG Buche; Eng. beech tree), which in Jacobsonian323 fashion calls to 
mind the forthcoming image of the stoc or tree-trunk in the following line. In addition, 
a stoc, senewe, and the skin of a boc would have all been familiar implements in the 
                                                
321 OE Boga: folded parchment [cf. Ger. bogen] :-- Cine quaternio, boga diploma, Wrt. Voc. i. 75, 12. 
(Supplement to An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary by T. Northcote Toller, 192, 100). 
322 MHG buoch or buch or  (dim.) buchl is also used for an unbound fascicle, a "booklet.” buoch in this 
sense is attested in medieval library lists and also in MHG text titles where it refers to the booklet 
format of the text. I owe this information, with thanks, to Sarah Westphal-Wihl (personal 
correspondence). 
323 Cf. Roman Jacobson, Lectures on Sound & Meaning (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1937). 
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production of vellum, from which the bogen of the medieval book were made. 
In this illustration, the skin of a goat (boc) is stretched 
on a frame (stoc) by a series of strings (senewe) in the 
process of turning a boc into a buoch. Thus, the 
seemingly inexplicable ulmiger stoc (“rotting tree-
trunk”) could refer to the besmirched stretching frame 
of medieval vellum production—a messy and 
olfactorily repugnant process. 324 
            Wolfram’s tale may indeed literally have been 
Ilustration 4                                 “received by a billy-goat” (daz ez noch paz vernæme       
ein boc, 241.29), assuming it was first written on vellum made from goat skin, which 
would have first been prepared on an ulmiger stoc.325 Thus the grande finale of 
Wolfram’s bow-metaphor excursus is bound together with his earlier deliberations on 
the status of Parzival as a “book,” which Wolfram famously denies: 
 
swer aber dem sîn maere schiuzet, 
des in durch nôt verdriuzet: 
wan daz hât dâ ninder stat, 
und vil gerûmeclîchen pfat, 
zeinem ôren în, zem andern für. 
mîn arbeit ich gar verlür, 
op den mîn maere drunge: 
ich sagte oder sunge, 
daz ez noch paz vernaeme ein boc 
odr ein ulmiger stoc. (241.21-30) 
 
[If someone, however, shoots his tale at a man who is perforce disgruntled by 
it – for it has no staying-place there, and a very roomy path – in one ear, out 
the other – I’d be altogether wasting my toil, if my tale were to press itself 
upon him. Whatever I said or sang, it would be better received by a billy-goat – 
or a rotting tree-trunk.] 
 
                                                
324 “Here, the skin of a stillborn goat, prized for its smoothness, is stretched on a modern frame to 
illustrate the parchment making process.”  http://www.getty.edu/art/exhibitions/making/ 8/5/2009. 
325 The blood of a boc can melt the adamant of which Gahmuret’s helmet is made. 
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The implication seems to be that if oral transmission (sagen and singen) and aural 
reception (vernemen) fail, Wolfram would be better off committing his tale to a 
vellum skin (boc) and hence one of the much-maligned books of his earlier 
analphabetic rant (115,21-30). In addition, since classical times the boge of paper 
would have been known in Latin as a plagula.326 Latin plagula sounds like the 
(etymologically unrelated) MHG plâgen, “to afflict, oppress,” which, in turn, is very 
close to the verdriezen of 241.22. In preparation for binding, the gatherings would 
have been placed into a lying press and pressed (cf. drunge 241.27) before being sewn 
together.327 
 The most direct evidence for the association of boge and buoch is provided by 
the encyclopedic tradition itself. Wolfram’s specific debts to Isidore of Seville are well 
documented.328 According to Isidore, the word codex derives from a metaphor based 
on the “trunk” (codex/caudex) or what Wolfram calls the stoc of a tree.329  
 
Codex multorum librorum est; liber unius voluminis. Et dictus codex per 
translationem a codicibus arborum seu vitium, quasi caudex, quod ex se 
multitudinem librorum quasi ramorum contineat.330 
 
[A codex is composed of many books; a book is of one scroll. It is called a 
codex (codex) by way of metaphor from the trunks (codex) of trees or vines, as 
if it were a wooden stock (caudex, i.e., an older form of the word codex), 
                                                
326 Grimms’ Deutsches Wörterbuch: “9) böge papier, plagula, eigentlich gebognes, gefaltetes, 
zusammengelegtes papier.” Also “Bogenpapyr / plagula, ein Bogen in Quart / quaternio chartae” in the  
“Index V. Germanico-Latinus” to Michael Pexenfelder, Apparatus Eruditionis tam rerum quam 
verborum per omnes artes et scientias, 4th ed., Sulzbach: Martin Endter, 1704.  
327 Wayne Harbert offers verbal evidence that Wolfram possessed detailed knowledge of at least one 
other esoteric technical art, namely blacksmithing, cf. “Some Technical Notes on Parzival’s ‘Leaded’ 
Sword,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen, 91 (1990), 1-7. 
328 Groos (1995), cf. 28, 153, 158. Herbert Kolb, “Isidorische ‘Etymologien’ im Parzival,” Wolfram-
Studien, 1 (1970), 117-135. 
329 Similarly Hrabanus Maurus, De universo: “Codex multorum librorum est, liber unius uoluminis, et 
dictus codex per translationem a codicibus arborum seu uitium quasi caudex quod ex se multitudinem 
librorum quasi ramorum contineat” (ch. 5.5, “de opusculorum diuersitate”). Transcription of Karlsruhe, 
Badische Landesbibliothek, MS Augiensis 96 and 68.  
330 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), 
VI.xiii.1, 142. 
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because it contains in itself a multitude of books, as if it were branches.331]  
Isidore also associates the word for the archer’s arrow-case (teca) with the library or 
biblioteca (363):332  
De faretris. Faretra sagittarum theca, a ferendo iacula dicta . . . 2 Coriti proprie 
sunt arcuum thecae, sicut sagittarum faretrae . . . 3 Teca ab eo quod aliquid 
receptum tegat, C littera pro G posita. Alii Graeco nomine thecam vocari 
adserunt, quod ibi reponatur aliquid. Inde et bibliotheca librorum repositio 
dicitur.333 
 
[A quiver (faretra, i.e. pharetra) is a case [theca] for arrows, so named for its 
“carrying” darts . . . 2. Coriti are properly cases for bows, as quivers are for 
arrows . . . 3. A case (teca, i.e. theca), so named because it covers (tegere) 
whatever is held in it, with the letter c put for g. Others claim that theca is from 
a Greek word, because something is stored there – whence a storage place for 
books is called a bibliotheca.334] 
 
Thus, there is a precedent in the primary source of the medieval encyclopedic tradition 
for the association of arrows (“daz diu senewe jaget,” 241.11) and books, tree-trunks 
(241.30) and codices,335 all of which Wolfram combines in an encyclopedic synthesis 
in the image of the boge. Ultimately, we are left with  an elaborate series of puns 
based on the techniques of manuscript production, from the pen of an allegedly 
illiterate author. 
The image of the bow spans the tale of Parzival’s quest (241.1-30-805.14.15). 
What comes before and after is preface and postscript. The presence of the “bent” 
bow-metaphor at the beginning and end of Parzival’s travails is suggestive not only of 
the archer’s bow but also the bending-back-on-itself of the Bogen (quire) on which it 
                                                
331 Isidore of Seville. The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, ed. W.J. Lewis, Steven A. Barney, J.A. 
Beach, Oliver Berghof (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 142. 
332 Cf. Hrabanus: “Theca ab eo quod aliquid receptum tegat. C litera pro G posita alii Greco nomine 
thecam uocaro asserunt, quod ibi reponatur aliquid, inde et bibliotheca librorum repositio dicitur” (Book 
20.9, “de faretris”). 
333 Etymologiae, XVIII.vii.1-3. 
334 Etymologies, 363. 
335 A liber according to Isidore (XVII.vi.16) refers not only to a “book” but to the inner part of the bark 
of a tree, so called from its being “released” (liberare), i.e, set apart as a kind of medium between the 
bark and the wood. 
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is written. The bow as martial-literary metaphor is invoked even earlier, in the 
following passage: 
 
hiest der âventiure wurf gespilt      
und ir bogen336 ist gezilt,      
wande er ist alrêst geborn,      
dem diz maere wart erkorn. (112,9-12) 
 
A great deal of manuscript variance in this passage suggests its problematic status in 
scribal transmission.337 Most manuscripts have a variant of begin (beginning) instead 
of bogen, but there is an argument to be made for the early variant “bogen” of 
Fragment 33 (Hs. Gs), which is clearly the lectio difficilior.338 The earliest Parzival 
manuscripts do not much predate the mid-thirteenth century. Dating from the end of 
the thirteenth century, Fragment 33 (Hs. Gs) is one of the oldest Parzival manuscripts; 
only three of the 16 complete manuscripts can be said to be older.339 MHG zilen 
commonly means to set a boundary (zil) or marking, and gradually acquires the sense 
of aiming at such a mark, as with a lance or by shooting at a target, as is clear from 
Wolfram’s own usage in Parzival: 
 
sîn tjost hin wider wart gezilt (288.22) 
 
er truoc drî tjoste durch den schilt, 
mit heldes handen dar gezilt (300.3-4) 
 
ein tjost durch sînen êrsten schilt 
mit hurtes poynder dar gezilt (349.16-17) 
 
wie stêt ein tjost durch mînen schilt, 
                                                
336 Fr. 33 (Hs. Gs) Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. germ. fol. 1394 (früher Bad 
Berleburg, Sayn-Wittgensteinsche Schloßbibl., ohne Signatur); Wolfram von Eschenbach. Wolfram von 
Eschenbach, ed. Albert Leitzmann, 1.-3. Heft: Parzival, 6th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1959-1961).  
337 With reference to manuscripts listed in Lachman (6th ed., pp. xxvii-xlviii) we find the following 
variants: begin* begind o, beginnens G I (L) R T, begynnes M (O Q), beginne(n) U (V W), begen Z, 
bogen Fr33. 
338 Emanuel Tov, “Criteria for Evaluating Textual Readings: The Limitations of Textual Rules,” The 
Harvard Theological Review, 75 (1982), 429-448, especially 439ff. 
339 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, ed. Karl Lachmann, 6th rev. ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 
xxvii-xlviii. 
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mit sîner hende dar gezilt (355.5-8) 
 
dâ sach er blicken einen schilt: 
dâ was ein tjoste durch gezilt (504.9-10) 
 
zilen applies not only to tjoste (jousts) but also projectile weaponry like spears, as in 
Dietrichs Flucht (9455 – 9461): 
 
ez wart durch halsperc und durch schilt 
die scharphen gêre gezilt. 
Und ir bogen ist gezilt is hence a double metaphor; it refers not only to 
Wolfram’s martial calling (the “schildes ambt”) but also to the arena of literary 
production and the technology of the book. Not only does it refer to the aiming of the 
bow at its target (zil), but also to the demarking (zilen) of a new section manuscript 
page (boge): “and its bow is aimed / and its page is marked.” 
 The bow-metaphor is bound up with the technology of the book in other ways 
as well. From at least the twelfth century 
the stitching was done with the help of a 
sewing frame that is remarkably 
reminiscent of the archer’s weapon in  
Illustration 6 
Illustration 5 
appearence.340 The frame is a wooden  
contraption, rather like a gate, which  
stands upright on the bench. The bands  
for the spine are tied to it vertically, 
                                                
340 Szirmai, 140. 
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suspended from the top and bottom of the frame. The first gathering of the manuscript 
is placed on the bench with its spine up against these taut bands and is sewn through 
its centre and around the bands. Then the next gathering is placed on top, tapped down 
with a block of wood to keep the result firm and tight, and is sewn around the bands, 
and so on, one after the other, until all 
the book is there lashed by its spine to 
the frame.341 
Illustration 7 
“zeinem ôren în, zem andern für” 
(241.25) could likewise refer to       Illustration 8 
contemporary  bookbinding techniques. MHG ôr could refer to the sewing holes made 
in the quire prior to biding, which would have either been pierced with an awl or the 
sewing needle itself, prior to stitching “in one ear, out the other.”342 The sewing needle 
itself has an œr (NHG Öhr), literally, an earlike small ovular opening on the head of 
                                                
341 Cf. Jonathan J.G. Alexander, Medieval Illuminators and Their Methods of Work (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1992); David Bland, A History of Book Illustration: the Illuminated 
Manuscript and the Printed Book (London: Faber, 1969); Giulia Bologna, Illuminated Manuscripts: 
The Book Before Gutenberg (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); Michelle P Brown, 
Understanding Illuminating Manuscripts: A Guide to Technical Terms (London: The J. Paul Getty 
Museum and The British Library Board, 1994); David Diringer, The Illuminated Book: Its History and 
Production (London: Faber, 1967); Geoffrey Ashall Glaister, An Encyclopedia of the Book: Terms Used 
in Paper-Making, Printing, Bookbinding and Publishing (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1960); 
Christopher de Hamel, Medieval Craftsmen: Scribes and Illuminators (London: British Museum Press, 
1992); Ludwig Brade and Emil Winckler, Das illustrierte Buchbinderbuch (Leipzig: Wilhelm Knapp, 
1860). Illustrations from Abigail B. Quandt and William G. Noel, “From Calf to Codex,” Leaves of 
Gold: Manuscript Illumination from Philadelphia Collections, eds., James R Tanis et al. (Philadelphia: 
Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2001). 
342 Szirmai, 142. 
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the sewing needle, through which the thread is secured.343 
The esoteric codex-metaphor is bound up with the overt images of military 
technology, thus addressing the dual nature of Wolfram’s role as knight and poet, and 
transmitter of clerical culture to the secular laity. Wolfram’s “tree-trunk” or stoc 
(241.30) may also refer to the stoc (NHG Stock) of a crossbow. The female 
counterpart of a boc or billy-goat is a nanny-goat or MHG geiss; in NHG a Geißfuß is 
spanning mechanism for a crossbow, and stoc can refer to the “stock” or the long 
wooden shaft on which the firing mechanism is mounted. The bow of the primitive 
crossbow was attached to the stock by a bridle of sinew.344 (Since a traditional bow is 
not mounted on a stock, Wolfram’s range of linguistic associations raises the question 
as to whether his famous bow-metaphor should perhaps be renamed “Wolfram’s 
crossbow-metaphor.”)345 Wolfram’s bow-metaphor is surprisingly “flexible” indeed if 
we factor in these codicological terms in addition to the palpable surface meaning of 
“bow-and-arrow.” The senewe which binds the sheets is straight or sleht even though 
the bogen themselves fold in on themselves on a curve. Thus although each leaf of 
vellum bends both forwards and backwards in on itself, they bring daz diu senewe 
jaget (that which the sinew chases), the arrow or story itself, hurling forwards at all 
times. Both the archer’s weapon and medieval (and modern) book consist of bent 
“bows” held under tension by a taut string or sinew. In both cases the sinew or string 
is straight (sleht), while the bow is, by definition, bent. Bending a bow becomes an 
image for opening a book. The gatherings or quires (bogen) were ordered in their 
proper sequence and sewn together onto cords or leather thongs (sinewe) that served as 
supports. Once the sewing was finished, the ends of the supports were laced through 
                                                
343 Öhr, das; -[e]s, -e [mhd.  r(e), ahd. ori, eigtl. = ohrartige Öffnung]: kleines [längliches] Loch am 
oberen Ende der Nähnadel zum Durchziehen des Fadens ( Duden). 
344 Ralph Payne-Gallwey, The Book of the Cross-Bow (1903; rpt., Mineola, NY: Dover, 1995), 66. 
345 Wolfram uses the armbrust (crossbow) as an image for the lover's swollen breast (36.1) in the 
Gahmuret episode. 
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channels carved into the wooden boards that formed the front and back covers of the 
book.346 Thus the medieval codex, both in its basic physical structure and the 
vocabulary of its production, can be shown to be roughly homologous to the archer’s 
bow.  
The production of the medieval book was overseen by the armarius or master 
scribe.347 Both aurally and on the written page, there is not much difference between 
the armarius (master scribe) and the arcarius (archer) of medieval Latin.348 The near-
pun is curious, to say the least. Through the metaphor of the bow, Wolfram playfully 
hints at his knowledge of the production of the written books he professes not to be 
able to read. When Wolfram claims that his story proceeds “âne bogen” (without a 
bow) he refers not only to the “bow” of the present metaphor but also to the status of 
his narrative as a book and his earlier claim that the tale proceeds “âne der buoche 
stiure” (without the guidance of books). Wolfram’s covert indebtedness to the 
metaphorics of the book is no less than Dante’s overt use of codicological imagery, as 
when he famously sees the entire universe in the image of a bound encyclopedic 
gathering of the scattered pages of the world book: “legato con amore in un volume, 
ciò che per l’universo si squaderna” (Paradiso XXXIII, 85-87). 
 
“schildes ambet ist mîn art.” 
The image of the bow/book is an apt symbol of the warrior/poet who officiates 
in the schildes ambt (“the shield’s office”). “[S]childes ambt” (115,11) is an aptly 
flexible coinage, for it can combine the notions of martial service (schild) with 
                                                
346 Cf. Michelle B. Brown, Understanding Illuminated Manuscripts: A Guide to Technical Terms (Los 
Angeles: Getty Museum, 1994). Christopher De Hamel, Medieval Craftsmen: Scribes and Illuminators 
(London: British Museum, 1992). 
347 William Whobrey, “Bookmading and Production,” Medieval Germany: An Encyclopedia, Routledge 
Encyclopedias of the Middle Ages (New York: Garland, 2001), 70. 
348 Arcuarius in Classical Latin. Such Latin wordplay is a common feature in medieval discussions of 
grammatica. See Suzanne Reynolds, Medieval Reading: Grammar, Rhetoric and the Classical Text 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 6, esp. 85-87. 
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religious office (ambt), which together constitute Wolfram’s authorial self-
construction in Parzival. Wolfram turns a metaphor for the relation of the Old and 
New Testaments based on military technology into a metaphor for the operation of his 
text. He furthermore “bends” this overt military metaphor into a covert codical-literary 
metaphor which would only have been understood by a small elite—an elite to which 
Wolfram hereby signals his membership. Wolfram thus points his audience towards 
the vast literacy underlying his allegedly illiterate-martial persona.  
Ambt/Ambet and its variants are commonly used to refer to both the mass and 
other sacraments (“gotes ambt”) on the one hand,349 and duties, responsibilities, 
station in life, or position of political power on the other.350 Succinct examples of both 
senses of ambt are found in Hartmann von Aue’s Iwein:  
 
“mahtû mich danne wizzen lân,      
waz crêatiure bistû?"     
“ein man, als dû gesihest nû.”      
“nû sage mir waz dîn ambet sî.” 
 
[“Tell me, what sort of creature are you?” “A man as you now see.” “Now tell 
me what your station is” (my trans.).]  
 
(Iwein, 486 – 492) 
 
ir tôten truogen sî hin      
ze münster, dâ manz ambet tete 
 
[They carried their dead to the cathedral where the sacrament was performed.] 
 
(Iwein, 1411 – 1412)   
                                                
349 Cf. Barlaam und Josaphat, 15550, 5572; Alexander (Rudolf. von Ems.), 5393, 9924; 
Deutschenspiegel, p. 11, ch 3, par. 4, line 6; p.14, ch. 4, par. 2, line 15; p. 198, ch. 107, par. 21, line 8; 
Der guote Gêrhart, 5069; Gauriel von Muntabel, 2326; Der Renner, 9, 795, 2793, 7759; Der Heilige 
Ulrich, 1424; Der Jüngere Titurel, 391,4; Silvester, 556; Der Schlegel, 896; Tristan und Isold, 15638, 
15652; Wigalois, der Ritter mit dem Rade, 4385; Wilhelm von Wenden, 6867, 8172; Engeltaler 
Schwesternbuch, p. 32, line 11,23. “Amt” is used in this archaic sense in Wagner’s Parsifal. 
350 Cf. Tristan und Isold, 3322, 4756; Der Trojanische Krieg, 181, 20455; Wolfdietrich (Hs. A), 193,3: 
223,2; Engeltaler Schwesternbuch, 27, Zeile 5-6; Der Renner, 7392, 15154; Seifrits Alexander, 3897; 
Kaiserchronik (Anhang 2), 371-377; “daz heilige ampt” and variants thereof occur eighty times in 
Priester Konrad. 
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The only approximations of Wolfram’s “schildes ambt” are found in the poetry of 
Ulrich von Liechtenstein and Thomasin von Zerklaere, which post-date Wolfram. 
Thomasin speaks of “rîters ambet” in the Der welsche Gast.351 Parzival was almost 
certainly complete before Der welsche Gast, which is dated to 1215-1216. Ulrich says 
that his ampt is “ritterlich.”352 Ambt is thus a word with a foot in both worlds—the 
Here and the Beyond, the secular and the sacred.353 The “schildes ambt” hence 
authorizes Wolfram to dispense salvation in a secular (in the strict sense of non-
                                                
351 Der welsche Gast, 7772-7784:   
 
Jâ hât der gouch wol den sin, 
ob man im ein schellen bint zem vuoz,   
daz er si hin tragen muoz.  
Swer wil rîters ambet phlegen,  
der muoz mêre arbeit legen    
an sîne vuor dan ezzen wol:      
mêr ze tuon er haben sol 
danne tragen schoene gewant     
und varen swingent sîne hant.     
Der mac niht rîters ambet phlegen,      
der niht enwil wan samfte leben.      
Swelich man müezec ist,      
der ist unmüezec zaller vrist. 
 
352 Frauendienst, 757,1-4:   
 
Diu minen ampt sint ritterlich      
und sint doch da bi chumberlich;      
ez mac vil wol ein amtman min      
verliesen al die ere sin. 
 
353 This split between between the two senses of secular or sacred office and station in life is exploited 
to comic effect, as in the following two examples:  
 
Tristan, der niuwe spilman,      
sin niuwez ambet huober an. 
  
[Tristan, the newly-made musician, began his new official duties.] (Tristan und Isold, 3566-
3567)  
 
man sol ez dem boesen tavernære      
lân, wan ez ir ambet ist      
daz si schallent zaller vrist.   
 
[One should leave evil tavern-goers to their own devices, because it is their office in life to act 
like fools at all times.] (Der welsche Gast, 340-342)   
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clerical) tale told to a secular audience. Considering Wolfram’s earlier description of 
his own knighthood as the “schildes ambt,” by combining the languages of martial 
society and holy office, the metaphor of the boge—both the bow of the arcarius and 
the boge of the armarius—simultaneously invokes the spheres of an illiterate secular 
knightly class and of clerically-educated literary production, both of which Wolfram 
straddles in Parzival.  Thus in the coinage “schildes ambt,” Wolfram’s philology 
recapitulates both his audience’s and his own ontology. This novel conception of 
knighthood as a holy office is made all the more evident by reference in Latin sources 
to the Grail as a “scutella” or little shield, diminutive of Latin scutum, which was also 
part of the knight’s “office.”354 Wolfram thus combines the originally competing ideas 
of martial service and religious devotion in a way parallel with but—given his 
ecumenical-encyclopedic vision of heathen and Christian—counter to the 
contemporary ideology of the crusades.  
 
Don’t Call him Ishmael! 
Finally, the bow-metaphor relates directly to the typology of heathen and 
Christian evident in the relationship of the Christian Parzival and his heathen half-
brother Feirefiz. James V. Schall, in a review of Ronald’s Murphy’s recent book 
reading Parzival as a plaidoyer against the fratricide of the crusades, invokes the 
figures of Romulus and Remus, Cain and Abel, Eteolcles and Plynices, Ishmael and 
Isaac, and Parzival and Feirefiz as examples of the theme of fraternal struggle.355 
Helen Adolf states that Wolfram “symbolizes East and West in the figures of two 
                                                
354 Jean Frappier, “Perceval or Le Conte du Gral,” in The Grail: A Casebook, ed. Dhira B. Mahoney 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 185. 
355 James V. Schall., S.J, “The Holy Grail: At the Liturgical Center of the Universe,” Telos, 140 (2007), 
177-187, cf. 180. 
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brothers and he divides the blessings of the Grail Castle between them.” 356  Feirefiz, 
she notes, like Ishmael, is the elder brother, but likewise born out of wedlock. Adolf 
recognizes this parallel between Feirefiz and Ishmael, which even a religiously-
minded critic like Murphy misses. However, more fundamental parallels between the 
line of Gahmuret and the line of Abraham have gone uncommented.  
According to Genesis 16, Ishmael was the son of the patriarch Abraham by the 
Egyptian handmaiden Hagar. When Abraham's supposedly barren wife Sarah finally 
bore Isaac, a rivalry developed between Sarah and Hagar and thus between the two 
half brothers, Isaac and Ishmael. Cast out into the wilderness, Ishmael was the 
ancestor of the nomadic Arabian Ishmaelites, arranged, like the Israelites, into twelve 
tribes. It is because Islam traces its lineage from Abraham through Ishmael and 
Judaism and Christianity trace their lineages through Isaac that Muslims, Jews, and 
Christians are all referred to as the spiritual “children of Abraham.” 
In frame story one hears the prolonged echoes of a story and genre 
considerably more ancient than Chrétien’s Perceval. The figures of Wolfram’s tale 
line up quite neatly with their Old Testament antecedents: the patriarch Gahmuret as 
Abraham; Belcane as the foreign woman, Hagar; the first-born Feirefiz as Ishmael; 
and Parzival, the destined heir to the Grail, as Abraham’s heir Isaac. Feirefiz takes a 
wife from the foreign land of “Tribalibot,” just as Ishmael takes a wife from Egypt. 
And yet the two narratives do not line up precisely. Both Parzival and Feirefiz 
are born without their father’s knowledge; their mothers, Herzeloyde and Belcane are 
never direct rivals like Sarah and Hagar (although they do rival for Gahmuret’s 
affection, and he abandons one for the other); unlike Ishmael, Feirefiz does eventually 
come to share in his brother’s inheritance—indeed, the story of how he comes to do so 
                                                
356 Helen Adolf, “Christendom and Islam in the Middle Ages: New Light on ‘Grail Stone’ and ‘Hidden 
Host,’” Speculum, 32 (1957), 103-115, cf. 113. 
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is perhaps more central to the meaning of Parzival than the Grail quest itself, which 
appears to be a mere precondition for this reconciliation. We would do well to keep in 
mind Jean Danielou’s statement on the nature of all typology: “Equally with the 
parallelism, the narrative brings out the differences, the essential distinction between 
type and reality.”357 Isaac “receives the inheritance, to the exclusion of his elder 
brother, born of a slave girl.”358 Wolfram, by contrast, brings Ishmael-Feirefiz back 
into his father’s inheritance, and gives him a new wife. There is repetition, but— 
critically—there is difference. 
Hitherto unnoted, the parallelism between the fraternal pairs is reinforced by 
the centrality to both narratives of the image of the bow: 
 
14 So Abraham rose up in the morning, and taking bread and a bottle of water, 
put it upon [Hagar’s] shoulder, and delivered the boy, and sent her away. And 
she departed, and wandered in the wilderness of Bersabee. 15 And when the 
water in the bottle was spent, she cast the boy under one of the trees that were 
there. 16 And she went her way, and sat over against him a great way off as far 
as a bow can carry, for she said: I will not see the boy die: and sitting over 
against, she lifted up her voice and wept. 17 And God heard the voice of the 
boy: and an angel of God called to Hagar from heaven, saying: What art thou 
doing, Hagar? fear not: for God hath heard the voice of the boy, from the place 
wherein he is. 18 Arise, take up the boy, and hold him by the hand: for I will 
make him a great nation. 19 And God opened her eyes: and she saw a well of 
water, and went and filled the bottle, and gave the boy to drink. 20 And God 
was with him: and he grew, and dwelt in the wilderness, and became a young 
man, an archer. 21 And he dwelt in the wilderness of Pharan, and his mother 
took a wife for him out of the land of Egypt. 
[14 surrexit itaque Abraham mane et tollens panem et utrem aquae inposuit 
scapulae eius tradiditque puerum et dimisit eam quae cum abisset errabat in 
solitudine Bersabee 15 cumque consumpta esset aqua in utre abiecit puerum 
subter unam arborum quae ibi erant 16 et abiit seditque e regione procul 
quantum potest arcus iacere dixit enim non videbo morientem puerum et 
sedens contra levavit vocem suam et flevit 17 exaudivit autem Deus vocem 
pueri vocavitque angelus Domini Agar de caelo dicens quid agis Agar noli 
timere exaudivit enim Deus vocem pueri de loco in quo est 18 surge tolle 
puerum et tene manum illius quia in gentem magnam faciam eum 19 
                                                
357 Jean Danielou, S.J, From Shadows to Reality. Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers 
(London: Burnes and Oats, 1960), 120. 
358 Ibid. 
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aperuitque oculos eius Deus quae videns puteum aquae abiit et implevit utrem 
deditque puero bibere 20 et fuit cum eo qui crevit et moratus est in solitudine et 
factus est iuvenis sagittarius 21 habitavitque in deserto Pharan et accepit illi 
mater sua uxorem de terra Aegypti.]  
At the beginning of Parzival’s tale (241.1-30, 805.14-15), the image of the bow marks 
a transition from a state of joy to woe (when Parzival fails to ask the redeeming 
question), and at the end of his tale the same image marks a transition from a state of 
woe (the discovery of the dead Sigune) to a state of joy (the final journey to 
Munsalvæsche) occassioned by Parzival and Feirefiz, respectively. The transition from 
woe to joy is indeed original to the Old Testament narrative, in which God reveals to 
Hagar that he will not let Ishmael die, but rather make him the progenitor of “a great 
nation.” The image of the bow in Book 16 of Parzival also immediately precedes a 
narrative turn towards the salvation of Parzival’s half-brother, Feirefiz, just as it 
precedes the salvation of Isaac’s half-brother, Ishmael. The image of the bow not only 
contains within it the image of the book, but also the basic structure of all typology, 
which Wolfram, in line with but in excess of any theological precedent, mobilizes in 
an attempt to reconcile the two rival brothers—one heathen, the other Christian—just 
as his encyclopedic book attempts to reconcile their sibling traditions.359 
 
 
 
 
                                                
359 If Wolfram's bow is indeed a crossbow, I would note that this weapon, like Biblical typology itself, 
is an instrument whose only permitted use is by Christians against heathens:  In 1139, Pope Innocent II 
condemned and forbade the use of the crossbow by Christians against Christians, saying that this 
weapon is “deathly and hateful to God and unfit to be used among Christians.” Heathens, on the other 
hand, were fair game. 
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EPILOGUE: From Knowledge to Knowing (and Back) 
The reorganization of knowledge in the age of Wikipedia, Google, and their 
kin points to a fundamental change in the technology and techniques of the storage 
and retrieval of cultural information. Fast, convenient access to cut-and-paste clusters 
of scattered cultural pasts is only the latest expression of an encyclopedic impulse that 
can be documented as far back as the invention of the codex itself. 
As opposed to the scroll, the codex enabled quicker access to information by 
favoring the primacy of discrete units (numbered pages, paragraphs, etc.) over a 
narrative flow that could only be scrolled up or down. The apparatus of the codex, 
which furthered the work of forgetting fostered by writing itself,360 has in Google et 
al. an assemblage of heirs (e.g., the “links,” “bookmarks,” and “favorites”) which 
come from the same family of short-cuts, indexes, and cross-references. The 
encyclopedic literatures that have been the subject of this dissertation are the product 
of an attempt to reconcile the encyclopedic and the narrative impulse, which—
theretofore and since—have remained fundamentally estranged.  
The glossaries of late-Antiquity, medieval exempla, maxims, proverbs, 
aphorisms, and dictionary entries split knowledge into smaller units. Modernity and its 
technologies of information, from Gutenberg to Gates, have resulted in the further 
articulation of such units in comprehensive assemblages (e.g., the Adagia of Erasmus, 
L’Encyclopédie, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Le Grand Robert, Wikipedia, etc.). Since 
late antiquity, encyclopedism has been a movement away from narrative and towards 
the storage and retrieval of discrete units (statim invenire!), torn out of the context of 
their culture and its stories. But this was not always the case; nor is this movement 
                                                
360 “Writing is that forgetting of the self, that exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, 
of the Erinnerung that opens the history of the spirit.” Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, in Literary 
Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 317 
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dictated by any sort of inner necessity. 
In our era the encyclopedist has been replaced by the casual “surfer” and the 
aptly named “browser.” To sort out the melancholy generated by the disappearance of 
the encyclopedist from the enthusiasm that quickens the net-surfer’s rapid mouse-
clicks would require a complete discussion of historical personages and episodes far 
afield from the long thirteenth century of this study. An incomplete list would include 
Isidore of Seville, Alanus ab Insulis, Baltasar Gracián, the eighteenth-century 
encyclopedic works, Kant, the age of grand projects—Hegel, the nineteenth-century 
Indo-Germanists and historiographers, Darwin, Marx—leading up to the work of 
fragmentation in the twentieth century, especially as seen in the works of Jorge Luis 
Borges and his literary and philosophical heirs.  
Such a project, if one were foolish (or slowly-wise?) enough to undertake it, 
might focus on the relations between practices of concentrating, collecting, and 
sampling information, and the status of cultural information (à la Benjamin and Eco) 
in various historical settings, including and beyond those discussed here. Such 
informational techniques entertain complex relationships with the framings of culture 
at different points in time, our era being typified by a generic techno-framing which 
has replaced the mythical and epic narratives that dominate older medieval and 
nostalgic modern ones. 
This study has aimed to show that the medieval encyclopedia—a privileged 
locus for the dialogue of such seeming irreconcilables as “heathen” and “Christian”—
served some of the most influential authors of the thirteenth century as a metaphoric 
frame-of-reference that mediated a broader set of binary oppositions at the heart of 
their own literatures, histories, myths, and ideologies: Latin and vernacular, sacred and 
secular, courtly and clerical, foreign and native. The anthropological situatedness of 
“Encyclopedic Literature” allowed such authors to formulate a new literary discourse 
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of knowledge, whose status was distinct from the static and dislocated state of 
knowledge in the encyclopedia per se. This novel form of narrative “knowing” 
belongs to that bygone episteme of mythical and epic narratives, which receded in the 
face of the increasingly fragmented nature of encyclopedic knowledge from early 
modernity to the present. 
The writers of encyclopedic literature of the thirteenth century thus appear as 
the great aberration in the cultural history of Western encyclopedism. Dante, Snorri, 
and Wolfram attempt—against the grain of their classical forerunners and modern 
heirs—to reforge a fragmented, shattered knowledge in the crucible of its creation—in 
narrative. All three would lead us from knowledge to knowing: a knowledge that is 
always for whom and for what; one that answers the first ontological question of 
Judeo-Christian culture: “ubi es?” where are you—not the web-surfer’s, reference 
librarian’s, or archivist’s question: “ubi est?” where is it? Subsequent history, 
including that of our own post-humanist age, has led us back—for the time being—
from knowing to mere knowledge. 
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